A few weeks ago I posted comment by Charles Keyes on Sondhi Limthongkul’s presentation in Seattle. Keyes’ comment was first circulated on the Thailand-Laos-Cambodia (TLC) email list. In response to comment on that list Mike Montesano made the following contribution:
Whatever one’s views of Thaksin or the putsch that has, at least for the present, ended his premiership, it is high time to put an end to these very curious “Thaksin was the only politician in my memory who did anything for the poor.” lines. In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Khuekrit Pramot and his finance minister Bunchu Rotchanasathian introduced a raft of policies aimed at Thailand’s rural poor. In comparative perspective, the thoughtful design and frankly progressive rationale (little surprise, in view of Bunchu’s very long association with the Thai left) of these policies set a standard not equaled till today. In the event, Khuekrit and Bunchu had only a brief period in office to implement their policies. Nevertheless, many have endured, both as specific measures (consider, for example, the Thai rural credit system) and as examples to leaders like Thaksin and his advisors. As luck would have it, too, last year saw the publication of Nawi Rangsiwararak’s excellent Bon thanon sai kanmueang khong Bunchu Rotchanasathian. From this book one can learn much about that way that a sophisticated, committed man engaged with the problem of social inequality in Thailand in an era neglected by all too many commentators on recent events.
Keyes has now responded to Montesano on the TLC list.
I realize that I never responded to this comment of yours. There is a need for a study of all programs that were supposed to benefit the rural poor going back to at least the 1960s with the promotion of the government savings bank and the so-called Tambon Development Program. These were almost totally ineffective in offering villagers opportunities to make decisions about how government monies should be used to improve their lives. I agree that the Kukrit government’s ngoen phan program was a significant change and I take your point about the role Boonchu played. However, I also know from my own study of the successor programs in the late 1970s and early 1980s that villagers (whom I interviewed in several parts of the NE and North and in Songkhla in the south) still found these to be overly managed by the government, and especially by the district office. In other words, most programs for the rural poor up to the Thaksin government were manifestations of haut en bas rather than ones which villagers felt they had any input into. While it may be possible to find linkages at the policy level between Kukrit/Boonchu and Thaksin, from the perspective of villagers — based on my restudy in 2005-06 of a village in Mahasarakham where I had carried out fieldwork first in 1963-64 — it was only under the Thaksin regime that villagers really felt that they had ownership of programs under the Tambon Administrative Authority. I observed villagers deciding how loans should be made and pushing strongly on representatives of the BAAC for debt relief. This sense of ownership was the primary basis for rural support of TRT, not payments by huakhanaen.
11 responses so far ↓
1 patiwat // Dec 12, 2006 at 8:12 am
Andrew, could you post some links to Keyes’ 1963-64 work as well as his 2005-06 restudy?
2 Andrew Walker // Dec 12, 2006 at 11:08 am
I will see if Keyes has written any of this up.
3 Andrew Walker // Dec 12, 2006 at 11:08 am
Another contribution to this discussion from the TLC List:
It is important not to lose sight of large-scale programs that did not have a “rural development” or “tambon” label, but yielded substantial benefits over wide areas populated mostly by the “rural poor.” I refer to the major highway construction, feeder road building, water-sealed privies, malaria spraying, regional agricultural and vocational schools, education generally, health facilities, etc. some of which date back to the 1950s. In most countries with large rural hinterlands, the sine qua non for raising incomes has been the ground transportation facilities. Irrigation and agricultural research and extension have also been helpful, not to mention the marketing role of the private sector. Local control over local expenditure budgets is no doubt important politically and for the sense of some local empowerment. But the contribution such mini-budgets can make to long-run economic improvement is small and must be kept in perspective, interesting though such programs are to social
scientists.
Bob Muscat
4 patiwat // Dec 12, 2006 at 2:19 pm
Don’t forget rural electrification and the 1990’s/2000’s reforms that increased rural teledensity.
Access to information and communication play an important role in improving rural livelihoods.
5 Andrew Walker // Dec 12, 2006 at 5:02 pm
A further contribution from the TLC list:
With all due respect, the point is not whether such programs for the rural poor are merely of interest to well-meaning social scientists. The original debate was whether the Thaksin government’s rural development programs were qualitatively new and effective, or just old wine in new bottles. Prof. Keyes presented rather convincing evidence (while pointing out the need for further research) that these programs were indeed relatively effective and therefore popular. They were particularly significant for the much greater degree of localparticipation involved in them (esp. via the new localgovernment bodies established under the now abrogated 1997Constitution), as opposed to the paternalistic, top-down,corruption-mired, ratchakan-style projects of earlier governments (and indeed which continue today) that pay no heed to the real needs of local communities, and in many cases are merely a source of patronage for crony contractors with links to the bureaucracy or the politician that administers that ministry.
