New Mandala

27 responses so far ↓

• 1 Somsak Jeamteerasakul // Sep 14, 2007 at 2:10 am

  Thanks for the link to Michael’s blog. Quite interesting. However, I just posted a response to one of his entry (on Nidhi, particularly his reaction to the coup). Anyone interested please see :
  http://sovereignmyth.blogspot.com/2007/09/democracy-from-below-nidhi.html

• 2 Somsak Jeamteerasakul // Sep 14, 2007 at 2:20 am

  and another of my respond to Michael’s on the (infamous) speech of Thaksin (”I would resign only if the King whispered in my eyes”)

  http://sovereignmyth.blogspot.com/2007/09/fall-of-thaksin.html

• 3 somon // Sep 14, 2007 at 5:40 pm

  Thanks.

• 4 Restorationist // Sep 15, 2007 at 1:44 am

  I agree with Somsak. Michael has done us a great service in his book on identity and democracy, but he needs to be able to explain why he thinks the king should have a role in deciding whether a PM stays or not. Of course, Thaksin needs to explain that as well.

• 5 nganadeeleg // Sep 15, 2007 at 10:03 am

  Somsak asks: What business the (unelected, uncriticisable, untouchable) King has whispering to the elected PM?

  I cannot answer for Michael (or Thaksin), but here is how Anand answers: “He remains detached from politics, playing a non-partisan role in the country’s political process and development.As a constitutional monarch, however, he possesses “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn”. Under normal circumstances, he exercised these rights through private audiences he grants to the prime minister of the day. What transpires during these meetings remains private and confidential, and even after the statutory silent period, part of the consultations may not be made known.
  In a constitutional monarchy, the King does have certain powers and responsibilities under constitutional provisions. In exercising this power, he must be ever conscious of his responsibility and objectivity. All bills approved by the National Assembly are to be presented to the King for signature. This is not just a formality, as the King retains discretionary power to withhold his assent temporarily. In private consultations with the prime minister, the King’s comments, be they “encouraging” or “warning”, provide an important input for the head of government, if he wishes, to re-evaluate the government’s position and direction.
  His Majesty alone possesses continuous political experience and has always kept to constitutional proprieties. His remarks, whether made privately or publicly, have always been listened to with great attention and circumspection.”

• 6 m.lardprao // Sep 15, 2007 at 3:10 pm

  Our Thai King’s adherence to the principle of a constitutional monarch was seen most clearly during that serious political confrontation between the Government of ex-PM Thaksin Shinawatra and the PAD (People’s Alliance for Democracy). Many respected academicians and the media at that time were calling for the invocation of Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution, which means a request for His Majesty the King to exercise the royal prerogative to dismiss the current Prime Minister and appoint a new one. HMK turned down such request which he regarded as wrong. HMK then said that it was unconstitutional and the way out of the impasse had to be found through constitutional means, that is, through the decisions by the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court and the Courts of Justice. The King’s action, wrote one foreign analyst, proved that the rumor of the King being behind the political events in Thailand was false.

  After the coup on 19 September 2006, the coup leaders sought an audience with His Majesty the King to report their action and the situation to him as Head of State. According to the administrative customs established by the Constitution, the King had as his royal prerogative the right to be informed. He, however, was in no position to object or support such fait accompli by the military. Had he objected it, a second political crisis could have ensued. Had he supported it, that would have given legitimacy to the coup leaders. Adhering to the administrative customs by acting in accordance with the recommendations of those with real authority was thus the best course of action. Hence HMK’s assent to the royal command which coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin presented and countersigned was the most neutral act and was in line with the country’s administrative customs. The rumor that the coup had royal backing was incorrect.

