Comments on: Phra Viharn: the dividing line in Thailand http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/ New perspectives on mainland Southeast Asia Mon, 23 Nov 2009 15:28:26 +1100 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Thongchai Winichakul http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-544586 Thongchai Winichakul Tue, 26 Aug 2008 21:36:08 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-544586 Ooops! refer to my #8: When the conflicting info cannnot be left "undecided" and needed ultimate decision, the court (ICJ) is a way to resolve it when the two countries cannot talk. This is why we should respect the ICJ decision; in so many cases a territorial dispute may not be resolved by treaties, maps or natural features themselves. In the PV case, the court cannot reach decision based on the treaty and maps alone. It finally arrived at the final decision by additional evidence (actions that indicated precedented jurisdiction and sovereignty). If one doesn't accept the ICJ's decision, there are so many cases that are "unsolvable". Even a military approach would bring only a short term occupation. Ooops! refer to my #8:
When the conflicting info cannnot be left “undecided” and needed ultimate decision, the court (ICJ) is a way to resolve it when the two countries cannot talk. This is why we should respect the ICJ decision; in so many cases a territorial dispute may not be resolved by treaties, maps or natural features themselves. In the PV case, the court cannot reach decision based on the treaty and maps alone. It finally arrived at the final decision by additional evidence (actions that indicated precedented jurisdiction and sovereignty).
If one doesn’t accept the ICJ’s decision, there are so many cases that are “unsolvable”. Even a military approach would bring only a short term occupation.

]]> By: Thongchai Winichakul http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-544554 Thongchai Winichakul Tue, 26 Aug 2008 20:58:54 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-544554 One last posting in a long time: In the movie " Moonhunter" about Seksan Presertkul's political life, when Seksan had to travel in hurry from Laos back to Thailand in 1979 0r 80 after the Lao party told all Thai comrades to go (thansk to conflicts among the parties), Seksan crossed from laos to Thai soil at Nam Heung (the Heung River, read comment above). In the movie, once he crossed it, he kneeled down and kissed the soil, "Ahh...Home". I wonder which Heung stream he crossed? Was he sure that it was the one that separate Thailand and Laos? Because if he crossed the wrong one, it meant that the soil he kissed could still be the Lao soil, thus definitely not "Ahh...Home" yet. The kiss could have been misplaced, therefore invalid. Unfortunately even if he could remember which stream he crossed, nobody knows for sure if it is the boundary or not since there is no definite answer that both countries agree. The Kiss is undecided I never asked Seksan himself because the issue is too Derridean. One last posting in a long time:

In the movie ” Moonhunter” about Seksan Presertkul’s political life, when Seksan had to travel in hurry from Laos back to Thailand in 1979 0r 80 after the Lao party told all Thai comrades to go (thansk to conflicts among the parties), Seksan crossed from laos to Thai soil at Nam Heung (the Heung River, read comment above). In the movie, once he crossed it, he kneeled down and kissed the soil, “Ahh…Home”.

I wonder which Heung stream he crossed? Was he sure that it was the one that separate Thailand and Laos? Because if he crossed the wrong one, it meant that the soil he kissed could still be the Lao soil, thus definitely not “Ahh…Home” yet. The kiss could have been misplaced, therefore invalid. Unfortunately even if he could remember which stream he crossed, nobody knows for sure if it is the boundary or not since there is no definite answer that both countries agree.

The Kiss is undecided

I never asked Seksan himself because the issue is too Derridean.

