New Mandala

Burma is changing, and so are the lines of argument deployed to explain what’s going on.

With this in mind I have enjoyed Elliott Prasse-Freeman‘s three-part series on Burmese politics in the transition era; here are parts one and two. Part one is, many New Mandala readers will want to know, followed be a bit of push-and-shove centered on the always robust Maung Zarni.

Prasse-Freeman finishes his series with a call to arms against the potential for a “neoliberal sweep” of Burma.  He argues that:

Development is here the sacred object, led by ‘experts’ from outside who could (perhaps unwittingly) usher in a quasi-authoritarian neoliberalism where key social and political decisions over the future of the economy and its development would be quarantined in the hands of a narrow elite. The ritual activities of free voting and assembly would be given as so many crumbs to the masses kept outside of real politics.

He then flags some alternative strategies for the country to consider, including Bhutan’s oft-invoked, but little studied, Gross National Happiness model. Somehow I doubt that is the path the country will take but I like the fact that such debates are now possible. 

Long-time readers may recall the times I have endorsed the prospect of (real, not fake) Western fast food chains getting to Burma. Not everyone would agree with my take. And that, of course, is a very good thing.

For now, it looks like the new debates and battles to define Burma’s future are really only just beginning.

The Legend of the Greatest Queen Jamadevi (จามเทวี) is the latest film starring Princess Ubolratana Rajakanya Sirivadhana Barnavadi, the eldest daughter of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The film, due to be released sometime in 2012, must be perceived as another nationalist movie which reflects a desperate attempt to glorify the Thai royalty and to justify the making of enemies.

Here is its synopsis, as advertised by the film-maker:

One thousand years ago during the Dvaravati era, a baby girl was born with magical powers and grew up a fine lady of great wit and charm. Her profound beauty drew suitors from distant lands to Lavo, a kingdom most desired for the greatness and allure of its ruler’s daughter, Jamadevi herself. Brave at heart and firm in spirit, Jamadevi led vast armies into the battle. With intelligence and cunning, no man could ever rival, she triumphed over many invaders. Appointed to reign over Hariphunchai, she roamed far and wide across the kingdom, leading forces of warriors, monks, pundits and craftsmen in brave attempts to expand her territory. However, before Queen Jamadevi could achieve her greatest desire, the storm of a great war erupted. With her beloved land and freedom at stake, the revered Queen Jamadevi and her loyal warriors were about to encounter the most mighty and terrifying army ever, knowing that if they lost, all would be lost.

Unsurprisingly, the story is a full of fiction, the supernatural ability of the ruler, and an overbearing emphasis on love for the kingdom. The release will be timely and will possibly intensify the already heated debate on the reform of Article 112 (the lèse-majesté law). Thai hyper-royalists have lately tried to substantiate their claim that Thailand has remained an independent nation thanks to the sacrifice and bravery of past kings and queens. Therefore, those who strive to amend the law, designed to protect the dignity of the monarchy, must be regarded as “ungrateful” or even “threatening” to the royal institution and the Thai nationhood.

It doesn’t take a film expert to determine that the leading actress, Princess Ubolratana, is at best Madonna à la Thailand when it comes to acting. Wooden and emotionless, Ubolratana’s acting is excruciating. Yet, she has continued to appear in many films and enjoy her superstardom in Thailand, something that she had long yearned for.

Whenever reports on the state of inter-religious relations in Malaysia find their way into the world media, the tenor is worrying. One reads of “body snatching,” ominous places called “faith rehabilitation centres,” attacks on houses of worship, and the atrophying ties of friendship and trust between the country’s Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Tellingly, whereas media reports from the 1970s and 1980s depicted Malaysia as a plural country marked by “racial” divides, these now appear eclipsed by religious differences. Editorials on Malaysian politics paint a similarly bleak picture, highlighting the cynical manipulation of religious sentiment by an increasingly authoritarian state, the “radicalisation” or growing conservatism of Malaysia’s Muslim majority, and the ensuing resentment, even intellectual “ghettoisation” among some in the country’s non-Muslim minorities.

Whose responsibility?

Reading media coverage of Malaysia, one might be forgiven for thinking that one man alone is responsible for this situation: Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia between 1981 and 2003. The complex legacy of his twenty-two year long premiership cannot be dealt with at the requisite depth in an essay of this length, but I would argue that the overall failure of an inter-religious dialogue culture to take root in Malaysia has less to do with elite machinations than with widespread, if misplaced, misgivings over such dialogues.

