[Last week the National Thai Studies Centre hosted a discussion on the current border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. Here is the text of my presentation.]
Following the political turmoil that has gripped Thailand over the past few months, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the government of Samak Sundoravej has a commanding parliamentary majority. In the election of 23 December 2007 his People Power Party fell just a few seats short of an absolute majority. In the prolonged negotiations that followed, Samak was able to stitch together a coalition government that included all the minor parties. The Democrats sit alone on the opposition benches.
But the Democrats have some strong allies on the streets of Bangkok. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) whose vigorous protests helped to lay the groundwork for the coup against former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, wasted little time declaring their opposition to the newly elected Samak government. During February 2008, the PAD were threatening to revive street protests and calling for the dissolution of the People Power Party. The basis for this threat was the Party’s links to Thaksin.
In the second half of May 2008 the PAD made good on its threat and moved its campaign to the streets of Bangkok. Their cause was energised by Samak’s rushed attempts to amend the 2007 constitution that had been drawn up during the term of the post-coup military-appointed government. Although Samak was following the procedure for amendment laid down in the constitution itself, it was easy for his opponents to argue that he was seeking to consolidate the dominance of political parties at the expense of independent institutions.
But these protests lacked the energy of the pre-coup campaign against Thaksin. It became increasingly clear that the PAD’s new effort was failing to attract either the grass roots or elite support that it had enjoyed prior to the coup. Samak had taken much of the heat out of the constitutional amendment issue by referring it to a Parliamentary committee. There was even talk of taking any changes to a national referendum.
Of course there were other problems for the government and potential opportunities for the opposition movement. Samak’s government faced various challenges in the courts but the impact of these cases on the government was not completely straight forward. Certainly they contributed to the atmosphere of political crisis, but as various cases have made their way through the system the charge that Samak’s government operated without any external checks and balances lost some of its potency.
The government has also faced pressure as a result of rising energy and fuel prices. But given the Thaksin government’s legacy of livelihood support and local economic stimulus-which Samak’s government inherited and the opposition movement regularly condemns-these economic issues are hardly going to form a potent foundation for a concerted attack on the government.
But, above all else, the key problem for the PAD lay in Samak’s electoral success. Challenging the legitimacy of a government that had been so recently and so convincingly elected was becoming increasingly difficult for an opposition movement that campaigned under the banner of democracy.
Samak also holds an important trump card – the threat of a snap election. Talk of an early election is enough to send opposition forces scurrying for cover. The Democrats have no appetite for yet another electoral loss. And the PAD are reluctant to expose their high profile, but quite localised, campaign to the cold winds of electoral opinion.
Instead the PAD have proposed a new form of political representation in which only 30 percent of the parliament would be elected, with the other 70 percent appointed. It is a desperate proposal from an organisation that realises it would almost certainly lose an electoral battle against Samak. And it is a proposal that has helped crystalise growing public concern about the fundamentally non-democratic philosophy of the PAD leadership. Some of these emerging sentiments were delightfully expressed in a headline from the satirical website Not The Nation: “People’s Alliance for Democracy Protests Against People, Alliances, and Democracy.”
The Phra Viharn (Preah Vihear in Khmer) issue gained prominence in Thailand primarily as a result of an opposition movement that was struggling to find an issue around which it could build a credible campaign against a recently elected government that enjoyed parliamentary and electoral dominance. Phra Viharn had been bubbling in the background of Thai public discussion for some time, but in late May and June 2008 it became a focus for opposition protest, as they sought to ramp up their campaign with the PAD march on government house and the Democrat’s pursuit of no-confidence motions in parliament.
Phra Viharn provided a potent symbol that could help energise a flagging opposition campaign.
Why was it such a useful symbol for the opposition movement in Thailand?
The Phra Viharn issue was consistent with the well established PAD strategy of appealing to the potent and emotion charged trinity of Nation, Religion and King. The geographic boundary of Thailand, and its representation as an impenetrable “geobody”, is a core symbol of the modern Thai nation. As a historical site, Phra Viharn is also useful in evoking a former period of national glory in which the extent of the Thai kingdom is imagined to be much extensive than it is now, before it was emasculated by colonial incursions. In the midst of the dispute, one major Thai newspaper even ran a series of articles about the territories that Thailand had lost to France and Britain. Anti-western sentiment, a persistent sub-plot in the campaign against Thaksin, can be usefully marshalled to the opposition cause.