  Rumors to draw the monarchy into political conflicts have often been floated when such conflicts occurred. The conflicting parties, in shoring up their own advantage over the other side, would seek to use the monarch, who is the center of unity of all Thais, to justify and legitimize their own actions or to undermine their opponents. One disadvantage of constitutional monarchy is that the King and the Royal Family are not in a position to publicly deny any such references. Those who instigate the rumors were thus able to continue reaping political gains by spreading rumors. Nevertheless, as a saying goes, action speaks louder than words. Those who have wanted to use lese majesté charges against their opponents have had hard time achieving their aims because almost every lese-majesté case from past to present has been granted royal pardon either before or after the ruling by the court. Even before the political change which ended absolute monarchy, the King had granted royal par-don to those writers who criticized him, saying: “The expression of thoughts is the voice of the brain. The expression of loyalty is the voice of the heart.” A distinction must be made between the two.

  Indeed, if the King had other means, short of making verbal clarifications, to prove all other rumors false by his action, then the political impartiality of the Thai monarchy would become much more evident.

  (http://sirichai108.spaces.live.com/Blog/cns!5DDE323A1C0D265F!156.entry

• 7 Srithanonchai // Sep 15, 2007 at 3:37 pm

  Anand is not a good “witness”, being one of the most aristocratic propagandists of the monarchy.

• 8 Srithanonchai // Sep 15, 2007 at 9:06 pm

  1) “According to the administrative customs established by the Constitution, the King had as his royal prerogative the right to be informed” > The coup group rather went there because they knew were the power is in Thailand, and to apologize to the King that they had violated his expressed wish to see fair and just elections in October 2006 as his preferred solution to end the crisis. They also needed, as you mention, to make sure that he gave his blessings in order to avoid encouraging resistance.

  2) “Hence HMK’s assent to the royal command which coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin presented and countersigned was the most neutral act and was in line with the country’s administrative customs.” > To many people, in particular those who had supported the coup, that act did not look neutral at all but legitimizing.The media coverage reflected this perspective. I cannot remember this detail–did the King sign a similar command after the NPKC coup in 1991?

  3) “the way out of the impasse had to be found through constitutional means, that is, through the decisions by the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court and the Courts of Justice.” > However, the result of the King’s instruction to the courts seemed to have been a bending of the laws to achieve certain political ends (what some Thai academics criticize as “rule by law” as opposed to the “rule of law”).

• 9 Srithanonchai // Sep 15, 2007 at 9:44 pm

  P.S.: The author of what “M.Lardprao” has posted here is Ajarn Borwornsak Uwanno, previously the cabinet’s secretary general under Thaksin Shinawatra, and now the secretary-general of the King Prajadhipok’s Institute. The full text of his article on “Dynamics of Thai Politics” can be downloaded from its original place, namely KPI’s home page at

  http://www.kpi.ac.th/mod_news/news_view.asp?id=MTkg&g=NSAg&rand=1189851820491

  After Ajarn Borwornsak had resigned from his position in the Thaksin government, he published a five-part series on the Thai monarchy, from a royalist perspective, in the Bangkok Post. This is well worth reading. The series is as follows:

  June 12, 2006: Ten principles of a righteous King
  June 13, 2006: Thailand’s Dhammaraja
  June 14, 2006: The King and the constitution
  June 15, 2006: A proof beyond any shadow of doubt
  June 16, 2006: The King’s paternalistic governance

• 10 Restorationist // Sep 15, 2007 at 11:02 pm

  Bowornsak’s statement is the standard explanation from the current military regime. Rewriting history is the role adopted by the regime’s propagandists.

• 11 Somsak Jeamteerasakul // Sep 16, 2007 at 12:20 am

  Re: M.Ladprao (Borwornsak)

  Our Thai King’s adherence to the principle of a constitutional monarch….HMK then said that it was unconstitutional and the way out of the impasse had to be found through constitutional means…

  Since by law I cannot criticise the King and to challenge what he says runs the risk of being slapped with lese majeste charge, I will not dispute His Majesty’s claim (in the speech Borwornsak cites here) that HM has ALWAYS “adhere to the princilple of constitutional monarch”. But let me give here just two FACTS:

  (1) In 1957 after Sarit seized power in a military coup (I pointed out elsewhere that the situations that led to the 1957 coup bear striking similarity to the ones last year), HM issued a proclamation IN HIS OWN NAME WITHOUT ANY COUNTER SIGNATURE appointing Sarit as “phu raksa pranakon” (guardian of the capital) and URGED all citizens to obey Sarit. Not only this was against the “principle of a constitutional monarch” as universally understood, but at the time the 1952 Constitution was still in effect in which any proclamation, order, speech, etc had to be counter-signed by a Minister.

