Unfortunately, I’m not that much of an original thinker to run my own blog, but posting the odd comment on other peoples blogs is a good hobby for a lazy person like me.

“If it’s a ‘return’ then I guess that must mean the Democrats?!!!!” >> Had the Constitution Drafting Assembly adopted the suggestions concerning the introduction of a proportional voting system, then we would now have exactly this–the Democrats, led by Abhisit as prime minister, joined by CTP and Phuea Phaendin. In that case, Michael probably would have seen more than just a “slim” chance for democracy.

Now, let’s lean back and watch the battle…

It’s lucky for Pranee Khlangpha that Thaksin is not yet fully back in power, or she might not have lived to tell her story.

You seem to think it’s only ever the Royalists that manipulate the military, the courts, the police etc etc, and you pro-Thaksinites even go so far as to blame HMK for the drug war, and exonerate Thaksin from any culpability.
Why is it that the only part of any royal speech you don’t want to criticize is the one where there might be some (ambiguous) support for Thaksin?

What do you make of HMK endorsing the PPP speaker?
So much for a coup by stealth!

Yes , definitely too soft if looked at from the perspective of a military dictator – apart from the initial coup, those guys were just a democratic as Thaksin ever was, and far less bloodthirsty.

But a number of them continue to “stick to their guns”. One example can be seen in Connor’s “Thailand’s coup by stealth or something else” that was published in Asia Sentinel a couple of weeks ago [http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=982&Itemid=35].
When I saw this article my first thought was, well, the “song mai ao”s do not seem to have learnt their lesson from 2006. Then they failed to support a democratically elected government against a royalist-military attack, and now they look as though they are at it again. Connors’ article shows all the hallmarks of the “song mai ao” position: the belief that there is another possibility between the royalists and Thaksin-TRT-PPP; the view that the forces are “contending fractions of the Thai elite” and so equally “bad”; and most irritating of all, the image they have of themselves as being above politics and the evil, corrupt politicians. Their own political position is ambiguous. The fact that TRT-PPP have won strong victories in 4 elections in a row, the last one against active opposition from the royalist dictatorship, doesn’t seem to matter to the song mai ao.

I found myself disagreeing with virtually every sentence of the article, but let me just take a few of the choice ones.

The article’s argument appears to begin boldly as a refutation of the “coup by stealth” argument by questioning the portrayal of the Election Commission as a CNS “stooge”:

1. “…In news coverage and commentary, the Election Commission of Thailand has been presented as the council’s [CNS’s] stooge. The Thaksin PR machine could not have hoped for more…”

The sarcastic tone here suggests that the allegations of bias directed at the EC are merely a product of Thaksin’s “PR machine” (no mention of the obstacles placed in the way of Thaksin’s “PR machine” – to the extent it is allowed to operate at all – by the royalist regime). But the attempt at a rebuttle soon fizzles out when Connors actually contradicts himself by agreeing that PPP’s “claims of a plot against it surely have some substance…. But why should it be otherwise? In a war, one force uses the instruments open to its influence…”

2. “…Is the election commission a stooge…”

In his initial attempt to refute the coup by stealth argument Connors tries to argue that the EC is not a stooge because it was appointed during the Thaksin era, apparently by pro-Thaksin senators. There are two problems with this: (i) the point is not whether the EC is a “stooge”, but whether it is being used as a conduit for the exercise of extra-Constitutional power by the anti-Thaksin forces following the PPP’s good result in the election; and (ii) as we know, in the case of Thai politics public figures are always ready to “jump ship” when the political winds change. In Thaksin’s own party scores of members abandoned TRT after the coup when the new “power” took over. Just because they were appointed by Thaksin (at a time when politically Thaksin was extremely weak – who knows whether Thaksin in fact had the final say over these appointments?) does not mean that the commissioners could not be subject to outside influence, especially when the stakes are so high.

Apart from this there are the scandals involving the EC’s request to the deputy director of the Santibal, who was involved with the PAD demonstrations under Sondhi Limthongkul, to “help” them with their investigations into electoral violations, and the request that Sodsri’s daughter be seconded to work for Sondhi Bunyaratkalin (which makes it a little strange that Connors should take Sodsri’s words at face value).

3. “…For reasons that remain unclear, a day after the 19 September 2006 coup d’etat the military endorsed the Senate selection of the commissioners…”

After everything that happened since September 19 (the coup-makers’ attempt to destroy Thaksin, as Connors himself argues) surely there is an obvious reason: they were endorsed because the coup-makers obviously knew that this EC could be bent to their will (or, more accurately, to the will of the powers behind the coup-makers). Why else spare such an important body after everything the coup-makers had done?

4. “…One might surmise, rather generously, that the coup group acted thus because the 10 nominees forwarded to the senate by the judiciary were chosen in the shadow of the king’s appeal to judicial integrity, and thus could be expected to act with caution and impartiality…”

This statement is quite astonishing in its credulity. Connors actually takes what the King says at face value! Anyone who has studied the king’s speeches will know that they are not to be taken literally (anymore than the speeches of any other politician) but they should be read as coded message being sent to a particular target audience for a political purpose. The king can not be seen to intervene in politics (unless in a “crisis”), but as we know, he continually makes his position and desires known to the relevant people. The phraratchadamrat have the effect of giving a “royal blessing” for controversial political actions later taken by the military, judges, senior bureaucrats, which prevent criticism of that action, eg. the 25 April 2006 speech to the judges which led to the annulment of the result of the April elections; the 25 May 2007 speech a week before the dissolution of the TRT and banning of the 111 TRT executives, following which the CNS told the whole country to stay calm and abide by the phratchadamrat; and the outrageous birthday speech last December where he outlined his wishlist of military purchases. As Somsak has argued, the fact that the king is allowed to comment in public at all without his remarks having first been sent for approval by the democratically elected leader of the government is itself a big problem for democracy in Thailand.