Nonetheless, as such encounters are thankfully becoming increasingly normal around the world, inter-religious dialogue appears to be gradually finding greater acceptance in Malaysia, too. This will also be helped greatly if the spirit necessary for such dialogical encounters, the attitude of “come as you are, not as I want you to be,” is respected. Because while many Malaysian Muslims appear convinced by the need to engage more substantively with their Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, animist or atheist compatriots, many others are put off by what they perceive to be unwarranted meddling in theological matters by forces hostile to their religion.

It is thus intellectual dishonesty to use fictitious, disingenuously arabicised terminology such as “ummat kitab” to seek theological legitimation for out-conversion from Islam. Of course, many learned scholars have argued that the act of leaving Islam must be distinguished from the act of treason, and such a debate is an important one for Muslim communities to have. However, foisting a discussion of so-called “apostasy” on calls to strengthen the much needed inter-religious dialogue in Malaysia is counterproductive. I wish to steer clear of the “apostasy” question that featured in some of the previous contributions, and focus instead on the actual instances of inter-religious dialogue in Malaysia – or rather the impediments such dialogues face.

The ‘resurgence’ of religion

No religious community speaks with a singular voice – including, of course, Malaysian Muslims. But that there are a couple of hundred, perhaps even as many as tens of thousands who have left the religion of their birth, should not detract us from the fact that for many millions of others, Islam matters more than ever before. Their turn to religion was of course cleverly utilised by the Mahathir government, which portrayed itself as a spirited defender of Muslim interests. But it was not public policy that led so many Malaysian Muslims, along with co-religionists elsewhere and, in fact, people of religion around the world, to become more observant of their religious duties.

Although he never had much time for public displays of piety, Prime Minister Mahathir had in his own ways strong sympathies for the abstemious and yet tolerant, open-minded kaum muda-suffused interpretation of the Islamic message which he had imbibed in his childhood and youth. He appreciated earlier than most of his contemporaries the rallying and motivating power inherent in Islam, and he understood that his vision for modernisation was best realised with rather than against the faith.

An Abrahamic dialogue

Although his detractors in PAS (The Islamic Party of Malaysia) employed various unsavoury epithets to highlight Mahathir’s opposition to the establishment of Islamic rule, at no point of his career can he be described as someone opposed to religion or even as a secularist in the received meaning of seeking to separate the religious from the social and relegate the sacred to the private sphere alone.

It is important to remind ourselves that Mahathir’s positive predisposition towards religion extended beyond his own. In many of his speeches, he stated that human relationships in situations marked by a retreat of religion from society – a condition which Mahathir had detected in the predominantly Christian countries of the modern West – become brittle and ultimately unravel under the burden of materialism and selfishness.

Humankind, Mahathir often stated, was unable to order its universe without reference to a higher being. It was thus, Mahathir averred, post-Christian and not Christian Europe that had “lost its spiritual anchor” and was confronting meaninglessness and decline on account of its “spiritual emptiness.”

While one must remain mindful of the many discriminatory effects of the government’s “Islamisation” policy on the country’s non-Muslim communities, it is important to acknowledge the deep respect for religion, in particular the Abrahamic faiths, which Mahathir expressed in this and many similar instances. Some of his views on Hinduism and Buddhism, on the other hand, are deeply problematic, but must be explored elsewhere.

Not a Muslim thinker

In view of his only rudimentary religious education, Mahathir cannot be described as a Muslim thinker. It is legitimate, however, to describe him as a Muslim statesman. Like many of the Muslim world’s great 20th century statesmen, Mahathir’s legacy on the international stage is far less contentious than some of the effects his twenty-two year rule have had on Malaysian society.

The politics and policies of the long Mahathir era are often said to have prepared the ground for the difficult environment in which inter-religious relations presently find themselves. There is some truth to that, but Mahathir also made some extraordinary efforts at building bridges between faiths – in particular between the Abrahamic faiths. In a notable division of labour, Mahathir appears to have left the outreach to Confucianism to his then deputy Anwar Ibrahim. Mahathir was thus keynote speaker at the World Evangelical Fellowship convention in Kuala Lumpur in 2001 and the 50th anniversary celebration of the Council of Malaysian Churches in 1997.

Mahathir does not appear to have been opposed to the idea of dialogical encounters between practitioners of different faith traditions, in particular between adherents of the Abrahamic faiths. Quite notably, despite the odd lapse, Mahathir also regularly sought to educate Malay-Muslim audiences on the difference between being Jewish, Israeli and Zionist – differences that were becoming less and less clear in coffee-shop chatter.

