The motivation behind the 2006 coup d’etat can be explained from various perspectives. On the one hand it was simply the military under the command of the then army chief Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin that staged the coup. On the other hand, the anti-Thaksin movement which emerged from 2005 reveals, at a deeper level, how three major national institutions – nation, religion and monarchy – had conspired together to form the core opposition.
What’s important is that the leader in this campaign to exploit nation, religion and monarchy was media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, once a friend of Thaksin (The Nation, November 28, 2005: 1A). Sondhi launched an attack on Thaksin after his business suffered severe losses. His friend Viroj Nualkhair (who helped Sondhi resuscitate his business from the debts that followed the 1997 economic crisis) was not offered the chance to renew his contract as CEO of Krung Thai Bank. This also coincided with the removal of Sondhi’s Thailand Weekly television program from Channel 9 (The Nation, November 30 2005: 4A).
Sondhi’s anti-Thaksin movement, which was later joined by people from various other groups including intellectuals, aristocrats, some of the middle-class, members of the Privy Council and some parts of the military, cited issues relating to nation, religion and monarchy to oust Thaksin.
When Sondhi and his allies launched their attacks on Thaksin -whether at gatherings that took place in the auditorium of Thammasat University, Lumpini Park or at Sanam Luang – the slogan ‘save the nation’ was used to justify their political mobilisation. They were convinced that the Thaksin government was responsible for corruption in the purchase of the explosive detection system CTX 9000 and the Russian C 130 aircraft. Even more important was the sale of USD 1.8 billion worth of shares of Shin Corporation by the Shinawatra and Damapong families to the Singaporean state-owned Temasek Holdings on January 24, 2006 (Ukrist, 2007: 108-109). They branded this transaction a sale of national assets since Shin Corporation received access to Thailand’s satellite network.
From a focus on the nation, the anti-Thaksin campaign moved on to issues related to the monarchy. Sondhi and his allies demonstrated their loyalty to the king under the political slogan “we will fight for the king,” wearing yellow shirts, the colour of Buddhism as well as the colour representing Monday, the day of the king’s birth. “We will fight for the king” was unveiled with the release of Pramual Rujanaseri’s book entitled The Royal Power, which demanded a return of royal power to the king. Later on, in August 2005, during a seminar at Thammasat University that included Sondhi, Pramual and Kaewsan Atibhoti as speakers, Pramual announced that:
…there are two paths for our country to follow, one is to be a kingdom where prosperity of the country is measured not only by economic prosperity but through the improvement of the people’s quality of life according to the advice given by His Majesty the King.
The second path is to see to it that our nation turns into Thailand Company Limited where money is everything and everything is money…
The “royal power” discourse soon transformed itself from an idea in a book to a basis for the formation of various anti-Thaksin movements in society and was popularised by Sondhi in his Manager newspaper and on his ASTV.
The most significant movement to restore royal power was the petition for a royally-appointed prime minister, citing Article 7 of the 1997 constitution as a justification. The king, however, dismissed the possibility of using Article 7 on April 25, 2006.
Religion and monarchy: Sondhi and Luangta Maha Bua
Later on, the anti-Thaksin campaign employed religion as a tool to attack Thaksin. Sondhi Limthongkul observed that politics had begun to encroach upon the institution of Buddhism. The appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharn (Somdet Kiaw) as Acting Supreme Patriarch, with a special committee appointed to act in the ailing Supreme Patriarch Nyanasamvara Suvaddhana’s stead, was regarded as an appointment which could provoke a rift among Buddhists in Thai society due to the perceived existence of two Supreme Patriarchs. The appointment was also believed to contravene the royal prerogative of the king (Kumnoon 2006: 54).
