Trekking to London for Thongchai Winichakul’s talk on 28 November 2006, I wasn’t quite sure what to expect. The last time I attended a Thai Studies event in London – the talk given by Kraisak Choonhavan and Sondhi Limthongkul.back in mid-October – it was jam packed and, at times, just a little bit tense. In contrast, Thongchai’s talk was a more relaxed affair. His interpretation of recent political events didn’t seem to provoke any of the candid opposition that confronted Kraisak and Sondhi. Thongchai was, somewhat to my surprise, greeted by a generally receptive audience – patient to clarify his thoughts on the trajectory of Thai politics and, in particular, the role of the King and royally-aligned elites.
Regular New Mandala readers will recall that the October SOAS event was publicly condemned by Singapore based Thai Studies specialist Dr Patrick Jory. Jory, and other critics of SOAS’ initial post-coup offering, may be partly sated by SOAS’ collaboration in this most recent Thai Studies event. As my account of Thongchai’s lecture should make clear, a largely well-received case was made against 19 September style Royally-sponsored, anti-democratic interventions.
As usual, a free and frank debate of Thongchai’s ideas, and other perspectives on the coup, is very welcome here on New Mandala. All shades of opinion can be aired.
This open invitation comes with the warning that, by virtue of the medium, I am forced, in this post, to extensively paraphrase and quote Thongchai’s arguments. Some of the finer points of his lecture may have been lost in my interpretation but, in general, I feel that this is a clear, if relatively dull, account of proceedings. I have also included a number of images to show the tone and style of Thongchai’s 26 power-point slides. I hope that my account makes a small contribution to the essential debates that are currently stewing. All we can really hope is that from this process of argument and analysis will come improved understanding of Thai political organisation. And perhaps a few ideas about making politics – whether in Thailand, Australia, Burma or the United States – work better for all.
The Talk, 28 November 2006 – “Thailand’s September Coup: One Step Backward to Restart Democracy or One Step Forward in a Wrong Direction?”
Thongchai Winichakul was introduced to the audience – composed, to my eye, mainly of London-based students and academics (there was a small Oxford contingent) – by SOAS Thai lecturer Dr Rachel Harrison. Regular New Mandala readers will remember that Dr Harrison also introduced Kraisak and Sondhi at the controversial October event. In her brief overview of Thongchai’s life and work, Harrison mentioned that he spent almost two years in a Thai prison in the 1970s as punishment for his opposition to military rule. She also noted that his subsequent doctoral research at the University of Sydney was supervised by eminent historian, Dr Craig Reynolds, who is now based at the ANU. Harrison briefly discussed Thongchai’s famous contribution to Thai historiography, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, and the generally high esteem in which serious scholars hold his historical work. Thongchai is, according to Harrison, currently working on a new book that examines “moments of silence” in Thai history and historiography. By the sounds of it, it will be worth looking for when it hits the shelves.
After this very positive introduction, Thongchai paused before launching into his argument and his lecture. He began on a personal note. He reflected that under current circumstances, with so much uncertainty, and some people trying to pick sides, many “academics become politicians”. In an attempt to buck this trend, Thongchai indicated that after his current batch of talks he plans to return to “academic” work. He described this work, by way of clarification, as being critical and historical in focus.
Thongchai began the lecture, firstly, with an introduction to the political scene in Thailand. To my eye, the audience generally appeared to have a good grasp of the nuts and bolts of this overview. Many heads nodded throughout. In particular, Thongchai highlighted the “sins” of the Thaksin government and clarified the reasons for much popular discontent with Thaksin’s rule. This discussion clearly showed how polarisation had occurred. The stark oppositional positions that have resulted are, of course, something that is not unfamiliar to regular readers of New Mandala. Thongchai simply put the various arguments in their national context. Thongchai then indicated that he was more interested, unsurprisingly given his chosen vocation, in seeing the recent coup in longer historical perspective.
Apparently, this approach has drawn the ire of some of his academic colleagues. Thongchai related that he has been criticised by colleagues in Thailand for two main reasons. Thongchai is, they posit, outside the country, and thus has a more limited understanding of contemporary problems. He is also, they say, pro-Thaksin and blinded by his devotion to the man. He dismissed these criticisms and thought it laughable that he could be described as pro-Thaksin. He argued, quite forthrightly, that he has no intention to defend Thaksin but, as a point of clarification, noted that his current arguments emerge from a simple point: “I just don’t like the coup”.