]]> By: Thongchai Winichakul http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-544532 Thongchai Winichakul Tue, 26 Aug 2008 20:39:56 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-544532 "Watershed" This is one of the most misunderstood issue in the recent dispute. Watershed is a common boundary marking. But it is not a clear-cut, scientfic, permanent marking as people might think it is. 1. How does a "watershed" mark a boundary? Does one "watershed" provide a longgggg line over hundreds of kilometers, and perfectly connect to the next long line provided by the next "watershed", and so on? No. A watershed cannot do that. A watershed provides a section (long or short) of demarcation. Many more sections of boundaries are simply the "logical/reasonable" lines that connect those watershed marks. There are areas where two watersheds are too far apart, thus a boundary must depend on other kinds of marking. 2. Does a watershed remain the same forever? No. I don't know enough about the PV areas. But a watershed in the dense rainforest mountains can cause headache to boundary demarcation because it can shift. You can imagine the rest of the story over decades or a hundred years. ALL natural features that mark a boundary shift from time to time: streams changing courses, sandbars getting larger and smaller, and so on. 3. Suposed that a watershed remain stable, the precision for boundary marking is not as precise as people think. There is NO precise watershed. The demarcation still needs geometry, geodesies, and, finally, "agreement" by both sides (of equal or unequal powers is beside the point here). The is the same as there is no precise "depth of a stream" that demarcates many rivers and streams, or the precise size of "sandbars" in the Mekong that demarcate Thai-Lao territories. The shifts and changes in 2 and 3 , assuming that there is no other factor in a dispute at all, need to go to a table for human from both sides to agree from time to time. And if they don't, which are unfortunately often the case because each side want to stick to the original or previous agreements which are no longer supportred by the natural features, what can they do? Continuing negotiation. The citing of generic mantra "watershed" "watershed" "watershed" may or may not be correct in the PV case -- I do not know. But in somany cases, such a mantra is not much relevant for a few acres or sq. km. 4. That's why a treaty (word) that provides the fundamental authority to a demarcation may not be much helpful in deciding a precise demarcation of a few sq. km. Modern states need maps. Unfortunately maps are often conflicitng for so many reasons: human errors, changing natural features over time, and so on. Better tehnology can be a cause of problem because it makes a later map better/ more precise than the earlier one, conflicting the earlier one that was not as accurate. 5. In the case of Siam-French Indochina, the treaties of 1904 and 1907 treaties were concluded BEFORE the detailed surveys were carried out. Yes, the treaties were based on the preliminary surveys and maps. The surveys continued afterward and new maps were made to attach to the treaties. The discrepansies began right there in some spots, for example, the area under dispute between Thailand and Laos in 1988. In that case, the 1907 treaty said the "Hueng River" was the demarcation in a section between Leoi Province and the Lao side. Only one year later 1908, a team of French surveyors found that there were two streams of Hueng -- one called Heung Yai, the other Heung Noi. There was no "Hueng" (one word) River. By 1988, one stream dried out, and the name gone from local memory. The new stream emerges but with a new local name. Which one is the boundary line according to the 1907 treaty? As a consequence, about one thousand soldiers from both sides died before both countries agree to settle on the table. Since then, I havn't heard yet how it is resolved. I guess that it cannot be resolved -- same as many other cases. This is only one deadly example how maps cannot help as much either. (More about conflicting maps in this case and how absurd the conflict was -- but not here.) Yet the dominant regime of modern political geography assumes that natural features, treaties, and maps (and technology) can solve these problems once and for all. If anybody wants to instigate more nonsense conflicts over disputed tiny territories that could lead to more nonsense battles and deaths, there are many dozens more locations to choose to die for -- from the shrotest boundary between Thailand and Malaysia, to every other boundary of Thailand and its neighbours. “Watershed” This is one of the most misunderstood issue in the recent dispute. Watershed is a common boundary marking. But it is not a clear-cut, scientfic, permanent marking as people might think it is.
1. How does a “watershed” mark a boundary? Does one “watershed” provide a longgggg line over hundreds of kilometers, and perfectly connect to the next long line provided by the next “watershed”, and so on? No. A watershed cannot do that. A watershed provides a section (long or short) of demarcation. Many more sections of boundaries are simply the “logical/reasonable” lines that connect those watershed marks. There are areas where two watersheds are too far apart, thus a boundary must depend on other kinds of marking.
2. Does a watershed remain the same forever? No. I don’t know enough about the PV areas. But a watershed in the dense rainforest mountains can cause headache to boundary demarcation because it can shift. You can imagine the rest of the story over decades or a hundred years. ALL natural features that mark a boundary shift from time to time: streams changing courses, sandbars getting larger and smaller, and so on.
3. Suposed that a watershed remain stable, the precision for boundary marking is not as precise as people think. There is NO precise watershed. The demarcation still needs geometry, geodesies, and, finally, “agreement” by both sides (of equal or unequal powers is beside the point here). The is the same as there is no precise “depth of a stream” that demarcates many rivers and streams, or the precise size of “sandbars” in the Mekong that demarcate Thai-Lao territories. The shifts and changes in 2 and 3 , assuming that there is no other factor in a dispute at all, need to go to a table for human from both sides to agree from time to time. And if they don’t, which are unfortunately often the case because each side want to stick to the original or previous agreements which are no longer supportred by the natural features, what can they do? Continuing negotiation. The citing of generic mantra “watershed” “watershed” “watershed” may or may not be correct in the PV case — I do not know. But in somany cases, such a mantra is not much relevant for a few acres or sq. km.
4. That’s why a treaty (word) that provides the fundamental authority to a demarcation may not be much helpful in deciding a precise demarcation of a few sq. km. Modern states need maps. Unfortunately maps are often conflicitng for so many reasons: human errors, changing natural features over time, and so on. Better tehnology can be a cause of problem because it makes a later map better/ more precise than the earlier one, conflicting the earlier one that was not as accurate.
5. In the case of Siam-French Indochina, the treaties of 1904 and 1907 treaties were concluded BEFORE the detailed surveys were carried out. Yes, the treaties were based on the preliminary surveys and maps. The surveys continued afterward and new maps were made to attach to the treaties. The discrepansies began right there in some spots, for example, the area under dispute between Thailand and Laos in 1988. In that case, the 1907 treaty said the “Hueng River” was the demarcation in a section between Leoi Province and the Lao side. Only one year later 1908, a team of French surveyors found that there were two streams of Hueng — one called Heung Yai, the other Heung Noi. There was no “Hueng” (one word) River. By 1988, one stream dried out, and the name gone from local memory. The new stream emerges but with a new local name. Which one is the boundary line according to the 1907 treaty? As a consequence, about one thousand soldiers from both sides died before both countries agree to settle on the table. Since then, I havn’t heard yet how it is resolved. I guess that it cannot be resolved — same as many other cases. This is only one deadly example how maps cannot help as much either. (More about conflicting maps in this case and how absurd the conflict was — but not here.) Yet the dominant regime of modern political geography assumes that natural features, treaties, and maps (and technology) can solve these problems once and for all.

