Reconciliation Between China and Japan: A Search For Solutions

Thursday, August 17th 2006, Morning Session

Peter Van Ness: Opening remarks. Acknowledges the conference’s bias towards reconciliation, and the goal of ‘working things out’ because it is more than a bilateral problem. Everybody will pay the price if there is conflict between China and Japan. Description of the Blog, with reference to important articles in the archive.

Mel Gurtov: A further introduction of workshop origins and goals. The genesis of the project is a belief by the four organizers that ‘we scholars and practitioners’, as a Track 3 grouping, have a role to play beyond research, writing, publishing. Where will the dispute lead? With the potential global implications, perhaps we scholars can impact the direction it will take. All of us are here because we share a similar concern, even if we do not know how to fix it. This is very specifically a workshop, not a conference or symposium. A ‘workshop’ means we are all in this together – not to assess responsibility or take sides. We all know the issues, what we are trying to do is work together collectively. How will we answer when asked, ‘what did you experts finally come up with that is worthy of attention by other scholars and governments?’ We all have responsibility in that product, and there is no shirking of that responsibility. We need to support one another to create realistic ‘solutions’.

Richard Tanter: Describes work with Nautilus, and how this project fits in with the idea that all scholars need to be engaged with a wide variety of groups. Not much is being done on this issue, so scholars need to act positively to encourage governments, NGO’s, etc, to become positively involved. In addition to Mel’s suggestions in terms of realistic solutions, we should also think beyond realistic. We are not here to persuade each other, but rather that we can all think something new than we thought this morning, thanks to new proposals and new understandings.

Peter Van Ness: The agenda here is not to read long papers, rather to take up topics one by one. A few people from each session will be invited to start topic sessions. The First topic is history, beginning with the co-authored textbook, and impressions on the process. But first, introductions and hopes for what can be achieved.

The History Issue

Richard Tanter: Dr. Akami will discuss the textbook achievement, and Dr. Hundt will discuss the Korean perspective.

Tomoko Akami: Introduces the history textbook that was produced jointly by historians in China, Japan and Korea. It was prompted by the publication of the history textbook by ‘Atarashii rekishi o tsukuru kai’ in Japan in early 2003. Work began in 2002 and finished in 2005, and the second edition is out now. Its main point is that we must face past wrong-doings not to repeat mistakes, and to construct a peaceful and bright future, particularly for younger generations; we needs a history which will be open for the future. Hence, Nicchukan sangoku kyotsu rekishi kyoza iinkai, Mirai o hiraku rekishi: Higashi Ajia sangoku no kingendaishi (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2005) [The three country joint
committee to produce teaching materials for a common history of Japan, China and Korea, *History Which Opens a Future: Modern History of Three Countries in East Asia* (Tokyo: Kobunkan, 2005, second edition)]. Description of the four chapters and prologue.

Is it a successful tool for reconciliation? Its immediate and direct impact may not be great, but it is important in a few significant points. First, its symbolic meaning is great. Because of how a textbook is used in Japan, an impact of a history textbook may not be great among high school students. But the fact that this book is out is symbolically important. Second, it is important because it creates a sense of a shared regional community and regional citizenship, which suggests a responsibility to the community beyond the nation-state boundary. Third, it is important to demonstrate diverse opinions on Japanese history within Japan. Although overseas media reports had focused on Tsukuru kai’s history textbook, not this textbook, and sensationalized the revisionist history move in Japan (which is indeed growing), this textbook demonstrates that there are other opinions against the revisionist move. There have been fierce debates among scholars of Japanese colonial pasts in the postwar period, and the textbook is one example of the different viewpoints on the issue. It is, however, more significant at the present, because in the sixties and seventies, the orthodoxy in Japan was an emphasis on peace and horror of history. This orthodoxy has now been shifting to revisionism.

**Richard Tanter:** This is a very good introduction to our discussion. It is particularly important to recognize the pedagogical framework in which this is taking place. Those who have taught in Japan recognize this.

**David Hundt:** A discussion of collaborative paper on learning from attempts at reconciliation by North and South Korea. Three main recommendations on China-Japan reconciliation.

First, reconciliation needs to be a political project and requires Track 1 efforts. Other countries have had to deal with this, and much can be learned from them. Reconciliation is not about reestablishing a preexisting order, for those days are past. The break from the past must happen at an elite level.

Second, there is a need for Track 2 and 3 work, like the textbook work, which is a promising example of what can be done. Looking at bare minimum facts of what has happened, there will always be differences, but the order of this project was a unified narrative about history. In terms of shortcomings, it is not a comprehensive account of East Asian history. There were no Taiwanese or North Korean scholars, and the narrative tended to take on an invasion, not liberation, type theme, so it read somewhat as a history of Japan’s invasion of its neighbors. Thus it cannot replace history textbooks, and is more of a supplement. There is a need to add key issues that are not explored.

Third, there needs to be a Track 3 notion of respecting differences between actors. There will always be a ‘remainder’ of issues that cannot be resolved right now, so there should be acceptance that there will be differing accounts for a time. In the textbook, a lot of first hand testimony was used, which can be helpful and is also indisputable. Also, we reiterate the importance of there being no monolithic national positions. There has been debate in Japan for forty years over history. In Korea there has also been a debate, including but not limited to Japan. Korea has its own difficult period over this past century, which is being redressed even today. South Koreans are asking big questions, difficult questions, but ones that are very important. Perhaps that type of discussion can lead to the resolution of bigger issues.

**Richard Tanter:** Thank you, those are good points on Track 1, 2 and 3 suggestions. They are relating questions of what happens between societies and within societies. It is important that reconciliation is
international and intranational. Questions?

Mel Gurtov: How widely is the textbook used in the three countries? Are there any figures? Does this type of a project have a future, and how can it be built on?

Tomoko Akami: Don’t know the exact figures, but the recent second edition is a promising sign. History teachers at the high school level in Japan may not use it as a textbook, but may use it as a resource for their teaching.

Mel Gurtov: And what about in China?

Shi Yinhong: We need a national history in China that is not biased, that is objective. International history abounds in China, but national history is also important. Perhaps it is the most important? How can national governments reconcile national histories of their own? Maybe textbooks are downplayed by most people. East Asian history is not only about war, it is about post war history and much more. Often people selectively discuss history. For example, maybe in Japan they only think China’s post-1978 history is good, that before is bad. In China, nobody talks about what happened after 1945. The same is true for Korea and the Korean war. How can different countries have a common approach to deal with the Korean war?

Also, textbook publication numbers will not reflect the power of the project. Maybe the influence of the textbook project is among scholars, not students or teachers. In China, there is Chinese history and world history, but not East Asian history. Even in China largest university history departments, there is no discussion of East Asian history, or at least it is too limited. But most important to reconciliation is a restructuring of national history.

Chris Braddick: There is often too large a distinction between world and national history. Like in Europe, national history and national myths needed to be separated and cleared. But that is a tall order in East Asia.

Chen Mumin: I recently went into a large bookstore and couldn’t find the joint-textbook in the textbook section, only in the best-seller section. It is important that students be forced to read this textbook, by being asked questions that force them to read it. So governments need to include specific questions on entrance examinations. In Taiwan the book wasn’t published because Taiwan was excluded from the project. Students in Taiwan aren’t reading it because they read what they are tested on.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: This textbook comes from one collaborative project, of which there have been a number, and of various combinations. It would be interesting to look at how those different projects have gone. Other endeavors have deliberately not produced textbooks, instead arguing that the communication and collaboration is most important. These different efforts should be compared and evaluated.

There is also a need to find other ways to get the ‘message’ to a broader audience, not simply through textbooks. What about a television drama produced by the three countries? Another thought is a really good website on historical reconciliation, that links historians in various countries with archival and video material, and provides something that textbooks don’t provide, a space for dialogue.

Jin Xide: In China, it is not viewed simply as a textbook, but is much higher than that and is read by high-up people. If it will become a textbook in China, there is a long way for it to go. There is still criticism in other countries, and young people need to be educated in a more balanced way. Much of
the history issue is not a textbook issue, but a political issue.

**Chris Braddick:** If the goal is to achieve a consensus view of history, this is difficult if not impossible to achieve. Maybe reconciliation doesn’t require complete consensus. But what is important is what becomes the mainstream view that matters. In the battle for hearts and minds, how can that be influenced through other channels?

**Mindy Kotler:** Traditional pedagogical ways of teaching through textbooks do not reach students. National myths take time to come down, look at Americans for example. Today, South Korean myths are coming down. To look at 19th/20th century Asian history apart from world history is to miss the whole picture. For example, how well covered is the topic of the United States helping to liberate China by stopping Japan? There also needs to be more school trips, but there is no Dachau or Auschwitz. People need to understand that history is going to be full of realities that aren’t wonderful.

**Malcom Cook:** Political elites need to be moved, and the larger mass audience need to be moved as well. But the ways of doing it are different, and need to be. The mainstream will not swallow a ‘reconciliation message’.

**Tea Break**

**Richard Tanter:** Let’s now continue with the question of approaching reconciliation through history, self-understanding, the understanding of others, and particularly Yasukuni.