The core symbolic defender of the Nation is, of course the King. In one of his first statements on the issue, PAD leader Sondhi wasted no time in linking the Samak government’s territorial betrayal at Phra Viharn with allegations that elements within the government were behind, or sympathetic to, material distributed in Thailand and on-line that was slanderous to the King and some of his closest confidants. In the PAD campaign, defence of Nation and defence of the King have been closely linked.
Apart from its broad symbolic purpose, Phra Viharn was also useful for the opposition movement because it could be readily linked to Thaksin, seemingly providing support for their central claim that Samak leads a proxy government. During his term as PM, Thaksin had taken some interest in the Phra Viharn issue and, in fact, he was due to inspect the temple with Hun Sen in September 2006. However the trip was cancelled in the wake of an alleged car-bomb assassination plot against Thaksin.
Since the coup, Thaksin was also rumoured to be considering investments in Cambodia and it was very easy for opposition figures to suggest that the Thai government’s support for the world heritage listing of Pra Viharn had been given in return for Cambodian concessions on contested oil and gas reserves that would commercially benefit Thaksin.
In some of the more flamboyant opposition material, Thaksin’s links with Cambodia have also involved his dabbling in highly potent forms of Khmer magic in an attempt to secure, or regain, his position of power in Thailand. On this point it’s worth noting that earlier this month, in response to a Cambodian “prayer for peace” conducted at Phra Viharn, Thai newspapers urged the residents of border provinces to wear royal yellow shirts to ward off the effects of the cross-border magic.
Most significantly, Thaksin’s involvement in the Phra Viharn issue was seemingly underlined by the fact that the Thai Foreign Minister who had conducted the negotiations with the Cambodians had been Thaksin’s legal representative in Thailand following the 2006 coup. To have someone so closely linked to Thaksin’s personal interests, conducting international negotiations on an issue so rich in symbolic potential was an invaluable gift to the opposition movement.
Another reason why Phra Viharn was useful to opposition forces was that it represented an opportunity to draw the military into political debate. In January 2008 there was a brief flurry when a ministry of defence committee accused the Cambodians of fabricating historical evidence to support their World Heritage application. This caused some Cambodian outrage but it was quickly hosed down by the newly elected Samak government. Last month the military concerns became public again when the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Command appeared at a PAD rally, in full uniform, to express his disappointment about the government’s handling of Phra Viharn.
The primary cause of the crisis of Phra Viharn is not the line of demarcation between Thailand and Cambodia. The primary cause is the dividing line that runs through contemporary Thai politics. Samak’s government hold a commanding parliamentary majority and there is no sign of a substantial shift in the sentiments of the electorate since the election of last December. The opposition movement has no coherent or credible response to this primacy. Their best hope in the current circumstances is that they can create an atmosphere of crisis in which core national symbols appear to be under threat. Some ham-fisted and inept acts on the part of the Samak government have assisted them in this cause.
10 responses so far ↓
1 nganadeeleg // Aug 25, 2008 at 7:12 pm
Some ham-fisted and inept acts on the part of the Samak government have assisted them in this cause
That’s an understatement!
What were they thinking having Thaksin’s lawyer do the temple deal at the same time as Thaksin was doing business deals with Cambodia?
Although their nationalistic tone has been disgraceful, you cannot blame the PAD for bringing up the possible conflict of interest – they could hardly ignore it.
2 Emil // Aug 26, 2008 at 2:53 am
Thank you Andrew for posting your presentation into the public sphere.
As a student here @ the ANU, I had hoped to attend this seminar but circumstances occurred.
I’m curious as to what views were expressed by the other presenters.
3 KL // Aug 26, 2008 at 11:45 am
Thank you for posting this as I was trying to get more information about the seminar. I agree the crisis was set off by Thai internal politics, but the consequences have gone way beyond that. What could be other [underlying] causes that sustain the dispute, particularly public opinion. Was this discussed in the seminar?
“As a historical site, Phra Viharn is also useful in evoking a former period of national glory in which the extent of the Thai kingdom is imagined to be much extensive than it is now, before it was emasculated by colonial incursions.”
I can’t disagree since I don’t have much insight into Thai perspective, but I don’t understand. Preah Vihear was built by Khmer kings in the 11th century deep inside Cambodia’s interior and at least a century before the emergence of a Thai state. It would be logical/natural for the site to evoke memories of former glories of the Khmer Empire to Cambodians, but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power. The ‘geo-body’ perhaps can, but not the cultural, ancestral, and historical aspect of the site per se – unless such connection is either falsely created or wrongly imagined. In this case, public opinion and misunderstanding weighs in heavily.
