Conventional wisdom has suggested for decades that the monarchy is the most important factor that stabilises Thai politics and its transition to democracy. We can find this view in so many publications from academic works to journalistic outputs.
The crisis since 2005 indicates the opposite.
The view that the monarchy is the political stabiliser is in fact only a particular historical perspective, say, of the royalist liberals based on their experiences through the transition from military rule (the 1960s) to the first decade of parliamentary democracy (mid-1980s to mid-1990s). Such a perspective forgets the entire period from the final twenty years of the absolute monarchy to the first twenty years after the 1932 Revolution. During the forty years before and after the 1932 Revolution, the monarchy was definitely not the stabiliser. In the political context of the time, the monarchy itself was the central issue of the battle between the status quo and change. It was one side of those years of political and civil war.
In fact, the explanation from the 1960s to the 1990s that the monarchy was the stabiliser is also dubious, especially if we take “the monarchy” not only as an individual king but a network of politically vested interests (a la McCargo’s) operated by various people and groups of royals and non-royals.
The current political crisis is no longer under the same conditions as during the period from the 1960s to the 1990s either. Popular, electoral politics has developed to the extent that people enjoy the benefits of the electoral system. Parliamentary democracy was being institutionalised. Meanwhile the monarchy (as a network of vested interests) is facing the most critical and uncertain transition that it has faced during the past 50 or 60 years.
It is obvious that the monarchy is at the heart of Thailand’s current political instability.
3 responses so far ↓
1 Portman // Apr 28, 2009 at 9:55 pm
“Such a perspective forgets the entire period from the final twenty years of the absolute monarchy to the first twenty years after the 1932 Revolution. During the forty years before and after the 1932 Revolution, the monarchy was definitely not the stabiliser. In the political context of the time, the monarchy itself was the central issue of the battle between the status quo and change. It was one side of those years of political and civil war.”
You cannot say whether the monarchy was a political stabiliser or not in the 20 years prior to the revolution because there was no other political force under absolute monarchy. For most of the 20 years following the revolution, this was equally irrelevant because the monarch was virtually out of the picture with first an absent monarch who then abdicated in favour of a young prince who lived abroad. On the other hand, Pridi Banomyong, as regent in the post revolution period, was as left wing as you got in Thai politics and was locked in a struggle with the right wing fascists who were against the monarchy, led by Phibulsongkran. The reference to the monarchy’s involvement in the political and civil wars in the period 1912 to 1952 is confusing. What political and civil wars took place in 1912-32? Apart from Prince Paribatra’s ill fated attempt at a counter revolution, which didn’t seem to have the blessing of the monarch, what political and civil wars took place in 1932-52 with involvement from the monarchy?
The author seems to concur grudgingly that the monarchy has been a stabilising influence from 1960s to the 1990s, no mean achievement, if true, given the turbulence in neighbouring countries in that period. He then suddenly interjects his final conclusion that the monarchy is obviously at the heart of Thailand’s current political instability without giving any reasons for this view.
NON SATIS. Please do again.
2 Pam M // Apr 29, 2009 at 1:59 am
After reading this I cannot feel that this site is more often than not a political site to dissemble and repeat ad nauseum apoint of view la Fox news in the USA, as opposed to a place to explore issues and possibilities.
This shallow polemic above discourages any real possiblility to engage, other then to get into an argument about unprovable historical allegations, lack of fact checking, and stretched logical conclusions.
In addition, being “at the heart of ” many issues in Thailand does not at all have to mean that the monarchy is inherently negative or evil. Neither is it logical to conclude causality – that is to say that being at the heart of things makes it the absolute cause of issues, i.e. stymies to democracy such as corrupt practices or politicians, double standards in the legal system, nasty divisions in society, extrajudical killings, violent thug-like intimidation, and other nasty realities of most developing or many middle income countries.
The light, unbalanced, and inflammatory interpretation of “history” above at best discourages meaningful analysis; at worst it preempts it by primarily eliciting equally unbalanced and jaded responses. (Which perhaps is its true purpose).
Nevertheless why not consider alternative theses as well.
Certainly, the monarchy has taken public positions contributing to, or appearing to legitimize, some tragic and disappointing events over the decades (which also must be analyzed in the context of their historical timeframe) and royal survival instincts (perhaps read networking here) have been strong. However “facts” and legends can also fit other scenarios.
For example, what if perhaps by survival instinct, or by desire (consider the youth spent abroad, western education, and parental influences of this present king), or by pragmatic choice the institution has not strayed too far from a roadmap (albeit long and winding) to “real” democracy (please save another debate on what participatory democracy is, and is not, for another thread).
If, in fact, a primary long term goal is to aim for democracy and accept the need (and defacto reality) to diminish, limit, or more clearly define the monarchy’s historical influence and role, then the palace must directly, or at least indirectly, support an evolving political system of decentralization of power and participatory decisionmaking (i.e. elections, establishing democracratic values with checks and balances, and local community decisionmaking on taxes and budget). Thai history in the late 1980s and the 1990’s might support this.
However, also inherent in this long term goal is to ensure that, although the royal institution may be “diminished” in its role, it is not to be merely replaced by another family (literally or figuratively) that would perpetuate (and perhaps greatly abuse) an expanded role – to be more specific any continuing concentration of unchecked power. (One might consider the progress of the 1990’s culminating in the 97 constitution juxtaposed with concerns since 2002, when the increasing extra legislative policymaking through PM decrees, purposefully less tranparent budget allocations, and extra legal activities for personal benefit revealed Thaksin’s serious ethical character flaws and massive ambitions).
Perhaps the fear was that leadership lacking ethics and character would regress the country into models of kleptocracy and extreme crony capitalism supported by blatant abuse of power and the rule of law, not too mention eliminating any attempts at institutional checks and balances or free press. Think power models emulating Marcos, Suharto, or Mahathir in the best case.
Perhaps this is why Thaksin continues to elicit such a visceral negative response in many. He was perceived to be rolling back the clock.
While others have tried to assert (check the Economist articles -comments section) that the palace is jealous of Thaksin’s popularity; the case may be rather that Thaksin (or anyone else aspiring to dominating, unaccountable power in Thailand) is arguably jealous of the potential absolute power of an old stye king. The ex PM has never been a proponet of democracy, much less its champion, but rather an extraordinarily disappointing run of the mill unethical Thai politician at best. At worst he is a regressive, potential “usurper of the throne” who would sidetrack Thailand off of any realistic and peaceful roadmap to democracy .
So destabiliser or stabiliser?
3 amberwaves // Apr 30, 2009 at 6:26 am
I’d say Pam M’s points are interesting and debatable (aside from the silly rant about this web site, which is contradicted ipso facto by the publication of Pam M’s comments).
But let’s bring the argument up to the present day. How much stability is afforded when a long-reigning monarch becomes weakened, in this case by age and attendant ill health? Looked at from a global perspective of the last century or so, or a Thai perspective going back several dynasties, wouldn’t one be hard-pressed to argue that the royal system operates well under such stresses? And the transition process hasn’t been tested here for more than half a century — when the world was quite a different place.
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