Thongchai’s talk repeated his key theme of injecting some historical rigour into discussion of September’s events. The emphasis, in his mind, should not be merely on “yesterday and tomorrow” but rather on the longer-term development of Thai political actors and their political system. He positioned his argument as an “atypical view” which sees Thai history as a “series of three main conflicts”.
In this talk, Thongchai, firstly, highlighted Series 2: “military versus civilian conflict”. This is, he argued, the most familiar conflict for the current generation of Thais. In fact, Thongchai asserted that most people only see this conflict and largely ignore the other series that overlap with the commonly described tension between military and civilian control. As part of this series, which stretched for most of the 20th century, Thongchai highlighted the existence of parliaments that operated within a system of military power. There was, under these conditions, a number of periods where something approaching “semi-democracy” was allowed to flourish. To illustrate this point using the career of Thailand’s most recognisable senior Statesman as a benchmark, Thongchai noted that “Prem never went through elections”. General Prem is now, of course, the Chairman of the Privy Council. He has been a key player in Thai politics for many decades and his longevity as a political force is remarkable. But he has not fought and won elections. Thongchai returned to Prem in the conclusion of his talk. Read on – to see where Thongchai places Prem in the broader picture he tries to paint. The era of conflict between military and civilian control ends, abruptly in Thongchai’s view, with the violent events of 1992.
Series 1 is a less conventional interpretation of modern Thai history. This interpretation is, at least from my viewpoint, one that seems to be gaining currency and acceptance in many current debates. Series 1 highlights the conflicts that have pitted “Royal power against people’s power”. According to Thongchai, between 1932 and 1945 – in the immediate aftermath of the “Royal gift” of constitutional monarchy – there was a great deal of conflict that can be best explained with reference to this particular series. In October 1933, for example, there was conflict spurred by those seeking the “restoration of Royal power”. The elite stoushes of this period continued for years. For those interested in how a “Royalist democracy” could be instigated, Thongchai suggested that the 1949 constitution was a good place to begin interpreting Royalist visions of government and power. Discussing this series, and its implications in the current day, Thongchai said that “history is so cruel, fantastic…it never allows anybody to have what they want”.
In Thongchai’s historical overview, Series 3 describes the power relations among what he rather playfully called “M/P3”. This is the series that focuses on the interactions between “Politicians (elected)/Money; People/Mass; Palace/Monarchists, Monarchy”. He sees this series, which begins in 1973, as heralding “the revival of the monarchy”. Speaking of the bloody events of October 1976, Thongchai argued that nobody mentions that “the King’s intervention is part of the massacre”. This is all part of Series 3. In this scheme, “Royalists now talk democracy” and have, very cunningly, created an “upper floor of politics”. This is a “second floor [that] provides the moral authority”. On this point, and as a digression, Thongchai briefly noted that Paul Handley’s widely debated book, The King Never Smiles, is, in his view, “not academic but worth listening to”.
Having galloped across a turbulent century of Thai political evolution, and introduced his three descriptive summary series to describe different types of conflict and tension, Thongchai started warming up for his punchline. In Thailand, according to Thongchai, discourses around “clean politics” and extra-electoral interventions are a real test of commitment to democracy and democratic institutions. In a poignant, rhetorical flourish, Thongchai asked the audience whether even though President Bush “is even worse [than Thaksin], does he deserve a coup?”
To begin answering this question, and what it means for Thai politics, Thongchai mentioned some anthropologists that he has communicated with who completed detailed studies of village-level politics during the Thaksin era. These anthropologists told Thongchai that “people elected Thaksin because of what he promised and he delivered…What they wanted is different than people in Bangkok”. This manifestation of electoral will has been widely discussed here on New Mandala. There are usually two standard positions. Thongchai strongly supports the view that democracies need to be defended even when they produce what some people consider to be “immoral” results.