4 Fisherman // Aug 26, 2008 at 1:45 pm
Emil, the other two presentations were mainly just a historical background of the dispute. A key point was that the early 20th century map in dispute (which was agreed to by the Thais at the time) has a border which mistakenly follows the wrong watershed line. The issue has been raised at various times throughout the C20th to promote nationalistic feeling on either side – see Thongchai’s ‘Siam Mapped’ for a good summary of Thai resentment towards the border issue and loss of national pride. As far as I know, there is no claim that the Thais actually built the temple, the claim is that it falls within Thai territory.
In the discussion, there was a persuasive argument from a well-informed ANU academic that the Thai (military) reaction was merely reactionary to events, not politically orchestrated as partly inferred in the presentation. There was also some criticism about the lack of Khmer focus to the presentations – and for my two cents I think it highly likely the dispute was mostly stirred for Cambodian political reasons (the election).
5 Emil // Aug 26, 2008 at 4:03 pm
Thanks for the rundown Fisherman.
6 saay // Aug 27, 2008 at 3:07 am
One should hope that Cambodian authorities remain ignorant of the fact that the developers of the forthcoming “Tomb Raider. Underworld” computer game placed Angkor Thom right in the middle of Thailand. In a newly released trailer, Lara Croft – in search of Thor’s hammer – makes her way through Thai ruins, at some point passing ancient structures similar to the gates of Angkor Thom crowned by the famous four faces… http://www.tombraider.com/server.php?show=ConMediaFile.726
To my knowledge there is no four-faced Angkorean gate on Thai soil.
Hopefully, the developers had no Thai cultural experts who were aware of the fact that this is a virtual annexation of Angkorean heartland to Thai territory.
7 Thongchai Winichakul // Aug 27, 2008 at 6:44 am
Re: KI #3 “…but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power.”
To explain the connection, we need to understand three things in Thai historical mentality/ ideology.
1) The significance or “trauma” of the 1893 defeat that marked a series of the “loss of territories” from 1893 to 1909 to colinial powers — a.k.a. farang, the West. The 1893 defeat — the painful birth of Siam as a territorial state — laid a foundation of the modern Thai nation that so far has escaped our attention, namely a peculiar anti-colinial, anti-farang historical ideology. The trope of the Thai anti-colonial is the “loss of territories”. This anti-colonial ideology has not been properly understood because a) the mantra that Thailand was never colonized, and b) the parallel fact that Thailand has been, comparatively speaking, open and accommodating the West in somany ways.
2. But the anti-colonial (can we call post-colonial?) ideology exploded from time to time. One of them was in 1940-41 when Thailand fought to “reclaimed the lost provinces” from Cambodia/ French Indochina. In that incident, the link to 1893 was vivid. The target was the West in general to some extent, but the French in particular. The Preah Vihear was not under particular attention yet. But the PV was in the area of dispute in 1940-41. More importantly, the “trauma” of losing territories was revived significantly by the dispute over the Thai-Cambodian border areas. The areas were registered in recent Thai memory as Thai’s land that were wrestled away by the farang. The areas become a significant representative of the whole “loss of territories” ideology.
3. Then came the dispute over the Preah Vihear in 1957-1962. Since than, the PV has become an (the?) emblem of the “loss of territories” ideology in Thai history.
My understanding of this comes from the work of Shane Strate, a student of mine, who is writing his dissertation on the significance of the “loss” as a foundation of modern Thai historical ideology. The importance of the geobody is one thing. But the fact that the geo-body was injured, was harmed and seriously hurt, is as much important. A conventional history that celebrates the survivial from colonial threats doesn’t help us understand Thailand’s anti-colonial, anti-West mentality. I would ague that after the end of the Cold War, the anti-West ideology has become stronger among those who see capitalism and globalization as “national threats”. The PAD nationalism is within this context.
8 Thongchai Winichakul // Aug 27, 2008 at 7:39 am
“Watershed” This is one of the most misunderstood issue in the recent dispute. Watershed is a common boundary marking. But it is not a clear-cut, scientfic, permanent marking as people might think it is.
1. How does a “watershed” mark a boundary? Does one “watershed” provide a longgggg line over hundreds of kilometers, and perfectly connect to the next long line provided by the next “watershed”, and so on? No. A watershed cannot do that. A watershed provides a section (long or short) of demarcation. Many more sections of boundaries are simply the “logical/reasonable” lines that connect those watershed marks. There are areas where two watersheds are too far apart, thus a boundary must depend on other kinds of marking.