**Ryosei Kokubun:** Very impressed by this morning’s discussion. The joint-textbook is very meaningful, especially for our children, if it is achieved. But the problem in Japan is that in high school, students don’t always use their textbook, or even open them. In some college classes only 20% of students read their textbooks. Entrance exams are so difficult that students only memorize the facts, and Oriental or Asian history is not taught.

What sources, then, are they looking at for information in both Japan and China? According to polls, in Japan, most people say news media. Books and textbooks account for only 12.9%, while television is the highest at 74.7%. The Internet is a small percentage. In China, most answer news-media as well, with TV accounting for 77.9%. The Internet is a small percentage, as are textbooks. So textbooks are limited in usage in both countries.

A right and conservative group for writing a new textbook has been split because they failed in their promotion campaign. Now Japanese government is trying to organize a joint study teams with China on modern history. The Foreign Ministry tried to find scholars and professors to participate in the project, but all people who were approached were reluctant because it is too political, it is too loaded a subject, and they risk being criticized from all angles.

So the government has been commissioning historical studies between Korea and Japan. When times were good between countries this was more successful and both countries could write parallel histories easily. And that kind of joint work went well, lots of people were involved, friends were made, and confidence building took place. But the second stage of the project has not yet started because the political atmosphere has changed.

Recently, in the Bingdian (Freezing Point) Weekly, a Chinese professor wrote an essay about the
problems with China’s textbooks and history, which he said are distorted. He cited the very nationalistic look at the Boxer Rebellion, and this Sino-centric view was criticized. When this view was published, the editor of this publication lost his job, then openly criticized China’s leaders by name. The criticism is still going on today. So, maybe in China, that type of discussion is alive. But this year is forty since the start of the Cultural Revolution, and thirty years since the ending of it yet it is not mentioned or written on in China, because it is too dangerous to write about. So, in China, it is a very critical moment in writing its own modern and contemporary history

Richard Tanter: Yes, international and domestic issues are closely tied, which flows to the wider issue of Yasukuni. I’d like to open the discussion.

Tomoko Akami: If there are diverse opinions in China, Japan, and South Korea, is there a possibility for network developments to connect these diverse groups?

Ryosei Kokubun: Yes, and there are already networks - look at Dr. Shi and Dr. Jin and I, who see each other several times per year.

Peter Van Ness: That is true, when I mentioned Dr. Kokubun was coming to our Chinese guests, they both said ‘yes, we’ve met several times this year already’.

Richard Tanter: The relationships that are made in collaborative projects are very important. In working on Indonesia, it is surprising how little others are known in other countries.

Jin Xide: In China, academic research is looking at WWII and the post-war era more closely. Non-governmental research and journals are also growing. Many journals and publications are already having lively discussions, and there are so many out there, Bingdian Weekly is only one of them. And there are many books and publications about the Cultural Revolution, so it is not a mum subject. Much has also been put forth by Taiwan-based and Kuomintang investigations.

Jiang Wenran: The view of history is indeed evolving and changing. Many years ago, a student wanted to research the role played by the Kuomintang in fighting the Japanese. Back then, it was discouraged. Today the atmosphere has changed and that type of research would be accepted. Over the decades there has been a lot of opening up. So the main point is that things are indeed changing, and there are fewer freezing points in discussions.

A second point is that neither Japan or China is monolithic. Japan is often discussed as having diversified views, but China too has diverse views, open discussions, etc. For example, look at Dr. Shi and the New Thinking on Japan movement, which was an olive branch by the CCP that was somehow missed. We need to recognize the diversity of opinion, and plurality of views, on both sides. This is a very important step for reconciliation. Otherwise, misconceptions have the potential for being exploited by politicized leaders. For example, on the internet, there are many sites about the ‘coming war’ with Japan. These extremists cannot hijack the discussion, and be allowed to by being misperceived by the other side. Political leadership and commitment is needed. How do we, in this workshop, go from Track 3 to Track 2 and Track 1 action?

Richard Tanter: Which raises the question of, what is the role of the media?

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: In China and Japan relations, we are at a critical point with important changes, specifically with the changing of the Prime Minister in Japan. In Japan and China there are many sides of the debate, but they are not all reflected in the media. Even though Chinese and Japanese media are quite different, they both have their own problems. In Japan it is a free media, but certain issues get
enormous coverage, like the North Korea kidnappings. But others don’t. For example, nowhere in the last few days’ news are there reports that after a prominent politician criticized the Yasukuni visit by the Prime Minister, his house was burnt down by a right wing extremist. Why was this not more publicized or reported?

Shi Yinhong: China’s media? It is an issue raised by many all over the world. From China’s point view, is modern history still compatible with China’s rise? Maybe China’s own view on modern history is not compatible with China’s communist history. In the Mao era, the Japanese atrocities weren’t as well publicized, yet today they are much more so. A strong China has more victim sense, a weak China had less victim sense. Pre-Deng history was more oriented to the building of the Communist state. But in terms of modern history, China’s own books don’t focus on Roosevelt, Churchill, etc, but only on Japan and its victims. Social change is the most important thing now, and with the open door policy there is change in domestic China. But now it is a more nationalistic Japan and a more nationalistic China.

Tomoko Akami: It's easy to say ‘do this and do that’ from far away and from a safe place. But there are extreme right-wing groups that could present serious threats. So what sort of risks are we people in Japan taking by addressing the topic of reconciliation? (This question was specifically addressed to Mr. Tennichi and Professor Kokubun)

Chris Braddock: Yes, it is true that views have become more nationalistic. If we look at the 1950s and 1960s, it was a time of divisiveness, and the war guilt on the Japanese was profound. There were apologies back then, but the Chinese Communist Party was saying ‘thanks for your help, but you weren’t at war with us, only the Koumintang’, etc. Perhaps the precedents from a different era can inform the present.

Jin Xide: In China, in order to improve the news reporting, it is very risky to promote certain reforms or ideas. Like in Japan, there can be repercussions from outspoken positions, and perhaps it is easier to stay silent or say something hard-line rather than something constructive. Scholars in China and Japan are in a very difficult position.

Richard Tanter: What risks do scholars face?

Jin Xide: The influence of the internet is very powerful in China, because it is the most ‘free-talking’ space. This is true particularly for intellectuals, for whom much publishing is done on the internet. In Japan, scholars can publish what and where they want.

Richard Tanter: So people who take a friendly Japan position are criticized?

Jin Xide: Yes. I have been criticized.

Ryosei Kokubun: In joint history studies, many scholars are reluctant to engage in joint studies with China because its too political.

It is true China has been changing, and the internet is full of different opinions. But the official lines of the CCP have not been changed though. Because it is a Communist Party, making the Japanese a cornerstone to the CCP cannot be changed. If joint studies are to be conducted government to government, this poses problems with ‘official lines’.

A second point is that most people are becoming concerned about Sino-Japanese relations, and the Yasukuni visits. While some newspapers are not critical of these visits, many are very critical.
Yasukuni is a domestic Japan issue, not necessarily China’s issue. Koizumi is the only recent Prime Minister not criticized by right-wingers. He has apologized about invading Korea, but has not been criticized by the right wing because of the Yasukuni visits.

Lastly, if you look at Sino-Japanese relations, the two top leaders have no communications. But among normal people there is communication and interaction; among school people, among scholars, non-mainstream media, etc.

Richard Tanter: Perhaps the point is that we need to have a wider sense of all that is going on, and what has gone on. There are sub-national, sub-elite connections, and important connections between civil-society. These need to be mapped and shown, because more is there than meets the eye.

Takahiko Tennichi: The right wing is very critical, but not extremely dangerous. For example, the diaries leaked about the emperor were detrimental to the right wing, and there was a bombing that may or may not have been related. But the newspaper is more careful of terrorism. Terrorism depends on the case.

Richard Tanter: What about another bombing? With Mr. Kobayashi?

Ryosei Kokuban: This had to do with the 21st Century Commission of Sino-Japanese Friendship. Mr. Kobayashi, Japanese side Chairman of the Commision, during an interview, mentioned that he ‘personally’ does not agree with the Yasukuni visits. This statement was then singled out and put on newspapers. Then there were various kinds of menace.

Richard Tanter: Were you surprised, Tessa, that the recent bombing wasn’t publicized?

Takahiko Tennichi: I might suggest that it wasn’t publicized immediately because on August 15th much about it was still unknown. So more may be known and written about it later.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: Yes, that may be. But it is still surprising that it wasn’t mentioned on the NHK website, and in today’s news it is still not there.

Richard Tanter: There have been other attacks that have not been reported.

Malcom Cook: If you look at the last fifteen years, China has been doing much reconciling. In SE Asia, fifteen years ago, it was there that the China threat was most present. Today, this view is held in the United States and Japan. Thus, changes may not only have to do with domestic political shifts, but also much larger geopolitical shifts.

Chen Mumin: How does the general public in Japan view China? Especially if most of what is learned comes from the media and television, not textbooks? How does the media portray modern China, not historical China? In China, a lot of inaccurate and negative information is circulated on the internet. Is it similar in Japan?