And this brings Thongchai to his discussion of the “Royalist coup” including the reasons that it happened and the longer term ramifications of 19 September. Thongchai said that this Royal coup fits nicely within elite perceptions of “a moral coup” that reinforces the notion that democracy equals moral rule. This position is based in “calls for the moral authority above politics”. Here, Thongchai was particularly scathing of one example he raised: Thirayut Bunmee’s suggestion that a “Council of Moral Authority” including military leaders, judges, privy councillors and academics should be instituted to provide guidance and governance.
But this is all just preamble to Thongchai’s final volley. In Thongchai’s view the coup was, on some level, motivated by concerns about succession. Paul Handley has also recently discussed this important issue. In this part of his talk, Thongchai focussed on “the King-makers in Thai history” and argued that “the nobles are the real power”. What occurred in September was one episode in a battle between two factions of ambitious Kingmakers – Thaksin and cronies vs Prem and friends. Prem is, Thongchai concluded, “the mastermind of this coup”.
To wrap up his argument, Thongchai related that “rumours about royalty are often true”. In his view, the tight control of most palace information ensures that “rumours are a source” and in this case he exalted the audience to “help spread the rumour”. His forceful argument, and one that he is happy to make without resorting to pseudonyms or crude personal attacks, makes a very refreshing change. In his view, “Royalists worried that Thaksin was privatising monarchy” and forced the Prem faction of Kingmakers to retake control.
And so the rumour spreads.
As always, New Mandala reader contributions to the debate about these important and controversial ideas are very much encouraged.
More about Thongchai’s views on the coup is available from a number of good sources including: Prachatai, Blog Gang, Thailand Coup Watch, and right here at New Mandala.
26 responses so far ↓
1 patiwat // Dec 15, 2006 at 11:26 am
This seems fairly consistent to the messages he gave at the NYU panel a few weeks ago. Nicholas, your paraphrasing seems directionally correct.
At the time, Acharn Thongchai also noted that he really didn’t like commenting on modern issues because his academic specialization is pre-20th century history/historiography.
Nicholas, you should try to get a screenshot of the general diagram he used. Series 2 is one of the detailed ones. At NYU, he spent a lot of time to discussing the general diagram and explaining how the conflicts that Thailand faced in each “Series” different significantly, and that trying to understand modern challenges through the lens of an older “Series” would lead to incorrect conclusions.
At NYU, Acharn Thongchai also mentioned what he thought was the fundamental reason for the coup: the issue of succession. But he didn’t really give it enough time. Over dinner with the organizers and other panelists, he explained it in much more detail, but noted that people often misunderstood his argument about why succession was such an important issue. Nicholas, it would be great if you could expand a bit more on what Thongchai said in public on this matter.
2 Republican // Dec 15, 2006 at 1:06 pm
The original title of Thongchai’s 28 November 2006 talk at SOAS as recorded in New Mandala (http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2006/11/15/lecture-thongchai-in-london-on-the-coup/) appears to have been, “Thailand’s Coup: A Step Forward in a Dangerous Direction”. But in this posting the title has apparently been changed, to “Thailand’s September Coup: One Step Backward to Restart Democracy or One Step Forward in a Wrong Direction?”
I have two questions (not having attended the talk):
(i) Why was the title of the talk changed? Does it indicate that originally Thongchai believed the coup to be a “step forward”, but changed his mind afterwards?
(ii) How on earth can the coup be seen as a “step forward”? (I can’t see how from the account of the talk given above)
To me his comment that Handley’s book was “not academic but worth listening to” smacks of academic snobbery. Handley has produced the only critical biography of the king in 60 years, and in my opinion it is having a massive impact on Thai Studies (both English and Thai). And it is leading to academic “spin-offs” in the form of articles and blog-postings, almost all of whom quote Handley. Works such as these, “even” if they are written by lowly journalists, deserve praise from academics, who should rather be asking themselves why it was a journalist, not an academic, to write such a book.
3 nganadeeleg // Dec 15, 2006 at 1:35 pm
patiwat: That might be a way for you to accept the coup – a case of good management (forward planning) ?
4 patiwat // Dec 15, 2006 at 2:51 pm
Republican, you misunderstand the situation with Paul and Thongchai. Progressive academics want to see this book become as influential and as credible as possible. The only way to do that is to silence the Chlear academics. The Chlear academics had their criticisms of this book even before it was published: that it was full of lies, that it was full of unsourced rumors, etc. To prevent the Chlear academics from doing this, certain progressive academics are setting the standard as high as possible – every critical fact has to have a footnote and a reference, no anonymous pamphlets should be used as sources, everything has to be 100% correct, etc.
