New Mandala

16 responses so far ↓

• 1 XKMasada // Sep 23, 2006 at 7:37 pm

  I’ve read your post on your review of the Thaksinization of Thailand. But I disagree that it has stood the test of time.

  You noted how the book described Thaksin’s effectiveness at “create for himself a remarkable base of loyal supporters”, controlling the media, and changing the face of Thai political discourse. And how this made him remarkably powerful.

  But the ease with which he was removed from power suggests that all of this was in vain, and that any power, no matter how great, is reduced to insignificance when the palace wishes to strike down on it.

  Power in Thailand, no matter how effectively and innovatively it might have been accumulated or to what good ends it might be used, is a useless endeaver. Why bother, when in the end, you’ll be struck down.

  A book like the Thaksinization is useless as long as the current King is still alive.

• 2 Nicholas Farrelly // Sep 23, 2006 at 9:38 pm

  XKMasada,

  Thanks for your comment. There are some important points here, so I will provide some brief clarification.

  As I note in the review, Ukrist and McCargo go to some lengths to describe how a political crisis – perhaps provoked by the alienation of “ultra-conservative forces\” – could unravel the Thaksin Prime Ministership.

  This seems like a keen observation, especially when made in the heady days of 2004.

  They foreshadow the kind of showdown that we have just seen. They never argued that Thaksin was indestructible. They just happened to focus on his ascendancy at that time and the ways that he had changed politics (and political economy) in Thailand. They didn’t argue that he was necessarily immune to the palace and its intrigues.

  Perhaps, as you say, the type of power Thaksin accumulated has been shown to be largely worthless. This is an interesting and potentially important observation. It is also an observation that, in my view, could not have been made with any confidence 3 years ago, or 3 months ago or even 3 weeks ago.

  That’s why I am still uncomfortable dismissing the Ukrist and McCargo book as “useless”. I do, however, see why some may feel strongly that the Thaksin years were anomalous. Some may see recent events as a return to the standard pattern, now that the conservatives are back in charge.

  NSF

• 3 XKMasada // Sep 24, 2006 at 6:59 am

  Thanks for your response, NSF; those are some very helpful comments.

  As a Thai, I’m feeling emotionally frustrated at prospects for the future of Thai politics. The palace has proven itself incredibly capable of surviving in any type of regime – whether it be military dictatorship, unstable civilian government, or stable civilian government – and playing a key role in there downfall.

  The question that I, and many Thais are asking is: what next? If the palace has shown that it is unwilling to co-exist with a stable (and by definition, highly popular) civilian government, then what type of government is it willing to co-exist with? And is that a type of government that going to be an appropriate for one where people have already had a taste for populism?

  Ukrit and McCargo describe a near-complete chapter in Thai political history. It is a great prescient guide to the Rise and Fall of Thaksin. But to me, it is incomplete because they don’t give an indication about what the logical next step is.

• 4 New Mandala » Chronicle of Higher Education: McCargo Interview // Sep 27, 2006 at 8:13 am

  [...] David Glenn, a journalist at The Chronicle of Higher Education, has sent me the link to the transcript of an interview conducted with Duncan McCargo, one of the best known writers on the now defunct Thaksin government.  As I noted in an earlier post, last year I reviewed McCargo’s co-authored book on the former Prime Minister.  The full text of the Chronicle of Higher Education article is only available to the Chronicle’s subscribers after the temporary link I have been sent expires in a few days time.  There is, however, much in the article that will interest New Mandala readers.  I have taken a few choice quotations from the transcript and, with any luck, a permanent electronic version will become available soon. [...]

• 5 Asst.Prof.Dr. Pacapol Anurit // Feb 9, 2007 at 9:28 pm

  I’m writing up academic papers with special reference to the theme “The De-Thaksinisation of Thailand” and would be pleased to co-work and/or receive suggestions.

• 6 Vichai N // Feb 9, 2007 at 10:58 pm

  Many in this forum seem to believe that Thaksin Shinawatra, despite his anomalous rule, would have survived and flourished still . . . had Thailand without its HMK. But is that presumption valid?

  Southeast Asia had even more powerful ‘democracy-defending’ monsters like Marcos, and later on Joseph Estrada (whom many Filipinos claim was even more popular to the majority Philippine rurals and poor). And Thailand’s Suharto too was another powerful corrupt and was too deposed extra-constitutionally. And the Philippines and Indonesia we know had never had Kings.