Ryosei Kokuban: In 1980, there was very little if any contact between countries, but they had favorable impressions of each other. The TV show “Silk Road” gave friendly impressions. In those times, China was still a developing country, and it was isolated. Japan began ODA because it believed China should be a part of the international community. Now, China is rising, but we are still wondering what direction China is moving for.

Today, opinion polls show that Japanese impressions of China are very simple. The top five impressions of China, according to opinion polls, are: Communist, status-oriented, socialistic, militarist, chauvinistic. In China, the view of Japan is: Militarist, nationalist, economically-driven,
Richard Tanter: What about the Bush doctrine? How does what is happening in China and Japan fit in with what is happening in the USA? Also, assuming Abe will win, and that he supports constitutional revision, the question is: is remilitarization a good idea?

Mindy Kotler: There is too much of a fear factor in Japan, and politicians are fearful of being attacked for their views. It is shameful that the US government is not speaking up about this. But to compare Japan and China is to compare apples and oranges. In China, the state keeps close tabs on the media. In Japan, there is the perception of shared values between the U.S. and Japan, in terms of democracy and freedom of speech. So there shouldn’t be a fearful atmosphere. But why are these things still allowed to happen? Why is the comfort women museum still getting threatening phone calls? In Germany there are laws etc about this, for example, the Holocaust-denier who is in jail in Austria. Is it against free speech? Maybe, but maybe not. Why are sound trucks allowed in Japan? It is very troubling.

Mel Gurtov: As a footnote, the U.S. Government never feels bad about commenting on undemocratic activities in other countries, particularly in China, despite its own obvious shortcomings.

Mindy Kotler: The Bush administration did not have much to offer on foreign affairs. Richard Armitage was going to lead the ‘contain China’ policy with the Japan alliance. Japan relations were cultivated for along time. The men in the current administration have not had problems with the Yasukuni visits. Bush went to Japan and then China in November, and it is likely there were discussions. Bush realized there is a problem that is affecting relationships, but wanted to keep the problem at arms distance from the White House. But now at least they realize it is a problem.

Chris Chung: China is moving away from this victimhood mentality to a great power mentality. With regard to Japan’s bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, and China’s opposition, wouldn’t it be useful to reconciliation if China helped Japan get a seat on the Security Council? It would indicate China’s magnanimity on the history issue.

Richard Tanter: I am longing to see the person who can redesign the security council.

Willem van Kemenade: On the history issue and German and Austrian justice, yes, there has been legal redress in court, but most of these cases were lost because of some intervention. In Germany in 2000, Germany adopted a law ordering compensation for East European forced laborers, and the cost would be shared by the German government and the companies involved. In Japan, there is almost a complete rejection of these issues.

Mark Valencia: We have been focusing on history this morning, so I’ve been silent. About the U.S., it is the elephant in the room. Part of the problem is the changing nature of the US-Japan alliance - against who and against what? It is not hard to understand why China feels threatened. Japan is being encouraged by the US to be a deputy sheriff (like Australia). Japan would maybe approach the East China Sea issue differently if it did not have US support. The Japan-U.S.-Taiwan alliance is also very important.

Peter Van Ness: With regard to US-China-Japan relations, Thomas Christensen at Princeton, who has just joined the Bush administration, published an article (Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol 23, No. 4, Spring 1999), in which he argued that there was an inevitable security dilemma between China and Japan, and that
the US should seek to ameliorate that dilemma. I don't believe that there is an inevitable security dilemma between China and Japan. What the US role has been is to play the two Asian powers against one another: Washington does not want outright conflict, but it is deeply concerned that China and Japan may work strategically together in a way to make the US unnecessary in East Asia. Chris Chung has written a paper on the East China Sea, pointing out that Japan has territorial disputes with almost all of its neighbors, while China meanwhile has negotiated territorial agreements with most its neighbors. The fact that Japan has not resolved its territorial disputes has to do with its reliance on the US. What is the answer? Japan may need to return to Asia. Is Japan a part of Asia or of the West? This is a question that has been asked in Japan since Meiji. Since the end of WWII, Japan's reliance on the United States has stood in the way of Japan's reconnecting with its neighboring Asian countries.

Richard Tanter: We are loosening the knot, one issue at a time. And these important issues can be embedded in a broader framework.

Lunch

Mel Gurtov: It is worthwhile to make one comment on where we are. Clearly what we did this morning was interesting, and we appreciate the participation. I would like to remind all of us why we are here, in the sense that our purpose is to look for ways to take present realities and convert them into something better. We often tend to fall back on exchanging information on things we’re familiar with, which is interesting, but we need to keep in mind why we are having this event, and to what purpose we are putting this information. We want to come up with an agenda for improving the current relationship. Dr. Valencia has been asked to focus on the options for dealing with the East China Sea dispute.

Mark Valencia: [see Mark Valencia paper]

Chris Chung: What is at stake? Resources, and their potential to feed into the broader bilateral relationship, for better or worse. There is potential for the dispute to be co-opted by nationalists. Where does it all go?

We’re on a road to nowhere – since 2004 there have been six meetings by foreign officials, but very few results. There needs to be an expert panel and emergency hot line set up. The threat is that provocations could spill over into greater problems, or a tipping point. There is increased frequency and intensity in military intelligence gathering in disputed areas.

How to go somewhere? A three-step process: 1) Establish a co-chaired senior official advisory group. 2) Build confidence through functional cooperation. 3) Strike a grand bargain. Need an epistemic community to put it into a forum. Taking issues out of the polemical forum of Track 1 senior official meetings provides opportunity for unique solutions. A grand bargain would be based on mutual agreement not to settle the territorial dispute, for 50 years, and then move ahead with joint development. Sharing percentages are possible, and this is a well-established process in the oil and gas community. Political and economic advantages would result from a grand bargain. It would be a demonstration effect for other issues, and it would give political substance to rhetoric on friendship. In terms of economics, it would circumvent the opportunity costs in energy supply, unlocking revenue streams.
The political will must be there. Both sides mention the Law of the Sea and historical precedents, but political will needs to be there. It is truly a win-win opportunity.

**Mel Gurtov:** This is a specific case, but what lessons could be learned from this case and applied to other issues? There are many steps that need to be taken, such as preventive diplomacy and intermediate steps, steps that could provide spillover effects.

**Richard Tanter:** A few things. First, the optimistic part is that if you talk to energy people in Japan, the message is that at the vice-minister level and below there has been some very serious thinking and reasonable and informal discussions with Chinese counterparts. Though the political framework is impeding, it is optimistic that the bureaucrats are discussing this. Second, on the other side, it is perplexing that, after many years of exploring in the area, that Japan has waited so long to begin exploratory work on their side. Why is that? This breeds skepticism about rational calculations in Japanese politics. Third, the military aspect is deeply worrying. There is the Chinese submarine issue, but I’m more worried about planning documents in the Japanese military that have been leaked on the issue. There have been moves and developments, militarily. In the national defense policy outline in Japan, there is much talk about Special Forces, which mention defending the islands. There is also an almost primitive level of communications, militarily speaking, leaving the door open for conflict, all of which is dangerous.

**Katherine Morton:** Where do corporations sit on this issue? Is there any space for corporations to be involved in preventive diplomacy? Would it be helpful or hurtful?

**Mark Valencia:** There have been attempts, by companies, to drill and be involved. Conoco went to both China and Japan seeking a joint concession, regardless of the boundary, but neither would agree. With joint developments, once an agreement is struck and implemented, there is often little problem of cheating, and usually they go rather smoothly. Agreements can happen, its implementation that is hard.

**Mel Gurtov:** Can we generalize that reaching an agreement is dependent upon the overall state of political relations?

**Mark Valencia:** There are many factors, one of which is politics, and another is the need for energy and resources. If there are other resources, then a country may be inclined to wait awhile. For example, the recent discovery of giant gas reserves in the China’s portion of the South China Sea may give China some time and bargaining leverage.

**Shi Yinhong:** Do you think there is any real possibility of a grand bargain between countries? There are many complicating factors, particularly domestically. Chinese view the East China Sea as a major part in future interests and strategic planning, so any concession would not be good. It is probably the same in Japan. It is imperative to not try and solve major disputes, but manage them.

**Richard Tanter:** How can this be controlled?

**Shi Yinhong:** Governments realize there needs to be concrete plans to control disputes. It is imperative that any accident is not allowed to become a major conflict. The idea of dispute resolution is harder than people think. More emphasis should be placed on damage control.

**Jiang Wenran:** Yes, the dispute is very complicated. China and Japan won’t go to war over historical disputes, but the East China Sea is different. Look at the size of the oil reserve. 100 billion in East China Sea, whereas Iraq has about 95 billion, Saudi Arabia has 250 billion, Canada has 175


billion. So the stakes are very high, for Japan and China. It goes beyond simple negotiations. One country’s exploration of energy is perceived on the other side as invading one’s own resources. This makes it a military issue, a tense issue, and it is a multifaceted and long-term issue. Nationalism and national security interests complicate the issue in a major way.

Shi Yinhong: There is no possibility of a deliberate conflict, but an accidental conflict is very possible. In an incidental conflict, where a gun is fired, domestic national sentiments create problems.