Handley’s response was that his manuscript was much longer and had an even more massive set of references. It ended up being shortened to make it more readable for the mainstream audience. But even so, the book is still extremely credible. Of all the mainstream Thai history books, it probably has the fewest errors, and I’ve been through it with a magnifying glass. But even then, I still complained to Handley that he didn’t have enough footnotes. When I questioned him about some unsourced facts (I actually had a checklist several pages long), he was able to cite from memory the sources of most of them, so I’m very confident that he didn’t make anything up or use rumors. My intention (which I think is shared by Acharn Thongchai) is not to bring down the book, but to make it even more accepted among mainstream academics.
Ngarnadirek, I shouldn’t have to tell you this: a country can’t be managed the way a company is managed by a CEO. No matter how much perfect foresight a leader has, he has to listen to the people, adjust his priorities to reflect popular concerns, and play by the rules. Prem’s perfect crystal ball and genius in forward management are no excuse for bypassing the polls and ripping up the Constitution.
5 polo // Dec 15, 2006 at 3:04 pm
Could you explain what you think he mean about rumour at the end of his talk, what he was getting at?
6 nganadeeleg // Dec 15, 2006 at 5:34 pm
‘No matter how much perfect foresight a leader has, he has to listen to the people, adjust his priorities to reflect popular concerns, and play by the rules.’
patiwat: Whatever happened to leading?
Are you saying that truly great people/statesmen are unelectable in modern democracies?
Actually, I think I already know the answer.
Yes – I know Prem was never elected.
7 Nicholas Farrelly // Dec 15, 2006 at 6:31 pm
Thanks everyone,
Just to briefly clarify -
1) Republican: As I recall, Thongchai did not provide any extensive explanation for his change of title. As you know, people do alter the advertised titles of presentations at conferences, lectures and seminars quite frequently. I think the new title was just an attempt to pose a question that clarified his argument and thinking. He has been giving a few similiar talks – perhaps the feedback he received is that this title “works” better or is more understandable. Sorry, I’m just not sure, but it is a good question.
2) Polo: Towards the end of his talk, and as Thongchai developed his conclusion “based on rumours”, he was keen to show that he sees the “Kingmakers” as the driving force behind recent events. He didn’t want to imply that this meant the factions specifically (or solely) backed any one future King or Queen. Instead, they were jostling for the right to “make” the next monarch – whoever it may be. That was one key element of the “rumour” that he outlined. He sees the longer duration of Thai history as involving key groups of “Kingmakers” and insists that, in the present, we should not overlook this aspect of Thai political culture.
Thanks for all of your comments. If further matters require clarification or explanation I may make a follow-up post and include the rest of the photos that I snapped on that evening.
All the best,
NSF
8 Republican // Dec 15, 2006 at 6:31 pm
Patiwat, maybe you are right. I wasn’t at the seminar so I don’t know the context of the comment. Politically of course they are on the same wavelength. But how are you going to silence the Chlear academics by giving the book such faint praise in public as “not academic but worth listening to”. Isn’t that giving the Chlears an instant point on which to criticize the book? You know that in the Thai intellectual culture if you say something is not “academic” (ie. วิชาการ) then (rightly or wrongly) that is an instant attack on its credibilty. My feeling is that the Chlears are never going to accept such a book, whether academic or not. Why help them by casting doubt on its academic integrity?
To be honest, I have been surprised by the rather lukewarm reception this book has been publicly received by many academics, in reviews that have been published on this website as well as elsewhere. The guy has basically sentenced himself to exile from Thailand for the forseeable future, presumably earned the hatred of a large proportion of his Thai friends and colleagues, and the people who should be most grateful for such a book can’t seem to bring themselves to give the book its due. I can’t help feeling that at least part of it is due to academic snobbery towards journalists’ work, which is a pity, because it gets in the way of what should be a common cause.
9 Republican // Dec 15, 2006 at 6:40 pm
Reply to Nicholas #7: maybe the change in title was a case of the “pragmatism” of Thai intellectuals?
10 Jon Fernquest // Dec 15, 2006 at 8:04 pm
Police versus Army sweatshirts for the big game.