Sondhi opined during the first travelling session of his Thailand Weekly on September 25, 2005, that;
…The country is comprised of only two institutions that are, please remember, religion and monarchy, not the 30-baht health campaign, not anything else. Whenever religion is vulnerable, the monarchy will become vulnerable, too, and vice versa. Then, we will have no country, no religion, whether Buddhism, Christianity or Islam, all of which form the anchor of spirituality of Thai society…
…The monarchy is the final buffer of the Thai society which we all can depend on whenever the leader is deficient in his virtues. However, whenever the monarchy becomes but a mere political rubber stamp and the country could be subject to a transaction because the constitution was created by politicians, who were controlled by the party, which was owned the capital… (cited in Kumnoon 2006 : 54)
Sondhi’s reference to Buddhism and mention of the perceived violation of royal power as a means to attack the Thaksin government was not his sole attack. He found ardent support and close alliance in a senior monk, namely Phra Dharma Visuthimongkol or Luangta Maha Bua. Luangta Maha Bua dispatched 600 monks from the forest temples to give Sondhi a blessing and support at his Baan Phra Athit headquarters, Bangkok, on November 21, 2005 following Sondhi’s attacks on the prime minister. Later on, Luangta Maha Bua summoned both Sondhi and Thaksin for a meeting at Baan Tad forest temple, Muang district, Udon Thani, on November 24, 2005. However, only Sondhi turned up for the meeting (Kumnoon 2006: 159). Luangta Maha Bua cited the peace of the country as the reason behind his invitation, while allowing Sondhi to stage a travelling session of his Thailand Weekly programme there for Sondhi’s own safety (Kumnoon 2006: 160).
Initially, Luangta Maha Bua had been very supportive of Thaksin, particularly during the time the former prime minister was being investigated in the first assets concealment case in 2001. Back then, Luangta Maha Bua’s crucial disciple Thongkon Wongsamut said in a newspaper interview that during the time Thaksin was faced with difficulties it was Luangta Maha Bua and a number of meditative forest monks and disciples who mustered up their resources and manpower to gather signatures in support of Thaksin. It turned out that within a period of two months they had a list of 1.8 million names (Manager, March 29, 2006: 10). The main motivation behind Luangta Maha Bua’s support of Thaksin was a belief that Thaksin could steer the country through any financial crisis after the approaching general election.
Thongkon gave an interview saying that:
…I asked Thaksin why he had been in and out of the political arena and why he returned to politics. He told me that he had everything and had had enough but then one day, Dr Chao Na Sylvanta, privy councillor and a disciple of Luangta Maha Bua approached him, and asked if he could spare a sum of 5 billion baht to establish a political party to solve the problems of the country… (cited in Manager, March 29, 2006: 10)
Upon hearing Thaksin’s answer, Thongkon volunteered to help and asked him to take on the task of restoring the status of Buddhism to its former glory. Thaksin’s reply was that there was no need to worry because he would certainly restore Buddhism, particularly the Buddhist treasures which would be utilised to generate more money. This reflects a capitalist idea that was deeply rooted in his head, which dictates that any asset that was immobile became useless, including religious treasures (ibid.).
Luangta Maha Bua, Thongkon and the disciples’ support for Thaksin would subsequently hinder Thaksin strongly opposing them after Thaksin was cleared of the assets concealment case and became prime minister. Later in 2004, the Thaksin government, through the Deputy Education Minister overseeing the Department of Religious Affairs (Chamlong Krutkhuntod), cited Article 7 of 1992’s Sangha Act (second edition) to justify the appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharn (Somdet Kiaw) as Acting Supreme Patriarch following the chronic illness of the current Supreme Patriarch. Sondhi and his allies, however, objected that the Supreme Patriarch was not too sick to perform his duties and that during the past two years (2004-2005), the Supreme Patriarch had been performing his religious functions as usual (Kumnoon 2006: 77-79).
The appointment of the Acting Supreme Patriarch was one issue that turned Luangta Maha Bua against Thaksin.
The use of religious disputes in political conflicts escalated following the September 2006 coup. After the coup, there was an accusation that an order of the Supreme Patriarch was counterfeited. The order had attempted to change the Acting Supreme Patriarch from Somdet Phra Buddhacharn (Somdet Kiaw) to Somdet Phra Maha Theracharn, the abbot of Wat Chanasongkram (Thairath, November 7, 2006: 19; Matichon, November 8, 2006: 16). Approximately 300 monks from several temples turned up to protest against the order, which was claimed to be fraudulent.
Also, there was an attempt to take an opportunity to propose a new Sangha law to the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly (Manager, November 7, 2006). The proposed Sangha Law was a revised draft for the 1962 Sangha Act (amended in 1992). Paisan Peutmongkol gathered 32 names of fellow NLA members to propose the amendment of the Sangha Act. One major amendment was to base the qualification of candidates for the post of Acting Supreme Patriarch on seniority of ordination, that is, according to the total length of time spent in the monkhood, rather than the seniority in the monastic hierarchy (Matichon, November 8, 2006; The Nation, November 9, 2006).