Chris Chung: Somewhat worried about the figures on the resource potential. Estimates vary quite widely. There may need to be clarity on what exactly is under the sea, cooperatively. The East China Sea may or may not be a major contribution to China’s energy demand. China is making a worldwide search for sources of energy. What is striking is that neither side has given a contract to a US oil company. Could this be an issue?

In terms of a grand bargain, yes it is ambition, but there is a need to develop oil, there is an opportunity cost. Militarily, the East China Sea is important, but so is the South China Sea. China does not want a disruption in the sea, as that is how China’s exports move around the world.

Ryosei Kokubun: This issue very important, but it is also related to China’s energy consumption issues. If Japan’s energy consumption per GDP is counted as 1, EU is counted as 2, USA is counted as 4, China is counted as 8. China’s energy demands are going to grow tremendously. Japan has technology and a scarce resource base. Japan will, after 2008, start something other than ODA type of assistance in the field of energy and the environment. China’s energy consumption, and inefficiency, is a world issue. China’s energy crisis is a worldwide issue. The East China Sea issue – if you talk to business people, they are very rational. They say that in fact China must be losing money in the East China Sea, maybe or maybe not. Japanese companies have no strong interest in investing in that region, because there is a lot of uncertainty about oil and natural gas.

Another point, on Senkaku in 1978 there was the big incident when 200 fishing boats came to the Senkaku region from China, with machine guns, while the countries were talking about a friendship and peace treaty. The 200 boats had communicated with China’s mainland, one was the military port in Shanghai and the other in Shandong, but the top leaders in China did not know about this incident itself. Deng came in and reeled in the situation, calling it an accident, and shelving the issue to future generations. But there is no Deng in China now. I worry now too, about some accidental incident. There is no network, no hotline between the top leaders.

Shi Yinhong: Beijing and Washington have good communications, but there is no Beijing-Tokyo communication.

Malcom Cook: Moving forward two possible solutions. One, the East Timor resolution was helped by the fact that there was clear knowledge about how much oil and gas was in the reserves. Two, maybe bilateral issues can be moved forward by connecting them to larger, multilateral global discourses. Maybe this would change the way the issue is discussed. Also, there are two views on energy resources, there is the economic view of energy, and a security view on energy. Economists and security strategists have different views. Maybe the economists’ view is the safer one.

Mel Gurtov: There is yet another approach to this though, called enlarging the pie, not just as a scarcity issue, but in the larger context of energy and environmental security for all, which opens up larger possibilities.
**Peter Van Ness:** This topic is important because it is the most potentially explosive, yet there is also great potential benefit if some agreement can be reached, to build cooperation on the principle of mutual benefit. It’s also important because of its urgency, because if the energy potential is accurate, the concern about that potential will either create conflict or provide for cooperation. It is an energy-security dilemma. From a security point of view, it doesn’t have to be seen as a security dilemma – just like the Sino-Japanese relationship doesn’t have to be a security dilemma. The opportunity cost here is huge, as the world energy market grows - in terms of security issues and cooperative security, in terms of countries agreeing to resolve issues where there is obvious mutual benefit. But diplomats and defense officials are trained to think in terms of worst-possible-case scenarios. That is reasonable so that they can anticipate future security dangers, but they also should be taught about the opportunity cost when states choose not to cooperate.

**Mark Valencia:** We should be careful about the 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent figure. There has been very little actual drilling, and this is data figured based on comparison and extrapolation. And most of it the resources appear to be gas. Sometimes in joint development schemes, the unknown is often a helpful factor. The South China Sea Agreement is a step forward, and there are initiatives to explore, but the problem is China waited long enough that it got the Philippines to agree to joint development in an area where China had no legitimate claims. Another pessimistic view is that if China does find significant reserves elsewhere, then maybe it is in China’s interest to keep Japan out of the East China Sea, and wait out Japan. Also, Professor Shi is right, it is a strategic issue of control over space and resources. Because of this, there must be a code of conduct for military activities and scientific research. I agree that it is a very dangerous situation.

**Richard Tanter:** On whether or not it is desirable or helpful to know more about what is or isn’t there - why are there uncertain estimates? Because China won’t share its data on what it knows. And again, there is the question of why Japan has not explored. In terms of what we’re talking about here, the precursor to reconciliation is avoiding conflict. The situation is urgent, and there are no rules or codes of conduct as of yet. That is dangerous. The chances of accidental confrontation are too high.

This is also a classic area of the realm of imaginary war, with both countries doing a lot of planning, which has potency. There is also something about oil that sets people off – it’s not seen just as a monetary resource, but as more than that, in terms of political imagination. It has a multiplying effect.

So what do we want out of this? The urgency is there in terms of establishing military codes of conduct.

Lastly, we need to think politically because there are political steps that need to be made, and conditions that need to be met, for there to be progress. We should be encouraging our government and other governments to explore this issue and take steps. It has global implications.

**Willem van Kemenade:** There has been much talk of setting up an East Asian multilateral security dialogue. There has been talk that the six party talks could be expanded to this. But those are not going very well. Is there any other proposal on the table? The Asian Regional Forum? There needs to be steps to set up an early warning system. There are European precedents for this – look at the steps taken to prevent another war, steps putting German coal and steel resources under wider control, which became the coal and steel community, which led to bigger things. Is this possible in Asia?

**Mel Gurtov:** I’m reminded of what Richard said, correcting me, that we must propose ideas that today seem realistic, mixed with some idealism. Nautilus has done work on this.
Katherine Morton: We need a Jean Monet, who can make this happen. Much has been discussed, but for this type of architecture there needs to be an architect.

Shi Yinhong: China has tried to use a framework to solve Sino-Japanese problems. But there are differences between post WWII Europe and today’s Asia. All of Asia is rising. The power dynamics of the region are not favorable to some kind of experiment. China and Japan lack strategic dialogue. Beijing is realizing that Track 1 dialogue between China and Japan is the key.

Peter Van Ness: We here, neither Chinese or Japanese, hear that in your bilateral discussions you fire shots at each other. Would a multilateral setting be more conducive to building cooperation? For example, the benefit of the 6 party talks is that not all parties see it as a zero-sum game.

Shi Yinhong: The Chinese government is paying more attention to global sentiment on the China-Japan relationship. But I don’t think multilateral discussions will work for either government, even though each is increasingly aware of global opinion.

Chen Mumin: In terms of cooperative security, no matter if you are realist or liberal, both agree that two great countries can cooperate only when there is common interest. In China Japan, it is difficult to find a common interest.

Shi Yinhong: The common ground is to prevent conflict.

Chen Mumin: National interests and energy security issues are both vital to finding common ground between the two countries. It is also very dangerous if the general public jumps into the debate on energy security issues before leaders from both countries reach a consensus.

Shi Yinhong: Yes, the public always takes a simplified view. But China is not a democratic society, so public opinion is less important.

Tim Stoddard: What can be learned from the South China Sea meetings? Is there any indication that this type of dialogue could begin in the East China Sea?

Mark Valencia: No, it is unlikely there could be something similar. There have been any number of attempts by Chinese and Japanese scholars to have Track 2 dialogues, etc. The South China Sea workshop was led by two people who really made it happen. And it is doubtful that two major powers would accept an intermediary approach.

Jiang Wenran: My pessimism is not something that I advocate. What actually dominates the discourse is that neither side really wants to find a way to solve the problem, perhaps because popular sentiment on both sides is too strong. This shouldn’t be the case, but it is. So there needs to be a way to move away from the deadlock, by averting people’s view from what is at stake and the possible confrontation. Really, what is the larger context of the debate? China is energy hungry, is in manufacturing, and is at a stage of industrialization that requires much energy. Japan is doing well in energy efficiency and conservation, so maybe these factors need to be included in discussions, and in doing something to these effects. Look at the Energy Conservation and Cooperation agreement, with 800-900 people gathering in Kyoto to discuss what they can do together. Perhaps this could be an annual dialogue. There is benefit from working together. Fuel efficiency is crucial, there needs to be tangible ways forward.

Mel Gurtov: That’s an example of enlarging the pie.

Jin Xide: There needs to be a more comprehensive approach to the East China Sea issue. We can see
progress in some ways at the previous 6 rounds of talks on this issue between China and Japan. The two countries have reached agreement on some issues. In China we are pushing forward the improvement of the environment, it is very important. It will be very difficult to reach an agreement on the median line in the East China Sea. China needs oil, but is also concerned about the security of oil imports and shipments into China.

**Shi Yinhong:** Both China and Japan have high aspirations about their own power and interests, with regards to the East China Sea. But on the other hand both capitals know much more clearly the dangers of territorial disputes, maybe leading both sides to making some concessions. With small steps, at least it could prevent deterioration of relations, and eventually more and more can come.

**Mark Valencia:** There has been some progress. There was almost an agreement on joint development and that is still the focus of the discussions.

**Shi Yinhong:** There are linkages to be made. If the prime minister were to agree not to go to the shrine, maybe there would be concessions in other areas.