Someone jokingly suggested this as a winning business idea. In the US, you have the army-navy football game and Stanford versus Berkeley, sales of sweatshirts, hats, dolls with little bobbing heads, are brisk.
During the Thaksin administration everywhere you turned, police. Billionaire civil servant and police colonel Thaksin. Election commissioner, police general. Deputy prime minister, police general. Mysterious super-powerful board member of the university I worked at, police general.
Personally, I\’d rather have a humbled army, that acts to do honour to the king, as a **permanent prime minister** than a government saturated by the omnipresent, omniscient police force that I have observed, from a distance, in one instance, pushing around and trying to extort baht 1.5 million from a European one day, only to have that European hang himself in his cell the next day, all of which the print media blithely ignored, so one could say it was invisible, with almost zero transparency, like so many other incidents, that have made my skin crawl, observing from a distance, of course. They can even tell people exactly how much money they have in their bank account. I\’ll never forget when the family of the female Akha id card advocate starting getting harassed by the police. Perhaps one of her family was involved in drugs in some way, but surely she sure wasn\’t. Then there is the story of how Thaksin sicked the police on his American business partner. Then there was that German who I taught at a university in South Korea with, whose business partner absconded with everything, in collusion with the police. They harassed my own family (who fastidiously follows every letter of the law) at a checkpoint once, even though we had all our papers in perfect order, they objected that the seal was too light and wanted to pull us off the bus, apparently to instill fear and extort money. I stood defiantly in front of the bus when the driver wanted to leave us behind to those vultures, and when I arrived, lodged formal complaints with the company and the provincial police. I accompanied mostly senior citizen farmers to a wedding party in Bangkok once, we were all hauled out of the van, car sick the police accused us of being Yah Baa. Despite wanting to laugh at the absurdity of this casual accusation that could land one in jail for years if it was true, we had to humbly wai and deprecate ourselves in front of them. All this and yet running red lights and hit and run are still so common. More police generals would no doubt solve all the problems.
Police power is more insidious, and people are much more willing to dismiss and ignore the rantings of obviously guilty criminals. Check out Amnesty international’s yearly reports. At least when the military violates human rights, it makes all the major international newspapers. I lived in Burma two years where there are hardly any police to be found. Leave the house, and presto, burglary. No, having expressed my opinion on this subject, I can only pray that I don’t end up in jail. Even though I work for a newspaper would it even make it into the newspaper if what happened to that poor European I mentioned above, happened to me?
If someone wants to write a stylishly postmodern dissertation, pray dig a little deeper and unearth some real victims of \”law enforcement\” and expend the effort to find them rather than deconstructing them.
11 nganadeeleg // Dec 15, 2006 at 9:03 pm
Jon: I want to commend you on another excellent post.
12 Republican // Dec 15, 2006 at 10:01 pm
With respect, we’ve had army officers as prime ministers telling us they are honouring the king for most of the last 50 years, and you have just graphically described the state of the country that that has brought us to. You truly believe a permanent military dictatorship would improve things? Isn’t what is needed a truly representative democratic government (not nganadeeleg’s “white knight” fantasy – a Western fantasy too; I thought he was all for “Thai-style”?), where, not in the short term, but in the longer term, this type of police corruption will gradually be weeded out, as it has been in other countries – (e.g. Taiwan, Korea, if you want some non-Western examples). The police, like the military, like the civil bureaucracy, like the universities, are “kharatchakan” and they share the same problem as all the kharatchakan – they are servants of the raja, not of the people. Which is why they are untouchable. These institutions all date from the era of the absolute monarchy and the mentality has hardly changed. What is needed is “khaprachachonkan” – servants of the people. Only then will they become responsible to the people through their elected representatives. But as we have just seen, the monarchy refuses to accept such a system of elected representatives, and it has continually used the military to prevent it establishing itself. Which is why inevitably the fundamentally political problem remains: the monarchy as the main obstacle to democracy in Thailand.
13 polo // Dec 16, 2006 at 2:08 am
Nicholas: Thanks for the post and all the detail. I think one could add that there are not just “kingmakers” but “king-benefitters” that we can assume have a horse in the race: People whose personal interests — job, bank account — will rise in one particular resolution.