5. “…Whatever one thinks of the PPP and its claim to represent the democratic will of the people…”

What does this mean? That the PPP does NOT represent the democratic will of the Thai people? So Connors does not accept the election results? He does not think that the PPP represents the democratic will of the Thai people?

6. “…The acute state of Thai politics at this present time has little to do with democracy…”

What an extraordinary statement – which shows how faithful Connors is to the “song mai ao” credo. Democratic elections appear to mean nothing to him. They are just another way by which one section of the “elite” manipulates the population, who are too stupid to be able to vote for the parties which the “song mai ao” academics would like.

7. “…they have yet to elaborate any genuinely ideological position…”

The implication (very common of the elitist stance of the “song mai ao”) is that the PPP-TRT is purely a political vehicle for Thaksin to manipulate the electorate (because the villagers are too stupid and uneducated) so it doesn’t need any ideological stance. Well, given that the party was only formed 6 months ago, during a royalist-military dictatorship which controlled the media and made it extremely difficult for the PPP to get its message out at all, one might think that Connors might have sympathized with the party’s difficulty in pursuing its public relations. But given that the PPP is publicly recognized as essentially the resurrection of the TRT, one would think that people already have a pretty good idea of the “ideological position” of the party. Maybe that is even why so many people voted for them.

8. “…Enlightened Thaksin forces want a bourgeois revolution …They are also hostile to liberal forms of democracy…”

Huh? No evidence is given to back up this vague statement. Who are these “enlightened” forces? Who pronounces them “enlightened”? (this is another feature of the song mai ao academics: they see themselves as morally and politically superior to the appalling politicians). How are the enlightened Thaksin forces “hostile” to liberal democracy? Which party has utilized the discourse of liberal democracy (especially the importance of elections, following the Constitution) more than the TRT-PPP? In one paragraph Connors is saying, sarcastically again, that “They [the pro-Thaksin forces] have been unrelenting in their claim of Thaksin’s democratic mandate” and then in another he says that they are hostile to liberal democracy. The logic that makes this contradiction work for Connors is that he obviously considers TRT-PPP’s rhetoric about democracy a sham. In fact, they are just right wing, authoritarian chauvinists, ie. as bad as the royalists. It’s just that the villagers are too stupid to understand this and are being duped. So we need the far-sighted, selfless academics to lead the “people’s sector” instead. Classic ” song mai ao” discourse.

9. “…Enlightened Thaksin forces … mobilise forces under a banner of right wing populism, including Buddhist chauvinism…”

Oh, a beauty this one. So the support that TRT gained was because they “mobilized forces” (ie. got people to vote for them) based on populism (ie. the wicked practice of the TRT by which they promised and delivered upon policies that addressed the needs of their constituents). How is this “right wing”? Don’t right wing political movements eschew the sort of welfare programs that TRT was delivering to the poor? As for Buddhist chauvinism, who are more chauvinist than the royalists and the military when it comes to Buddhism! (This is the whole problem with Buddhism today: it has been strangled by the royalists for the best part of the last 50 years).

10. “…it is indeed surprising that not more has been done to eliminate the Thaksin threat….”

What an extraordinary statement. For Connors, everything that has happened since September 19 2006 is not enough: the overthrow of the TRT government by tanks and guns in a royalist-military coup; the arrest of its members and the flight of others into exile; the exile of its leader; the year-long use of martial law in half the country (which continues in many provinces); the blanket censorship of any news about Thaksin; the dissolution of the TRT; the political banning of 111 executives; the seizure of Thaksin’s assets; the drafting of a constitution by royalist-appointed members specifically designed to prevent Thaksin from returning to power; the beefing up of the powers of the military under the new security act; the obvious intimidation and obstruction of PPP campaigning, etc. etc. But all this is not enough for Connors. It is a “surprise” that not more has been done to get rid of Thaksin (since, according to Connors, he is a “historical calamity”). So the regime has been too soft on him?!

11. “…They have been unrelenting in their claim of Thaksin’s democratic mandate, willing to ignore that democracy means so much more than a mark on a ballot paper…”

Well, here we go. The hoary old “song mai ao” disparagement of elections. This is possibly the most offensive statement of the article. Connors can’t seem to understand the fundamental problem of Thai politics: the failure to cement the principle of popular sovereignty because of the restoration of the political fortunes of the royalists after 1947, and the subsequent indoctrination of the population through the organs of the state with the ideals and values of absolute monarchy. The only mechanism by which the people can have real leverage over politics (however flawed and open to abuse that leverage might be) in the face of the royalist manipulation of the Thai politics is elections. Everything follows from elections. And that is why the royalist attack on elections has been so violent and determined (apart from the coup itself) – from the rhetoric that the people are too stupid to understand what’s good for them, that they sell their votes, that they vote in “bad” people, that they are victims of “populism”, etc. etc., through to the rigging of the constitution, the ridiculously strict limitations on campaigning, the threat of red and yellow cards, etc. The reason why elections in Thailand at this moment are SO FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT is that they are the only means by which the legitimacy of the royalist hold on the Thai political system can be challenged. The attack on elections (“democracy means more than elections”) is a royalist ruse and Connors supports it.

And finally:

12. “…Thailand’s chance of returning to some form of liberal democracy are slim…”

If it’s a “return” then this obviously rules out any government that has been or will be dominated by TRT-PPP, because Connors has already declared that these people are “hostile” to liberal forms of democracy.

If it’s a “return” then I guess that must mean the Democrats?!!!!

There you have it: “song mai ao” lives on.