The Bangkok Post analysis mentioned that Somdet Phra Buddhacharn or Somdet Kiaw of Sra Ket Temple was the most influential figure in the Council of Elders. But he is less senior than other elders. All this reveals the ongoing feud between Luangta Maha Bua, an outspoken and revered forest monk, and his arch-enemy Somdet Kiaw. Luangta Maha Bua has long campaigned for a return to the original Sangha Act, which would block Somdet Kiaw’s rise in the clergy on grounds that the present bill infringes on royal prerogative as well as violates the Vinaya (Sanitsuda, 2006 : 11).
In November 2006, there was an attempt to file a petition to then Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, pressing him to bring the subject of changing the Acting Supreme Patriarch to cabinet (Thairath, November 7, 2006 : 19). But he didn’t comply with the request in the petition. Besides, some members of the NLA withdrew their names from the proposal for the amendment of the Sangha Act, leaving the proposal short of the compulsory 25 names required for legislative consideration (Thairath, November 9, 2006: 10; Krungthep Turakit, November 9, 2006: 19).
Manager newspaper criticised those NLA members who withdrew their name, branding them irresponsible while Paisan Peutmongkol said in an interview that he had a rural background and was a follower of Buddhadasa Bhikku and not Luangta Maha Bua, and that his action had not been prompted by any order from anyone, nor was it masterminded by Sondhi Limthongkul (Krungthep Turakit, November 9, 2006: 19).
***
The religion and monarchy issues fuelled the conflict between the Thaksin government and its opponents. The accusation that the appointment of the Acting Supreme Patriarch is a violation of the royal power is a strong accusation. Religious issues were also related to the movement to replace Thaksin with a royally-appointed prime minister. Such political machinations can be considered directly related to the monarchy.
Thaksin journeyed upcountry and travelled overseas to tone down the intensity of resistance and to avoid confrontation. The Thaksin government had exploited the political legitimacy derived from winning the general elections in 2001, 2005 and 2006 with an overwhelming vote and the establishment of a single-party government. In addition, Thaksin had managed to dominate the bureaucracy, provincial governors, and police officers, as well as the military.
When the attempt to oppose the government through the parliamentary system failed, the anti-government group resorted to non-parliamentary politics by calling on anti-government spirit using nation, religion and monarchy as tools to attack the Thaksin government through the media and the campaigns staged by Sondhi Limthongkul.
In terms of the conflict between the two senior monks, it remained clear that religious issues were used to damage the government which culminated in the coup of September 19, 2006. The junta, however, never again mentioned the religious issues raised during the anti-Thaksin movement. The issues relating to the monarchy, though mentioned by the coup makers in the Council of National Security’s announcement, were not pursued. However, the anti-Thaksin government was trying to take advantage of the junta-appointed NLA to propose a change to the Sangha Act in order to use the monarchy’s royal power to appoint the future Supreme Patriarch. However, the rushed attempt met with no success.
15 responses so far ↓
1 annonomous // Aug 13, 2008 at 2:01 pm
I was actualy present when the coup took place. What an event that was. it was a bloodless coup . i did not even know it was taking place !!! . thats how peacefull it was . What i will say is that it is a terrible shame to see a great country like thailand with great potential to become a a finanacial power house , go down the path it has. Geographicaly thailand is positioned half way between europe , north America and Australia. The work ethic in Thailand as far as i know is first rate. So as i was saying , great posibilities exist in thailand. I had no idea untill now , how monarchy and government allways seem to come , head to head and lock horns. ( so to speak) , would it be a good idea to go back to monarchy rule , due to the fact that many thai people revere the king. JUST AN IDEA.
2 ThaiCrisis // Aug 13, 2008 at 2:47 pm
And… ?
I mean this long paper is interesting and gives informations (particularily about religion, this angle is often ignored) and how the campaign against Thaksin did evolve.
But, as usual, it fails to go to the point.
The real question is : why ?
Why “three major national institutions – nation, religion and monarchy – had conspired together to form the core opposition.” ?
To write such story without talking about… the succession issue, and the very existence (and its form) of the thai monarchy after Rama IX, is a little bit … disappointing.
I often feel frustrated when I read papers written by thai academics. They never go to the point.
3 matty // Aug 13, 2008 at 5:26 pm
Nothing new about this article. It just confirmed, what had been known long before and general knowledge, that there were certainly lots of disturbing, negative and unacceptable ISSUES concerning Thaksin, his cronies, and his gang during Thaksin’s rule.