**Katherine Morton:** There needs to be an important first step towards joint exploration. Like in the environmental issues, there is in the beginning a lack of cooperation, but gradually it evolves. For example in the area of glaciology there is cooperation, which is perhaps leading to greater cooperation on other environmental issues.

**Mel Gurtov:** We’ve arrived at some consensus on the issues in the problem, and without necessarily solving the problem, we could take some intermediary steps. To our two presenters, what are the most important things we can do to move forward on this?

**Chris Chung:** I like the idea of enlarging the pie, putting the East China Sea within a broader framework. The incremental approach is also important to building trust. Environmental issues, for example, are non controversial but provide a first step.

**Mark Valencia:** I would like to see some op-ed pieces, which get wider circulation than academic papers. So I would like to see some sort of statement, or summary, or consensus, written by the organizers, that would outline the dangers and the opportunity costs, then praise the progress being made, then propose some control mechanisms like guidelines or code of conduct. I would shy away from joint development details, and also try and embed this within a larger framework.

**Ryosei Kokubun:** There is a need for discussion on political and non-political issues. Political problems contain Taiwan issues, history issues, East China Sea issues, security issues, no war cooperation treaties (learning from the European experience), and others. Extreme nationalism must be contained. Then there is the non-political: high school exchanges, pop culture exchanges, bureaucrat exchanges, women exchanges, language programs, joint studies of natural sciences, such as environment studies, sustainable development studies, energy sustainability. We should start from non-political aspects first, then gradually engage the political.

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**Friday, August 18th Morning Session**
Richard Tanter: Welcome back, everything went well yesterday, thank you. Today we are shifting gears. The general theme today is ‘what is to be done’. We are generally moving from analysis to action and initiatives, in hopes of loosening the knot in this region. To begin with, there will be a brief discussion, initiated by Horiuchi Yusaku, on Friendship During Crisis.

Horiuchi Yusaku: This paper is based on re-analysis of data, which my former student initially used for her master thesis. A question examined is quite simple: Do people in Country B who have a friend from country A have more positive attitudes towards country A than those who do not have such a friend? For this project, we surveyed more than 1,000 students in 13 Chinese Universities. What is interesting and important about this dataset is that during the period of data collection, there was a sudden anti-Japanese movement following an incident at Northwest China University in 2003. This provided a natural experimental situation, which allows us to compare Chinese students' attitudes before and after the crisis. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: What is your image of the Japanese government? What is your image of the Japanese people? And, is Japan trustworthy? With these question, we examine whether answers to these questions are different if a respondent has a Japanese friend?

Our data show that the friendship effects are significant only after the incident but not before it. We argue that friendship has no immediate positive effect, but it works as a "buffer" during the crisis. We should note that the magnitude of the effects are small, and thus we cannot simply claim that making friends lead to building mutual trust.

Mark Valencia: The word friend is a rather widely used and misused term, so maybe the term friendship needs to be defined better or the results may seem rather speculative.

Chris Braddick: Same, is the definition of ‘friend’ self-defined? And, is the number of friends worth counting, or does it matter?

Horiuchi Yusaku: Yes, the data are based on a master's thesis research, and there obviously needs to be more appropriate questions for future research.

Jin Xide: Our institute has done similar research, asking ‘have you ever been to Japan?’ and ‘are you familiar with Japanese people’. People who have experience with Japan and Japanese people have a more positive feeling.

Horiuchi Yusaku: Yes, we did control the effects of some other variables on Japan, including whether respondents speak Japanese.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: Did people who lived in Japan have a positive impression, or did their stay in Japan leave some people with negative feelings?

Jin Xide: Right away, upon returning, people have different views. But they are mostly positive.

Chen Mumin: Maybe the geographical distribution of where the people were from, and how that relates to the WWII occupation, affects the opinion.

Horiuchi Yusaku: In our analysis, which is based on the method of exact matching, many other possible determinants are held constant.

Shi Yinhong: Opinion polls are often misleading. For example, it depends when the poll was taken, and how different political climates may affect the results. There are other factors, like tensions,
Koizumi, etc.

**Richard Tanter:** Thank you Yusaku, you’ve introduced today’s topic very well. Surveys and results need to be explained with great care. Now we need to move to another set of answers of what is to be done. Now maybe we can discuss the role of mass media. I want to remind people that in Japan, like in other countries, there are different views from different media outlets.

**Peter Van Ness:** In working on the blog, we’ve tried to keep a list of those initiatives that are possibly most fruitful. The investigation by *Yomiuri Shimbun* newspaper, investigating the war-time responsibility of Japan, is a most important project, of which Tennichi-san has been a part.

**Takahiko Tennichi:** *Yomiuri Shimbun* initiated a war-responsibility investigation. This investigation surprised many people, as this is a somewhat conservative newspaper. The paper has criticized Japanese militarism and our younger generation’s insensibility to the war.

[See Tennichi paper]

Basically, *Yomiuri* is conservative, and takes the nation state as very important. As for nationalism, *Yomiuri* has a negative view of narrow-minded nationalism, yet a positive view of patriotism.

**Richard Tanter:** This is very important, thank you to *Yomiuri* for your leadership, and for embracing a controversial position. Although there will be great debate, this is important, and needed across the board.

**Tessa Morris-Suzuku:** What about the response from readers, and the response from advertisers? What response is there, on a controversial view and topic? Is it positive or negative?

**Takahiko Tennichi:** The response from readers is positive, and they say they learned a lot from the campaign. So it is a very positive response. Overall, we aren’t deeply concerned about reactions in terms of advertising and revenue.

**Shi Yinhong:** I don’t know what is Japanese traditional way, but we in Asia and SE Asia know that Japanese behavior was aggressive. And what standard by which should we judge Japanese behavior? And what are Japanese national interests? In seeking reconciliation, you should not seek out Japanese interests.

**Tomoko Akami:** Although I found some approaches in the stories as problematic, I thought the initiative was great. My question is related to Tessa’s - *Yomiuri* has the biggest circulation in the world, what was the impact of the study, and what has been the peripheral impact?

**Takahiko Tennichi:** Mr. Shi’s point is very important, I understand that he says in the Sino-Japanese war, in 1895, in those days Japan was very aggressive. There is a big debate in Japan about this. Yes, there is a militaristic element in Meiji era, but after 1930 Japan changed very dramatically, since the 1930s it was different. Since last year of June, we published some big editorials saying that the Japanese government should build a new memorial in place of Yasukuni. Abe visited the company, and asked ‘what is the meaning of the editorial’? It was said that we must reconcile the war past, and Abe understood this.

**Mindy Kotler:** From my perspective, in the last few years, regarding China, what is significant is that the word ‘responsibility’ is being used in modern Japan. Using the word ‘responsibility’ is very important and commendable. Will Japan finally take responsibility? It is more than making a new memorial. It is legislation on comfort woman, and a House resolution in which it says there should be
‘responsibility’. These are small changes, but the word is very significant. It is a movement toward Japan being responsible for the damage that was caused.

**Chris Braddick:** I have some problems with the history contained in the report, but I think what is more important is that Yomuri is doing this. My biggest problem is that it is taking a narrowly Japanese perspective; for example, only counting the Japanese deaths, not total deaths. And I have a problem with #5, in terms of questioning Allied equality.

**Horiuchi Yusaku:** I think Yomiuri’s stance has changed, even though it is said that it hasn’t. I also highly doubt that Yomiuri doesn’t care about business or popular opinion. My hypothesis is that Yomiuri is following a current trend moving away from the right.

**Jin Xide:** There was a shock in Chinese academia over this, and the view is changing on Yomiuri. I criticized an editorial of the paper two years ago, but I agree that it is changing. What is the future of this project, and what is the role of Japanese scholars in this? Are conclusions being written by the scholars or by others? What is your plan for exchanging the views with other countries, or the media in other countries?

**David Hundt:** I think the most interesting word used is ‘campaign’, which maybe means this was a political decision made last year, by the paper, to raise questions about the war. Are we trying to shed old light on the war, or new light on the war? Are you conducting new research using scholars, or are we clarifying or highlighting what is already in the public sphere? And what comes next? Will a book produced? Or are there other investigations that can be made? Like investigations on Nanjing, which may resonate throughout the region.

**Malcom Cook:** I think the focus on national interests is good, for tactical reasons, because essentially it is a battle within Japan against the right. Using international norms as a standard simply doesn’t hold water, because no other country’s history can live up.

**Richard Tanter:** Yes, in this respect discussing national interests is important.

**Tessa Morris-Suzuki:** The Yomiuri series is great because it has inspired others to do something similar, and because it involved an investigation and criticism of the media during the war. And, as a plea, what can Yomiuri do next? Also, in your presentation, you mentioned that the key factor in Japanese nationalism is North Korea. Yet a large part of that nationalism has to do with the way that North Korea is reported in the media. I think the next step for the Japanese media is to be more balanced in that debate, maybe by focusing more on the ‘normal’ people in North Korea. I think Yomiuri could do much in terms of balancing the debate.

**Chen Mumin:** What the paper is doing is very positive. We should also expect the Chinese media to play a similar role. When special reports are done on certain dates, they are too often used by the Chinese government to refresh people’s memories of the war. In Taiwan, our government does not rehash old events for the younger people. The Chinese media could do more.