Mahathir often argued that while religions were frequently part of the problem, in view of the magnitude of the challenges facing humanity as a whole, they would simply have to be part of the solution, too.

[Read more →]

The Pheua Thai government has now firmly clarified its position on moves to reform Thailand’s lese majeste law.  The Bangkok Post quotes Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung who said:

Some people seem to overreach their bounds and express their wishes to amend Section 112…What right do they have to change it? What power? They can only talk…The [Pheu Thai] party will never change this law. I will also oppose anyone who proposes that it is changed.

He has, of course, said similar things before. But there is now no doubt that the lese majeste law will be maintained by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s Pheua Thai-led government for the foreseeable future. This raises all manner of intriguing questions and scenarios.

I think some of these were summed up best by Singapore-based political scientist Pavin Chachavalpongpun in The Wall Street Journal when he argued that:

Puea Thai supporters suspect that Ms. Yingluck may have struck a grand bargain with the traditional elites: If she leaves the lese-majeste law alone, they will not overturn her government by street protests, court cases and military intervention, as they did previous pro-Thaksin governments. If this is true, the class war is over and the Puea Thai has become an accepted part of the Thai elitist world.

This might bring stability to Thailand for a time. But it is not sustainable. In their frustration, Ms. Yingluck’s supporters may turn to more radical groups. The more the elites exploit the lese-majeste law for their own purposes, the more they erode true support for the monarchy. By stopping progress toward democracy, they are ensuring that when class war resurfaces it will be even more divisive.

This is an important line of argument and one that will, I’m sure, be developed over the months ahead.

Claudio Cicuzza, A Mirror Reflecting the Entire World: The Pali Buddhapādamaṅgala or ‘Auspicious Signs on the Buddha’s Feet’  

Critical Edition with English Translation.  Bangkok and Lumbini: Materials for the Study of the Tripitaka Vol. 6, Fragile Palm Leaves Foundation and Lumbini Research Institute, 2011.  Foreword by Peter Skilling.  Pp. lxiii, 224; ills., bib., index.

Shimizu Yohei, Bodhi Tree Worship in Theravada Buddhism

Nagoya: Studia Asiatica 9, Nagoya University Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 2010.  Pp. vii, 109; ills., bib., index.

Reviewed by Justin Thomas McDaniel.

I am excited to review these two books together because they represent some of the best new work coming out of Southeast Asian Buddhist textual studies and because they afford us the opportunity to reflect on several important developments in the field. After briefly describing the books, I will offer some remarks on these developments, emphasizing especially the importance of publication series coming from Asia, the rise of textual-anthropological approaches and material-culture studies, and a broadening of the study of Indology to take more seriously Pali and Sanskrit texts composed inSoutheast Asia.

Claudio Cicuzza is one of the leading Indologists working in Thailand today. His breadth of language skills in Pali and Sanskrit, as well as his growing knowledge of vernacular Thai work, provides him with the skills not only to translate and analyze important works in classical Indic languages, but also to study how those works circulated and interacted with the intellectual, artistic, and ritual life of Siam/Thailand. His most recent book, A Mirror Reflecting the Entire World, is a meticulously researched and well written edition and translation of the Buddhapādamaṅgala, with an extensive introduction (as well as a foreword by Peter Skilling).  The text is an anonymous Pali work most likely originating in Ayutthaya in the sixteenth century. It has circulated in manuscript form in Thailand, and “the Pali of this text has been strongly influenced by Thai syntax and prosody” (page l).  As Skilling notes, “it also shares in a broader intertextuality of Southeast Asian Pali literature” (page xi). Cicuzza consulted six manuscripts and a printed edition in Thailand. He provides detailed lists of the various maṅgalas (auspicious signs) in important Pali texts like the Pajjamadhu, Jinālaṅkāraṭīkā, and the Paṭhamasambodhi, among others. He also provides photographs of one of the original manuscripts and a thorough bibliography and index. The English translation and Pali edition are both of very good quality. The detailed bibliographic information on individual manuscripts is presented clearly, and references are made to overlapping content and/or concepts in the Buddhavaṃsa and Apadāna.  Cicuzza brings us not merely a straightforward introduction to the text at hand, though. He also offers some interesting thoughts on the significance of footprints in general in the study of religion and culture in non-Asian contexts, thoughts which lead him to suggest that footprints of the Buddha were so important inSoutheast Asia because of the popularity of walking images of the Buddha.

