I never asked what’s in it for you, I told you that my motivation for knowing is to be able to see where Thailand can go from here. Seeing as you know what the issues are having accused me of not getting to them, I asked what an issue for you is…?

Out of self-interest, the single issue for me is, where does Thailand go from here? What is it for you?

If someone was to gain some sort of objective clarity on Thai identity I am sure it would be a result of a careers work. Sure it’s easy for me to say “oh, it’s a great big tangled fishing line” between the monarchy’s reel and ending at the hook of the rural farmer, and leave it there because I don’t know enough. I don’t think many other people are clear beyond their self-interested opinions on the issues. Issues plural. The issues are not one dimensional, ‘Lese Majeste is wrong’ etc, but are multi-faceted and I think are at the crux of where Thai identity will continue to evolve from.

So for me, it is clear Lese Majeste is draconian. It is clear that some Thai people feel their ‘freedom’ is being obstructed and suppressed, and it is clear that for democracy to be more than simply a label for a voting process, Lese Majeste, the visible mole from the cancer lurking beneath, must be removed for further ‘treatment.’ However, I am sure there are Thais who are completely opposite and feel that the Lese Majeste protects what perhaps ‘provides’ freedom – the “benevolent” elites.

What I wrote as a response to Chris at the beginning, the ‘Chulalongkorn as Thailand’s Harvard’, ‘bright creative martyrs’ rubbish, was just to be antagonistic towards people who feel they do have an objective grasp on the situation. If you do have a grasp on it, I am envious! Posts like the ones from Craig Reynolds, ‘Ralph Kramden’ and ‘kjf’ don’t seem to be playing into the waiting hands of the cancerous debate which seemingly ends in a Thai room 101.

On the issue of the alliance between urban middle-class and rural masses, what I mean by urban middle class are the masses of middle-income voters (say, TB 10,000-100,000 a month) in Bangkok (not necessarily intellectuals). My point here is that while urban voters were almost single-handedly responsible for Suchinda’s removal in 1992, the fact that the movement was almost exclusively Bangkok-based prevented the events of Black May from resulting in even more sweeping change. This time, however, could well be different; *should* these urban voters rise up against the current government, the movement’s support is likely to have a much broader base of support in the provinces.

By the way, I am not saying this will happen or even that it’s likely to happen; large-scale mobilization is a decisively rare occurrence in any context. While I don’t really presume to have anything in the way of a workable action plan, I also think that the impetus for this kind of broad-based movement is most likely to come from the red camp. For it to be able to attract urban voters, however, I think it must do more to distance itself from Thaksin/TRT – that is, become more “orange” than “red.”

Good point about Khana Ratsadorn. However, remember that they came to power because they controlled a good chunk of the military and the bureaucracy, as opposed to broad-based popular support. In fact, they were so aware of being out of step with the rest of the country that they refused to allow the formation of political parties for the first 14 years of their rule. Any kind of “change from below” that seeks to displace the military-bureaucratic elites today needs the kind of mass support that Giles’ manifesto is guaranteed to alienate.

Finally, about Thai culture. It is precisely because Thai culture is such a flimsy, amorphous concept that proponents of democracy have a lot of room to maneuver within discursive frames that are acceptable in contemporary Thailand. The key here is to push for radical change in ways that don’t appear quite so radical. Successful dissidents are generally quite good at claiming “backward legitimacy” – that is, the consistency of reform with a country’s history and traditions (which, again, are so open to alternative interpretation as to allow for almost any such claim). My point is not that there is any such thing as a clearly definable “Thai culture,” but rather quite the opposite. It’s precisely because it is so hard to define that it is possible to ground in it even pretty subversive agendas.

Thailand is a Buddhist and the Thai people will never adopt the ideas of Giles Ungpakor with his advocacy of abortion, republicanism, and surrender to the Muslims of the south. Instead, we should return to what we are: the natural order of Thai civilization.

Look at Russia, After suffering under 70 years of Socialism, they are now returning to their historic and religious roots. We Thais should do the same. It is past time to undo the tragedy of 1932 and, once again, become officially the Buddhist Kingdom of Siam, wherein we can find the true spirit of being Thai.

kjf: The best hope for real democratization in Thailand is an alliance of the provincial masses and those urban middle income voters who have largely been on the fence over the past few years (applauding, perhaps, the case made in support of the coup but never particularly enthusiastic about either the PAD or military rule).

RK: Well it might be the best hope, I am not sure. It depends a bit on one’s reading of the politics of the urban middle class. Frankly, this class is rather too diverse to be able to detect a tendency. Sure, some sat on the fence, but others clearly didn’t. So an alliance is likely to result from some parts of the middle class (academics, intellectuals perhaps?) to elements of the vast, unorganised rural poor (which might those be?).

If one reads the Ji manifesto, it seems that he agrees and sees that he has a potential role. But where is the organisation? Ji seems to think it comes from the Red movment, if it breaks from the dominance of the “Thaksin will save us” perspective. Perhaps.

What do you see as a way to organise this cross-class alliance?

kjf: Because of recent events, that alliance seems to me to be more workable now than it has been at any point in modern Thai history.

RK: Ji seems to agree. But I still don’t see the mechanism for the alliance. How is it done?

kjf: Generally speaking, real democratization is only achievable by effectively using discourse that is acceptable in current Thai society

RK: A truism perhaps? But see the initial announcements of the khana ratsadon. Who would have claimed those as compatible with “Thai culture”?

kjf: as opposed to appear to want to burn the whole house down (which makes any “democratic movement” must easier to demonize and repress). Hence the references to (highly idealized) aspects of the Thai past that any such movement might be able to evoke for the purposes of mobilization. This, incidentally, is why I thought Giles’ statement (which I had not read prior to publishing the post) was in fact quite counterproductive. If the goal is “democracy,” I would argue that the way to achieve it is to make a case for its compatibility with Thai culture, as opposed to tainting the case with ideologies most people in Thailand find distasteful or downright heretical.

RK: How do you know what is acceptable and what isn’t? What constitutes “Thai culture”? It is clear that what you call “Thai culture” is a recent invention. No culture is unchanging. It would seem to me that a call to alternative political arrangements can be powerful in many societies that have languished under repressive and corrupt regimes. Why not Thailand? Why is Thailand different?

So I guess I am still asking, How?