**Richard Tanter:** Yes, what would be some comparable initiatives that others could do, in the political or media system?

**Ryosei Kokubun:** At the break of the Iraq war, all the papers in the U.S. supported the war. But now things are changing. I think in some ways Yomiuri changes, but in other ways it has never changed. Yomiuri has never strongly supported the Yasukuni visit, and Yomiuri has also criticized Chinese pressure on the issue and said this is a Japanese domestic issue. We are so encouraged by recent
Yomiuri’s active efforts on historical studies about Japan’s past activities in war.

I would like to mention one thing. I have met Mr. Koizumi several times before in my capacity of a member of the 21st Century Commission. In our conversation, Mr. Koizumi has never demonized China and consistently said he is pro-China. I think he is not simply a rigid nationalist.

Takahiko Tennichi: First, I would like to say that Japanese militarism is the cause of much disaster, not only to Japanese people, but to the people of the world. But my personal view is that the world has two views, one is that it was an aggressive war, another is that it was an imperialist war. I don’t think Japan was wrong for everything that happened, but of course we must apologize not only to the Japanese, but to the people of the world. The era of imperialism, then, was very complicated. In those times the world was imperialist and imperialism ruled; Japan followed the rules of the world. Today I didn’t say much about the result of the report. You can read those later when the book comes out.

We must emphasize that this was a disaster to Japanese people, and also that Japan is responsible to the people of the world. Today, as a national issue, I emphasize the national interest of Japan. Yomiuri does not necessarily stress national interests. Three or five years ago, Yomiuri advocated Japanese SDF should go abroad and be a part of UN efforts.

As for advertisements, Yomiuri in 1994 proposed that the Japanese Constitution should be changed, which was shocking. Also, the President of Yomiuri cannot interfere with the editorial board, so the campaign has no real concern of advertisement.

Richard Tanter: You’ve raised a whole series of issues, particularly about national interests, the place of those, what is meant by those, and how do we square those with global ethics. There is a dialectical dance that will move here and there, bear that in mind.

Jin Xide: There is a discussion on how to improve our relations and public opinion with Japan in our media. We have made efforts. We have made proposals to improve public opinions to Japanese. I think Yomiuri is providing a positive environment for Abe to stop Yasukuni visits, and we try and promote that in China as well. I wrote a short article on Abe’s Asian policy, and he is now observing whether to visit or not visit. We will only know after the elections. China is trying to send a clear signal on the Yasukuni issue, that until visits stop there will be no improvement in relations. We also see that the Japanese want to solve this problem by themselves, which is complicated. The Chinese are prepared to make a positive reaction to Abe.

Richard Tanter: It is good to look for the cracks that make movement possible.

Proposals for Tracks 1, 2, and 3

Mel Gurtov: With regards the handout being passed around, we need an answer for what it is we are producing, what have we done, and what we are putting forth. Many of the items in the matrix we have are illustrative, though many of your comments from our initial proposals are in the box.

Although Track 1 has three separate areas - unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral - in truth those three areas could also apply to Tracks 2 and 3 as well. What we now want to do is change the format, in the interest of efficiency if nothing else, to divide us into three tracks. We have somewhat arbitrarily
divided or assigned you into one of the three tracks. Each group will take a track. The groups will
meet, then come back together and report to larger group. Be both as realistic and idealistic as
possible, and as specific as possible. This will help to concretize our discussion and enable us to have
something to show for our efforts.

Richard Tanter: Please think creatively, but also with a political eye. What has to happen in order
for ‘that’ to happen. And we can put these things in a melting pot, for we are making a menu of ideas.

Mel Gurtov: It would be perfectly acceptable to think in terms of immediate, mid-term, and long-
term goals.

Tomoko Akami: What about incentives for reconciliation, which are important?

Richard Tanter: Yes, like with Mark’s work, we must think about incentives, encouragement, etc, to
make things happen – to find pathways and cracks in the wall.

Friday, August 18th, Afternoon Session

Mel Gurtov: Welcome back everyone. Willem will start.

Willem van Kemenade: First, what is the re-Asianization of Japan? It actually started with the
Nixon shock and the end of the Vietnam war, but this idea of re-Asianization is only recently being
seriously reconsidered. I spoke about this to Kobayashi Yotaro, a former CEO of Fuji and Zerox, who
still plays a large role in politics. He said that if you look at the Meiji Restoration, what happened then
was the de-Asianization of Japan. He said that, at the time, Westernization was a very clever strategy,
but in looking to the future, the key for Japan is re-Asianization. Everybody views Japan as not part of
Asia, even though Japan’s future interests lie there. In the Meiji Era, the U.S. - Western model was the
role for Japan to follow. Western nations have always believed that their role was to extend the
benefits of Western Civilization to the rest of the globe, and Japan picked up on that role. This model
led to disaster.

Now, for re-Asianization, there is no real engine for this in East Asia because of the poor political
relations. In European terms, this would be as if Germany and France could still not get along even
fifty years after WWII. This is absurd; relations must improve. Japanese officials often say that
integration is much more difficult in East Asia than in Europe, for a number of reasons, many of which
are true. But there were also a great deal of differences and disparities in Europe.

If the political elites fail to deliver, than the business sector can take some charge and deliver at the
economic level. A separation of politics and economics has been attempted, if only so politics don’t
block business. The re-Asianization movement has made several attempts in different forms. If
politics warm, then the governments can take charge again. Kobayashi was optimistic about Abe, in
spite of certain political views. In the long term I think there is reason for optimism.

Leadership is also most important. Looking at post-war Europe, there were strong leaders with great
determination, which has enabled the peace and prosperity of the past sixty years. There was dialogue,
there was communication. Strong leaders are essential. The excuse by the Japanese that there is no
commonality with China is not necessarily true. Look at the differences between Germany and
Poland. Would strong Japanese leaders of this nature please stand up?

Also, Japan must proceed with re-Asianization as U.S.-Japan relations are not as good as they seem; they are only good between Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Bush. There is also the view that Japan will always be a junior partner, to either China or the U.S., so the U.S. is preferable. But is China really requiring that Japan accept subordinate status? I do not see clear indication of this.

The U.S. needs to rethink its own version of US-East Asian alliances and dependence. Japan is a civilian power that prefers to assert its role in the world in a peaceful manor. Germany should serve as the model for Japan’s reconciliation with history, and the European Union should be the model for East Asia. To conclude, Japan owes it to the world to do more to build a decent relationship with China, and the onus for this is on Japan.

**Jenny Corbett:** A few words about the economic relationship between China and Japan, as it feeds into the reconciliation issue. There are two key issues. First, there is the question of whether economics are an incentive that encourages reconciliation. And two, can economics give us some idea about what the cost of not reconciling is?

Economics do and don’t drive political relations, but we need to understand more about the nature of the economic relationship. It is, in some sense, a glue that holds things together while politics suffer. But the glue may or may not be strong enough to prevent it from exploding. The economic actors present also have a role feeding back into politics, and where they are in the political debate is important. But there is very little actually being done on this question. It is a conventional view that if the economic relationship is well there no need for discussion. But in reality we know very little about the nature of the economic relationship. There aren’t many books about it or other great sources, such as research institutes. The wider world knows almost nothing about this.

After quickly looking at papers that have come to me, what strikes me is that there is a near consensus suggesting that the relationship is not as close as one would predict, on simple economic grounds. There are studies on the extent to and the direction in which bilateral trade flows, and how it is affected by political issues. How much really is there, economically, to be put at risk if the relationship does not go well? This needs to be researched, which we plan on doing. The relationship is multi-faceted and trade is not simply in final goods, but it is more a trade along production networks among many countries. If this trade were to be seriously interrupted, it would affect not just China and Japan, but really the whole region. The question is, what would be the economic impacts if politics do not allow for reconciliation?

One final thought, on regional integration, is that there is much more room for the discussion of East Asian regionalism, which is dependent on China and Japan. There is indeed some sophisticated East Asian regional institutional building happening, and there is competition on how these will be formed and whom they will favor. What we can say though is that regional integration is going ahead, whether or not China and Japan come closer, but the nature or architecture of it will be different depending on how the two countries relate to one another. For better or worse is not known.

**Peter Van Ness:** If one looks at the U.S.-China relationship as an analogy, I think it is fair to say that when the U.S.-China relationship went sour, the big economic players literally went to the White House and said ‘this cannot happen’. I don’t see that at all in the relationship between Japan and China, with the exception of a recent statement by the business group Keidanren. Economic relationships must also facilitate political relationships, not just the other way around. It is very
important in China and Japan that the big corporate interests involved with trade and investment not only bring pressure in support of the relationship in their own countries, but they also need to work together between countries to better the relationship.

I don’t believe that East Asian economic integration will happen anyway. After World War II, Japan went out and built economic relationships throughout East Asia that were mutually beneficial. I think that needs to happen again to improve political relations.

**Jiang Wenran:** Where is it all going? We talk about economics between the two countries, and the two are becoming much more important to each other. But we are looking at a China that is diversifying its trade with more parts of the world, while Japan is becoming more dependent on China. So the balance is shifting in favor of China, and if politics get worse it will affect the economic relationship. For example, China is not involving Japan in any discussions of railroad building, but if the political relationship were better, they would probably be more involved.