As for the content of the Buddhapādamaṅgala, it is a commentary on the 108 marks (lakkhaṇa) on the bottom of the feet of the Buddha. It refers to itself as a vaṇṇanā, aṭṭhakathā, and vinicchaya—all forms of exegesis, commentary, and analysis. The 108 marks include the cakkavāḷa (mountain range surrounding the world), the sovatthika (sash of gold and diamonds), and suriya (sun), among others. As Cicuzza writes, these elements seem “to yield a kind of map of the whole universe, a mosaic in which the constituents of the world are parts of the body, the mind and the Dhamma of the Buddha” (page xxxvi). This is a good point, one that should have been expanded. There is a whole body of ritual and cosmological texts in Southeast Asia that  describe the connections between the microcosm of the human body and the macrocosm of the earth, levels of hell and heaven, animal realms, and the like. Cicuzza gestures towards these connections in a lengthy footnote. There he shows possible similarities between Tibetan tantric concepts and this text, but there are much more tangible connections to texts and practices inThailand. Moreover, I would have liked to see more information about the liturgical and ritual uses of the text in Thai pasts and presents. He hints at these, but does not offer extensive explanations. While I am confident that he is knowledgeable about these uses of the text, these types of speculations do not seem to be his goal. Instead, quite appropriately, he sticks to the text at hand. Since we know so little about Pali literature in the region, new editions of translations of these “local” Pali texts are of paramount importance for future work on the textual and manuscript cultures of Buddhist Southeast Asia.

Shimizu’s work is quite different from Cicuzza’s. While each book offers a detailed study of one of the major indices of Buddhist visual culture – footprints and Bodhi trees, respectively – Shimizudoes not go into deep philological and codicological detail like Cicuzza. Instead, he offers a broader material-cultural study of Bodhi tree ritualization and textual sources in various locales. He places the honoring of the Bodhi tree within the larger context of the religious significance of plants and trees. I found his description of pre-Buddhist worship of the Aśvattha tree particularly interesting. The Aśvattha tree, which is believed to be the pre-Buddhist name of the Bodhi tree, is found on earthenware buried in tombs from the time of the great Indus Valley civilizations and mentioned in the Ṛg Veda, the Atharva Veda, the Mahābharata, the Upaniṣads, and other non-Buddhist Sanskrit texts. Shimizu’s book becomes not just a study of Bodhi trees, but a useful source for the study of the place of plant life in Indic art and texts more broadly. [Read more →]

Andrew Selth, the veteran Australian Burma-watcher, has provided a very helpful assessment of recent political events for the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter. Selth offers a wide range of astute observations. One I particularly like introduces the road ahead for President Thein Sein’s government. Selth argues that:

The task facing Thein Sein is daunting. After more than 50 years of brutal, inept and ideologically distorted military rule, there is hardly a single sector of Burma’s government, economy and civil society that is not begging for reform and desperate for financial, technical and other kinds of assistance. Some steps can be taken quickly and relatively painlessly, but the depth and complexity of the challenges faced by Burma are such that fundamental reform will take considerable time, effort and resources.

He then finishes the piece by suggesting:

For her part, Aung San Suu Kyi is facing the challenge posed to all popular leaders, of making the transition from political icon to effective politician. For the time being, she seems prepared to work with Thein Sein in achieving national reconciliation and incremental reform. This is a pragmatic strategy but it carries risks. It has already upset some of her supporters. It will also be difficult to sustain. For there will come a time when pressure will build for Burma’s ‘disciplined democracy’ to give way to a genuinely representative system of government. That may prove the real test of the President’s reform program.

The entire analysis is worth digesting.

Yesterday, the Khana Nitirat, the group of seven lecturers at Thammasat University who work to put law in the service of the people, held a public seminar on the nullifcation of the 2007 Constitution. The Sriburapha Auditorium at Thammasat University was overflowing with people listening inside, and exchanging ideas, browsing books and doing political performance art outside. Read reports summarizing the seminar here, here, and here, and view video of the seminar here, here, and here.