If anybody wants to instigate more nonsense conflicts over disputed tiny territories that could lead to more nonsense battles and deaths, there are many dozens more locations to choose to die for — from the shrotest boundary between Thailand and Malaysia, to every other boundary of Thailand and its neighbours.

]]> By: Thongchai Winichakul http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-544488 Thongchai Winichakul Tue, 26 Aug 2008 19:44:33 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-544488 Re: KI #3 "...but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power." To explain the connection, we need to understand three things in Thai historical mentality/ ideology. 1) The significance or "trauma" of the 1893 defeat that marked a series of the "loss of territories" from 1893 to 1909 to colinial powers -- a.k.a. farang, the West. The 1893 defeat -- the painful birth of Siam as a territorial state -- laid a foundation of the modern Thai nation that so far has escaped our attention, namely a peculiar anti-colinial, anti-farang historical ideology. The trope of the Thai anti-colonial is the "loss of territories". This anti-colonial ideology has not been properly understood because a) the mantra that Thailand was never colonized, and b) the parallel fact that Thailand has been, comparatively speaking, open and accommodating the West in somany ways. 2. But the anti-colonial (can we call post-colonial?) ideology exploded from time to time. One of them was in 1940-41 when Thailand fought to "reclaimed the lost provinces" from Cambodia/ French Indochina. In that incident, the link to 1893 was vivid. The target was the West in general to some extent, but the French in particular. The Preah Vihear was not under particular attention yet. But the PV was in the area of dispute in 1940-41. More importantly, the "trauma" of losing territories was revived significantly by the dispute over the Thai-Cambodian border areas. The areas were registered in recent Thai memory as Thai's land that were wrestled away by the farang. The areas become a significant representative of the whole "loss of territories" ideology. 3. Then came the dispute over the Preah Vihear in 1957-1962. Since than, the PV has become an (the?) emblem of the "loss of territories" ideology in Thai history. My understanding of this comes from the work of Shane Strate, a student of mine, who is writing his dissertation on the significance of the "loss" as a foundation of modern Thai historical ideology. The importance of the geobody is one thing. But the fact that the geo-body was injured, was harmed and seriously hurt, is as much important. A conventional history that celebrates the survivial from colonial threats doesn't help us understand Thailand's anti-colonial, anti-West mentality. I would ague that after the end of the Cold War, the anti-West ideology has become stronger among those who see capitalism and globalization as "national threats". The PAD nationalism is within this context. Re: KI #3 “…but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power.”
To explain the connection, we need to understand three things in Thai historical mentality/ ideology.
1) The significance or “trauma” of the 1893 defeat that marked a series of the “loss of territories” from 1893 to 1909 to colinial powers — a.k.a. farang, the West. The 1893 defeat — the painful birth of Siam as a territorial state — laid a foundation of the modern Thai nation that so far has escaped our attention, namely a peculiar anti-colinial, anti-farang historical ideology. The trope of the Thai anti-colonial is the “loss of territories”. This anti-colonial ideology has not been properly understood because a) the mantra that Thailand was never colonized, and b) the parallel fact that Thailand has been, comparatively speaking, open and accommodating the West in somany ways.
2. But the anti-colonial (can we call post-colonial?) ideology exploded from time to time. One of them was in 1940-41 when Thailand fought to “reclaimed the lost provinces” from Cambodia/ French Indochina. In that incident, the link to 1893 was vivid. The target was the West in general to some extent, but the French in particular. The Preah Vihear was not under particular attention yet. But the PV was in the area of dispute in 1940-41. More importantly, the “trauma” of losing territories was revived significantly by the dispute over the Thai-Cambodian border areas. The areas were registered in recent Thai memory as Thai’s land that were wrestled away by the farang. The areas become a significant representative of the whole “loss of territories” ideology.
3. Then came the dispute over the Preah Vihear in 1957-1962. Since than, the PV has become an (the?) emblem of the “loss of territories” ideology in Thai history.

