The International Crisis Group (ICG) has published a new report titled Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand. The Executive Summary is available here and the full report, as a PDF, is here.
The following information particularly caught my eye:
Insurgents draw on local culture to invoke traditional oaths to discipline their own ranks, though such practices alienate them from the religious purists attached to the global jihad. Ancient charms and spells are applied to protect fighters from harm, coexisting with YouTube videos and propaganda circulated on VCDs.
This isn’t exactly a news-flash but it is always good to be reminded that it is not just in Bangkok that supernatural beliefs influence political action.
Thanks to Michael for pointing out the ICG report. More substantial analysis from commentators is very welcome.
I felt nervous clicking the link as I live in Narathiwat, but I couldn’t help myself!
This is an argument that Duncan McCargo deals with in his book Tearing Apart the Land. (He’s referenced in the paper, which I was glad to see. That book has given me a lot to think about.) I haven’t read through the paper except to see if McCargo was referenced. However, I’m intrigued by the fact that they immediately call out large Islamic schools. I work at one, you see. It surprised me, as I always imagined little kampong pondoks recruiting idle hands. (Possibly, this is the influence of office gossip, which also places teen drug use at 80%.)
But then I thought about it. Other than a few of the Arabic teachers, I don’t really know any of the religion folks. They keep to themselves. (At the very least, they don’t interact with my clique.)
Makes me a little more introspective about exhorting my students to use silat against interlopers in the computer lab…
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Adherents to an occult belief usually fall easy preys to exploiters. Countless examples of these can be found among Thai citizens, alot of them Buddhists who are victims of some crooked monks. It seems to be a universal human phenomenon.
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Nonviolence International Southeast Asia also released a report last month:
“Rule by the Gun: Armed Civilians and Firearms Proliferation in Southern Thailand”
Authored by Diana Sarosi and Janjira Sombutpoonsiri
The report is available online:
http://www.nonviolenceinternational.net/seasia/
The report provides another dimension that can potentially contribute to the worsening of the situation in the deep South. It made me think of an American-style gun culture developing in the deep south…
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“I haven’t read through the paper except to see if McCargo was referenced.” >> You could try to do the same for Marc Askew, who has researched and written about issues relevant to the report. Yet, you would be disappointed…
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First, my guess is that Maria teaches at Attarkiah Islamia School in the town of Narathiwat. For secular education, that school is probably the best private Islamic school in the region. I don’t think it is at all considered a hot-bed of Patani Malay Muslim nationalist teachings, unlike a place like Thammawitthaya School in Yala town, which is the largest school in the region, I believe, but has also long been suspected by Thai authorities as breeding grounds for nationalist sentiment.
The ICG report doesn’t really seem to offer any groundbreaking information. It does contrast with Duncan McCargo’s arguments in at least one area: While McCargo found that insurgents were coming mostly out of the traditional pondok schools, the ICG report says that most are being drawn from the more modern private Islamic schools such as Thammawitthaya.
There is one very naïve statement in the report that I would like to criticize. While it may just be a very small part, it demonstrates a limited understanding of society in the 3 provinces. I am talking about one section that discusses the Thai government’s effort to distribute a Thai-language book that demonizes the movement. ICG writes “It is unclear how many Malay Muslims have read the publication since it was published only in Thai and not in local Jawi script” (page 17)
This struck me as a pretty baffling statement. Are readers of this report supposed to think that Malay Muslims would not read it because they can’t read Thai, or because they are proud of their unique Patani Malay Muslim identity and refuse to read it because it is symbolic of the Thai nation-state?
First off, the Malay-speaking Muslims in the 3 provinces are generally much, much more proficient in written Thai than Jawi (which keep in mind is the written form of standard Malay, not the local dialect). Any Muslim who has come out of the private Islamic school system has at least a basic understanding of Jawi, but official Thai is the language of instruction (at least it’s supposed to be, though at times teachers – especially religious teachers – use the local Malay). Jawi is also taught at other Islamic schools, but my understanding is that those people who are most fluent in it have graduated from the private Islamic schools. I’ve been told by a Patani Malay Muslim who is an expert on education that about 50 percent of the Malay-speaking population can read Jawi. The literacy rates are much higher for Thai, especially for anyone who is under the age of 60 or so.