  (2) In fact, even the episode Borwornsak cites as example of HM’s “adherence to the principle of a constitutional monarch” and espically what happened afterward (cf. the notorious Jakrapob’s Secret Tape) had NO CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION whatsoever. Anyone who thinks otherwise, let him/her produce just ONE article of the 1997 Constitution which provides the King with power to ORDER the three highest courts to solve a political crisis.

  Indeed, give me just one example anywhere in the world wher a CONSTITUTIONAL moarch has the power to give UNPREPARED, UNCOUNTER-SIGNED (”live”) speech on such important matters.

  In any democracy, public power has to be ACCOUNTABLE. And since we don’t want the monarch to be accountable, it’s universally understood that a constitutional monarch cannot do things on his own (e.g. give “live” important speeches). Otherwise it’s UNFAIR, UNDEMOCRATIC to be able to have such enormous power without ACCOUNTABILITY.

  I could go on with many similar FACTS (as in the 1973 case of so-called “Racehorse Rigns Assembly” for in stance), but I am already frightened to my bone just to say the above.

• 12 nganadeeleg // Sep 16, 2007 at 10:30 am

  Khun Somsak: In case you haven’t noticed, the king is old and won’t be around forever, and it is unlikely that the next monarch will be as universally respected as the present king.

  At some time in the future I think the powers of the monarch should be more clearly defined to basically exclude the monarch from doing anything apart from preside at ceremonies and rubber stamp parliamentary decisions etc.

  However, IMO now is not the time to do it because the situation is too volatile with all the competing interests (military, old & new elites, rural masses etc) and an **unsophisticated electorate that can be easily manipulated.

  There are many views about why the electorate is still so unsophisticated and I can accept that HMK needs to share some of the blame for being an over protective ‘parent’ for too long, but IMO it is more complex than that and the poor behavior of politicians also cannot be discounted, nor can the way the electorate turns a blind eye to wrongdoings.

  As you enter the political fray, I think you would be better served taking off your historian hat for a while, and instead concentrate on ways to encourage the people with real power (the masses) to be more discerning and responsible, and less able to be manipulated.

  **Andrew Walker might not concede that the electorate is unsophisticated, but IMO any objective analysis of the actions, beliefs & superstitions of a large portion of the electorate could not fail to reach that conclusion.
  If I understand Andrew’s argument it goes something like this:
  - The rural poor never got anything from the old elites, and because Thaksin promised & delivered some benefits, he got and retains their support.
  That is understandable, but I don’t regard such self interest as particularly sophisticated.

  IMO a more sophisticated line would be:
  - Thank you Thaksin for delivering, but we are worried about your policy corruption, tax evasion, extra-judicial killing etc etc – We cannot turn a blind eye to those wrongdoings – Please amend your ways or we will have to find someone else to support.

• 13 Tosakan // Sep 16, 2007 at 11:03 am

  It is a shame that a notable lawyer and scholar like Ajarn Borwornsak should pretend that HMK acts within his constitutional limitations when the historical evidence demonstrates the exact opposite, as Ajarn Somsak has pointed out. Plus, there are more examples than the ones he has briefly cited.

  I kindly suggest that Ajarn Bowornsak’s duty, as a lawyer and scholar, is to tell the truth.

• 14 Srithanonchai // Sep 16, 2007 at 2:59 pm

  “but I am already frightened to my bone just to say the above” >> One good thing with democracy is that citizens do not need to have such worries.