Yet rather than write about the important proposal of the Khana Nitirat here, what I want to do instead is to flag the threatening response that their work has generated. In particular, I turn to the comments section of an article about yesterday’s seminar posted on the online version of ผู้จัดการ/Manager newspaper. The article was the ผู้จัดการ/Manager take on the seminar and the Khana Nitirat proposal. The comments are full of unconstructive misreadings of the Khana Nitirat proposal, but more than that, a virulent thread of hatred.These comments do not seem to be in the interest of furthering debate about democracy, rule of law, and monarchy, but rather shutting it down, by making the possible risks for entering it grave and unpredictable.

Perhaps if I read the comments on ผู้จัดการ/Manager articles more frequently, I would be inured to comments which suggest that people be murdered or burned alive. But I do not, and I am not, so I offer a catalogue of the comments posted, circa 12 noon Thailand time on 23 January 2012.

At that time, there were a total of 227 comments. While several comments took the proposal of the Khana Nitirat seriously, many comments chose to forgo engagement and instead engage in harassment and threats against the members of the Khana Nitirat. Of primary concern here, commentators cast the members of the Khana Nitirat as less than human, called for the involvement of the military, called for surveillance, called for their deaths in a vague sense, and called for murderous vigilante violence against them. Many other comments suggested that the members of the Khana Nitirat were not-Thai and should leave the country. In what follows, the number in [ ] refers to the number of the comment which corresponds to the content noted.

Less than human

• Comparison of the members of the Khana Nitirat with dogs [50]

• Members of the Khana Nitirat are aliens [23]

• Members of the Khana Nitirat are not human [186]

Call for involvement of the military:

• What are soldiers doing about this [31, 110]

• Call for a coup [148]

• Where is the Army’s pride [150]

Call for surveillance:

• For the names, addresses, phone numbers, and maps of the house location of the members of the Khana Nitirat to be published [41, 86,117]

• Listing of the names of the members of the Khana Nitirat with the admonition to remember it well [159]

• Request for other commentators to be the eyes and ears, i.e., to be an informal surveillance network [78]

Call for vigilante and/or state violence, including murder:

• Soldiers should disappear the members of the Khana Nitirat by throwing them from helicopters [45]

• Along with their families, the members of the Khana Nitirat should be necklaced and burned alive in front of their houses [44]

• Members of the Khana Nitirat should die a violent death (ตายโหง) [4,10]

• Members of the Khana Nitirat should be beheaded [29]

• Members of the Khana Nitirat should be beheaded and their heads put on stakes outside the front of the entrance to Thammasat University [85]

• Ajarn Worachet should be executed [111]

• Take care of the members of the Khana Nitirat with an eye for eye, a tooth for a tooth [105]

• General death threats [24, 37, 79, 102, 153]

• Thammasat University should be burned down [111]

• Trash should be thrown at the members of the Khana Nitirat [179]

To be clear: my point is not to suggest that the proposal of the Khana Nitirat should not be engaged critically. But the comments posted on ผู้จัดการ/Manager are neither critical nor about engagement. They are about calling for violence. In what universe is it appropriate to call for someone whose ideas one disagrees with to be beheaded and their head put on a stake outside a university? This is an attempt to intimidate and threaten the members of the Khana Nitirat, as well as shut down, not open, criticism and conversation. I would further ask, what does this mean – for the present and future of politics, about the possibility of the rule of law, about the protection of human rights, and about the status of the freedom of expression in Thailand? Does dissent – no matter the form – remove one’s claim to be human? In the present political moment, perhaps.

Elizabeth Fitzgerald is the pen name of an observer of Thai politics and history. She can be reached at lizziefitzy@gmail.com.

Today The Myanmar Times has published a bumper edition. It showcases an interview with former Prime Minister and Military Intelligence supremo, Khin Nyunt. If you read right to the end you’ll find he even starts to riff on the theme of “a sufficient life”. It’s a good read.

Today’s paper also includes two interesting articles on conflict and politics in the country. One is about a nascent peace movement which brings together Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Muslim leaders. All are working towards a peaceful and non-violent future.

The other describes efforts to build new dialogue between the government of President Thein Sein and the Kachin Independence Organisation, the political wing of the main Kachin ethno-nationalist movement. The Kachin Independence Army has been fighting the Burmese government since its 17-year ceasefire collapsed on 9 June 2011.

These two articles are notable for a few reasons (and not just because I am quoted at the end of each).  They point to what is, by historical standards, a rapid and radical change in the content of Burma’s mainstream media. They also highlight a genuine diversity of voices and a fair range of opinion.