For Thais (though not for Thai Studies programs in Western countries, perhaps) this debate is not a mere academic exercise – especially in the context of the politicalsituation in Thailand today. Prof. Keyes’ view would seem to run counter to the argument that the apologists for the coup put forward, that Thaksin’s “populism” was just a cynicalpolitical exercise to win power (in fact, I think the criticism of Thaksin’s so-called “populism” by many political commentators, both Thai and Western, was in many cases highly irresponsible and even irrational: if one buys votes and does nothing one is condemned; if one buys votes and then delivers on promised local development policies one is also condemned as a “populist”. It is very difficult to win against this elitist, paternalistic mindset of many academics and politicalcommentators – in many cases the same ones who have been crucial to building intellectual legitimacy for the coup).
Mr. Muscat’s argument on the benefits of state-directed local development, however, would be music to the ears of the royalist-military regime that has seized power in Thailand, which believes ratchakan knows best. Is this the sort of support that we should be giving this regime?
Patrick Jory.
6 Andrew Walker // Dec 12, 2006 at 8:36 pm
Further comment from Mike Montesano:
Dear Biff [Charles Keyes],
Thanks very much for the reply, and for the posting to the TLC list. Your long-term research in Mahasarakham puts you in a position to approach some of these issues with exceptional clarity. And I am not going to take issue, directly, with what you say. Nevertheless, a number of observations.
First, I would argue that Bunchu’s approach to rural poverty was a comprehensive one, with firm ideological foundations and a coherent design. In this regard, it differed considerably from Thaksin’s. This point relates to two others. While the Bunchu-Khuekrit programs are most commonly understood to consist essentially of “ngoen phan”, they were in fact far more extensive. To use ngoen phan and its successors, all of which were just as top-down as you state, to represent the entire Bunchu-Khuekrit agenda is not to do it justice. And, while in the event political turmoil in Bangkok meant that neither the Bunchu nor the Thaksin programs ever really had a fair chance to prove its long-term value, one does have to wonder whether the former may not have proved more sustainable than the latter.
A fourth observation relates to the BAAC. To be sure by 2001 many BAAC borrowers needed debt relief very badly. But their indebtedness related above all to rather abrupt changes in the structure of Thai agriculture, not least in the context of international competition, and to the failure of the BAAC to keep up with these changes. Again, however, the post-1975 BAAC and its use of borrowers’ groups were long and justifiably seen by students of rural financial markets as a relative success. And in the first decade or so of that success, Bunchu’s design for the channeling of commercial-bank funds into the rural sector was the key factor.
Fifth, these observations notwithstanding, rural people’s sense of “ownership” of programs intended for their benefit is a phenomenon of great political importance. The stress that you place on it is important for any understanding of recent events in Thailand.
For now, thanks again,
Mike Montesano
7 patiwat // Dec 13, 2006 at 4:02 am
I haven’t read Nawi Rangsiwararak’s work yet. So could somebody please explain to me what exactly policies Boonchu and Kukrit initiated that were so enduring?
The only example given is the revamping of the rural credit system. Does this mean the BAAC? Because the BAAC was established during the 1960’s – Kukrit headed his government for a short time during the mid 1970’s.
8 Empiricist // Dec 13, 2006 at 10:30 am
To “Biff” and Mike,
During the 1980’s and 1990’s the concept of ‘People Participation’ has been promoted and implemented by the development projects, small NGOs, with villagers groups throughout the country, especially in the North and the Northeast . Though few scholars may view this as the counteraction to the expansion of Communist ideology, the impact of the effort in the North and the Northeast Thailand, together with the decentralization of the government authority in administration asserted by democratic movements, have yielded great impact as fertile soil to the political campaign of Thai Rak Thai Party and its implementation, as Keyes witnessed in his revisit to Mahasarakham. Thaksin is just the opportunist politician, not the savior of the grassroots.
9 Andrew Walker // Dec 13, 2006 at 11:58 am
Another comment from TLC list, responding to Patrick Jory (see comment 5 above):
Patrick,
Wonderful! I could not agree with you more! (By the way, there is no hard evidence that “vote-buying” has determinative effects on elections.It takes place, but does it determine outcomes? I can cite several anecdotes where it did not.) The latest news on reorganization of ISOC tells the tale – elites are simply positioning the military to prevent any kind of “populist” success into the future. (See the Nation within the last few days for information.) Regardless of future elections, Thailand will be a military regime well into the future. The coup has been the death of democracy for the long term.The death of democracy is the responsibility of all those who apologize for the regime, as well as the elites who perpetrated it. Is there no shame?
Bob Albritton
10 Andrew Walker // Dec 14, 2006 at 1:23 pm
Further comment from Charles Keyes with references to his work on northeast Thailand:
Dear Mike,
You have obviously studied the Boonchu-Kukrit project more than anyone else and you should really write a longer piece on it, ending with recommending that it be reconsidered today. It would also be useful to compare/contrast this approach and that of Thaksin with the vision of sustainable development that has been widely discussed since the King’s speech in 1997 and which is now being advocated by the present government.