Second, if ICG was somehow suggesting that people wouldn’t read this document because its Thai is symbolic of the Thai nation-state and the Malay Muslims are committed to resisting the state’s imposition, then ICG should both 1) spend more time reading the academic literature based on ethnographic research in the region; 2) spend significantly more time hanging out in different circles of the Malay-speaking Muslim population. If ICG would choose to do either, they would find large sections of the population that are not preoccupied with ethnic preservation, nor bent on resisting the mono-ethnic character of the Thai state.
But ICG didn’t seem to do this. The trend among researchers (whether academics, human rights activists, or reporters) since 2004 has been merely to focus on insurgents and “victims” of either state security forces or the insurgency.
Here may be a good place to address Srithanonchai’s brief comment on Marc Askew. It’s not exactly clear what Srithanonchai was specifically talking about when he said “you would be disappointed” [in reading Askew’s work on the south], but I would venture to guess that it probably stems from Askew’s comments like this one: “The insurgents (if they can be so named) are fighting an Islamic people’s war, notwithstanding the fact that most Malay Muslims in the south are not terribly interested in this cause, though they are all affected” (see http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2007/08/31/nothing-much-new/#more-1452).
We should consider Askew’s assertions. Maybe they are accurate; maybe they aren’t. But the guy has spent more time conducting research in the far south than any other foreigner, so he should be listened to.
Moreover, we should also keep in mind how Askew’s assertions are at odds with the moral schemas guiding researchers’ views on the south on two levels. First, I would say that the most people following the situation in the south are liberally-minded and generally sympathize for ethnic minorities. Because of the tendency to have sympathy for minorities, there may also be a general tendency for most of us to celebrate “resistance” to a centralizing state. We like to see the preservation of cultures; it’s seen as a good thing. And even though we may not enjoy violent revolution, it may hard for us to believe Askew’s comment that “most Malay Muslims in the south are not terribly interested in this cause” because we would like to see a group of people struggling to preserve its identity.
Second, in light of the US “war on terror,” there have been many alarmist portrayals of Islam and social movements made up Muslims. ICG, Duncan McCargo, and so many others have presented arguments that downplay the significance of Islam in the movement in southern Thailand. Specifically, they have said that because the movement in the south is not linked to Al-Queda, Wahhabism, or Salafism, that the Islamic factor should not be given marked priority.
I believe that many people who have done work on the south have a predisposition to downplay the international dimension to the situation. Askew has not done this at all, and in doing so has probably created some enemies.
But the moralism that guides people’s research on the south has really got to be suspended when one is trying to objectively understand 1) dispositions toward support for the armed movement, and toward the preservation of Patani Malay Muslim identity; and 2) the role of Islam in giving rise to armed resistance.
Askew has elsewhere commented that Malay Muslims’ marked concern for ethnic preservation is exaggerated in the literature. This argument is basically no different from the ethnographic work done by anthropologists Saroja Dorairajoo and Michiko Tsuneda.
Having spent more than two years in the region, I have come to believe this as well. I have had friendships with Malay-speaking Muslims who never bring up identity issues, who never talk about concern for autonomy, and who have no qualms with military forces at all. In fact I have met Malay Muslim men who aspire to be policemen or soldiers. Moreover, I don’t know how many times one of the first things I have been asked by a Malay Muslim is whether I like “som-tom,” or if like Thailand, or if I think Thailand is “na yu.”
But because there is this ethno-religious struggle (which is carried out violently by insurgents, and non-violently by intellectuals and academics) being carried out, there is a tendency to assume that “the” Malay Muslims have similar goals – specifically acquiring some form of autonomy and more legitimacy for identity issues.