Also, with the East China Sea energy dispute, this area is becoming more competitive, not complimentary. This needs to be replaced. We need to talk positively about what should happen. The ODA may not have done a lot, but there are more opportunities. Put in place a bilateral relationship for environment and energy cooperation, which both sides want badly and which would help both sides. There are huge oil importers who are talking about making an oil-importing block of countries, to bring prices down. There should not be negative comparisons between Japan and Germany, but positive comparisons in terms of how Germany recovered and grew.

**Willem van Kemenade:** On political damage to economic relationships, there are already negative impacts in Chinese consumerism. Many Chinese don’t want to buy Japanese cars…look at railways, look at nuclear power.

**Richard Tanter:** Which reminds me…How many psychiatrists does it take to change a light bulb? One, but the light bulb really has to want to change.

On raising the question of a bilateral relationship within the context of regional integration, the comparison with Europe is both good and bad. The positive part of the European framework is economic cooperation as a springboard to regional security. Just as we made the jump from looking at the bilateral relationship to regional relations, the elephant in the room is again the US role in all of this.

On a negative note, the depth of the threat is not just the costs or benefits foregone, but to take the real chance that it is more likely that in the next five to ten years nuclear acquisition will become more in the forefront of discussions in Japan. North Korea likely has nuclear weapons. The questions we’ve talked about over the years, about nuclearization, are becoming much more of a possibility. Also, it is not making too much of leap to get to the point that the American role in not facilitating the relationship is related to US interests in nuclearizing Japan.

**Horiuchi Yusaku:** I agree with Jenny, there are lots of things that we have to study, and too many important things that are not studied. If companies are shifting from China to Malaysia, how do we know that this is driven by politics? We need to study more about the relationship between politics and economics.

**Mindy Kotler:** Investments levels have remained the same before and after the anti-Japanese riots.

**Jenny Corbett:** Thank you for the comments.
Jin Xide: The 2003 event when Chinese people boycotted the Beijing and Shanghai railways, on the internet. That time the Chinese government could separate politics and economics, but it is getting harder because of Koizumi’s continued Yasukuni visit. Abe wants to visit Yasukuni and still say to separate politics and economics. Such separation will not be possible.

See Powerpoint On Track I, II, and III Ideas

Comments on the Track 1, 2, and 3 Proposals

Mindy Kotler: Disagrees with the use of wording of ‘re-address compensation issue’ and language of ‘charity’. There needs to be some all-encompassing commission that is not running from the issue.

Willem van Kemenade: A saying on war compensation/ODA feelings is ‘Japan cannot say sorry, China cannot say thank you’.

Chen Mumin: Institution building is critical. There aren’t any, and they need to be built.

Jiang Wenran: The May conference in Kyoto between China and Japan needs to be built on into the ‘climate joint partnership’ initiative discussed.

Mel Gurtov: Now for student comments…

ANU Graduate Students: Our discussions were more Track 3, but with realizing that Track 1 political efforts are the most important. With Track 3, one idea is that in Japan there is the JET program, and in Germany there is a similar program. Why not an exchange of S Korean, Japanese, and Chinese teachers?

And also, some kind of social studies teachers’ conferences and meetings, so that teachers can develop links and take those experiences back to the classroom.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: We have talked about the experience in Australia where it has been so helpful to have Japanese taught in schools. What if there were more Chinese language programs in Japanese schools, and vice versa?

Horiuchi Yusaku: What if Koizumi didn’t go to Yasukuni? Do you think that Track 3 would all of a sudden work?

ANU Graduate Students: What about anti-Japanese education in China, is it true or not? I wonder if there is still anti-Japanese education in China?

Jin Xide: I know the stories about anti-Japanese education in China, but these are old stories that I’ve heard many times. I would say that there is not anti-Japanese education, even though the invasion of China by Japan is a big part of modern history. So students and Japanese neighbors don’t like wartime militarism.

Jiang Wenran: There are observations that today’s younger generations of Chinese are more anti-Japanese than previous generations. There are also observations that anti-Japanese nationalism is a means of legitimacy. But the bigger picture has to do with the fact that decreased, decentralized, and lessened control over the past few decades has maybe enabled the rise of anti-Japanese feelings. One
diagnosis is that old style CCP propaganda, for many decades, was a grand picture painting about CCP liberation. Now, today, there are more human stories about war. This is a change. Maybe our pictures today are too black and white, and there are many more dimensions to the causes of resentment. The de-doctrinization of the CCP has led to more human responses.

**Richard Tanter:** I want to push a little harder on the Track 3 part, in a different more political way. It seems to me that if we’re talking about this level of danger, and the need to transcend the borders of these issues, it is important to look to the non-state political organizations that are looking at these issues. Nautilus is one example of this. Looking at Northeast Asia, it is important for us to identify and encourage those campaigns that are trying to act in a political way, and some of them may confront governments. Today, as an example of one organization, we have circulated a document by GPPAC [GPPAC is Global partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: [http://www.gppac.net/](http://www.gppac.net/)].

It is an offshoot of an NGO that originated looking at civil society. In Northeast Asia, a coalition of groups involved in this project have evolved and continued working on these issues, through academic connections, political connections, etc. In each case they are pragmatic in relieving tensions.

Also, we need to see civil society groups as stakeholders, taking active steps, building networks to ameliorate crisis. We all know this that wider question of capacity building, in civil society, requires direct political intervention, action, funding, etc, and needs to be restored to our agenda.

**Tessa Morris-Suzuki:** In Track 3, we didn’t talk about NGOs and civil society networks enough. And there is another layer that is not as political, that is networking between environmental groups. Another is the networking over migration and refugee issues. The other touchy one is human rights issues, and there are a number of such networks throughout Asia (including Australia). These Track 3 groups need to be expanded.

**Mindy Kotler:** Amnesty and other groups have made statements on this, and if their resolutions ever see the light of day, these organizations could bring pressure to bear.

**Katherine Morton:** An add-on, in terms of the NGO network, is that there is much more space today on the China side, and there are many NGOs working in China.

**Richard Tanter:** A comparable network is the global green network, of which there is now a Northeast Asia one. These types of cross-border networks are growing and are important. Civil society networks need to grow.

**Mel Gurtov:** Where do we stand in all this? What I would like us to give some thought to is that our powerpoint is not a finished product, but how can we refine these ideas, how can we improve them, how and which do we want to be associated with?

Also, Richard has drafted a statement that he will put up that might serve as a preamble for more focused policy recommendations. This will require some common agreement. We still have work to do, what do we want to come out of it with?

**Friday, August 18th, Final Session**
Peter Van Ness: Here we are, with an hour and a half to go. This has been a wonderful two days, with so many great ideas. We all have our own images of what this is about. Mine is that this is a probe or beginning of something. Many are asking ‘what will we produce’, ‘what will be the product’? My own vision is that it should be 100 flowers blooming– we should write op-eds, academic articles, go on TV, etc. We want to assist, support, and encourage you, and we will do all we can. Then there is another strong feeling, and that is, can we as a group say something, in general terms, about what we’re trying to do with this enterprise? Could we, in some general terms, talk about a direction or some hopes that this workshop might stand for? We all have our own priorities and disagreements, but let’s talk about this statement by Richard, and Track 1, 2, and 3 ideas and what we’d like to see happen.

Richard Tanter: The idea for all of us at the workshop was to have key elements brought out of this, about what needs to be done. This statement is a preface, which would be followed by recommendations in abstract terms. Can we all agree on this statement? First, we are all specialists that are coming together because we are deeply concerned. But we don’t want to underestimate the complexity of the problems and challenges in governance. But we also believe this is a very serious threat to the security of both countries, nationally and humanly. As a group of international specialists, we are urging the governments to control the risks, and recognize that there are real risks.

Beyond that, governments can do positive things in spite of apparently intractable problems. We need the governments to take positive initiatives. We also believe that these conflicts not only endanger Japan and China, but are also a risk to the security of all. It is quite genuinely a matter of global consequence, and not only a regional problem. China and Japan have a responsibility to the rest of the world, but equally, countries that are friendly to the two have a responsibility to foster reconciliation.

Clearly, no single action, or what we suggest alone, will loosen the blockage, and no one track will do it alone. But we believe that the initiatives we’ve explored should be undertaken by a wide range of organizations and groups.

The language is intentionally loose.

Shi Yinhong: Maybe there should be one or two sentences about the long-term perspective. There should be progress toward a kind of long-term settlement, which should accommodate national interests, feelings, and aspirations.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: One matter of significance is what exactly we do with this statement. Also, I would change the wording from ‘failure’ to ‘lack of progress’.

Horiuchi Yusaku: Most of these statements are not talking about what ‘we’ should do. We are asking governments to do things, but what are ‘we’ supposed to do?

Mel Gurtov: Yes, I think there could be language of ‘on our part’ or ‘we commit ourselves to do our part to working for constructive solutions’.