• 15 jeru // Sep 17, 2007 at 7:42 pm

  The fear that is whispered about: “After HMK Bhumibhol, will Thailand implode because there will be no more ‘unifying’ father symbol?”

• 16 Dickie Simpkins // Sep 17, 2007 at 8:12 pm

  In the case of Thailand, I would probably talk about the virtue of patience.

  One should not even suggest topping 60+years of goodwill, even based on the strong foundations of democracy. Many people I notice on these boards give good and strong pros and cons on the status of Thai society and its acceptance with the total chaos that democracy can bring. One of it being a peoples uprising against Thaksin (much bloodier than a military coup).
  I also find it comical that such smart, rational, and disciplined people like the Thais can also (and often the same people) be blind with emotions and superstitions.
  As such, I feel that Democratic Institutions require failure for them to be strengthened.
  HMK is great because of how he has ruled for 60 years. If he was unjust or indulgent he would never build the love and respect of the great majority of Thai people (as I don’t believe in absolutes, I won’t say all, also Thaksin is definately not a lover of HMK). You can fool most of the people some of the time, but you can’t fool most of the people most of the time, no matter how unjust the lese majeste laws might be.

  Furthermore, though there is some talk about HMK curtailing Democratic reform, these has been no concrete examples of HMK diverting grand funds from State to his own personal investments or HMK being frugal with taxpayers money as opposed to say Thaksin Shinawatra. I’d say that HMK has is the beacon of all the great things of Thai culture, and at worst has been too paternalistic about democracy. The best analogy I guess is that he’s too worried to take the training wheels off the bike because he feels his child will fall and get hurt. I know how that feels because I fell off a bike in my first try and required 7 stitches!
  But I would probably argue that patience and restraint are among the best virtues of Thai people. I would’ve preferred Thaksin to be gone through a popular uprising, that would’ve truly planted strengthened democratic institutions in the country with amendments protecting minority rights and curtailing executive power. But I also understand that this is not really what an 80 year old man nearing the end of his life would’ve wanted to see his life dedication and work (which he did honestly and ethically, with human mistakes along the way) suddenly transform into a state of chaos.
  Hence patience and restraint for a popular democratic society is, in my humble opinion, the best way forward for Thailand right now. Democracy activists are better off working with grass root activism for now. I don’t honestly think Thailand will be ready for full-blown democracy, sad to say, till HMK is no longer with us. Pity that 2 amazing things have to be mutually exclusive.

• 17 Restorationist // Sep 18, 2007 at 12:30 am

  jeru asks if “After HMK Bhumibhol, will Thailand implode because there will be no more ‘unifying’ father symbol?” Good question, but seriously, if this king and his advisers and their military allies had worked to develop a real constitutional democracy, this wouldn’t be a question that would need to be asked.

• 18 Srithanonchai // Sep 18, 2007 at 1:12 am

  Societal formations do not implode or explode this easily. Using figurative expressions are not always that helpful. But sure will there be a void, and one might ask who or what might try to fill it.

• 19 James Haughton // Sep 18, 2007 at 3:51 pm

  “there have been no concrete examples of HMK diverting grand funds from State to his own personal investments ”

  1) the Siam Central Bank and various other companies owned by the Crown Property Bureau were the first to be bailed out by the state (the taxpayer) when the currency crisis hit, despite their longstanding record of sub standard and corrupt banking and business practices. No such largesse was forthcoming to all the workers who lost their jobs.

  2) There has never been any independent oversight, auditing, etc of the many many millions spent on the various “Royal sufficiency, royal agriculture, New Economic Plan, etc” projects. No one would dare. As a result no-one knows if they actually work.

