I’m thankful for this book, especially because it contains the rumours and what I would call “grey literature”. As mentioned above, rumours often have a value in itself, and contribute to the tide of history; just think of the “predictions” about the length of the Chakri rule and their impact on 1932 or the succession.
As a student living abroad I appreciate this kind of information, even with the ambiguities attached. As far as I remember Handley has always marked passages in his book that were based on underground information, and of course we are bound to harsh scrutiny anyway before quoting any book. That the book was published by YUP does not release the reader from common sense and responsible use.
That some students though fell into the trap, mixing likely assumptions out of TKNS with confirmed data as Bangkok Pundit has pointed out, can be ignored as collateral damage.
However, the gentlemen assembled here seem to overlook that not everybody has a Thai wife, girlfriend or other acquaintance teaching at Chula, TU, SWU or RKH, who can feel the pulse of the Thai nation directly.
TKNS positively stands out from what we are usually served with – especially in Thai – from those syrupy hagiographies that try harder to hide than to reveal. If you have fought your way through lengthy passages about dhammaraja and devaraja cult theories, you finally had a good reading at rainy days too, an underestimated quality in the field of academic writing.
I do not appreciate the system of endnotes though; especially not separate endnotes for each chapter, – but at least and laudably TKNS contains a useful index, unlike many recently published books.

The only point I deplore is that the most entertaining sources are by their very nature unavailable, like the alleged treatise of Prince Sukhumbhand or the inflammatory remarks about Thailand’s alleged Susie Wong.

Greetings.
Having been run through the grinder here in Thailand a couple of times myself, a former Thailand Peace Corps volunteer and long-married to a wonderful Thai lady (39 years), bot of us were accused of being foreigners damaging the nation, the religion and the monarchy, I had a charge of lese majesty against me filed with the national police, and we have been in court for criminal and civil (defamation) claims and counter-claims.Yet, no one would proceed with human rights-related investigations of what happened at Watpa Salawan that 12 February 2005.
I am working on a book on the topic, tentatively titled Five Octobers, because events at Watpa were precipitated by an October 2004 incident and the other four Octobers, in Thailand, relate to the infamous massacres and southern violence. I have spent some nine years with the local media – something foreigners are not supposed to be doing – and have a personal in-depth grasp of what the media are faced with, as well as how academics, government and private sector individuals and groups act, etc.
In short, I would like Mr. Handley’s email address, and would appreciate anyone else’s comments who cares to contribute something to this new book.
Thank you all.
Sincerely,
Frank G Anderson

http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/04Oct2007_news04.php

It may sound like an oxymoron – but it has been a ‘dynamic’ but ’stable’ system (someone must have a better term) that guarantees continuity and was, importantly, adaptible to changes. There are conflicts aplenty, but they seem of the ‘creative’ type that does not degenerate into the destruction of whole societies (safe the 2nd fall of Ayutthya?). Arguably, the concept of Uparaj (2nd king) seem to be designed with stability in mind – as it co-opts another highly talented royal, while also serving as a backup system (a complete administrative system in fact) in the case the king/his court fails or passes away suddenly (whether through disease or warfare).

Even more recent ideological/personal conflicts between the alpha males of FMPibul and AjarnPridi seems to illustrate this – especially during WWII. FMPibul sides with the Axis, Ajarn Pridi with the Allies – but there are evidences that they were coordinated all along (for the aims of national survival). AjarnPridi may have eventually lost out to FMPibul then, but we know who will have the last laugh. Democratic government is not necessarily ’stable and harmornious’, but played maturely (in the spirits of the rules of the game), it is stable – and Thai society is slowly, but surely, growing into it (under the auspices/actions/intents of many from King Prajadhipok, AjarnPridi – even FMPibul, through a succession of many individuals/groups/agencies to the present, HM the King being one of the key players in the past half century).

It is interesting to note that in 1932, Thailand had a military coup against the monarchy to install ‘democracy’ (proto/pseudo-democracy to be more accurate). In this historical context, the monarchy, the military and democracy manifests both eccentric synergies and conflicts. Trace that historical trajectory, there’s no doubt democracy will prevail – and, I stress again, both the monarchy and military (at least a critical mass) knows and accepts that inevitability (which they always had a hand in creating).

Future monarchs will succeed to the throne in a much more, open and democratic age. They will need to be extremely capable and charismatic to emulate HM the King’s achievements and popularity. I suspect they won’t need to be – as, it is hoped, the work has already been done… the people will take care of themselves. The struggle, then, will be like any other democracies – to mitigate money politics and economic inequalities.

I argued that the preference for stability, via negotiations/compromise, is culturally deep and Siamese/Thai history (particularly from the rulership – whether they be ‘warrior’ and/or ‘trader’ kings) provides ample evidence. The traditional guarantee of that stability is the military which the king and nobles were also part of. The other is economic stability which Siamese/Thai kings were also known to be very active. The 19th century colonial threat heightened/reinforced the monarchy’s (and nobility’s) role in both military and economic means towards stability/survival…

Response:

The Thai monarchy, for the most part, hasn’t been stable, going back to very ancient times.

Siam has had a long history of fratricide, regicide, and deadly competition by the elites at the highest level.

During the Ayutthaya period, Thai kings and/or elites used foreigners, the Portuguese, Dutch, French, etc as allies in putting down Thai competitors, as well as subjugating Thai muang on the periphery.

During the early Rattanakosin period, the various Chao Phya would be at each other’s throats trying to defend their own political and economic turf, more than willing to sacrifice political stability of the country.

Many, such as the Bunnag clan, would openly defy the king if that meant furthering their own interests.

During the reigns of Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, the 2nd kings were open and active competitors who had their own wealth and armies, and formed informal relationships with foreigners outside the purview of the court.

The institution of the second king was done away with during the fifth reign because the second king rebelled against King Chulalongkorn, and when his rebellion failed, he sought refuge at the British embassy.

There was an attempted coup during the 6th reign.

The absolute monarchy was overthrown during 7th reign

King Ananda was murdered, probably, during the 8th reign.

The only king that has been obsessed with stability has been this one, yet how many coups has there been during his reign? Too many to count

If there is a truism of Thai politics: It isn’t stable and harmonious.

>>I argued that the preference for stability, via negotiations/compromise, is culturally deep and Siamese/Thai history (particularly from the rulership – whether they be ‘warrior’ and/or ‘trader’ kings) provides ample evidence. The traditional guarantee of that stability is the military which the king and nobles were also part of. The other is economic stability which Siamese/Thai kings were also known to be very active. The 19th century colonial threat heightened/reinforced the monarchy’s (and nobility’s) role in both military and economic means towards stability/survival…

You are right of course. The issue is, what has prevented the Royal CPB-Privy Purse-Charity Funds-private funds money complex from being as rapacious as the Suharto or Marcos families? There is a range of explanations, including laziness, lack of desire, incompetence, failure, discipline, self-control, Finance Ministry influence, the king’s influence, and so on.

Likewise, there must be a reason why there is a need for financial assistance from tycoons like Thaksin and Fayed to rebuild old palaces. Could it be true lack of resources, cheapness, habit, working from example (of parents), something else? The government gives a budget for upkeep of the royal family and its buildings and offices — why wasn’t this enough?

Paul