My understanding of this comes from the work of Shane Strate, a student of mine, who is writing his dissertation on the significance of the “loss” as a foundation of modern Thai historical ideology. The importance of the geobody is one thing. But the fact that the geo-body was injured, was harmed and seriously hurt, is as much important. A conventional history that celebrates the survivial from colonial threats doesn’t help us understand Thailand’s anti-colonial, anti-West mentality. I would ague that after the end of the Cold War, the anti-West ideology has become stronger among those who see capitalism and globalization as “national threats”. The PAD nationalism is within this context.

]]> By: saay http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-544315 saay Tue, 26 Aug 2008 16:07:42 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-544315 One should hope that Cambodian authorities remain ignorant of the fact that the developers of the forthcoming "Tomb Raider. Underworld" computer game placed Angkor Thom right in the middle of Thailand. In a newly released trailer, Lara Croft - in search of Thor's hammer - makes her way through Thai ruins, at some point passing ancient structures similar to the gates of Angkor Thom crowned by the famous four faces... http://www.tombraider.com/server.php?show=ConMediaFile.726 To my knowledge there is no four-faced Angkorean gate on Thai soil. Hopefully, the developers had no Thai cultural experts who were aware of the fact that this is a virtual annexation of Angkorean heartland to Thai territory. One should hope that Cambodian authorities remain ignorant of the fact that the developers of the forthcoming “Tomb Raider. Underworld” computer game placed Angkor Thom right in the middle of Thailand. In a newly released trailer, Lara Croft – in search of Thor’s hammer – makes her way through Thai ruins, at some point passing ancient structures similar to the gates of Angkor Thom crowned by the famous four faces… http://www.tombraider.com/server.php?show=ConMediaFile.726
To my knowledge there is no four-faced Angkorean gate on Thai soil.

Hopefully, the developers had no Thai cultural experts who were aware of the fact that this is a virtual annexation of Angkorean heartland to Thai territory.

]]> By: Emil http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-543853 Emil Tue, 26 Aug 2008 05:03:47 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-543853 Thanks for the rundown Fisherman. Thanks for the rundown Fisherman.

]]> By: Fisherman http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-543739 Fisherman Tue, 26 Aug 2008 02:45:03 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-543739 Emil, the other two presentations were mainly just a historical background of the dispute. A key point was that the early 20th century map in dispute (which was agreed to by the Thais at the time) has a border which mistakenly follows the wrong watershed line. The issue has been raised at various times throughout the C20th to promote nationalistic feeling on either side - see Thongchai's 'Siam Mapped' for a good summary of Thai resentment towards the border issue and loss of national pride. As far as I know, there is no claim that the Thais actually built the temple, the claim is that it falls within Thai territory. In the discussion, there was a persuasive argument from a well-informed ANU academic that the Thai (military) reaction was merely reactionary to events, not politically orchestrated as partly inferred in the presentation. There was also some criticism about the lack of Khmer focus to the presentations - and for my two cents I think it highly likely the dispute was mostly stirred for Cambodian political reasons (the election). Emil, the other two presentations were mainly just a historical background of the dispute. A key point was that the early 20th century map in dispute (which was agreed to by the Thais at the time) has a border which mistakenly follows the wrong watershed line. The issue has been raised at various times throughout the C20th to promote nationalistic feeling on either side – see Thongchai’s ‘Siam Mapped’ for a good summary of Thai resentment towards the border issue and loss of national pride. As far as I know, there is no claim that the Thais actually built the temple, the claim is that it falls within Thai territory.