• 20 James Haughton // Sep 18, 2007 at 4:14 pm

  3) Thailand is generally agreed to have an incredibly bloated military, especially at the top level; it has far more generals than any other military of its size. Appointment to the rank of general is at the king’s discretion. They cost a lot, even when they aren’t leading coups. Then again, ever since Sarit the military have hid behind HMK’s robes and used him as a puppet, so perhaps this last isn’t his fault.

  To be deposed by a popular uprising, you have to be unpopular. This was not the case for Thaksin, for very good reasons. The government is not a bicycle and the general public are not children! This kind of paternalist metaphor is completely unhelpful.

• 21 Dickie Simpkins // Sep 18, 2007 at 8:46 pm

  James,

  1. The state always bails banking and property at the expense of the ‘people’. Look at Northern Rock in England.

  2. I agree with you, but then I will refer to the fool some people some of the time and fool most of the people most of the time…

  3. Agreed.

  The problem with Thaksin is that he was unpopular in Bangkok and immensely unpopular in the South. It is understood that the NE has the most people and because of his popularity there, he was arguable still the ‘popular’ choice to lead the country under Democratic principles. For the sake of brevity, I will cut a long-wided bridging argument to present 2-3 points.
  In the United States, the framers of the constitution understood that the representation shouldn’t be only by the numbers, that is why in the US senate, each state provides 2 senators regardless of size. Hence, a tiny little state the size of Rhode Island has equal representation to the hugely populous California, though their representation is vastly different in congress. This is important because it highlights the voice of smaller states (or in this case provinces/districts) where the PM was unpopular.
  Second, and hear this loud and clear. Thaksin wasn’t even the PM! His one-party election resulted in a parliament that couldn’t convene. Hence, he and his party were no longer the government. He was a care-taker PM who quit the post, and then re-appointed his own return. Is that even allowed? So I will disagree with you, and even point out that you are misinformed for saying that his popularness was for ‘very good reasons’ as you say it.
  Though I will concede that it would’ve been interesting if we could vote province by province to see which provinces would’ve impeached that nepotistic cronyist who changed the rules of the game to level the playing field for everyone except for his friends and family.
  Either ways, some food for thought.

• 22 Srithanonchai // Sep 18, 2007 at 10:18 pm

  Thaksin was not “unpopular in Bangkok”! Look at the 2005 election result. Rather, he was the first elected Thai PM who had the support of both BKK and the countryside (except the South). Before him, people in BKK had normally voted against the PM.

• 23 Taxi Driver // Sep 18, 2007 at 11:00 pm

  Dickie Simpkins, your comparison of SCB and Northern Rock belies either your confusion (at best) or deliberate obfuscation (at worst).

  In SCB’s case, the Thai state bailed out the shareholders (i.e. the elite). The shareholders effectively got a free get out of gaol card by receiving equity capital injection on very friendly terms.

  In Northern Rock’s case, there is NO attempt to bail out Northern Rock shareholders. If your are currently a Nortnern Rock shareholder you will know this well. The actions of the BoE (acting as lender of last resort to Northern Rock) is aimed at protecting the depositors in the bank (i.e. moms and dads, the common people) and to protect confidence in the banking system (good for everybody commoner and elite alike). There is a big difference between protecting depositors and bailing out shareholders. The BoE could never do the same for Northern Rock shareholders as the Thai state did for SCB shareholders.

• 24 James Haughton // Sep 19, 2007 at 5:58 pm

  And in this case “the state” is “the Crown”.

  I don’t see where I raised the issue of whether or not Thaksin was constitutionally enabled to form a government. You are off on your own track there. This issue has nothing to do with his popularity. His popularity depends on the fact that he did things that helped the poor. To be overthrown by a popular revolt, you have to be unpopular. Is this hard for you to understand?

  There are a lot of arguments about the pros and cons of senatorial non-proportionate governance. Most of them are completely irrelevant in this context, since Thailand doesn’t have that style of governance and probably never will. Every time Thailand has had strong regional representation in government, the strong regional representatives have ended up dead or fled.

