Asia Rights

Journal of Human Rights, Media and Society in Asia and the Pacific

Archive for August, 2012


Posted in News on August 26th, 2012

On 24 August 2012, Osaka Mayor Hashomoto Toru tweeted at length on the subject of the so-called ‘comfort women’.

There are many sources of informed discussion on the ‘comfort women’ issue. These include

– the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Radhika Coomaraswamy, 1996, available HERE

– the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Gay J. McDougall, 1998, available HERE

– Digital Museum – The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (containing many key documents on the issue) accessible HERE

– The the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, accessible HERE

– Yoshiko Nozaki, “The ‘Comfort Women’ Controversy: History and Testimony”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, available HERE

– The story of Jan Ruff O’Herne, outlined HERE

– C. Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008

-Toshiyuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the US Occupation, London and New York, Routledge, 2002.

– Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Comfort Women. Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, Asia Perspectives, translation: Suzanne O’Brien, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

An unofficial translation of Hashimoto Toru’s comments on the subject is given below.


Now we’re being abused by the Korean media about the military comfort women problem, right? And if you try to argue back in the Japanese media you get in terrible trouble, but, ah well, it can’t be helped. In the position of mayor of Osaka, a mere local government leader, I guess I shouldn’t touch national foreign policy, but I will make a statement as representative of One Osaka (Osaka Ishin no Kai) who thinks about problems of national politics.

This time when the issue was raised what I clearly understood is that the Japanese government’s logic about the 1993 Kono Statements needs to be sorted. In 2007, the Abe cabinet made an important cabinet resolution about the 1993 Kono Statement, which had admitted that military comfort women were subject to forcible recruitment (kyosei renko) by the Japanese state. In 2007 the Abe cabinet made a cabinet resolution that there was no evidence that comfort women were forcible recruited by the military or officials. That is the view of the Japanese government. I am a Japanese, so I stand by the view of the Japanese government. Besides, I am not a historian, so I’m not going to do the work of collecting historical documents to deliberately overturn the Japanese government’s cabinet resolution.

So what I’m saying is I want the Korean side to produce proof that they were forcibly recruited by the Japanese state. I’m not saying I absolutely don’t accept the statements of the Korean side, I’m saying show us the proof. Then Korean media comes back and says the Kōno Statement is the proof.  That’s complete tautology.

This is where Japanese nationals need to be properly aware, confront Korea and argue back. The 1993 Kono Statement ran away from this most important thing. That’s what destroyed Japan-Korea relations. This is the real responsibility of politicians. Fight it out verbally until you foam at the mouth. We need to think seriously about what the real issue is, and how far we should respect the position of the other side.

In the 2007 cabinet resolution, the Japanese government determined that there was no proof to support the 1993 Kono Statement. But in spite of that Korea says the Kono Statement is the proof of forced recruitment. We can’t leave the Kono Statement the way it is. It’s true that the Japanese army was involved in running comfort stations. These institutions were instituted because it was wartime. In contemporary society too brothels are publicly regulated. It was natural that comfort stations were publicly regulated from the point of view of hygiene and maintaining order.

The problem is, were comfort women forcible recruited against their will. That’s the number one point. But there is no proof of that on the Japanese side. Even when the Jeju Island media did a survey they couldn’t find anything to prove the fact that comfort women were forcibly recruited by the Japanese state. So I’m demanding that the Korean side provides proof. If there’s proof then there should be an apology. Forced recruitment can’t be justified by any arguments. But there isn’t yet any evidence that the Japanese state forcibly recruited comfort women.

This is separate from the question of sympathy for the comfort women. You’ve got to feel sympathy for the suffering people who became comfort women in all sorts of circumstances against their own will and experienced mental and physical suffering. It’s the same if you hear stories from Japanese people in the same circumstances. But [having to do something] against your own will and being forced is completely different.

The 1993 Kono Statement cheated us with the words ‘against their own will’. That’s the greatest responsibility of politicians. Does this mean it was against their own will, or does it mean that they were forced by the Japanese state? We have to make this clear. Of course we have to apologise if it was the latter. But now there isn’t any proof of this. That’s why I want the Korean side to produce it.