  ‘De-Thaksinisation’ is no more different to ‘De-Marcosation’ or ‘De-Suhartosation’. All were popular people protests to oust shameless corrupt leaders they can no longer accept nor tolerate. And once begun the ouster of these leaders could no longer be stopped, with violence or without.

  Personally I believe HMK’s presence helped prevent bloodshed from the Thaksin issue upheaval (and in the case of the Suchinda upheaval, stop more blood being shed). Thailand’s HMK could NOT ‘prevent’ or ‘encourage’ the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra . . . because once the Thai people made up their minds, every one else, including HMK, can only go with the flow.

• 7 Srithanonchai // Feb 10, 2007 at 12:10 am

  Ajarn Pacapol: Just two brief remarks. First, I would not refer (De-)Thaksinization to Thailand. That was a vast exaggeration already in the title of McCargo/Ukrist’s book. If anything, Thaksin had an impact on politics, while the other societal sub-systems remained largely unaffected. Teachers did not change their instruction methods because of Thaksin, neither did doctors, artists, lecturers, lawyers, or mass-media people change their modes of operation because of Thaksin.

  Second, even in politics one needs to be rather careful. Did Thaksin push through new socio-political structures or did he rather merely maximised existing structures to his own benefit? I would opt for the second option. Patronage networks at the national level, or phuak structures in the provinces existed before Thaksin, and they will exist after him. Look at the NLA, the CDA, and the CDC: Do they consist of individuals or of members of socio-political networks? Rather the latter.

  Thaksin is not pricipally different at all from Chartchai, Chavalit, Banharn, Suwat, Somsak, or Banharn. What distinguishes him from them is his great energy and determination, his unsurpassed egocentrism, his visionary and modern approach to political marketing, and, of course, his immense personal wealth, which has made him basically independent from financiers. Simply speaking, where Banharn or Kamnan Poh could “buy” Suphanburi and Chonburi, respectively, Thaksin could aim for the entire country.

  With the departure of Thaksin, Thai politics is de-Thaksinized already. However, the structures that enabled him to do what he did are general Thai socio-political structures that continue to exist.

• 8 Srithanonchai // Feb 10, 2007 at 1:35 am

  Who precisely are “the Thai people who made up their minds”, those in BKK, or those up-country, and what were their relative strategic advantages?

• 9 Tosakan // Feb 10, 2007 at 2:11 am

  What does De-Thaksinization mean?

  Same as De-Nazification?

  De-Baathicifation?

  Was there a Thaksinology in the Thaksinocracy?

  The problems were not Thaksin. The problems were and are still institutional.

  But, of course, no serious Thai academic will ever challenge or go after the institutional structures that perpetuate dysfunctions in Thai politics, which is why the same problems keep repeating themselves time and time again.

  Thai academics are part of the problem, and like political cronies of powerful figures, they will never bite the hand that feeds them.

• 10 Bystander // Feb 10, 2007 at 8:19 am

  To use a medical metaphor, the ‘conventional wisdom’ is that what has been ailing Thai society is a ‘pathogenic’ agent, reads Thaksin, and his minions of corrupted politicians and bureaucrats. According to this view, if you get rid of the ‘pathogen’, all will be fine and dandy. The ‘De-Thaksinizing’ coup is thus like an antibiotics or an antivirals. Disease cured. End of story. Life goes on as it has always been, or so they thought.

  But while the above diagnosis may appeal to many, in part, because it absolves most people of their guilt, it may well be too simplistic.

  Perhaps Thailand can better be described as suffering from a different kind of disease though. If Thailand can be compared to a human being, one must say that she is not one known for virtues or moderation, despite her constant proclamation to the contrary. Her fortune in life is derived largely from resources that has been passed on to her from earlier generations, and perhaps from her agreeable personality, and from being a good cook possibly, but her relatively lapse personal discipline is a handicap that hinder her from realizing her full potential. She would also be someone who didn’t pay much attention to school in her youth, prone to vanity and luxuries, fairly excitable, drinks and party excessively, and of easy morals. So, just as someone who leads an easy life like this is not likely to age gracefully, perhaps Thailand is going through the same phase as well? Thus, what is ailing Thailand may better be compared to some kind of social ‘degenerative’ disease, a la various neurodegernative diseases–alzheimer’s, dementia, and the like, for example, for which Thaksin and the ensuing conflicts are but one of many symptoms. And what constitute to the conditions is the way every Thais go about their lives, for better or for worse. Thaksin, the juntas, the elites, as much as everyone else is part of the problem.