14 Matthew // Dec 16, 2006 at 3:08 am
I would like to comment on the police and army thing as well as a few others. For one, the Thai people need to build some backbone as they have done in the past and stand up to all these police and army and royals.
Few people would join in my efforts, but the brutality that the police and army used on the Akha people is enormous. The difference between the police and army is that the army folk are a little more disciplined as armies need to be and police are a little more willy nilly. At the end of the day if you end up dead, in jail, hidden in a hole in the ground in an army camp under complete control, both you and your village, there is little difference.
One very interesting thing is all the Royal Projects in Thailand. Particularly in hill tribe areas. The fact is, for all the fawned pretentions, the Royal Projects are massive rip offs of hill tribe land dressed up as helping them, backed by police, army, forestry. When people need the land for food, for their children, it becomes a very blatant form of genocide after a while. Rather than stepping in to stop abuses, which In never saw, the Royals contribute to the mayhem at the village level and give permits to the police and army and forestry to act on their orders with much leeway and self interpretation, in order to get the job done.
Hooh Yoh Akha in Ampur Mae Faluang, is just such one example of how 8500 rai of prime mountain farm land was taken away for the Queens Project to teach the hilltribe how to grow vegetables on land they don’t have any more. Very few westerners would stand up about this case.
The land belonged to five villages, was a complete valley, and took away the self determined lives of more than 1500 Akha, without free, informed and prior consent of the Akha, and is a violation of their human rights no matter who you are, under international law, which more often than not is a moral law.
If you crush people, you crush democracy and human rights.
15 Vichai N. // Dec 16, 2006 at 3:13 am
Educate us Republican, articulate please, why you believe HMK was impeding the development of Thai democracy.
Otherwise I will consider your statement as merely malicious, similar to Andrew Walker’s authoritative malicious lie that ‘Sufficiency Economy’ espoused by HMK was designed to impoverish the Thai poor.
16 anon // Dec 16, 2006 at 8:39 pm
Vichai, I’ll let Republican answer on his own, but here’s why I think the King is impeding the development of Thai democracy.
1. The King actively supported the coup. He was with Prem the moment tanks rolled out of Lopburi. The evening after the coup, the King endorsed the coup leaders.
2. The King didn’t have to support the coup. The King actively supported the government in 2 out of the last 3 coups in Thai history. The coup leaders included his most trusted advisors. The advisors serve at his own pleasure. The King is at the 60 year height of his popularity, and can add or remove any advisor he wants.
3. The coup-leaders have governed the country in an undemocratic manner. They cancelled a democratic election that was less than a month away, that was being actively contested by numerous parties. They abrogated the most democratic constitution in Thai history. They shut down hundreds of radio stations, something that had never been done before. They arrested peaceful protestors. They have soldiers sitting inside television control rooms, something that also hasn’t been done in recent history. They have put in place an undemocratic constitution. They have established an undemocratic process for drafting a future constitution.
4. The King continues to actively support the coup-leaders. He strongly praised them during his birthday speech. This wasn’t just politeness – the scathing criticisms in his previous speeches have become legend.
5. Thus, the King is impeding the development of Thai democracy. Q.E.D.
17 Vichai N. // Dec 17, 2006 at 1:46 am
Maybe I should wait for Republican to reply then I can respond to both Anon’s and Republican’s nonsense (once it comes) at the same time. Because I suspect Republican will be as ridiculous as Anon anyway.
18 Republican // Dec 17, 2006 at 4:41 am
You don’t want to be educated Vichai. If you did you would read Handley.
19 Republican // Dec 17, 2006 at 5:22 am
During these dark days for Thai academia, when university rectors and professors accept lucratively paid positions in rubber-stamp legislative councils appointed by military juntas, “public intellectuals” write columns legitimizing dictatorships, and political scientists airbrush the monarchy out of Thailand’s political history, occasionally there are shafts of light. Check out this penetrating analysis of the “October Generation’s” betrayal of their ideals by Thammasat economist, Phichit Likhitkitsombun, posted on Prachatai (http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/page2.php?mod=mod_ptcms&ContentID=6252&SystemModuleKey=HilightNews&System_Session_Language=Thai), which in a short time has become the most stimulating website for informed discussion of the coup and the royalist regime.
