Then, we advance our own views on the basis of our experience with three wealthy Thai undergrads so alienated from their country’s intellectual life that they are taking their first degrees, in English, “at an Ivy League university in the U.S.” (as opposed, perhaps, to an Ivy League university in Swaziland, or in Bulgaria?).

Who is really out of touch here?

Not sure who you might be, “Maw Hom,” but I am afraid that you have to do better than this.

An anecdotal contribution: I’ve assigned the book in an undergraduate seminar on Southeast Asian history at an Ivy League University in the U.S. (there were at least 3 upper class Thai students in that class, each from wealthy and/or powerful families in Thailand, and each planning to return to Thailand–some to get involved in politics–after graduation), and the reaction from the Thai students in the class was like charting the stages of grief in reaction to death: denial, anger, bargaining, acceptance.

It took a *great* deal of convincing before two of my Thai students were even willing to pick up the book (as in, literally touch the book): they knew it from reputation in Thailand as an evil, defamatory text not even worthy of critical scrutiny. Remember, these students would be in their late teens/early twenties, and one thing Handley’s book does well is to offer a sense of their worldview regarding the monarchy: by the time they were born, the palace PR machine was up and running smoothly and well-oiled, and the *political* consciousness of these students is likely dominated by the 1992 images of the antagonists in that political crisis knelling at the feet of the king while with a few nationally televised words he ends the bloodshed and restores peace and democracy to the kingdom.

For students and Thai people of this generation, the power of Handley’s book lies *not* in its systematic attack on the Thai monarchy (the book contains no such programmatic attack), but rather in its willingness to analyze the king and the institution of the monarchy as a *political* institution. To say, as Reynolds does, that the book contains “not much new” for Thai speakers and to suggest that its value is primarily for the English speaking world not acquainted with contemporary Thai discourse is to vastly underestimate the continuing hold of the “king and monarchy is above politics” narrative.

Handley’s book should hardly be taken as the last word on the monarchy. Rather, its promise lies in clearing some land–much like in swidden agriculture–and fertilizing the soil for what will hopefully be many more such studies (academic or not) to follow.

Handley, on the subject of the monarchy as a political institution in Thai politics and history, your book changed at least two of my Thai students to the core, Reynolds’ “yawn, sigh” concluding line notwithstanding.

Other posters- Sorry for taking the discussion off track. Back to TKNS.

Especially interesting as the current monarch was selected by Phibul Songkram, based on factors other the purity of direct lineage playing a major role.

Interesting stuff! Another example of how this reign consciously seeks to identify with the most important reigns of the past, whether Sukhothai or Ayutthaya or Bangkok periods, to claim “direct” lineage and justify their family position. Besides Chulalongkorn, the palace has tried to tie King Bhumibol with King Mongkut, maybe even moreso. I’m sure observant Thais can see more of these small but important assertions of linkages than I could.

Internationally, perhaps they don’t care too much about the views of the West, but they do worry about the pictures that cause their “peaceful rise” position to look entirely like propaganda.

The idea that you put forward in the 2nd half of your middle paragraph is fanciful – at present. However, as China comes more into economic prominence it does seem to be loosening up, & it is possible that they will eventually move in the direction of having the luxuries you list (as the West did) in some form. It’s a ‘maybe.’

However, I really do sympathize with your statement that “The Chinese have shown themselves to be a people who know the price of everything & the value of nothing.” Many of them, especially the worst polluters, et cetera, are really odious. The environmental degradation China suffers is unbelievable… Maybe its time for an updated set of Confucian values. Say, checks-and-balances Confucius. Emphasize the respect and unity, but instead, focus it on things like rule of law, love of justice, and human rights rather than an entirely top-down relationship where even though the upper strata are technically duty-bound to the lower strata, only the obligation from the lower strata towards the upper ones are enforced.

Another note about Tibet, how much of the rioting is actually due to xenophobia? Seeing as all parts of China (excluding perhaps HK and Macao) are under a repressive dictatorship, is the Tibetan cause (reflected in the recent riots) really just? I’m all for the proposals from the Dalai Lama. What I don’t comprehend is why China doesn’t treat Tibet in a much more conservative version of “I’ll leave you alone, you’ll leave me alone” type fashion as it is doing in Hong Kong or Macao? And I always thought “the Chinese” were known for compromise.