Mindy Kotler: Using as a model the seven-page Armitage Report, we should list our concerns and list our proposed solutions. These are only suggestions, which we don’t all agree on, but they are something. This is too vague.

Jiang Wenran: If we are the scholarly community, we should add that the international scholars of the world have not paid close enough attention to this matter, and have only treated it as a bilateral issue. We should add our community to the list of other ‘lacks of progress’, and call on our colleagues
from around the world to join us. I also agree that maybe we can do something a little longer, but if it is followed with other suggestions this is very good. This would be catching.

**Peter Van Ness:** These are some ideas, and we would encourage further development of these ideas. Also, maybe we should not say ‘join us’, but use some other language along this line.

**Mark Valencia:** I’m concerned that what following list will look too much like a laundry list.

**Jiang Wenran:** We do need to put forward the rationales for these remarks and statements, then list why we are making these calls.

**Richard Tanter:** What follows needs to be thought of quite carefully, and will be built on. We will explain the Track 1-3 suggestions, and why these actions are relevant and necessary. I would though like to stick to something very close to this formulation, without tampering too much, and the focus on what comes next. This introduction is vague, but it is expressing the intentions.

**Ryosei Kokubun:** I have a different feeling about the statement. We are confident that problems like these will be solved in the future between the two countries. People may think what Kokubun is doing involving the outside world. The Japan-China problem is basically a bilateral one. I am still sure that we are enough matured, and we can solve these. It’s an international concern, but maybe this is basically our problem, maybe this issue shouldn’t be so internationalized. I am just wondering how this statement will be used?

**Shi Yinhong:** In the last session, I told Mel that this workshop produced fruitful, productive ideas that focused on reconciliation. But on the other hand, I feel we are not fully, in a strategic way, dealing with this problem. Maybe we talked too much about non-political issues. We should focus on the basic causes of this problem. Maybe we talked too much about history issues, because history disputes are symbolic. Some things are more fundamental than others. Maybe there is a little too much focus on short-term suggestions, which are important, but maybe we should look more at middle and long-term ideas, possible ideas that could accommodate national interests, national feelings, etc. China has national aspirations, so does Japan; China as a great power, Japan as a normal nation. How to accommodate these national interests is the long-term national issue. But first of all this is a Japanese and Chinese concern. Too much conflict will indeed hurt very deeply and profoundly in East Asia, but we should look at long term Sino-Japanese relations, 15-20 years later.

**Peter Van Ness:** Personally I disagree with both of you. Bilaterally, it will of course have to be sorted out at the governmental level. But what I would like to convey is that it is not just your business, the stakes are too high. Everybody in the region has a stake in trying to help you to cooperate.

**Shi Yinhong:** Of course, but primarily this is China and Japan’s business. If we have success it is both our success, if we fail it is both of ours.

**Jiang Wenran:** Perhaps the sensitivity is that if we produce some statement here, and we are not using appropriate language, that it is suggesting that the Chinese and Japanese cannot solve they’re own problems. We don’t have that intention or belief, but it is good to not imply in any way that this is the case. Second, I agree that this is not a two country problem. It has profound regional and international implications, and we will all suffer, so we all want to see the two countries get along. We are not saying ‘you cannot manage this’, we are trying to help. How can we help? How can we facilitate? That ANU is funding this is an indication that we care, that we are not intervening.
Shi Yinhong: This is primarily China and Japan’s problem, secondarily the world’s.

Peter Van Ness: Shi Yinhong, I’ve been following your country's international relations for many decades. I wrote my first book on Chinese support for wars of liberation many years ago. I appreciate current Chinese foreign policy and its support for multilateral institutions, its negotiations with all its neighbors, the way China has become so participant in building mutually beneficial institutions. In this regard, my own personal opinion is that in effect you’ve helped build up a great deal of mutual benefit for the rest of us in the region. If, in a worst-possible-case situation of military conflict, the whole system would be very seriously damaged, and we would all suffer. The countries and governments have to work things out. We’re not saying that its up to us or we have better ideas than you. What motivates me is that there is great potential and great hope for an East Asian Community that is based on mutual benefit. We want to encourage and support this.

Takahiko Tennichi: I came here to discuss the *Yomiuri* report, with permission from my company. I came here because I think the right dialogue is very important. But I didn’t come here to make a statement. My suggestion is that I’m skeptical to make a statement, so maybe we should introduce our discussion.

Ryosei Kokubun: This is maybe a personal concern. I’m also partly working for our government, in such organization as the 21st Century Commission for the Sino-Japanese Friendship. It seems difficult for me to write my signature here. It seems too political

Shi Yinhong: Whether we are from China or Japan, there is no problem that we are here, we are not representing our countries.

Jin Xide: I agree with the opinion that this is a third party statement, and that we make an amendment that we are not representing our governments. Maybe a summary of the workshop is better. A formal statement should exclude the people from China and Japan. But I don’t think that it sounds like a statement by countries.

Mel Gurtov: Ryosei, it sounds like you would be opposed to signing a statement as an individual. Would you be in favor of this going out in the name of the workshop? Would it be better without individual names?

Mindy Kotler: Or just put on the blog what we discussed?.

Shi Yinhong: I have no problem with that because both our governments won’t pay attention.

Richard Tanter: The question and solution Mel put to Ryosei, would that be acceptable to both parties from China and Japan?

Jiang Wenran: People will associate the workshop with the organizers.

Shi Yinhong: Concrete proposals may be best.

Chen Mumin: This looks familiar to me, when I worked for the Taiwanese government. At a summit hosted by our government, the government issued a statement and asked the participants to sign, but many of them did not want to sign it, saying it was not the purpose of their participation. We want to make this influential, and make available what we have been talking about. This will produce information on our findings.

Katherine Morton: I think that capturing the spirit of cooperation of the workshop is a good thing, while bearing in mind the sensitivities. What is most important are the concrete proposals. What we
didn’t have time to do are the short, medium, and long term proposals, so maybe we should divide these different proposals up in that respect.

**Tomoko Akami:** I think the fifth paragraph should indicate that it is not just about two countries, but other countries are all part of the problem (as well as solutions). I also suggested that, as I noted to Pete, that ‘reconciliation’ should not be a search for one single ultimate solution. It should be a framework in which on-going various efforts can be made in various forms for betterment of future dialogues.

**Peter Van Ness:** The subhead of the blog, ‘a search for solutions’, should be left out. We need to clarify that there are solutions, but this is a process, and will go both good and bad at times. It’s a good point.

**Horiuchi Yusaku:** I feel uncomfortable putting what we discussed on the blog. There are lots of things we did not discuss, and some we did discuss. I propose a next round, for we did not reach enough conclusions here.

**Tessa Morris-Suzuki:** Maybe it would be useful to put down ideas we have discussed, in the course of the workshop, in the space of three or four pages, as if they are preliminary issues which were discussed.

**Mark Valencia:** We should put this out in the name of the project, yes?

**Peter Van Ness:** Yes, a statement in the name of the organizers, about what we discussed, and the proposals put forward. It is most readily done in the name of the workshop and the organizers. What is important are the concrete proposals and this discussion.

**Mel Gurtov:** I’d like to get a sense from the group in terms of what needs to be done. For example, would we circulate the edited version?

**Peter Van Ness:** No, there would then be twenty editors. We have created community among us, but its limited in terms of how we see the world. The three of us should edit this, and talk about some specifics, and put it out in our name. For people who were here but disagree, their name is not on it. If I could shift things, it would be that the three of us could knock this around and put it out in our name.

**Richard Tanter:** I think that Pete’s proposal is a workable solution, but the real purpose is the issues we brought out, and then doing something with them. The question is to work out in different frameworks what we want to do on our own.

**Peter Van Ness:** Okay, stage 2. Its important that we all do our own thing, and if we can help, we will. Mel edits the *Asian Perspective*, and is interested in good pieces for his journal.

**Mel Gurtov:** It is an academic journal, it is peer reviewed, and full texts from the past five years are available at [www.asianperspective.org](http://www.asianperspective.org). As Pete said, I would be interested in having an issue that would be entirely devoted to our work here. So if you would like to submit a scholarly article, 25-35 pages, we’d be delighted. What we would like to do with that issue is to include a statement from the three of us to indicate the origins of the workshop, including the ‘statement’ and its policy ideas. We’d like to include the Yomuri editorial, and other documents.

**Peter Van Ness:** Malcolm Cook mentioned he is in touch with a whole range of editors, Tessa knows TV people, and Wenran gave me the DVD for the project on China’s Rise - maybe there could be something like that on reconciliation. There is a lot to do.
**Richard Tanter:** I think there is much more to do, and more forms of doing it, and what is appropriate varies in different countries. When we actually produce material on this, it should come together somewhere, academic or otherwise.

**Peter Van Ness:** The blog will continue, and there will be the second workshop, which will be on the theoretical realm of cooperative security, which is very important to the concept of an East Asian Community. You all have your own projects, to which reconciliation relates, and we can’t all do everything. But these spin-offs and cooperative efforts are very important.

**Mel Gurtov:** A statement of appreciation to Peter Van Ness, who bore the burden of putting this together, including raising money. A round of applause. A thanks to Joe and Tim, and a thanks to Gil.

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