It is well worth a read by fans of New Mandala, with a couple of exceptions: Vichai, who, we know, only needs his information from the 8 o’clock royal news and TIME magazine; and nganadit, who admits to being too lazy to read. It’s a pity, because Likhit gives good descriptions of these characters’ worldview.
By the way, if ever there was an argument for the de-bureaucratization (ออกนอกระบบ) of Thai universities, currently being resisted tooth and nail by the academics, the response of the universities to the coup is a perfect reason.
20 Johpa // Dec 17, 2006 at 7:29 am
It would appear that Thongchai is as conflicted by the coup as are many Thais I meet, as if there is this national embarassment that nobody could find a way to remove the man who would not play by the rules, Thaksin, other than that most traditional of Thai ways, a Royally supported military coup. The angst is palpable whether talking to Thai friends, listening to Sondhi L talk, or even just reading Nicholas’s review of the recent Thongchai lecture.
Yes, the dig at the Handley book is a bit surprising. I am just over half way through the read, and the book is most definitely an academic tome. In my most humble opinion, if Handley is a former journalist then I strongly suspect he has some very frustrated Thai academics behind him using him as a ghostwriter for their own feelings. Regardless, the timing of his book against the background of the recent coup makes it required reading. Is it fate or insider information that gave Handley such fortuitous timing?
As for the Akha up north, they have long been on the bottom of the pecking order, even amongst, I am ashamed to say, their fellow highland groups. The BPP, and provincial governors, and just about everyone else have abused them for at least the past 25 years that I have had close friends, including Akha, up in the northern hills. I have seen their possesions and crops confiscated by neighboring village militias. And I have seen them being incorrectly blamed for all sorts woes ranging from deforestation to the shootings that used to occur to the tourists on the long-tail boats going down the Kok River back in the 1980s. (It was a Lisu who was actually involved in one “accidental” death as he told me over Thai whiskey: “The dumb Farang stood up to take a picture when I only wanted to scare the boatman over to the river bank with a few gunshots.”
21 nganadeeleg // Dec 17, 2006 at 9:28 am
Most sensible people would be conflicted by the coup.
Of those who accept the coup, I am sure most wish Thaksin would have left in another way.
I wonder how many of those who are still against this coup, are conflicted by Thaksin?
Or do they just accept that because he was elected he could do what he wanted?
22 polo // Dec 17, 2006 at 10:24 am
I don’t read Thongchai as conflicted. You can — indeed you have to — talk about Thaksin’s outrages and still reject the coup. Reading Thongchai’s writings, there is no angst (that pitiful, fake angst of Sonthi Limthongkul) but anger. Also, Johpa, according to the U Wisconsin website, Thongchai’s Southeast Asian studies department invited handly to speak in September before the coup. That doesn’t sound like someone who doesn’t like the book. Maybe Thongchai just means it isn’t heavily connected to theory like his own books.
23 Vichai N. // Dec 17, 2006 at 11:36 pm
Is that it Republican? You cannot articulate? And you go on to denigrate my education as incomplete because I won’t read one Handley fiction book.
But I already explained to you that Japanese comics are more entertaining, didn’t I?
You are malicious Republican truly malicious . . . and that is NOT fiction.
24 Republican // Dec 18, 2006 at 3:37 am
No, you misrepresent me. I didn’t denigrate your education as incomplete, I denigrated it as not having begun.
25 Bystander // Dec 18, 2006 at 5:30 am
The Handley book is not that bad or evil or one-sided as those who never read it proclaim to be. It is after all published by the reputable Yale Press. I’m sure they take their reputation seriously there. Like it or not, it is now entering all the libraries and will be a required reading for anyone studying anything about Thailand for years to come.
If you don’t like the book, well, it’s not like there’s any choice in the market. Either TKNS or the Stephenson’s book, which is definitely not better than TKNS. Maybe those truly loyal academics should put their pen where their mouths are and write a better book and get it published by a reputable academic press. That will be a truer measure of their scholarship and loyalty.