For instance, I doubt that two years ago you could say, “and, for his own sake, the president needs to be working every last angle in an effort to stop the further fraying of Myanmar’s democratic experiment.” Things are changing… 

*****

But some things are still the same. As an illustration, New Mandala readers will want to digest this article about a Burmese indie rock band struggling against the yoke of United States government sanctions. Perhaps once sanctions are lifted (which is only a matter of time, right?) an enterprising young US Embassy staffer could get these guys invited to play inside the compound. That would be a nice touch. And probably a rocking party.

For a flavour of their music, this video is a terrific place to start. The image at the top of this post is, you will find, a still from that video.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia recently announced the setting-up of the Institute of Wasatiyyah at the recently concluded Global Movement of Moderates conference. The institute and the movement – brainchild of the PM – is to promote moderation globally.

Most Malaysians are of the opinion that Mr. Najib Razak is a hypocrite. After all, if he was sincere, he would promote moderation in Malaysia. Instead his tenure has seen an unprecedented surge in racial and religious strife that most Malaysians believe are emanating from him.

The disruption of this town hall meeting, ostensibly by UMNO supported thugs who specifically targeted Malaysian Indians is a tried and tested method by UMNO to intimidate, especially minority groups but also Malay Muslims, into supporting UMNO.

But this time, UMNO may have got its strategy wrong. HINDRAF and the Anything But UMNO (ABU) movement (a coalition of political parties and civil society movements) have vowed to continue their roadshow to promote the ABU campaign geared towards removing UMNO at the next general election.

The timing of the mob attack was perfect. It came just days after the Global Movement of Moderates conference ended, just like the decision to appeal against Anwar Ibrahim’s verdict.

Will Najib Razak, in his attempt to hold on to power, allow Malaysia to go over the edge or can Malaysians put a stop to this?

Watch out for Malaysia as the Year of the Water Dragon is definitely going to be an exciting one.

[There are several videos of the incident on cyberspace. Watch another video of the mobs HERE. Despite all these evidence, the police chief of the state where this incident happened (Selangor) has dismissed that such an event occurred. Only in Malaysia.]

SANG SUMNUEK WRITERS

Open Letter to Fellow Writers and the Thai People

Regarding Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code  

In July 2011, 365 Thai writers from all over the country signed a letter agreeing that Article 112 of Thai Criminal Code, or the “Lèse Majesté Law”, should be amended to be in line with basic human rights principles on the freedom of expression of the people under a democratic regime. The letter also states that the amendment of the law would protect the monarchy from being used as an instrument of politics, which is one of the important factors that undeniably creates conflict, inequality and violence in Thai society.

Apart from the writers, there were people from various groups and sectors in society, including a former Prime Minister, scholars, and influential and well-respected intellectuals who signed the letter. There were also Thai people who albeit have different political views but came out and agreed on this issue: that the use of Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code is urgently in need of reform for Thailand to become a civilised society replete with justice, compassion, peace and progress under a truly democratic regime.

However, the situation in Thailand is still going in the opposite direction. The use of Article 112 in order to persecute, threaten, harass, intimidate and constrain the people is ever more increasing.

In 2011, many Lèse Majesté cases came to be widely discussed in society. Thai citizens and international observers have raised questions about the verdicts in these cases. Increasingly, the situation has caused the credibility of the Thai legal process and the respect of basic human rights in Thailand to waver.

In addition, there are media outlets bereft of integrity and an ill-intentioned group unconcerned about the future of the country who are trying to distort, malign and attack the proposal for the amendment of Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code as an attempt to “topple the institution”, “topple the monarchy” or an action “without love for the country”. They have gone so far as to allege that the proposal itself is actually a violation of Article 112. This creates even more misunderstanding, confusion and conflict in society.

As part of the increasing intensification of the enforcement of Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, there are prisoners who have been given sentences comparable to those given for serious, violent crime for the sole reason that they expressed their opinions.  Furthermore, there is a movement to malign, prosecute and harass ordinary people who want the country to be truly democratic. We – Sang Sumnuek Writers – see that it is time for the people who love justice, envision democracy and want the monarchy to be free from being an instrument of politics, to come together and push for the amendment of Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code to happen as soon as possible.

We – Sang Sumnuek Writers – agree with the proposal to amend Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code by the Khana Nitirassadorn because we see the proposal as an initiative that will create a path to justice within society, and create a norm for the protection of rights and the freedom of expression of the people within a democratic regime. Moreover, it will protect the monarchy from being used as an instrument of politics in the long run.

The proposal for the amendment of Article 112 by the Khana Nitirassadorn can be summed up as follows: [Read more →]