With demonisation being a popular theme on New Mandala, it was interesting to see the return of Anwar Ibrahim to Malaysia’s Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives). Anwar’s victory in a recent by-election represents, for many, a victory for liberal democratic values and a defeat of the systems that promote crony justice.
As crony justice is also a topical issue elsewhere in Southeast Asia, I thought it made sense to use Anwar Ibrahim’s return as a basis for discussing the fate of Thai elites and Thaksin Shinawatra. Obviously, there are differences between Thaksin and Ibrahim and it would be unhelpful to compare them too closely. However, both men do share some common ground as they were both deposed through a process orchestrated by competitor elites. This has been at the heart of their respective character assassinations.
Anwar Ibrahim was charged with corruption in 1999 and sodomy in 2000. Anwar was, of course, released in 2004, with two of three Federal Court of Malaysia judges acquitting him citing inconsistencies in evidence relating to the charge of sodomy. Before Anwar’s “corrupt and devious behaviour” came to prominence in 1998, he had begun to promote transparent auditing that would have adversely affected people within his own party, the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO).
Thaksin Shinawatra has yet to be charged much to the chagrin of many yellow shirts. However, his wife Potjaman was sentenced to three years imprisonment for tax evasion in July 2008. The Shinawatras then fled to London after being allowed to attend the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, and are seeking political asylum. Thaksin blamed elites within Thailand for his quick exit. He said, “There is a continuation of dictatorship managing Thai politics … which is followed by interference in the justice system. These are my political enemies. They do not care about the rule of law, facts or internationally recognised due process.”
Couldn’t the same have been said for Anwar Ibrahim’s trials and tribulations at the hands of an UMNO backed judiciary in the late nineties? Would Anwar Ibrahim have fled to Athens if he had the opportunity? (He didn’t on his release in 2004, and the Olympics were there then!) If it weren’t for Potjaman, could Thaksin have tried his luck in the courts only later to emerge virtuous and a shining light for the democracy he claims to value?
Anwar Ibrahim has returned to Malaysian politics and does so at a time when competitor elites in Malaysia are on the back foot. What does the current situation say about elites in Thailand? Will they ever loosen their grip? If so, without a symbol of injustice (which Thaksin could have been), how?
4 responses so far ↓
1 matty // Aug 28, 2008 at 8:54 pm
Which ‘character’ of Thaksin was assassinated Colum G.? I am not sure anyone would dare impugn Thaksin’s character Colum because while in power or out, billionaire Thaksin was notorious for suing anyone for slander (to the tune of multi-millions) for even suggesting Thaksin has bad breath!
Had Thaksin really possessed character, he would face his slanderers and accusers, with conviction and fortitude. But Thaksin is Thailand’s fastest running cowardly fugitive . . . himself slandering the Thai courts just because he can no longer camouflage, hide or bribe his way out of, his guilt.
Anwar Ibrahim had never hesitated to face his accusers and was not one to run . . . So was Aung Sang Suu Kyi . . . And here right now we have Chamlong Srimuang and Sondhi Limthongkul ready to face arrests and defend their convictions in court . . . but NOT running away.
2 hrk // Aug 29, 2008 at 7:32 am
There a few quite crucial difference between the cases. Thaksin had his own party, while Anwar was a member of UMNO, led by Mahathir. Thaksin did win elections, while Anwar did not. Even at present the current government in Malaysia still has a majority, while Keadilan has not. Finally, Thaksin was ousted while holding a majority in parliament through a coup, which means that he was pushed out by means outside of the at that time legal political process. Anwar was pushed out within a legal framework.
The more interesting issue, however, which tells quite a lot about the differences between democracy in Malaysia and Thailand is that Anwar could return into politics through elections, while Thaksin could not. Obviously, those in power in Malaysia are less afraid of election processes then in Thailand.
3 Colum Graham // Aug 29, 2008 at 5:25 pm
hrk, thanks for your response to my speculation. ‘…those in power are less afraid of election processes…?’ Couldn’t that mean they feel more assured of victory?
That sodomy is perhaps viewed more as a personal crime than a crime against the state allows for Anwar’s return to public life. The opposite can be said of Thaksin – everyone will remember his corruption (guilty or not) because it allegedly affects the state. Few would immediatly think of Anwar Ibrahim’s corruption because sodomy was used to demonise him primarily in UMNO controlled media. Perhaps, if Anwar Ibrahim’s corruption was weighted more heavily in his demonisation, the Malaysian public would have been more focused on the corruption of other UMNO members.
Sondhi Limthongkul said “If we fail this time, we’ll quit and surrender the country to them. When people don’t care about us, we won’t have to care about them. Let others take over the country.” Who is the PAD holding to ransom? Citizens or subjects? At least if Thaksin Shinawatra was holding Thais to ransom, the victims fell into the category of citizen. Instead Thai political development remains stuck on repeat at ‘the pot calling the kettle black’, and will remain so until demonisation, (like the attempts on Samak’s character at the moment) is unneccessary.
4 Lee Jones // Aug 30, 2008 at 7:48 am
While not wishing to sanction the brutal treatment meted out to Anwar at UMNO’s hands, people who wish to see in him as a liberal-democratic saviour for Malaysia (e.g., much of the recent media coverage) seem to have quite a selective viewpoint. Doubtless this image is very attractive to Western governments who love to project their own self-understandings onto figures in non-Western states, and doubtless it has been very useful for Anwar himself as he has hopped from one visiting fellow post to another and become the darling of many liberal academics. But as Edmund Gomez points out*, before the Asian financial crisis, Anwar was just as much engaged in cronyist network building as Mahathir and Daim. He just wasn’t as good at it, and the struggles between these players was as much (or more) a part of Anwar’s downfall as his supposedly liberal credentials. (At a Q&A after a paper he presented on Islam and modernity at St Antony’s College, Oxford, a couple of years ago, he essentially admitted his own complicity.) So yes, Anwar promoted ‘transparent auditing’, but this can be seen less as an unequivocal, principled move towards ‘good governance’ and more part of this internecine competition – a weapon of the weak, perhaps.
As such I’d agree with Colum’s point about the small role that Anwar’s corruption played in his demonisation being significant — especially since much of ‘reformasi’ was a protest against corruption, rather than a demand for liberal democracy, per se (hence the rise in support for PAS). It was probably too much of pots calling a kettle black, hence the resort to sodomy charges as the main mode of demonisation.
* E. T. Gomez, ‘Political Business in Malaysia: Party Factionalism, Corporate Development, and Economic Crisis’, in his edited book, Political Business in East Asia (Routledge: London, 2002): 82-114.
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