In the discussion, there was a persuasive argument from a well-informed ANU academic that the Thai (military) reaction was merely reactionary to events, not politically orchestrated as partly inferred in the presentation. There was also some criticism about the lack of Khmer focus to the presentations – and for my two cents I think it highly likely the dispute was mostly stirred for Cambodian political reasons (the election).

]]> By: KL http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-543604 KL Tue, 26 Aug 2008 00:45:46 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-543604 Thank you for posting this as I was trying to get more information about the seminar. I agree the crisis was set off by Thai internal politics, but the consequences have gone way beyond that. What could be other [underlying] causes that sustain the dispute, particularly public opinion. Was this discussed in the seminar? "As a historical site, Phra Viharn is also useful in evoking a former period of national glory in which the extent of the Thai kingdom is imagined to be much extensive than it is now, before it was emasculated by colonial incursions." I can't disagree since I don't have much insight into Thai perspective, but I don't understand. Preah Vihear was built by Khmer kings in the 11th century deep inside Cambodia's interior and at least a century before the emergence of a Thai state. It would be logical/natural for the site to evoke memories of former glories of the Khmer Empire to Cambodians, but I don't see the connection it could bring with Thai people's sense of loss of territory due to colonial power. The 'geo-body' perhaps can, but not the cultural, ancestral, and historical aspect of the site per se - unless such connection is either falsely created or wrongly imagined. In this case, public opinion and misunderstanding weighs in heavily. Thank you for posting this as I was trying to get more information about the seminar. I agree the crisis was set off by Thai internal politics, but the consequences have gone way beyond that. What could be other [underlying] causes that sustain the dispute, particularly public opinion. Was this discussed in the seminar?

“As a historical site, Phra Viharn is also useful in evoking a former period of national glory in which the extent of the Thai kingdom is imagined to be much extensive than it is now, before it was emasculated by colonial incursions.”

I can’t disagree since I don’t have much insight into Thai perspective, but I don’t understand. Preah Vihear was built by Khmer kings in the 11th century deep inside Cambodia’s interior and at least a century before the emergence of a Thai state. It would be logical/natural for the site to evoke memories of former glories of the Khmer Empire to Cambodians, but I don’t see the connection it could bring with Thai people’s sense of loss of territory due to colonial power. The ‘geo-body’ perhaps can, but not the cultural, ancestral, and historical aspect of the site per se – unless such connection is either falsely created or wrongly imagined. In this case, public opinion and misunderstanding weighs in heavily.

]]> By: Emil http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-543119 Emil Mon, 25 Aug 2008 15:53:06 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-543119 Thank you Andrew for posting your presentation into the public sphere. As a student here @ the ANU, I had hoped to attend this seminar but circumstances occurred. I'm curious as to what views were expressed by the other presenters. Thank you Andrew for posting your presentation into the public sphere.

As a student here @ the ANU, I had hoped to attend this seminar but circumstances occurred.

I’m curious as to what views were expressed by the other presenters.

]]> By: nganadeeleg http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2008/08/25/phra-viharn-the-dividing-line-in-thailand/comment-page-1/#comment-542726 nganadeeleg Mon, 25 Aug 2008 08:12:16 +0000 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/?p=2659#comment-542726 <i>Some ham-fisted and inept acts on the part of the Samak government have assisted them in this cause</i> That's an understatement! What were they thinking having Thaksin's lawyer do the temple deal at the same time as Thaksin was doing business deals with Cambodia? Although their nationalistic tone has been disgraceful, you cannot blame the PAD for bringing up the possible conflict of interest - they could hardly ignore it. Some ham-fisted and inept acts on the part of the Samak government have assisted them in this cause

That’s an understatement!

What were they thinking having Thaksin’s lawyer do the temple deal at the same time as Thaksin was doing business deals with Cambodia?

Although their nationalistic tone has been disgraceful, you cannot blame the PAD for bringing up the possible conflict of interest – they could hardly ignore it.

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