If it wasn’t forced, how do we understand the comfort stations in the circumstances of the time? Japan wasn’t the only place where there were comfort stations to protect military order, and the prostitution industry exists in every country of the world. It is certain that comfort stations and similar sorts of prostitution industry exist. The problem is, were the comfort women forcibly recruited. We have to confront Korea about that face to face.

Should the Japanese government leave things as they are when the Korean media says the Kono Statement is proof that comfort women were forcibly recruited etc.? How about the issue of reconciling this with the cabinet resolution of 2007 which said that there is no proof they were forcibly recruited? Japanese parliament and Foreign Ministry, get your act together!

But hey, I don’t think we should quarrel with our neighbours in nearby countries about this. If the root of it is the military comfort women issue, we should debate it face to face, and if there are facts we should apologize about, then we should apologize. If no facts emerge, then we shouldn’t apologize. This is where the Foreign Ministry gets politicians to give a pathetic excuse of an answer. The 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty of Basic Relations.

In times of problems like this, there’s no reason to communicate with the other party by giving a bureaucratic reply like, this was all settled by the 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty of Basic Relations. You know, when I was Governor [of Osaka] and my departments kept producing that kind of formulaic reply, I’d just hit it straight back to them all the time. That’s the sort of formal logic that the law courts use when handing down judgments. Person to person communication is banned. 

But bureaucrats just develop this sort of formulaic logic. If you say ‘it was all settled by the 1965 Japan-Korea Basic Treaty!’ you have no idea whether there was or wasn’t forcible recruitment, right? A typical bureaucratic response. Whatever it says in the Basic Treaty, we should debate face to face whether there was forcible recruitment. Until persuaded. If there really was forcible recruitment, then we should debate whether it was settled by the Treaty of Basic Relations. There is definitely a legal principle that if you don’t enter into discussion of topic of conflict to be reconciled, the search for reconciliation is ineffectual. So if you say it was all solved by the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations, that’s no solution. Politics is what corrects the logic of bureaucrats. 

Whatever the 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty of Basic Relations, we should confirm whether there was or wasn’t forcible recruitment of comfort women. If we made a cabinet resolution in 2007 that there was no evidence of forced recruitment, then there is nothing for it but to revise the Kono Statement. And ask the Korean side for proof of forcible recruitment other than the Kono Statement. If proof emerges, then we will think of including the 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty of Basic Relations in the frame. Bureaucrats find it easy to start with hair-splitting. That’s why they start with the 1965 Treaty. Politicians should start with the real essence of things. Because of the problem of Takeshima, the people of the nation have come to know the Japan Korea conflict to this extent. This is the best chance to solve the comfort women problem which is at the root of it. That’s real politics for you.

(The final paragraphs of the tweet, which deal with the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, have been omitted)


source: NET IB NEWS,



Posted in Japan on August 26th, 2012


Tessa Morris-Suzuki

Hopes and Dreams

They exist all over Japan, like tiny sparks of light, flickering and fragile, but somehow surviving against the odds: the peace museums, the reconciliation groups, the local history movements that work to address problems of historical responsibility neglected or denied by national politicians. As Kazuyo Yamane notes, according to a UN survey, Japan has the highest number of peace museums of any country in the world (Yamane 2009, xii). But the heritage created at grassroots by ordinary Japanese people is constantly under threat from the hostility of nationalist politicians and sections of the media: and never more so than today (see Chan 2008; Morris-Suzuki, Low, Petrov and Tsu 2012)

Among the sparks of light is Osaka’s Human Rights Museum, also known as Liberty Osaka. Founded in 1985, Liberty Osaka is Japan’s only human rights museum. It features displays on the history of hisabetsu buraku communities (groups subject to social discrimintation), the struggle for women’s rights, and the stories of minority groups such as the indigenous Ainu community and the Korean minority in Japan. An important aspect of the museum is its depiction of these groups, not as helpless victims of discrimination, but rather as active subjects who have helped to create the diversity and richness of Japanese history. By 2005 more than a million people had visited the Liberty Osaka (see the MUSEUM’s WEBSITE )

