At the end of April, Burmese army officials met with leaders of ethnic ceasefire groups, including the KIO, and explained the junta’s blueprint for transforming the armed forces of ethnic ceasefire groups into border guard forces ahead of the 2010 elections.
…
Under the plan, one border guard battalion would have 326 troops including 18 officers. There would be three commanders with the rank of major. Each battalion would have two majors drawn from ceasefire groups and one major drawn from the Tatmadaw in charge of administration.

At least according to this account, the KIO/KIA rejection of the BGF proposal appears to be based more on concerns over a loss of independence and “having Burmese military commanders in its ethnic armed forces,” than concerns over “the very limited armed strength they would be able to retain.”

Of course, it’s most likely that there’s a lot more going on than The Irrawaddy reports.

Also, I realise that the link to the BGF chart (Burmese language) from my last post is broken. A working link to the chart is here.

I just wanted to mention a few key points that I think are missing from recent analysis:

1. I would argue that you left out an integral contributing factor to instability in Myanmar, and that is economics. Many people forget that the September 2007 unrest and civil disobedience began as a response and protest against dramatic hikes in the increase of fuel prices. I would argue that there is a great potential for civilian unrest in the leadup to the election given the huge impact of the global financial crisis on Myanmar. Any future civil disobedience that comes from civilians is likely to be based on economics and the unfair and extremely mismanaged financial policies that the government currently enacts.

2. In regards to your comment on that “The world continues to wait for a schism within the ruling clique to precipitate its end.” I think what the world is ignoring is that there is potential for this schism to develop during the 2010 elections.

The 2010 elections will by no means be free and fair. However, they will mark the biggest change in politics in Myanmar in the past 20 years. The elections are being held as a way for the military to shake up the rank and command of the leading clique of generals. Some analysts say that Than Shwe will step down to take a more behind the scenes approach, and that the battle for control will then be between Maung Aye, Thein Sein, and Thura Shwe Mann, who each represent factions within the military structure. Additionally, it looks like businessmen both of the middle class and of the elite class, will play a greater role in the upcoming election.

It is impossible to guess what the outcome will be, and the current crew could be replaced by more hardliners rather than pragmatists. However, this will still be the biggest change in Myanmar’s upper echelons we will have seen this decade, and there are a lot of folks who argue that anyone is better than Snr-Gen. Than Shwe.

http://www.tni.org/detail_pub.phtml?&know_id=308

I appreciate your well-made points.

On the question of tatmadaw strength, I was looking for the best number based on my current understanding of recruiting and retention. I have seen estimates, over the years, that range across your spectrum. My sense is that since some of Selth’s careful analysis of the numbers they have increased somewhat. Perhaps not to the level suggested by Maung Aung Myoe, but perhaps not far from it. “Almost 500,000″ is my best estimate right now but I am very happy to be corrected by readers with better information. I also sense that there are seasonal and regional variations that matter, and, of course, issues of precisely who gets counted. It strikes me that this merits more thorough (on-going) research.

The KIA’s resistance to the Border Guard Force proposal is based on the very limited armed strength they would be able to retain. Thus we have this recent talk about trying to negotiate for a “State Force” of some sort that keeps the “KIA” numbers high. The DKBA is, as far as I understand it, being given special dispensation and is even heavily recruiting to fill all of those extra battalions. As far as I know, the KIA (and everyone else…UWSA, NDA-K, etc) is in a very different position.

As for the loyalty among the tatmadaw lower ranks I appreciate that KHRG has done tremendous work interviewing deserters. But my sense is that command solidarity is much stronger than it appears at the border. I don’t have any evidence that indicates otherwise. When was the last large-scale mutiny? Every army has internal problems — it is a question, as I see it, of how such potential strife is managed. The SPDC brass, and even the more junior officers, appear to have managed to stop the sort of fragmentation that one would expect. Loyalty and solidarity are, somehow, retained. Is there evidence to the contrary?

Of course, on these, and other, points I am very happy to learn more. Thanks, Stephen, for your very insightful comments.

Best wishes to all,

Nich

But a few items, Nich:

You wrote that “Only a few armies have yet to sign ceasefires”. But as I understand it, almost all of the ceasefire agreements were verbal and only the KIA actually signed anything in the literal sense; At least according to Zaw Oo and Win Min in their helpful monograph Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords.

Also, you gave an estimate of the Tatmadaw’s “armed strength of almost 500,000”, but it’s not clear where this figure comes from. I know that Maung Aung Myoe has given a figure of over 600,000, but people like Mary Callahan and Andrew Selth have generally given figures of 350,000 to 400,000.

Regarding the transition of ceasefire groups into a Border Guard Force you wrote that (at least for the KIA) “this would mean a transition from an armed strength of around 5,000 to only a few hundred.” However, as I understand it, the figure of 326 personnel is per battalion (see a breakdown here), not for the entire armed group. At least this appears the case with the DKBA which is reportedly set to expand its size from a current estimate of 3,000 to a total of 9,000 as a Boarder Guard Force.

Finally, you wrote that “Command loyalty and solidarity remains a hallmark of the Burmese military system.” While this may very well be the case amongst mid and high ranking officers, this seems less likely between rank-and-file soldiers and low-level officers on the one hand and the higher level officers one the other (see, for example, Mary Callahan “ kyay-zu and kyet-su: the military in 2006” and the many KHRG interviews with SPDC deserters).