26 Republican // Dec 18, 2006 at 6:08 am
As noone seems willing or able to offer an explanation as to why Thongchai changed the title of his November 18 presentation at SOAS from “Thailand’s Coup: A Step Forward in a Dangerous Direction”, to “Thailand’s September Coup: One Step Backward to Restart Democracy or One Step Forward in a Wrong Direction?” let me offer a hypothesis (as for the title of the talk I would add that in the dire circumstances that Thailand finds itself at the present one would have hoped for a less ambiguous statement of where Thongchai stood on the coup).
Johpa is on the right track: like many academics Thongchai could not make up his mind whether the coup overall was a good thing or not (ie. well, at least it had got rid of Thaksin – a “Step Forward”). The change of the title of Thongchai’s SOAS talk betrays this uncertainty, as does his statement to the junta (signed, “respectfully yours”), published directly after the crisis NOT condemning the coup but expressing “regret” and “concern” and “urging” the “authorities” not to harm protesters(http://www.sameskybooks.org/webboard/show.php?Category=sameskybooks&No=146) (I wonder how many of Thongchai’s many diatribes in the media against the democratically-elected Thaksin ended with, “respectfully yours”?). Somsak Jiamthirasakul has already pointed out this type of academic hypocrisy, where in their campaign to oust Thaksin the academics joined the PAD’s rallying cry of “ทักษิณออกไป!”, but in the case of the royalist-military coup the language had changed to mere expressions of “regret” and “concern” (at best!). Mind you, Thongchai was in good company. Ten days after the coup Kasien, another staunch anti-Thaksinist, in his Matichon column merely expressed his hope that the new regime would ensure more freedoms than had existed under Thaksin (http://www.matichon.co.th/matichon/matichon_detail.php?s_tag=01act01290949&day=2006/09/29); again, no condemnation. There were many others. In fact Thongchai has been “flip flopping” continually since the beginning of the current political crisis in late 2005, which is why his 8 November article on the “pragmatism” of Thai intellectuals published in Krungthep Thurakit (http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/level3/news_119333.jsp) had the whiff of hypocrisy about it. What’s the expression? ว่าแต่เขา อิเหนาเป็นเอง.
Prior to the April 2006 election for many months Thongchai was firmly in the camp of the group that Somsak calls the “สองไม่เอา” for their irrational logic; that is, “ไม่เอาทักษิณ ไม่เอาอำนาจอื่นเข้ามาแทน/รัฐประหาร (ie. royal intervention)”. Of course, as everyone knew that Thaksin was always going to the win the election the only way that he was ever going to be got rid of was through royal intervention. The “สองไม่เอา” camp had given its support (through newspaper columns, แถลงการณ์ and suchlike) to the PAD in its campaign to oust Thaksin through non-electoral means, at least up until it called for the use of Article 7 (of the former Constitution), by which the King could constitutionally dismiss the PM and unilaterally appoint a new one.
In his rambling birthday speech of December 4, 2005, the King sent a clear signal that he did not support lèse majesté lawsuits filed by Thaksin or his supporters (the so-called “King can do wrong” statement). While the gullible saw this as a sign of the King’s “liberalism”, anyone who knows how the birthday speech works would have understood that the real intention was to give a green light to the media to criticize Thaksin, invoking the King if necessary. This is the most cowardly form of political attack because one can not defend oneself against it without risking lèse majesté – as Thaksin did with his famous ผู้มีบารมี speech. Within a short time Thaksin’s lèse majesté lawsuit against Sondhi, who had been using the monarchy shamelessly to attack him, was lifted and most of the media began to swing against Thaksin. Thus from December 4 it became clear that that the King had given his full support to the anti-Thaksin movement. What this means is that at this stage support given to the PAD in its campaign to oust Thaksin by any means was effectively to support a non-electoral outcome to the crisis. Yet Thongchai in numerous press articles continued to condemn Thaksin and express support for the PAD, up until it called for the use of Article 7 in March.
I’m not sure how much is Nicholas’ paraphrasing or whether Thongchai actually made this statement “… democracies need to be defended even when they produce what some people consider to be “immoral” results…” If Thongchai had been as firmly committed to democracy as he makes out here, in early 2006 he would have been strongly defending Thaksin, a democratically-elected Prime Minister, in his our of dire need against a likely royal intervention. But he could not bring himself to do it. But this of course is “history”. It is much easier (and noble) to be pro-democracy now with Thaksin out of the way and a royalist-military regime in power.
As I say, this is a hypothesis.
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