2. Does a watershed remain the same forever? No. I don’t know enough about the PV areas. But a watershed in the dense rainforest mountains can cause headache to boundary demarcation because it can shift. You can imagine the rest of the story over decades or a hundred years. ALL natural features that mark a boundary shift from time to time: streams changing courses, sandbars getting larger and smaller, and so on.
3. Suposed that a watershed remain stable, the precision for boundary marking is not as precise as people think. There is NO precise watershed. The demarcation still needs geometry, geodesies, and, finally, “agreement” by both sides (of equal or unequal powers is beside the point here). The is the same as there is no precise “depth of a stream” that demarcates many rivers and streams, or the precise size of “sandbars” in the Mekong that demarcate Thai-Lao territories. The shifts and changes in 2 and 3 , assuming that there is no other factor in a dispute at all, need to go to a table for human from both sides to agree from time to time. And if they don’t, which are unfortunately often the case because each side want to stick to the original or previous agreements which are no longer supportred by the natural features, what can they do? Continuing negotiation. The citing of generic mantra “watershed” “watershed” “watershed” may or may not be correct in the PV case — I do not know. But in somany cases, such a mantra is not much relevant for a few acres or sq. km.
4. That’s why a treaty (word) that provides the fundamental authority to a demarcation may not be much helpful in deciding a precise demarcation of a few sq. km. Modern states need maps. Unfortunately maps are often conflicitng for so many reasons: human errors, changing natural features over time, and so on. Better tehnology can be a cause of problem because it makes a later map better/ more precise than the earlier one, conflicting the earlier one that was not as accurate.
5. In the case of Siam-French Indochina, the treaties of 1904 and 1907 treaties were concluded BEFORE the detailed surveys were carried out. Yes, the treaties were based on the preliminary surveys and maps. The surveys continued afterward and new maps were made to attach to the treaties. The discrepansies began right there in some spots, for example, the area under dispute between Thailand and Laos in 1988. In that case, the 1907 treaty said the “Hueng River” was the demarcation in a section between Leoi Province and the Lao side. Only one year later 1908, a team of French surveyors found that there were two streams of Hueng — one called Heung Yai, the other Heung Noi. There was no “Hueng” (one word) River. By 1988, one stream dried out, and the name gone from local memory. The new stream emerges but with a new local name. Which one is the boundary line according to the 1907 treaty? As a consequence, about one thousand soldiers from both sides died before both countries agree to settle on the table. Since then, I havn’t heard yet how it is resolved. I guess that it cannot be resolved — same as many other cases. This is only one deadly example how maps cannot help as much either. (More about conflicting maps in this case and how absurd the conflict was — but not here.) Yet the dominant regime of modern political geography assumes that natural features, treaties, and maps (and technology) can solve these problems once and for all.
If anybody wants to instigate more nonsense conflicts over disputed tiny territories that could lead to more nonsense battles and deaths, there are many dozens more locations to choose to die for — from the shrotest boundary between Thailand and Malaysia, to every other boundary of Thailand and its neighbours.
9 Thongchai Winichakul // Aug 27, 2008 at 7:58 am
One last posting in a long time:
In the movie ” Moonhunter” about Seksan Presertkul’s political life, when Seksan had to travel in hurry from Laos back to Thailand in 1979 0r 80 after the Lao party told all Thai comrades to go (thansk to conflicts among the parties), Seksan crossed from laos to Thai soil at Nam Heung (the Heung River, read comment above). In the movie, once he crossed it, he kneeled down and kissed the soil, “Ahh…Home”.
I wonder which Heung stream he crossed? Was he sure that it was the one that separate Thailand and Laos? Because if he crossed the wrong one, it meant that the soil he kissed could still be the Lao soil, thus definitely not “Ahh…Home” yet. The kiss could have been misplaced, therefore invalid. Unfortunately even if he could remember which stream he crossed, nobody knows for sure if it is the boundary or not since there is no definite answer that both countries agree.
The Kiss is undecided
I never asked Seksan himself because the issue is too Derridean.
10 Thongchai Winichakul // Aug 27, 2008 at 8:36 am
Ooops! refer to my #8:
When the conflicting info cannnot be left “undecided” and needed ultimate decision, the court (ICJ) is a way to resolve it when the two countries cannot talk. This is why we should respect the ICJ decision; in so many cases a territorial dispute may not be resolved by treaties, maps or natural features themselves. In the PV case, the court cannot reach decision based on the treaty and maps alone. It finally arrived at the final decision by additional evidence (actions that indicated precedented jurisdiction and sovereignty).
If one doesn’t accept the ICJ’s decision, there are so many cases that are “unsolvable”. Even a military approach would bring only a short term occupation.
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