  This view is much less comforting, admittedly, since like their medical analogies, there isn’t much one can do yet to reverse aging or cure degenerative diseases.

• 11 patiwat // Feb 10, 2007 at 9:51 am

  Thaksin wasn’t the disease – he was the symptom.

  The root cause of the crisis was the 1997 Constitution, a constitution that assured that Thailand would get a strong and stable government, able to develop and execute radical long-term plans without falling apart every few months like the governments of the past – although some called that a parliamentary dictatorship. That’s why a 2/5’s vote of the House was needed for a no confidence vote.

  We didn’t want our MPs to be whores that defected to whatever party paid them the most money – even though some claimed that MPs should be able to defect whenever they wanted. That’s why the 90-day-before-elections party registration limit was put in place and Snoh was so unwilling to just leave the TRT.

  By design, the constitution created a strong executive branch with a firmer division between the executive and legislative branches – even though some called this the first step to a presidential system. That’s why MPs were forced to resign from the House in order to become Cabinet ministers. That’s why we adopted the party-list system.

  The constitution assumed that the electorate could provide better checks and balances for the government than the bureaucracy could – even though some people claimed that the people are too dumb to care about their own rights. That’s why we had an elected Senate and an Ombudsman.

  The constitution strongly advocated decentralization of power – even though some people said that rural politicians were even more corrupt than national politicians. But that’s why we had TAOs, PAOs, and later the CEO-governor model.

  The de-Thaksinization of Thailand isn’t just about exiling Thaksin. It also requires a dismantling of the key innovations of the 1997 Constitution.

• 12 jeru // Feb 10, 2007 at 11:34 am

  De-Thaksinisation do rhyme with detoxification.

• 13 Srithanonchai // Feb 10, 2007 at 3:10 pm

  And, of course, the academic sphere itself, i.e. universities, is just as disfunctional as the political arena is. But while academics are ready to criticize politics, they reject seeing their own substantial faults. Speaking of hypocrisy…

• 14 Srithanonchai // Feb 10, 2007 at 7:52 pm

  When one speaks about De-Thaksinization, one will also have to ask what will be put in place instead. And this is a good question to direct at the current constitution-drafting process. One might say that well, yes, the people’s political roles will be increased. However, this does not seem to be the case. The headline of Matichon’s Sunday edition (February 11) reads “The new constitution presages the weakening of the political sector and the restoration of bureaucratic power.” Thaksin is, so to speak, taken as an excuse by the monarchist and bureaucratic forces to wrest powers from the politicians and the people and return it where it was under pre-1997 conditions–the bureaucracy. Thus, weak coalition governments with parties riddled by factional infighting, so Matichon, is needed in order to put the “civil service party” back to where they used to be.

  On this way, important political rights of the people will have to be sacrificed. This concerns both the election of party-list MPs and of senators. The party list is of particular concern, because, for the first time, it enabled voters to translate their national political preferences into votes, thereby substantially increasing the citizens’ representational participation. This established an electoral link between voters and national-level politicians that was previously absent. This link, then, was an important element in decreasing the power of the bureaucracy. For this reason, it has to go.

  It remains to be seen, whether the CDC’s decision to abolish the party-list system will be resisted in the public hearings and surveys, and finally put back into the constititution.

  The drafting of the constitution warrants close observation. Equally important will be how the referendum will be conducted. There are some signs that an open debate and moves to push for a no-vote might be prohibited. This would seriously impact on the legitimacy of the referendum, and perhaps its outcome.

  In sum, there is more to the issue of “De-Thaksinization” than initially meets the eye.

• 15 Srithanonchai // Feb 10, 2007 at 8:03 pm

  To Khun Patiwat: TAOs and PAOs already existed before the 1997 constitutuion. But it openened the way for introducing direct elections of executives, and the transfer of powers via the Decentralization Act and the Decentralization Plan. Also, the previous sukhapiban had to be changed into thesaban tambon as a result of the constitution. The CEO governors have nothing to do with the constitution, but represent Thaksin’s attempt at centralizing policy-implementation power and establishing some degree of horizontal integration at the provincial level (suan phumiphak), which is highly fragemented. This sort of governor could rather be seen as contradicting the constitution’s push for democracy, especially if you consider Article 78.

• 16 Srithanonchai // Feb 10, 2007 at 8:04 pm

  PS: sorry — “push for decentralization”, not “push for democracy”.

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