  I will say that Senates work best when they prevents majorities exploiting minorities. For this to be the case, there have to be clear minority groups whose rights would be threatened in a larger political unit. It’s absurd to characterise the residents of Bangkok as a threatened and powerless minority vis a vis the inhabitants of Isaan and the North. The reverse is more likely to be the case. Any suggestion that the coup government would protect minority rights is utterly absurd.

  Thaksin was unpopular in the South because of his atrocities and ham-fisted policies, but in this he was following a long-standing tradition of Siamese exploitation of those they consider beneath them. The South has never been granted the kind of minority rights that a senatorial system would grant eg representation of their language, religion, culture, and possession of resources. Prem & by extension the “network monarchy” have been foremost in suppression of any such peaceful aspirations for cultural identity. If the Quebecois had been treated the way the South of thailand has been treated, Canada would be in a civil war.

• 25 Sidh S. // Sep 19, 2007 at 6:39 pm

  Khun Somsak, thank you for your bold comments. However, I would urge you to see HM the King’s actions in the context of his 60+ years career, Thai socio-political history and the nature of monarchic cycles. A young King, with his position uncertain amidst elder and experienced powerbrokers (and the brand new notion of ‘constitutional monarchy’), would make decisions in ways that are different from an old, experienced King, confident of his place in Thai society (with an increasingly clear definition and practice of ‘constitutional monarchy’ – with m.lardprao’s account as an example).

  James, to add to the complexity of your first point on the state bailing out of CPB businesses – let’s also see it from the view that these businesses were not privy to PMChavalit’s government to float the baht unlike some (including PMThaksin) in the inner circle which seem to actually even benefited.

  To your point three, I would also like to add that the bloating of generals in the arm forces was quite pronounced during PMChavalit’s previous career as army commander – and it was to build his political base towards becoming prime minister. Throughout the past 70+ years of Thai ‘constitutional monarchy’, there have always been various actors and agents (both internal and external) that have acted independently, many in fact being more influential than the monarchy in the course of Thai political evolution…

  Dickie’s analogy of Thai democracy with a kid learning how to ride a bike is also interesting. In relation to HM the King I would say this only applies later in his career – after the events of the 70s (even then PMPrem, with tacit support of the monarchy, had several unsuccessful coups against his government). In that context, the ‘first’ time the elite decided to take off the ‘training wheels’ was in 1988 when PMPrem decided to step down and let an elected politician, PMChatchai take the wheels. The second time was during the vote to pass the 1997 Constitution when I remember even the military (acting independently of the monarchy?) were pressuring the parliament to pass the constitution (which wasn’t popular with many politicians).

  I also see Dickie’s paternalistic analogy as apt as Thai society also has a Confucionist respect for elders – so that makes it much more critical to differentiate the actions of the King in various stages in his career and resist the extreme temptation to reduce Thai democracy to the prerogatives of one person or one institution.

• 26 Sidh S. // Sep 19, 2007 at 7:03 pm

  James, to add to the complexity of the Southern unrest, PMThaksin also dissolved a pre-existing security apparatus that seemed to function giving a more prominent role to the police (renown for their incorruptibility!). PMThaksin also sent troops to Iraq (even if humanitarian), which is unpopular amongst the Muslim population. He also admitted to issue orders to storm Krue-se Mosque and initially claiming responsibility for Takbai (before passing the buck)…

  He was a great PM for Isan, a terrible PM for the South, split down the middle for Bangkok (agreeing with Srithanonchai). He could have retained popularity of Bangkok had he merely pay some taxes on the ShinCorp sale and concurrently show more care in using state revenue, most of which are derived from the urban middle class taxes(and not just Bangkok).

• 27 jonfernquest // Sep 26, 2007 at 2:02 pm

  Two suggestions, while trying to find Michael Connor’s blog again:

  1. Put Michael Connors blog on your blog roll

  2. Put the date based archives on the right side bar again

  (the only way to find articles in the last month now is to page through with arrows at the top)

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