I am not at all trying to suggest that these issues don’t matter and that they don’t need to be addressed immediately by the Thai government. They do. But the sad truth is that the Muslims who either oppose the violence and/or are indifferent to the identity preservation issues, well, they are basically irrelevant to debates on the south. Their opinions aren’t heard. These people will not be delivering talks on the need for increased autonomy and the Thai state’s long-standing insensitive policies. It is only intellectuals, academics, and politicians who give these messages at seminars and conferences. Meanwhile, human rights activists’ focus on victims of state violence leads them to neglect those who do not hold animosity toward the state.
The Islamic factor is of course far more controversial than dispositions toward identity issues. ICG downplays the role of Islam, as did McCargo in his book. Both said that Wahhabist or Salafist elements are not at work in the movement. This may very well be true, but if one is considering the movement shouldn’t one move beyond the narrow understanding of it being based on the violent insurgent groups alone. I mean, what about the middle class academics and intellectuals who preach peace and non-violence but deliver portrayals “of” the Malay Muslims abiding wish for some form of autonomy and ethnic preservation? I’d have to go back and read his book more thoroughly, but I do believe that McCargo noted that the Prince of Songkla University’s College of Islamic Studies and the Yala Islamic University are influenced by Salafism. And though McCargo did not link people from these institutions to the insurgency at all, academics from these institutions do speak out on the need for the Thai government to address the political and cultural issues – on behalf “of” the Malay Muslims, of course. So, if we develop a broader understanding of this movement, shouldn’t these people be included?
But let’s just say that ICG is spot on in its assertion that the movement shows little influence of Salafism or and does not follow the ideology of Al Queda. Still, I have met several Malay Muslims who have talked about how impressed they are with Osama Bin-Laden. I am not talking about intellectuals or academics; I am talking about somewhat religiously conservative Muslims who seem to be Patani Malay Muslim nationalists, though not a part of the violence. Shouldn’t this kind of information be emphasized in ICG’s report? Moreover, why have I met many young Malay Men who can’t stand the US for its policies in the Middle East and its support for Israel? Why have I met so many Muslims who talk about the importance of the ummah and how Muslims in the world are all brothers?
My belief is that ICG downplays this kind of information because it interferes with liberally-minded individuals’ wish for the situation to be purely a domestic issue. I also think that ICG runs roughshod on the nuances within the Malay-speaking population because if they took greater notice of this it would interfere with their apparent commitment to promote political change and to reduce or get rid of security forces. But if you sit there and write that some folks just aren’t so concerned about these issues, or even that some Muslims support the use of troops, then you are providing information that weakens your argument that political decentralization or autonomy needs to be granted, and that the Thai government must become much more sensitive to Malay Muslim identity. Even though I totally agree that the Thai state does have to become far more sensitive and must make some significant political changes, I do not believe that you can or should ignore data that does not support your argument, and this report seems to do just that.
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Here’s my disclaimer: I’m a complete dilettante here in Thailand. My training is actually in South Asian studies. Mr. Johnson correctly guessed my place of work. Basically, I’m here for the self-serving reason of postponing grad school. My ‘real’ interest is in Tamil Islamic devotional literature (Whew!) My perception of things here in the south of Thailand is colored by my experiences in India. India, obviously, is a very different place, but it’s still the unconscious standard when I’m thinking about ethnic/linguistic or Muslim minorities.
In other words, I’m totally ready to defer to people with a better systematic understanding, more complete grasp of the literature and longer-standing interest.
And yes, a lot of the assumptions that I had about politics coming to the south have been thoroughly shaken; now that I’m getting a new perspective on all the above stuff, I’m becoming more excited about going back to school. I love having my assumptions shaken. Please keep shaking.
Yes, the sense that I got from most of what I had seen/read before actually coming here was that Malay Muslims were resisting assimilation into the Thai state (for whatever reasons). Imagine my bemusement when, as I was walking down Narathat Beach, a kid shouted at me in English, “I love Thailand!”
I now realize that I had still been working from my Tamil schema. Maybe that’s why McCargo’s work was appealing to me — the focus on ethnic and linguistic rather than religious issues resonates more with my paradigm.
Next time I’m in Bangkok, I’m definitely going to pick up some of Askew’s books. (I remember seeing them, picking them up, then imagining my total bill at the checkout counter before putting them back!) I did read part of the slim volume on disorderly borders at the library, though mostly for historical stats. Oh, to have more than 24 hours in a day…
This is going a bit off topic, but since we’re talking about McCargo, Askew, the ICG and various other researchers, is there a good, balanced reading list on the south available? (By balanced I mean showing a whole range of thought, sources and opinions.) Not only on the conflict dimensions, either. (I have Thai South and Malay North on my bookshelf right now, just waiting to be read.)
One last thought — I think the scare quotes around “the” Malay people are important. It’s such a duh question, but which Malay people are we talking about? It’s not like everybody has the same interests, beliefs or stakes in the game. Even one individual can have conflicting ideas and priorities. (I certainly do!)
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Jason:
Thanks very much for your detailed and interesting comment. You are correct re the meaning of my comment. It was indeed about rather different perceptions/interpretations amongst academics on what the “Southern Fire” actually is about.
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I think I actually misunderstood Srithanochai’s first comment. I think he was suggesting that Maria and others would be disappointed to not find Askew’s material cited in the ICG report. I mistakenly thought he was saying that people would be disappointed in Askew’s work, so I assumed that you were probably referring to his controversial view (that is posted in New Mandala) that no other area studies specialist has offered on the south. Here it is again: “The insurgents (if they can be so named) are fighting an Islamic people’s war, notwithstanding the fact that most Malay Muslims in the south are not terribly interested in this cause, though they are all affected” (see http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala/2007/08/31/nothing-much-new/#more-1452).
The point I was getting at was that Askew’s comment might be heavily criticized because of the moralism guiding area studies specialists and human rights activists take on the south. More specifically, I think it’s likely that — in general — area studies specialists and human rights activists are highly critical of Askew’s take because of the overwhelming consensus in these intellectual circles that ethnicity trumps religion as a causal factor, and that the Muslims in the south are determined to see their identity given more legitimacy. In the current politics of representation of the movement in southern Thailand, suggesting Islam as a causal factor in these intellectual circles is generally considered academically, politically, and morally incorrect – ultimately considered a conservative vilification of an ethnic minority group that has been marginalized by the Thai state and its apparatus.
But I think that when area studies specialists and human rights activists (and some others) tend to downplay Islam by saying 1) that Islam is “merely” a “mobilization tool”; and 2) that specific strands of Islam and/or links to Al Queda or JI do not exist, they are falling prey to the classical error in social science research of argumentum ad populum, in which a thesis is asserted, even acclaimed, because it resonates with the moral schemas and expectations of its audience.
I think these kinds of arguments can in part be understood as a kind of reactionary analysis to the alarmist literature (produced by the likes of Rohan and Abuza) and the US “war on terror.” In other words, many who work on the south feel not only obligated to address the public and policy debates on Islam, but to do so in a way that reduces cause for alarm. (The highly-respected John Sidel has gone to great lengths to minimize alarmist concerns in a few articles on the Islamic threat in SEA and in his book on violence in Indonesia.)
Ironically, even at a time when area studies specialists and human rights activists are committed to emphasizing the local factors at the expense of international ones, historians do not take any heat for producing work that emphasizes the significance of SEA Muslims associational activities in the Middle East and how these ties shaped nationalist movements in SEA. In fact, Michael Laffan’s book (http://www.amazon.com/Islamic-Nationhood-Colonial-Indonesia-Below/dp/0415297575/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1246242818&sr=8-1) has received a lot of well-deserved praise. But you don’t see any area studies academics talking about these contemporary activities abroad, do you?
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Jason:
“I think he was suggesting that Maria and others would be disappointed to not find Askew’s material cited in the ICG report.” > Yes, this was what I meant.
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