Here is a new publication on the war in Southern Thailand by Ji Ungpakorn and the Peoples Coalition Party.
Since the most recent eruption of violence in Southern Thailand, various governments, whether it be Taksin’s Thai Rak Thai government or the military junta, have all failed to solve the crisis. It is becoming clear that the war has reached a stale-mate.
1. Military commanders know that they cannot beat the insurgents. The only strategy that they have is to try to contain the violent situation so that it does not get any worse. Meanwhile, ordinary soldiers, many of whom are recruited from the poor villages of the North-East, have no will to fight. They care nothing about “the protection of the nation” and try just to survive their tour of duty.
2. The insurgents have become more and more efficient and coordinated. They can hit multiple targets simultaneously and hit targets outside the deep South. More and more young people in the villages are drawn to support them because of the atrocities carried out by the Thai State. Yet the rebels cannot beat the military either, because their mass base is too small.
3. Ordinary villagers live in constant fear. The Thai State’s arming of villagers only heightens the state of violence. Regular attacks occur against villagers, teachers and priests or Imams and they often cannot tell from which side these attacks originate. Villagers want an end to the violence and they want the troops and police to be withdrawn now.
The full text of this article can be read and downloaded here or here.
20 responses so far ↓
1 An ambiguous revolutionary // Mar 24, 2008 at 10:41 am
Wait a sec… the insurgents have become more and more efficient and coordinated. Yet at the same time, the military thinks it can contain the violence and achieve a stalemate?
What exactly are they going to do differently to achieve this wonderful outcome? Because they have certainly failed so far.
2 Surang Saitip // Mar 24, 2008 at 12:03 pm
A sensible thing to do would be to recruit the insurgents for the Thai army and police and make their leaders commanders. We have a lot of generals now, and it should not hurt to add a few more.
3 Srithanonchai // Mar 24, 2008 at 3:35 pm
A true “Giles” again…
4 nganadeeleg // Mar 24, 2008 at 7:01 pm
Srithanonchai: We already know you don’t agree with Giles’ politics – would you care to provide some more constructive criticism?
5 Srithanonchai // Mar 24, 2008 at 8:17 pm
nganadeeleg: Sorry, the comment was the most constructive thing I could come up with given the nature of the text.
6 Lleij Samuel Schwartz // Mar 26, 2008 at 5:50 am
What I found absolutely bizzare in Ungpakorn’s piece, especially considering it’s self-proclaimed Marxist viewpoint, was that he failed to address the fact that the insurgency is unwinnable, in its current state, because insurgencies are primarly won through ideological warfare.
The Thai government has shown a steady refusal to combat the insurgents on the battlefield of ideas, which is quite sad as I was hoping that progress in the South would have been one of the good things to come out of the coup. I was hopeful that prominant Thai Muslim members of the junta, like Sonthi B. and Aree Wong-araya, would possess an understanding of the religo-cultural concepts that formulates the causa belli of the insurgency. [It wouldn't be a LSS post without at least one egregious use of Latin, now would it?] However, even if, in fact, they did, it would be a monumental task to combat the ideology of the insurgents, as they are, in Ungpakorn’s words, so “radical”. I am, of course, using the term in its original sense, that is, the insurgents’ beliefs are grounded in the “roots” of orthodox interpretations of the Qur’an, the Sunna, authorative Hadith and centuries of Qur’anic exegesis by numerous faqih (jurists of Islamic law). [As an aside, what I also found to be equally bizzare was Ungpakorn's implication that somehow Communism and Islam were mutally exclusive; 10 million Hui prove him wrong.]
Ungpakorn is absolutely correct in his assertion that the concept of the Westphalian nation-state, along with the related principle of cuius regio, eius religio, has a great deal to do with motivating the conflict in the South. The concept of the nation-state runs directly counter to Islamic geo-political concepts, namely the Hanafi “theory of the abodes” that was developed a short time after Muhammad’s death. In short, in orthodox Islam, the world is divided into two spheres, Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and Dar al-Harb/Dar al-Kufr (the Abode of War/the Abode of the Kafir [Infidels]). Further divisions would come latter in the history of Islamic thought, such as Dar al-Hudna (the Abode of Conditional Cease-Fire), Dar al-Dawa (the Abode of Invitation, i.e. a land where Islam is being introduced for the first time), and finally Dar al-’Ahd (the Abode of Treaty; an Ottoman-specific concept that described Christian lands under the suzeranity of the Sublime Port). Now while Islam, as a univeralist religion like Christianity, and to some extent Buddhism, claims dominion over the whole world, there is considerable debate on how to accomplish such a goal.