Today, the museum faces the threat of closure. The Osaka city government headed by mayor Hashimoto Toru has decided to halt its funding from next year, on the grounds that the museum displays are ‘limited to discrimination and human rights’ and fail to present children with an image of the future full of ‘hopes and dreams’ (Mainichi Shinbun 25 July 2012)

The ‘Restoration’ of Japan

Hashimoto’s own hopes and dreams for the future have recently been on prominent display. His Osaka Ishin no Kai (generally known in English as ‘One Osaka’, though literally meaning the ‘Osaka Restoration Association’)  has high hopes of gaining a substantial share of the seats up for grabs in Japan’s impending national election, and Hashimoto is being hailed by many as a future national leader – even as a national savior. A relatively young politician with a successful career in law and the media behind him, Hashimoto has succeeded in winning popular support by projecting the image of an action man unafraid of taking the tough decisions.

Like Prime Minister Koizumi in the early 2000s, Hashimoto combines personal charisma, budget-slashing economic neo-liberalism and hard-line political nationalism. But Hashimoto is Koizumi on steroids. His radical plans for reform would see Japan converted into a quasi-federal system with prime ministers directly elected in presidential style, along with massive reductions in welfare spending and voucher-based educational system. He is famous for remarking the Japan would benefit from becoming a dictatorship – a remark that most commentators have not taken as seriously as they should. His penchant for attracting attention by deliberately outrageous statements gives his role on the political stage an unstable and ugly edge that was entirely lacking from Koizumi’s cooler and suaver performances.

At a time when Japan’s political system is mired in factionalism and indecisiveness, bold words have popular appeal. Until recently, Hashimoto has shown considerable skill in mixing policies drawn from various parts of the ideological spectrum, so avoiding being easily pigeonholed in conventional political terms. Ever quick to spot an opportunity to boost his political appeal, he responded to mass demonstrations against nuclear power following the Fukushima no. 1 accident by hastily adding an anti-nuclear element to his agenda for a new Japan.

But as the election draws nearer, Hashimoto’s true colours become increasingly visible. He is now wooing the support of leading old-style nationalist Abe Shinzo, a scion of Japan’s conservative elite and one of the rather crowded field of very short-lived former Japanese prime ministers. (Abe’s tenure lasted precisely one year, from 26 September 2006 to 26 September 2007). Abe Shinzo, for his part, has expressed interest in working with Hashimoto to change Japan’s postwar peace constitution (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, evening edition, 25 August 2012).

History by Government Resolution: Foreign Policy by Tweet

Amidst political change and heightened international frictions in Northeast Asia, Hashimoto Toru has found it impossible to resist stirring the pot of nationalist divisiveness. On 10 August, outgoing South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s paid a provocative and self-serving visit the island of Dokdo/Takeshima, whose sovereignty is disputed between Japan and Korea. Two weeks later, Hashimoto responded in kind, playing the shop-soiled card of historical revisionism: a favoured weapon of right-wing politicians in need of some free publicity.

Using Twitter as his means of communication, Hashimoto chose this sensitive moment in Japan-Korea relations to denounce the Kono Statement: a key element in Japan’s search for reconciliation with its Asian neighbours.

In 1993, after the government had collected and studied extensive documentary evidence over a two year period, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei acknowledged that the  Japanese military had been responsible for forcibly recruiting Korean, Chinese and other ‘comfort women’ to work in wartime military brothels where they were subjected to extreme sexual abuse. Kono’s carefully worded statement of apology noted that brokers had often been used to recruit the women, but that in some cases Japanese soldiers or officials had carried out the recruitment themselves (For the text of the Kono Statement click HERE)

Fourteen years later, the Abe cabinet issued a partial retraction, denying that Japanese military or government officials had been personally involved in forcible recruitment of ‘comfort women’. This resolution not only ignored crucial parts of the available evidence, but also failed to answer the obvious question: how does the use of brokers (which no-one denies) diminish the moral responsibility of the Japanese state and army? Or, to put it more bluntly, does employing others to do your dirty work make it OK?