So what’s the beef? Many of those issues singly by themselves justified the criminal prosecution of Thaksin, despite Thaksin’s popularity and majority vote handed to his disgraced TRT party.
4 fall // Aug 14, 2008 at 12:42 am
I often feel frustrated when I read papers written by thai academics. They never go to the point.
When discussing royalty, they cant go to the point.
This is Thailand, there is free speech and there is free speech.
Why “three major national institutions – nation, religion and monarchy – had conspired together to form the core opposition.”?
I would say “three major national institutions” is just the mean, not the end. The question could be shorten to “Why oppose”?
No one live forever and when changes come, the existing business men suffer. TRT/PPP effect old business/power clique too much, they must go.
5 karmablues // Aug 14, 2008 at 2:51 am
An interesting article about the anti-Thaksin movement can be found here (scroll down to second post on that page):
http://thaipoliticsreview.blogspot.com/search/label/Thaksin
Some excerpts:
“…. More importantly, the crisis represented a conflict between Thaksin and what McCargo (2005) has coined the “network monarchy.” The coup itself was orchestrated by members of this network and the ground for it was prepared for by direct interventions by the king and Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda (see Hewison, 2008). However, we argue that intra-elite conflict is an insufficient explanation for the dynamics or the social base of the protest movement, unless the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators are simply seen as royalist followers of protest leaders Sondhi Limthongkul and Chamlong Srimuang…..
…….
The characterisation of the anti-Thaksin movement as “middle class” does not do justice to the complex make-up of the protest movement. It will be shown that the dynamics of the protests led to a broadening of its social base, and opened the space for discontent towards Thaksin, which had grown over the preceding several years, to emerge in activist form……
…….
The PAD was an alliance between a wide range of sections of Thai society and between diverse political organisations. One wing was made up groups who could be described as an urban elite or as conservatives, such as disgruntled royalist civil servants who were being marginalised by the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, or sections of business who were not part of Thaksin’s patronage system (see Ukrist, 2008). Another wing (and this is what we will focus on in our argument) was made up of social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a grassroots base, such as workers, farmers, teachers and students. The PAD thus brought together elite and grassroots opposition to Thaksin.
…..
The contradictory nature of the PAD coalition was epitomised by the debate around the demand for royal intervention and the reference to Clause 7 of the 1997 Constitution (see Connors, 2008). This was highly contested from the onset, and was one of the reasons for the hesitation of many grassroots organisations to join the PAD. Because of general scepticism about Sondhi Limthongkul who was seen as a royalist conservative, some groups decided not to join the PAD at all (e.g. some smaller student groups and the Thai Labour Campaign)……
………
A range of protests ensued. School students developed initiatives, university campus demonstrations were held, women’s marches were organised, and rallies, marches and protests in towns and cities up and down the country were held. There was talk of strike action, and the countless and ongoing discussions and organising meetings meant that politics became everyday fare for hundreds of thousands of people over a period of several weeks.
……….
On the eve of the 4 February demonstration, lecturers from Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science signed a public declaration calling for Thaksin’s resignation. After Professor Amara Pongsapich, Dean of the Faculty, supported the declaration, she was leaned on to resign by pro-Thaksin government officials in the Political Science Alumni Association. In support, faculty members threatened to resign in protest if Amara was punished (Wattana, 2006; The Nation Online, 7 February 2006). Meanwhile, students at Thammasat University launched a campaign to collect 50,000 signatures calling for Thaksin’s resignation and Thammasat professors organised a controversial mock trial of Thaksin on his conflict of interest as prime minister and businessman. The Student Federation of Thailand kicked off the first PAD demonstration on 11 February 2006 by marching from Thammasat University to the Royal Plaza, in defiance of the government ban of the rally.
….By the 4th PAD demonstration on 14 March, activists from the Southern Community Forestry Network, the Federation of Small Scale Fishers from the south, the Isan Network of Small-Scale Farmers and the Northern Peasants Federation had joined the movement
………..
For the first time during Thaksin’s period in government, a mass movement was articulating different criticisms against him at the same place and time. Previously, he had tended to face criticism on single issues. Moreover, the public and mass nature of the criticism, broke through the previous apathy and fear that Thaksin’s powerful hold on the media and government had generated, and opened up space for politicisation and self-organisation. The single issues became connected to each other through the common demand for Thaksin’s resignation. Students were now protesting side by side with state enterprise unionists, and listening to speeches about the violence in the south. A new self-confidence was born out of a mass movement, where previously, solutions to particular problems had seemed unattainable because of Thaksin’s dominating position.
………
The mass movement against Thaksin was not simply made up of royalist followers of Sondhi and nor was it comprised of an urban, free-market elite as suggested by Kasian (2005: 132). At least part of the movement was made up of self-organised groups of workers, students, farmers and teachers, and of political activists from social movements and NGOs. The issues that were articulated under the common demand for Thaksin to resign, from media reform to FTAs, from teachers pensions to peace in the south, were, as we will proceed to argue, interconnected and sustained through contradictions within Thaksin’s project itself.
………
One of the greatest achievements of the anti-Thaksin movement, apart from concrete successes, such as the postponement of FTA talks or the halting of EGAT’s privatisation, was to bring these social and economic issues together with a political criticism of Thaksin’s regime. The misuse of political power for private economic gain was the predominant theme, of course, but the corporate undermining of free and democratic media, symbolised by Supinya’s successful fight against the libel charge, was also highly significant. And the fact that Angkhana Neelapaichit could speak to tens of thousands of people in Bangkok was immensely important in connecting the criticism of Thaksin’s repression in the south with the situation of the people in the rest of Thailand.”
6 jonfernquest // Aug 14, 2008 at 6:26 pm
Detailing the maneuverings of elite and the ideology that they inevitably employ only skims the surface and gets rather tiresome after a while.
How the opinion of different sections of the electorate in Bangkok has changed and evolved with respect to Thaksin over the last eight years would be far more interesting to learn about than elite maneuverings and grudge matches.
Many in Bangkok must be fed up with Thaksin for a variety of reasons. Because of the barbaric approach he took to solving many problems in the South (Tak Bai, Krue Se) or the “war on drugs.” For concentrating all power in one party and then using it to push people around, e.g. the media. For using divisive politics, clearly a huge division exists between the center and the periphery that needs to be healed. For milking the telecoms industry for everything it was worth (detailed in the Thai capital paper that the current author co-authored with Chris Baker). The Sondhi protests started escalating exactly when Thaksin sold Shin Corp to Temasek. This was the crucial breaking point. By now, many probably would just like to get rid of him so that Thailand can get rid of street protests and return to some semblance of stability. Continued political conflicts are not good for investment, business, revenues, or incomes.
7 Nick Nostitz // Aug 14, 2008 at 6:33 pm
“Karmablues”:
This is Oliver Pye’s and Wolfgang’s Schaffer’s research into the PAD – ‘Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: an Analyses’, which was included into the Special Edition of the Journal for Contemporary Asia.
I honestly do not know why this research was included in the otherwise excellent publication, because there is a far more competent paper on the same topic available.
Pye’s and Schaffer’s research has several factual mistakes, such as simply taking over the numbers presented by PAD and the Nation, without re-checking their validity.
They also overstate the influence of NGO’s and others, and have misinterpreted the Royalist influence (read Winitchakul and Ungpakorn, who both also have different views on these points).
Please compare this research with Michael Nelson’s ‘People’s Sector Politics in Thailand: Problems of Democracy in Ousting Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’.
I do find Michael Nelson’s research far more competent, and the facts presented do correspond to what i have found. Also the present position of the PAD as a group has re-confirmed Nelson’s research, and not Pye and Schaffer’s.
Here’s a link to Nelson’s paper:
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/WP87_07_MNelson.pdf
8 Observer // Aug 14, 2008 at 8:16 pm
I disagree with the contention that the coup was peaceful. Rolling tanks through towns, like the Thai army did here or the Soviets did in Hungary is an act of violence regardless of the degree of resistance.
If I walk into a liquor store with a pistol and the clerks just hand me money, it was still not a peaceful transaction.
If Thai people had resisted the military they would have been slaughtered like they were in 1992 – and I was here for both coups.
9 annonomous // Aug 15, 2008 at 5:19 pm
of what i have read so far of the responses , you kind of get the idea that the writing was on the proverbial wall for some time. of what i have also read of thai history is that coups have been part of the political land scape in thailand for some time. it goes back as far as the early 1930s. And every now and again when things do not go a certain way they should , ” hey guess what !! ” . Its coup time. What can the thai people do to stop this ? . You kind of get the impression , not too much. It all ways seems that who ever gets elected will run thailand like its there personal piggy bank. Where are the checks and balances ? .
10 Jim Taylor // Aug 17, 2008 at 10:40 am
Ukrist presents some important points though muchof this already known to many readers. However, there is a postscript that needs to be added for a fairer hearing. Political scientists have been slack on probbing for truths.
A year or so back the junta had requested that Sodhi L. ask Luang Ta Maha Bua for access to the Reserve Funds. This was refused. Sondhi never again returned. Luang Ta may have ben set up in the proceeding two years by Sondhi and his friends who attempted to get close to the revered monk and continue to mis-inform him of political and economic realities. These funds were established with the economic recovery of the nation post-2007 under Thaksin’s management- a fact which critics do not acknowledge. A year after the 2006 coup the coup-makers and friends squandered massive amount of the nation’s wealth for nice fascist toys and an impressive and extensive propaganda campaign to discredit Thaksin (seemingly effective even today). They used the Sangha as only one means to achieve this rift. Leaked sources indicate that Thaksin’s billions have been used by these same people taken out of his domestic bank accouts (at the time frozen) so Thaksin had to be found guilty at any cost- even changing the law and emplacing judiciary that were anti-Thaksin and pro-Democrat (who were in alliance with the military for their own ambitions). Thaksin therefore has to be found guilty and he must be imprisoned. The outcome has already been determined way back. The 2006 Constitution reflects the desparation of these folk to protect their illegal acts. The real puppet Master is not Thaksin (re-Andrew Walker) but Prem. That is another story and too long to relay here. The coup-makers and friends cannot be touched as long as the 2006 Constitution is not changed. Hence the desparation by these people not to change the Constitution. As it stands PAD are now proposing 70-30 system whereby 70% of lower house are “selected” (by guess who?), while 30% are elected.This is not “democracy” by any stretch of the imagination; neither is the arrogant urban, elite attitude that the peasantry are stupid and don’t know anything. I would argue that they know more about true democracy than PAD. You have all been duped.
11 nganadeeleg // Aug 17, 2008 at 7:32 pm
Leaked sources indicate that Thaksin’s billions have been used by these same people taken out of his domestic bank accouts (at the time frozen)…
If true, that’s a big story – I look forward to hearing more from Jim or others.
12 Bystander // Aug 18, 2008 at 12:50 pm
Well, I guess then ThaiCrisis can demonstrate the “right” way of doing it by “getting to the point” and put your real name and address there.
13 Bystander // Aug 18, 2008 at 1:06 pm
Some minor quibble: “Russia C130″ ? I don’t think that’s right. But whatever.
The religious angles of the ongoing saga is very interesting and has not be discussed much. What’s missing here is the role (whether active /passive) of Dharmakaya sect. The sect is pro-Thaksin, obviously. The acting supreme patriach that Thaksin promoted is said to be sympathizer/protector of the sect. IIRC, the Dharmakaya abbot is supposed to be defrocked but the matter get shoved onto a backburner or something like that. There’s also the group called Yuwasangha (young monks) with a very militant/ anti-PAD website. There’s also a large gathering of monks at Sanam Luang that antagonizes the early PAD protest. Just bits of details that I’m reminded of, upon reading this article.
All in all, though, I think the religious angles is mostly tactical maneuverings by both sides, to galvanize support/ open new avenues for attack, etc. Neither side strike me as particularly religious/ spiritual. I suspect they both didn’t give a damn about religions.
14 matty // Aug 19, 2008 at 2:27 pm
I wait with bated breath for more Jim Taylor tall tales.
But I still prefer to hear the dirty secrets direct from the horse’s mouth – Thaksin. The songs Frank Shinawatra can sing, with Jim Taylor providing the second vocals, to the entranced Thai judges . . . rap music anyone?
15 Jim Taylor // Aug 20, 2008 at 11:43 am
(re-Bystander) There is nothing to do with Thammakai and Thaksin, anymore than the Crown Prince and other royalty at one time patronized the temple as they do at many temples around the country. So I cannot see where the “obvious” comes in? Thaksin also went to many temples, mostly in the north, but was not particularly inclined towards any sect. Neither did Thammakai claim Thaksin as their follower. The Acting Supreme Patriarch Somdet Kiew appointed in 2004 is the most senior monk and from the more numerous Mahanikai. It was appropriate for him to be placed in that position to ensure good relations between the two Nikai. The government tries to alternate the position in discussion with the king, though historically the Thammayut has dominated. This is another example of spinning to try and show connections between Thaksin and a disgraced new religious movement. Good work boys- keep it up!
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