Nevertheless, all major schools of Islamic fiqh agree that once a land enters into Dar al-Islam it is permenantly part of the Islamic world and cannot fall back into Dar al-Kufr, even if no Muslims currently reside in that land. Therefore, since the Pattani Sultanate was part of Dar al-Islam, any claim by kafir harbi (infidels from the Abode of War) over such land is illegitimate. As such a claim is defined as fitna (disruption of the peace), a great sin in Islam, it becomes fard al-ayn (obligatory for every Muslim) to engage in defensive jihad against the “disruptors”, as mandated by Qur’an 2:190,4:95, and 22:39.
Now, of course, there are many ways in which a mujihad may engage the enemy. Jihad bis sayf (struggle by the sword), is one option; however, jihad bil lisan and jihad bil yad (struggle by the tongue and struggle by the hand) also exist. Thus, one could argue there exists a synergy between the violent acts of the armed wing of the insurgency, and the non-violent protests of the “women’s auxillary”. Nevertheless, many authorative faqih cite Qur’an 2:216 and 2:251 as mandating jihad bis sayf for defensive jihad.
Further adding to the problem, the increasing popularity of the Salafi and Deobandi movements across the whole (thanks to Saudi funding; Islam as vehicle of Arab imperalism is a discussion best left for another time) of the umma al-Islamiyah (global Muslim community) makes addressing the insurgency on ideological ground even more difficult as both schools of thought are grounded in the importance of the Sunna and the concept of Muhammad as uswa hasana, al-Insān al-Kāmil (the perfect man, whose actions are to be emulated as fully as possible), emulating the deeds of the Sahaba (the companions of Muhammad), and belief in taqlid wal-ittibā (giving preference to earlier muhaddith and faqih). Indeed, it is a quite mainstream belief in Sunni Islam that in the modern era, there exists no one righteous enough to qualify as a mujtahid, i.e. someone who can perform independent Qur’anic exegesis, and thus create new interpretations of sharia (Islamic religious law). To attempt to alter sharia without being recognized as a competent mujtahid is to commit the sin of bid’ah.
In this short comment, I hope to have shown the enormous task that lies ahead of those who would attempt to fight the insurgency on ideological grounds, considering that these beliefs are grounded in mainstream concepts that hundreds of millions of people share around the world. Yet, unless one attempts to counter the ideology that drives the insurgents to believe they are engaged in a sacred war of defense, the only option the insurgents will accept is full independence from the Thai nation-state. As Ungpakorn points out, the Southern insurgency shares many characteristics with Islamic irridentist movements around the world. Whatever the final outcome is in the South, it will have ramifications, both sacred and profane, that will be felt in places like Kosovo, Israel/Palestine, and Xinjiang.
7 hrk // Mar 27, 2008 at 9:26 pm
It is good news that the traditional argument of revolt due to deprivation and neglect of the southern South is not applied anymore. Ji is right in his argument that the violence and conflicts can not be solved by state repression. He is right as well in his pointing out that even though violence is wide spread, it remains quite well contained. This is most obvious when comparing it with other separatist or minority conflicts in Southeast Asia. Neither state repression nor revolt is organized well enough to define territories as under their respective control. Compare this f.e. to Burma or Aceh.
Looking at the conflict empirically the main fact is the extremely low level of organisation of those involved in it, which might be a reason why the conflict remains so well contained. Often one speaks of “the state”. In the south those organisations associated to the state like the administration, military, police etc. are strongly factionalized, with each faction and clique following its own agendas and interests as well as associating with others. The “movement” is probably as factionalized. It can even be doubted whether such a “movement” exists. It seems far more probable that very loosely linked small groups and individuals are violent and link this on an ideological level to wider issues like establishing an independent Islamic state etc. Thus, the “movement” is more of a virtual kind. This has the big advantage that neither policies nor visions, strategies or ideologies have to be defined. A sound analysis of Islamic doctrine does therefore not help to clarify matters, and it makes a “battle of ideas” rather complicated. I guess that neither the “state” nor the ”movement” have much of ideas to battle about. More of a reason for battle are personal interests with regards to power, influence and money (usually all are closely connected).
The current state of affairs of contained multiple conflicts that have violence in common, and thereby dissolve pattern of control and regulation be it social control within communities, control linked to patronage, self-control or control by state authorities, has the advantage for many to follow their own interests with regards to money, influence, power etc. For these violence and maintaining the conflict as violent is a means for their personal ends. This makes pacification difficult. Too many of those who do are in positiions of influence and power, derive their status exactly from the ongoing violence. Thus, pacification would be quite detrimental to their interests. However, this instrumental analysis of violence is insufficient. Violence can become and end in itself. We only have to turn to hooligans etc. Namely for the bored youth violence can be just such an end in itself, without or with limited fictive reasons. Reference to Islam, the “movement” etc. have in this case nothing or little to do with motivations. In this ontext one should remember that violence always implies shifts of power differentials. So, throwing a bomb or shooting a soldier or policeman provides the experience (even if it is only very brief) of being powerful.
Besides comparing the current conflict with other minority conflicts in Southeast Asia, the violence in the South has to be seen in comparative perspective to the rest of Thailand. Violence is very wide spread in Thailand and a gun certainly is an accepted tool to handle competition. Furthermore, all over Thailand the rapid economic, social and cultural changes have dissolved collectives and forms of control of violence. Elsewhere in Thailand too, this dissolution of communities has not been compensated by integration into a working state administration and civil society. Thus, individualism and egocentric personal enrichment, with little concern about how this is achieved, is common. The difference to the South is that these processes are more extreme there then elsewhere.
Another aspect usually not sufficiently taken into consideration is Kelantan. (However, not in the sense that the insurgents hide there). Keleantan certainly is a special state in Malaysia, and many issues raised in Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala are in Kelantan addressed to the Malaysian state as well. Instead of being fixed to Islam (which provides good media coverage though) it might be more useful to look at traits of a multicultural “Pattani” culture, which has been destroyed in Thailand as well as Malaysia, without any new institutions arrising.
The conclusion is therefore that a reduction of violence in the South can only be achieved with far reaching social reforms and changes in Thailand all together.
8 Lleij Samuel Schwartz // Mar 28, 2008 at 5:45 am
re: hrk
In your previous comment, you make several valid points, and I think we have more points in agreement than we do in disgreement. However, I would like address some arguements that you have made.
You wrote:
As I have argued before, I agree with you that a monolithic organization of “supervillians” masterminding events in the South doesn’t exist. Indeed, the loosely linked groups of the insurgency are some of the first examples of true “fourth generation warfare” or as John Robb terms it “Open Source Warfare”. Robb argues that modern day insurgents are organizing themselves more along the lines of open source software communities; first a small core group establishes a “source code”, i.e. a certain ideology that defines an enemy and a goal, and then the group opens the code to the larger community to allow various small groups and individuals to pool their talent to upgrade and employ the code through their own knowledge and resources. And of course, the larger community may contribute from a sense of altruism or they may be more mercenary in their motives.
On the previous point, we agree; however, when you go on to state that:
I must disagree. As mentioned before, “open source warfare” requires an original “source code,” and while there are many facets to the situation in the South, you must concede that many of them are reflected with, at least, the rhetoric of sacred Islamic defensive war. If the old platitude that the insurgents are just a bunch of bored teens looking for kicks were true, their “gangs” would have appellations such as “the Jets” and “the Sharks”. Instead, they align themselves into cliques with names such as the “Mujahideen Pattani Movement” (BNP), the “Islamic Mujahideen Movement of Patani” (GMIP), and the “Mujahideen Islamic Pattani Group National Revolution Front” (BRN). Many incidents in the South have been situated around pondok schools and mosques. Can you see the theme here? Again, I reiterate that it is just one element, but I argue that it an integral part of the “source code” that is ignored at one’s peril.
Furthermore, I find your violence as an expression of power differential argument to be a bit too naive for my liking. ( Besides, what’s so wrong with “individualism and egocentric personal enrichment,” this Agorist/Anarcho-capitalist asks?) In short, if violence for violence’s sake could provide enough fuel to support a prolonged insurgency, then why, in this post-Communist age, is there not a group known as the “Sons of Issan” ploting to bomb the district office at amphoe Ban Phai, in Khon Kaen? I maintain that an insurgency must be started with an ideology that allows for violent resistance to be part of it’s Robbian “source code”. The code may mutate and change over the course of time, as insurgents alter it to their own needs and agendas; however, if enough of the original source is removed or altered, than the insurgency will subside.
Finally, I agree with you that an understanding Pattani “pan-nationalism” is also useful. Your conclusion is also correct, in that, at least, you, Ji, and I agree.
9 HRK // Mar 28, 2008 at 5:42 pm
Thank you for the comments.
I think that a lot of misunderstandings concerning what is going on down south lies in the idea that we have basically one conflict that is usually described as conflict between state and insurgents (or whatever other names are used). In my understanding we have multiple conflicts which are partly related, partly quite independend from each other. That is the reason why I find it crucial to compare the level of violence in the South with violence in Thailand in general. Concerning the high level of violence, my hypothesis is that it results from “re-feudalization”, whereby social structurers are dissolved leaving only loose networks. The effect is a very low level of social integration and thus of both social- and self-control.
You certainly have a very valid point with the argument that we do not have a “Sons of Issan” movement. So even though we do find many similarities with Thailand in general (and I guess Southeast Asia in general), there are a few special issues to be considered while discussing the south. Unfortunately, even though I jave some informed guesses, I do not as yet know what these really are,
Just as a p.s.: What Robb defines as “open source warfare” has been described already by Clausewitz.
10 Srithanonchai // Mar 28, 2008 at 11:20 pm
In January, Duncan McCargo gave a talk at ISEAS, promising to answer the question, “What’s really happening in Southern Thailand.” His answer includes the role of religion, and his paper would make interesting complementary reading in this thread. The link is
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/rof08/s6_duncan.pdf
11 Lleij Samuel Schwartz // Apr 24, 2008 at 7:37 am
re: Srithanonchai
Sorry for the late response. Thanks for the link to the McCargo paper. As it is still in draft form, I will hold back on any criticism of it more substantive than observing that in the beginning of the paper McCargo seems to be firing the first salvo in an academic turf war over the Pattani region. Does the ownership of the current academic discource belong to the field of “area studies” and the like or does it belong to the trans-national “Islamic studies” field and its allied disciplines?
I can understand why the fighting is so intense, for the spoils are so valuable (speaker fees, book deals, tenured positions, department chairs, grants and increased budgets).
However, it is quite a shame that the two factions cannot work together; do you think even if Prof. McCargo, with his profound two and a half years of experience living in Thailand (as his university’s bio-blurb so proudly proclaims), were conversant enough in Southern Thai and Yawi to understand first-hand what was being spoken in the various masājid and pondok schools of the region, and even if he could accomplish a level of cultural penetration that the denizens of such would feel free to speak openly in the presence of even a sympathetic kafir harbi, he would understand if His Majesty the King was blessed during the prayer before the Friday morning khutab and if not, what that would say about the religious and political leanings of the congregation of that particular mosque?
I doubt it.
re:HRK
Just as a p.s.: What Robb defines as “open source warfare” has been described already by Clausewitz.
In his book, Robb acknowledges his debt to both Clausewitz and Col. John Boyd.
12 Srithanonchai // Apr 24, 2008 at 2:57 pm
LSS: What you mention in your main paragraph represents basic methodological considerations in any social-anthropological field research, in whichever setting it is done, including its limitations (the specific person of the researcher and his or her properties is one such limitation). Have you done any such research in the South, by the way? Since McCargo’s book will come out soon, you may feel free to contribute a more substantive book review to New Mandala. Besides, there have been at least four more academics doing field work in and on the South (Pattani, Narathiwat), using different approaches and commanding different personal qualifications. Thus, sooner or later, we will have more accounts from a number of perspectives. You might then contribute more reviews to New Mandala, and compare those writings with McCargo’s description.
13 Lleij Samuel Schwartz // Apr 28, 2008 at 12:35 pm
The browser ate my post: so I’m going to try again…
Re: Srithanonchai
Perhaps I’m being a bit too sensitive, but I cannot help but feel that the tone of your reply was slightly patronizing. Especially considering the fact that I’m the one calling for interdisciplinary collaboration; whereas, McCargo devotes the opening part of his paper to catty snickering at the field of terrorism studies. (Though knowing what an analyst working for Jane’s can make, I must admit feeling a slight bit of bitterness and envy myself.)
That having been said, I don’t disagree with some of McCargo’s points; however, McCargo’s efforts to pull the current academic discourse on the topic away from the effect Islamic doctrines on warfare have on the ideologies and goals of the insurgents only serve to obfuscate what role such doctrines do have. Just as McCargo observes that “[t]erroism experts frequently know very little about the countries on which they write…” McCargo, himself, seems to know very little about Islam beyond what would be covered in Comparative Religions 101. When he writes such howlers, like, “the Southern Thai conflict is not really part of a global conflict, a global jihad, or a global war on terror,” because “the Islam underlying the Southern Thai conflict is local, ‘traditionalist’ Islam, not Islam of the Salafi-Wahhabi variety,” one wonders whether he has any authority upon which to write on the topic at all. McCargo, probably having heard of the Salafi from a “news-clipping” or “internet source,” confuses what is essentially spiritual revival movement, like Sufism, with a school of Islamic jurisprudence, or madh’hab. The madh’hab most common in Southern Thailand is the Shafi’i. Within the Salafi movement, all four Sunni schools are found, including the Shafi’i. (And even if they were not, so what? The Salafi of Al-Qaeda had no problems working hand-in-hand with the Sufi Deobandi Taliban.) As I have stated before, all major madh’hab argue that that jihad is acceptable, and mandatory for defending the dar al-Islam; this includes the Shafi’i of Southern Thailand.
In assuring us that the Southern Thai conflict “is not a jihad,” McCargo seems to define jihad by the very stereotype he ridcules analysts of terrorism as possessing: Jihad as swarthy men on camelback, riding into battle with their trusty shibouks while ululating blood-curdling war cries. In actuality, jihad bin saif can consist of any action taken that disrupts or destroys the life, livelihood, and instiutions of the ahl-i-harb (Ahl-i-harb being defined as non-Muslims as a whole). It may be uncomfortable for some to label lawyers who make careers out of defending accused terrorists, or mothers who protest outside of police stations as mujihadeen, but I assure you that for many Muslims, no such cognitive dissonance exists. And it is due to such painful cognitive dissonance that McCargo twists his arguments so that he may wring the dirty water of “critical analysis of Islamic juriprudence” out of the fabric from which this discussion is woven. He writes that “[l]ike Muslims in many other countries, Patani Muslims do not revel because of deep-rooted socio-economic or psychological grievances, and nor are they primarily animated by jihadist ideologies. Their cause is a political one which centers on local questions of legitimacy; they want to regain control of territory they believe to be theirs, and doing so involves violently rejecting the claims of the Thai state”. Yet, in his paper, McCargo never gets around to telling us why the Patani Muslims believe that Thai claims to Patani are illegitimate, nor does he tell us why they chose to engage in violence, as opposed to Gandhi-esque satyagraha, for example. He only tells us that it is do to “politics” and asks our indulgence to trust him on his word. To counter the arguments that according to Islamic doctrine, the Patani conflict can be defined as a defensive jihad, McCargo is only willing to admit that “Islam serves simply as a mobilizing resource, and a means of framing increasingly shrill justifications for the anticivilian violence”. Again, McCargo doesn’t seem to want to acknowledge the fact that the orthodox (”traditionalist” in his words) interpretations of Qur’anic exegesis frame the political and sociological world-view of the Patani Muslim population.
Of course, recognizing all of this doesn’t absolve the Thai government of any of its brutal actions in the Southern provinces, and this is where someone like McCargo, with his scholarship on the “network monarchy,” could potentially be useful. I wish McCargo would stick to analyzing, for example, how the Queen’s rallying speeches to the various paramilitary groups in the South help formulate counter-insurgency policy. In any case, I do hope that before his next book is published, McCargo takes a walk across the Leeds campus to visit one of his colleagues in the Theology and Religious Studies department, so that he or she may fact-check McCargo’s manuscript before it goes to the presses.
14 Lleij Samuel Schwartz // Apr 29, 2008 at 2:22 am
re: Srithanonchai
For the past couple of days, I’ve been trying to respond to you, but the web browser keeps eating my posts. Perhaps I can e-mail it to you?
15 Nicholas Farrelly // Apr 29, 2008 at 2:44 am
LSS and Srithanonchai, and others,
Sorry about the temperamental filtering of comments. Over the past few days some of my own comments have even been eaten by the cyber-goats (even this comment here was taken for spam…). Please accept my apologies for the frustration any delays or disappearances cause. We receive heaps of spam comments each day (over half a million since we first installed the filter!) and the program that keeps them off our screens is an imperfect way of stopping the deluge. It sometimes catches legitimate comments by mistake. Such is the logic of the machine.
In particular, comments that include hyperlinks often get taken for spam. But sometimes there appears to be no reason for the filtering…
If your comments are not displaying as usual (with the “in moderation” prompt) then please let me know. I am always happy to retrieve those that the filter has taken by accident.
Thanks for your patience – the relevant LSS comment is now up online for the debate to continue.
Best wishes to all,
Nich
16 Infidel // Apr 29, 2008 at 2:31 pm
I agree with your analysis LSS – Islam is a motivating, guiding and unifying force in the conflict.
17 Srithanonchai // Apr 29, 2008 at 3:28 pm
LSS: “political and sociological world-view of the Patani Muslim population” > You seem to know a lot about what these Patani Muslims think. What is this knowledge based on in terms of research or reading? Any chance of seeing a substantive article on this authored by you?
“trans-national ‘Islamic studies’” > Can you please provide a few sources, preferably by members of this field who have done substantial field research in southern Thailand? (This is a real request, since I am not familiar with that literature.)
I really look forward to reading a well-crafted and clearly argued review of McCargo’s book written by LSS and contributed to New Mandala (or any major academic journal). You should not keep your apparently superior knowledge about the problems in the South all to yourself. As I have mentioned in my earlier post, there is a number of people doing prolonged field work in the South. None of them, as far as I know, has any substantial background in Islamic Studies. They often cannot even enter Muslim (and often even Buddhist) villages, because the situation is too dangerous, and few researchers would want to endanger their lives. Thus, the entire discourse on these problems might well benefit from your well-substantiated input.
18 david w // Apr 30, 2008 at 3:26 am
LSS:
I agree that it is important that scholars trained in Islamic Studies and knowledgeable about the comparative, historical complexities of Islam as a scriptural tradition and a living social reality join the
discussion about the situation in the Thai South. And critique the arguments advanced by other scholars. This is a badly lacking perspective so far in work on the South, particularly with regards to political Islam. So I would also encourage you to provide reviews of not only McCargo’s work, but that of others besides him, and to publish these not just here but in academic journals or other venues as well.
In that vein, are you familiar with the work of Alexander Horstmann on the Tablighi Jamaat al-Dawa movement and Southern Thailand? And if so, what are your thoughts on his arguments?
In general, it would seem to me that ideally one needs both historians of religion and anthropologists working in conversation with each other on these topics and issues regarding the Islamic framing of politics, religion, violence and history to more fully understand recent developments. And that these two perspective also need to engage with other such as experts in politics, insurgencies, terrorism, etc.
It seems to me that McCargo, along with Connors, intelligently criticize the extreme and uncontextualized analyses of terrorism scholars who buy into a war on terror framing and seek to aggressively and concretly link violence in the south to Al-Qeada and other radical movements. But they also frequently tend to over assert a political science perspective that treats religious factors as simply ideological at best and irrelevant at worst in comparison with the ‘real’ social factors of (elite) politics, policy, political culture, etc.
This debate is also found beyond the work on Thailand, for instance in John Sidel’s work on Islamism and political violence in Indonesia, in which his stand is very similar in its broad contours and approach, I would argue, to that of McCargo’s on the south. There are however appreciative but critical responses to Sidel’s work as well. As for instance in Vatikiotis’s review in the Asia Times:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IH22Ae01.html
or in a recent review of the same book in the April issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review (for which one needs a subscription to access the PDF). Comparative attention to these debates beyond Thailand might profitably benefit those thinking about the violence in the South.
19 Sidh S. // Apr 30, 2008 at 5:07 pm
These are very intriguing analysis and discussions on violence in the Thai South. I would also like to see LSS and others review and analyze the documentary “Citizen Juling”, which I think provides an excellent source (if not the best, apart from actually living there) of primary data of events in the southernmost provinces. I am certain we will benefit from it. I understand that very few would have seen the documentary with only limited screening so far (limited invitation in Thailand and a few sessions in Australia’s state capitals) – and maybe it is worth contacting the makers – KhunIng K, Ajarn Kraisak Choonhavan and Ajarn Manit Sriwanichpoom – directly (or through Ajarn Michael Connors – as Latrobe University sponsored the Melbourne screening)…
20 Lleij Samuel Schwartz // May 17, 2008 at 7:19 am
re: Nicholas
Thanks for the heads up; I won’t be so link happy in the future! Quite a shame that spammers are ruining what I consider to be the fundamental purpose of hypertext, that is to provide for a non-linear textual discourse paradigm. [The phrase "non-linear textual discourse paradigm" is not too pretentious, is it? ^-^]
re: Srithanonchai, david w, et al.
Sorry for not answering this before, but the answer is a definitive yes and no. That is, I’ve interviewed Southerners, but in the environs of Bangkok. A former student of mine offered me the opportunity to observe, for 2 weeks, the pondok school in Narathiwat, where he was a student and then an English teacher; however, I couldn’t take him up on the offer as, at the time, my daughter’s illness (Thalassemia – please donate!) prevented me from being away from her that long. Quite a shame, I hope to be able to take him up on his offer in the future.
When I discuss Islamic teachings, I am referencing mainstream, orthodox sources from the major schools of Islamic jurisprudence. I don’t think I have written anything about Islam that the average Muslim who is educated in his or her faith would find objectionable. I admit that when discussing Patani, I am making the assumption that the average Patani Muslim follows the mainstream teachings of the Shafi’i madh’hab.
Now, what I consider to be my elementary knowledge of Islam is based on the research I did when working with my mentor when I was a graduate student doing my teaching intership in a high school ESL class. My hometown, Manchester, New Hampshire, for many years, has been involved in a program to resettle refugees. Currently, the countries most represented are: Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq, Afganistan, Sudan, and Chad. With the exception of the Iraqi Kurds, the vast majority of these refugees are Muslim. In order to properly provide ESL services, it is important to understand the socio-cultural context in which their previous learning took place. That is what my mentor and I worked on, and then employed in the classroom as “action research”; for example, one of the problems we worked on was to find a culturally sensitive solution to the hostility many of these students had toward female teachers.
Now, I would like to emphasize that this research was only auxiliary to my discipline. I am not a scholar of Islamic studies; I am an educationist and linguist. I educated myself about certain aspects of Islam in order to suppliment the work I was doing with a certain population of students. I would not count the Islamic doctrine as one of my academic specialities; therefore, I wouldn’t have the hubris to attempt a scholarly review of anyone’s work in that vein. This fact should highlight my previous point about McCargo’s work. If Srithanonchai judges my knowledge of Islamic doctrine, which I consider to be basic, to be superior to McCargo, then how should we judge McCargo’s attempts to analyze the southern Thai situation?
I would be kinder to Prof. McCargo if he wasn’t so hostile to terrorism analysis and related fields. As to david w’s comments, if McCargo is going to call out scholars of terrorism studies for their narrow conceptualization of Islam, then his knowledge of Islam should be rock-solid. He only embarrasses himself when he makes such simple errors as I have pointed out in my previous comment. Indeed, I find offense in his claim that the insurgency in the south doesn’t fall under the definition of jihad, when the collective thought of the Muslim world have suggested the opposite for 1400-plus years. Ironically, McCargo seems to possess the narrow understanding of jihad that he accuses terrorism studies as having, that is jihad as “a bad thing”. In reality, the term “jihad”, in most cases, has a positive connotation throughout most of the Muslim world. It is recognition of this fact that has led the U.S. Department of State to ban the term in all offical discourse when refering to acts of Islamically-inspired terrorism. To an outside Muslim observer viewing the southern situation, he or she would see a Muslim population fighting against an occupation by non-Muslims. By any and all definitions from Islamic sources, this is jihad.
I agree with McCargo and Connors that the “evil mastermind” theory of terrorism is absolute bunk. Currently, if Al-Qeada and company have any hand in the south of Thailand, it is only in the “marketplace of ideas,” as I have mentioned before in my comments about Robb’s theories. We cannot ignore that the theology that groups like Al-Qeada follow argues against the reality of the Westphalian nation-state and only recognizes dar al-Islam (i.e. Islam as the umma: a supernational entity encompassing the entire Muslim population) and dar al-Kufr. This has political ramifications, as such a theory implies the belief that it is the obligatory duty of all Muslims to assist in defensive jihad.
As for the political science mindset, of course, Zionism is not Judaism; Hindutva is not Hinduism; and Deobandism and Salafism are not Islam, but surely a political scientist can see that an understanding of the religious doctrines of each are essential to understanding the movements as a whole. Just as Judaism and Hinduism are merely the codification of the mores and folkways of certain ethnic groups, Islam, which claims universal dominion (see the Hadith of Sahih Muslim 1:31), is inherently geo-political as it seeks to define the mores and folkways of the entire world. A vast amount of religious text in Islam is devoted to how Muslims should interact with non-Muslims. An understanding of what these texts say is essential in understanding how Muslim societies formulate such “social factors” as “politics, policy, political culture, etc.”
From what I’ve read of Horstmann, I agree with his observations that dawa movements, like the Tablighi Jamaat, are causing a polarization of views in South and Southeast Asia. I would connect the actions of the Tablighi Jamaat with the greater “Arabization” that is occuring around the Muslim world (cf. Western Africa, Indonesia, and according to some, even Iran!). That is, Islam, especially Sunni Islam, has often acted as a conduit for Arabic cultural imperalism, where the mores and customs of Arabs are seen as normative; especially, when connected with the concept of the Arabic Muhammad, as “the perfect man” (al-insan al-kamil), who is to be emulated in every detail.
It is also interesting to note the close connection the Tablighi Jamaat has had with the Deobandi dawa movement. Both groups, along with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, arose in what was then known as the British Raj, as a reaction to colonalism. The Deobandi believed that the influence of British culture was corrupting Islam, as such they turned to dawa in hopes of rallying the Muslim population against the British. Again, we can see how closely intertwined religion and politics are in Islam. The Deobandi felt that by returning the population to a “purer” form of Islam, they would accomplish the political goal of ending the British occupation of greater India. Why? Because of the centrality of jihad to Islamic doctrine and its resonance amongst pious Muslims. Case in point, one entire book of Hadith is devoted to jihad, over 100 verses in the Qur’an (out of a total of 540) are concerned with jihad, over half of the Sira, the collected hagiographies of Muhammad, detail his thoughts on jihad. Again, I would like to stress that jihad is not only jihad bis sayf, but also the use of money (Sahih Bukhari 2:24:522 and Sahih Bukhari 4:52:96, apologetics, litigation, and demographic warfare. While it is clear that the Patani fighters, for the most part, are not wild-eyed Hashshashin zealots, it is rather cynical to assume that the “piety” displayed by the insurgents only “serves simply as a mobilizing resource”. Either way, it is clear that the presence of the Tablighi Jamaat only fules the dégringolade of the south.
Just as an aside, while I realize that NM focuses on mainland Southeast Asia, I, for one, would like to see more articles concerning the Malay world (including Indonesia and Brunei). If we are going to discuss events in southern Thailand, it would be fruitful to examine them in context to the greater Malay world, as david w’s point illustrates.
Exactly.
Leave a Comment
Please note: New Mandala encourages vigorous debate. However, for the moment we will only be publishing high-quality comments that make original contributions to discussion. There will, of course, still be space for pithy, humorous, eccentric and cheeky input. Short and sweet will usually trump long and involved. Repetitive ranting, unimaginative point-scoring and idle abuse will not be entertained. Comments which carry a real name are also more likely to be approved. Thank you for your ongoing interest and contributions.