Hashimoto Toru’s analysis of this profoundly sensitive, painful and controversial issue is a long, rambling and totally uninformed series of tweets which runs in part as follows: ‘In 2007 the Abe cabinet made a cabinet resolution that there was no evidence that comfort women were forcible recruited by the military or officials. That is the view of the Japanese government. I am a Japanese, so I stand by the view of the Japanese government. Besides, I am not a historian, so I’m not going to do the work of collecting historical documents to deliberately overturn the Japanese government’s cabinet resolution.’ (for an unofficial translation of the tweets, which are recommended reading for anyone interested in the current state of Japanese politics, and further information, click HERE)

Hashimoto’s bright new Japan, it seems, will be a place where not only the country’s future but also the events of the past are decided by government resolution. George Orwell would have loved it.

Even without being a historian, though, Hashimoto might have recalled that the ‘comfort women’ fiasco was one of the less glorious moments of his would-be ally Abe Shinzo’s brief tenure as Prime Minister. Having pushed through the cabinet resolution, which caused considerable damage to Japan’s relations not only with South Korea and China but even with the United States, Prime Minister Abe then publicly  backed down, and repeatedly stated that his government intended after all to stand by the Kono Statement. He went on (bizarrely) to make a rather half-hearted apology, not to the victims themselves but to President George W. Bush, for any hurt caused to the ‘comfort women’ (Okinawa Times, 27 April 2007). Equally bizarrely, Bush solemnly accepted the apology.

Another Future is Possible

Hashimoto politics poses a dilemma for his critics. This is not politics by persuasion but politics by performance. The object of the current performance is obvious. It is to provoke impassioned counter-attacks, preferably from those who can be labeled left-wing and foreign – best of all from those who can be labeled Korean or Chinese nationalists. This will then allow Hashimoto to assume the ‘moral high ground’ as a martyred nationalist hero assailed by ‘anti-Japanese’ forces. In responding to Hashimoto-style politweets, it is important not to act out his predetermined scenario. But it is equally important that the considerable number of relatively sensible people who have seen Hashimoto as a possible beacon of hope for Japan should recognise what sort of person they are dealing with.

More broadly, the Hashimoto phenomenon can be placed in the context of the current political instability in Northeast Asia as a whole. A presidential election is imminent in South Korea; a change of leadership is underway in China; and an untested new leader in power in North Korea. All of this magnifies the uncertainties created by the massive disaffection from the mainstream parties in post-disaster Japan. It is from this context of change and anxiety that the resurgence of territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Takeshima/ Dokdo, as well as of nationalist rhetoric such as Hashimoto’s, emerges.

This makes a careful and considered response to the Hashimoto phenomenon particularly important. Above all, this phenomenon should not be ‘nationalised’. Hashimoto does not speak for Japan, and to condemn Japan because of his comments would only be to boost his demagogic appeal. The best reply from those who hope he never will speak for Japan is to allow his words to speak for themselves. Those outside Japan who are alarmed or offended by these words should seek out and lend support to the embattled peace, human rights and reconciliation groups in Japan which also seek a different future, so that their voices too may be heard at the national level.

Japan urgently needs political renewal and hope. But this is not going to be achieved by replacing the dull faces of traditional party politics with an egocentric would-be megastar who plans to conduct foreign policy by Twitter.  Rather, it is at the grassroots level, in places like Liberty Osaka, that the real hopes and dreams for the future are still being quietly nurtured. The worst tragedy of all for Japan would be to allow the search for ‘restoration’ to extinguish the sparks that still burn bright in many parts of the country.



Chan, Jennifer. 2008. Another Japan is Possible: Social Movements and Global Citizenship Education. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Morris-Suzuki, T., Low, M., Petrov, L. and Tsu, T. 2012 (forthcoming). East Asia Beyond the History Wars: Confronting the Ghosts of Conflict. London and New York: Routledge.

Yamane, Kazuyo. 2009. Grassroots Museums for Peace in Japan: Unknown Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation. Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller.