You would say that up until recently, people had more family experience of the Khmer Rouge than what they were taught in schools. Given theat the Khmer Rouge stopped being a major political issue in 1998, it was dangerous to talk too openly about the role of communist Khmer in Cambodian society. There is also a reticence to actually be open about the period – retribution(for whatever reason) is still a common enough occurance in Cambodian society to make people wary of rocking the boat too much. My moto dop driver for 2 years was a former Royalist soldier on the Thai border, a fact that he wanted kept quiet (even from othermoto drivers). History is a living, breathing and potentially deadly art to become involved with even in modern Cambodia. maybe not as deadly as the roads, but dangerous enough.

The best example of educating young generations of the horrors of the Khmer Rouge was a book authored by Khamboly Dy of DC-Cam in 2007 (”A history of Democratic Kampuchea”) that was slowly being introduced to schools and the wider community. This book is a great, albeit cleansed, version of history that avoids big questions like: why did the Khmer Rouge have so much support among Khmer farmers?; why did Pol Pot act with such savagry against internal dissent?; why did Vietnam intervene in 1979 – was it because of Pol Pots genocide, or because of border intrusions? It has government support, but I don’t know how well the book has done in terms of reaching the desired audience.The book was rumoured to have been diluted so that former Khmer Rouge elements in the CPP government would not be embarrassed. Now, you may think the questions I raise above are peripheral, but the ongoing fact remains that even university students know less about Cambodian history than a tourist who reads one of the photocopied books about Cambodia on the shores of the Tonle Sap in Phnom Penh.

The recent resignation of Robert Petit, the chief UN prosecutor in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, also points to problems in relaying history to people. Under the agreement that set up the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, outreach programs were deavalued. Everyone I have had contact with around the tribunal says that is possibly the worst element of the tribunal, even worse than the corruption in the court. The tribunal was supposed to be an event that would help unearth buried truths and air them for everybody. That hasn’t happened, and thats a great shame becuase a large discussion about the past role of the Khmer Rouge and other revolutionaries within Cambodian history would have been a useful way of releasing tension within the khmer polity and other minorities (like the Cham and ethnic Vietnamese).

Is greater economic status for Southeast Asian individuals, or a much expanded middle class, likely to provoke a change in political value? If this is the case, to what extent does China influence economic development in Southeast Asia?

I’m not saying China’s actions are benign (as is often the case when anyone presents a case for even distantly defending the CCP), or that Hanoi for instance, should have a giant starbucks next to a pumping stock exchange, with a low suicide rate amongst accountants being seen as a positive and noted in tabloids.. but siege politics does seem to inhibit patience…

On the other hand, is China’s two parties one country policy a good thing for a country like Thailand with the PAD preaching.. similar policies? ‘Good’ if we’re going to be all rigid about our own views…???

What influence do northerly Southeast Asian nations have over Southern China? Is it really all one way traffic?

Obviously since the signing of the TAC there have been huge incidents … but what I am getting at, with my short memory, is that sine 1995 when Myanmar and Cambodia signed up, the incidents, from what I can remember have been relatively few and therefore a seismic scale of Southeast Asian chaos could only be measured in small increments.

Surely Myanmar’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon would violate the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) which Myanmar is apparently a signatory – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southeast_Asian_Nuclear-Weapon-Free_Zone_Treaty.. So clearly the Junta must be pursuing Nuclear -energy- for the elite in Yangon? Hm. How would the rest of the members of ASEAN react to Myanmar having ‘the bomb’.. and breaking the aforementioned treaty?

What sort of labour from Myanmar does Thailand use, and .. how exploitative is it? Is it rural labour like in Isan?

Is China a greater positive influence in the region than we tend to acknowledge?

Yes, what is positive tends to reflect a value judgment and to answer this, there must be acknowledgement values can change in individuals. For me, I think liberalism is encouraged with economic advancement and thus, irrespective of whatever supposedly rigid political systems are in place, China’s industrialisation promotes liberalism in Southeast Asia through stronger economic relationships. Political systems evolve with peoples values. That current elites in Southeast Asia control the fruit of these economic relationships is something for citizens in ASEAN countries to consider… Much the same as it is for citizens in China to consider regarding the CCP.

How many people are employed by Burma’s censorship apparatus?

Those who feel attached to the state of Myanmar and the present SPDC paradigm might be considered ‘employed’ to censorship. So how many feel attached to that paradigm?

Is mainland Southeast Asia, as a whole, more peaceful in 2009 than it has been at almost any other time in history?

I think the incriments for measuring peace and stability in Southeast Asia since the TAC must be really fine to say that 2009 is the most peaceful time. Perhaps not, regarding Preah Vihear (Or Wat Wiharn?) and Rohingya hot potato. You sort of answer this with your #26 question too.

Does Thailand intentionally keep Burma unstable so that it can benefit from cheap labour?

I saw plenty of cheap labour between Si Saket and Kantharalak yesterday. How much cheap labour does Thailand need?!

What ambitions do the Burmese generals harbour for acquiring nuclear weapons?

Regime guarantee. Can hardly say that India or China are guarantors of the Junta.

Why did so few people in Thailand condemn the 2003 “War on Drugs” at the time?

Because it’s easier to defend liberalism when your name is not likely to be sullied.

32.A number of years ago I asked a Thai journalist if the names of the generals involved in the drug trade were known. The reply was “Yes,but they would never be published.”
One has to ask what has the Australian Federal Police been doing in Thailand over the past 20 years .I think the AFP have been working with the Royal Thai Police in combating drug trafficking [?] for about 20 years but the AFP have not outed one Thai general for being involved in the trade ,as far as I know.

36.Good question.

38.Another good question.A number of years ago I was surprised to learn that some PNG police were being trained in Israel.

41.Much worse, according to one Thai woman I know.

44.Probably one of the most important questions.Singapore needs be put well and truly in the spotlight .Or is that the hot seat?

46.Or,what is the role of the [expat] academic working…..?

Nothing on “Asian[Emperor Lee 's]values”?Just joking.

I appreciate all of these thoughtful comments and accept the limitations of my list. Clearly it doesn’t have the historical depth, geographic scope or epistemological range that other lists may strive for.

New Mandala is, as I indicated above, very happy to publish further lists of Southeast Asia-related questions. I am particularly intrigued by the possibilities of a comparative, long-duree list of important questions still unanswered. Obviously I don’t feel qualified to put together such a list myself but I am very open to offers from anyone who does.

Best wishes to all,

Nich

I’m sure they matter too.