I have not sought to trace the history of BAAC and clearly this is needed for me (and others) to fully understand the role it has played.
Andrew Walker informed me that one respondent to this discussion on New Mandala asked for some references to my studies of the village in Mahsarakham where I have carried out long term research. I am attaching a bibliography [inserted below] with some references. Thus far, I have only presented my findings from the 2005 study in seminar presentations at the University of Washington, Chula, and Copenhagen.
Cheers,
Biff (Charles Keyes)
CHARLES KEYES
Publications Concerning Transformation of Northeastern Thai Rural Society
1963-2006
Keyes, Charles F. 1967. “Peasant and Nation: A Thai Lao Village in a Thai State,” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1966. (University Microfilms, No. 67 2710, [1967].) (Dissertation Abstract in Dissertation Abstracts, 28.1 [1967], p. 33B.)
____. 1982. Socioeconomic Change in Rainfed Agricultural Villages in Northeastern Thailand. Seattle: Thailand Project, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington (Report for the United States Agency for International Development). (Copies have been deposited in the Cornell and University of Washington Libraries).
____. 1983. “Economic Action and Buddhist Morality in a Thai Village,” in Peasant Strategies in Asian Societies: Perspectives on Moral and Rational Economic Approaches, ed. by Charles F. Keyes. Journal of Asian Studies, 42.3:851 68, 1983.
____. 1990. “Buddhist Practical Morality in a Changing Agrarian World: A Case from Northeastern Thailand, in Attitudes toward Wealth and Poverty in Theravada Buddhism, ed. by Donald K. Swearer and Russell Sizemore. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. Pp. 170-189.
____. 1991. “The Proposed World of the School: Thai Villagers Entry into a Bureaucratic State System,” In Reshaping Local Worlds: Rural Education and Cultural Change in Southeast Asia, ed. by Charles F. Keyes. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 87-138.
____. 1991. “Buddhist Detachment and Worldly Gain: The Economic Ethic of Northeastern Thai Villagers,” in Yū müang Thai: ruam botkhwām thāng sangkhom pha pen kiat dāē Sāstrācān Sanē Cāmrik (“In Thailand: Collected Essays in Honor of Professor Saneh Chammarik), ed. by Chaiwat Satha-Anand. Special issue of Ratthasātsān (Journal of Political Science, Thammasat University), 16.1-2:271-98.
____. 1995. “Hegemony and Resistance in Northeastern Thailand,” in Regions and National Integration in Thailand, 1892-1992, ed. by Volker Grabowsky. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Pp. 154-182.
____. 2002. “Migrants and Protestors: ‘Development’ in Northeastern Thailand,” Keynote address, 8th International Thai Studies Conference, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, January. (Available on the disk circulated as the conference proceedings.)
____. Completed for Publication. “Communism, Peasants and Buddhism: The Failure of ‘Peasant Revolutions’ in Thailand in Comparison to Cambodia,” in Community and the Trajectories of Change in Cambodia and Thailand: Anthropological Studies in Honor of May Ebihara, ed. by John Marston.
11 Andrew Walker // Dec 17, 2006 at 9:10 pm
Another contribution to the TLC list from Mike Montesano:
Biff,
You are very kind. Actually, my understanding of Bunchu is not nearly so thorough as I should like. For now, my focus remains on his role in energizing the BAAC, as this relates very directly to changes in commercial banking in provincial Thailand, one of my main research interests. Certainly, the party line on the BAAC\’s borrowers groups always implied a sense of \”ownership\” … A good part of this story was actually pretty well documented some two decades ago in a large project
on rural credit undertaken at TDRI and Thammast with the leadership of Ammar Siamwalla, Niphon Phuaphongsakon, Choemsak Pinthong, and Prayong Nettayarak. And I am working on a book chapter that revisits the story. For me, the fascinating part of it all in the present context is that, Bunchu\’s epic role in helping Chin Sophonphanit and Prasit Kanchanawat turn the Bangkok Bank into the single greatest institution in post-1945 Thai capitalism notwithstanding, he–like Prasit–was an old-time (Hailam, I think!) leftist. In English, Kasian Tejapira touches on this in his book on Thai Communism. And the speeches cited in that bio of
Bunchu that I noted in my original response to Bob Albritton are, in this context, very impressive. With Thai progressives for some years now allergic to participation in party politics and with the resultant tragic concession of their natural constituency to the likes of Thaksin, figures like Bunchu, the late Bunsanong, and the Isan MPs that you discussed in your classic Cornell data paper of four decades ago really, really bear remembering today. And do keep us posted on work coming out of your 2005 return to Sarakham.
Mike
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