New Mandala

22 responses so far ↓

• 1 MongerSEA // Oct 14, 2009 at 4:58 pm

  It was not uncommon in Western societies of the past for one powerful individual to hold all the keys to patronage even if he was not the titular head of state. It’s not necessary for one super-empowered individual to do all the decision making — it’s enough that his will be known and for others to conciliate him because acting contrary to his interests is simply too dangerous.

• 2 semuren // Oct 14, 2009 at 5:44 pm

  Excellent point. I just finished reading over the article and did not even catch that line. In one sense I think that is because everyone knows it is hyperbole and no one really believes it to be a literal fact. But on the other had the discussion of Than Shwe, from a very personal point of view, seeks like natural corollary to the focus on Suu Kyi. Personalization, an overly stark contrast between “good” and “evil” and the idea that there is a know and workable solution seem like norms of journalistic discourse, at least in the English speaking West. The problem is that when readers know less about the details of the situation, are more distant from it and have fewer non-media avenues to learn about it, it is harder for them look critical at media output. So in the case of Burma we get simplistic narratives of Than Shwe vs Suu Kyi or if only Burma’s “ally,” China, would stop its rapacious exploitation then the SPDC would somehow be forced out and Burma would ride off happily ever after into the sunset.

• 3 R. N. England // Oct 14, 2009 at 5:55 pm

  Could MongerSEA please provide examples of powerful, dangerous individuals that informally held all the keys to patronage in Western societies?

• 4 Dom Nardi // Oct 15, 2009 at 12:03 am

  It might be a bit of an exaggeration, but is pretty close to the truth from what I know. Unlike Thailand or Bangladesh, which have democratic structures in name (if not actuality), Burma’s junta follows a fairly strict military hierarchy with no competing power centers. Especially in this transition period, Than Shwe remains central because he decides who succeeds him. His top subordinates have been jockeying for his favor for years. Yes, Than Shwe does have to manage other powerful generals in the junta, and he’s not really the only important figure in government. However, one of strengths was exactly that – somebody who provided the junta with the leadership and ability to balance competing factions. In fact, he rose to power in the early 1990s because he was able to gain the trust of both the Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt factions within the military. Now, those two generals have been sidelined and the younger generals all owe their success to Than Shwe.

  So, did Andrew Marshall exaggerate a bit? Maybe. But he knows what he’s talking about.

• 5 Charles F. // Oct 15, 2009 at 5:31 am

  If Than Shwe were to suddenly exit the stage it would result in the other generals immediately trying to grab the reins of power. The various cliques would form new alliances to further their own ambitions.
  It would probably get violent, too, with those more willing to commit violence and treachery rising to the top.

• 6 Jotman // Oct 15, 2009 at 5:56 pm

  Dom Nardi’s observation brings to mind David Steinberg’s recent reference to Burma as having “one man rule.” Steinberg spoke about Burma in such terms during his testimony to the recent US Senate hearing on Burma. I quote him here:

  http://jotman.blogspot.com/2009/10/burma-is-not-vietnam.html

  This post might also be of interest:

  http://jotman.blogspot.com/2009/10/how-should-us-engage-burma.html

• 7 Hla Oo // Oct 16, 2009 at 2:48 pm

  Than Shwe definitely rules Burma with an iron fist like his mentor Ne Win had done for over 20 years. Here is the simple but extremely tight mechanism he inherited from Ne Win and uses with success.

  Basically the whole Burma is divided into many regional military divisions, Taings in Burmese, and each division with about twenty infantry battalions is controlled by a divisional commander, Taing-Mhu in Burmese, a major general now but a colonel during Ne Win’s era.

  These divisional commanders are the regional warlords with absolute power and they are carefully hand-picked from the army by the dictator of the time. The parallel civilian administrative structure including the courts, police, and civilian militia is just a tool for the respective warlord for that divisional region.

  During Ne Win’s rule, all divisional commanders met regularly, sometimes every month or even week during crisis-periods, in Rangoon to report to Ne Win and also to take direct orders from him.

  As divide and rule strategy, Ne Win also created mobile infantry divisions called LIDs and its commanders as counter-warlords in every region to check against the respective regional commanders.

  He often used these Light Infantry Divisions to dispose the recalcitrant regional commanders. Depending on the circumstances the ex-warlords fallen from his grace are either shifted to a civilian post or pensioned off. Some even ended in jail or dead.

  Now the Burmese army is bigger and so Than Shwe has created additional layer between him and the regional divisional commanders. Lieutenant-generals, called Taing-gyoke in Burmese, now directly controls three or four adjacent military divisions and the divisional commanders report and take orders from them instead of Than Shwe.

  For example one such lieutenant-general called Min Aung Hlaing now controls Shan-State-North, Shan-State-South, and Trangle-Region military divisions as a Taing-Gyoke. He was formerly a warlord of the Triangle Region, now the warlord of the whole Shan State.

  So unlike Ne Win, Than Shwe now deals with only four senior warlords instead of 20 odd warlords and as many counter-warlords. Maybe it makes his life much easier so that he can enjoy the English Soccer live on late-night satellite TV with his grandson.

• 8 semuren // Oct 16, 2009 at 5:21 pm

  Hla Oo’s valuable comments seem to prove the point of the original post. What Hla Oo describes above is a system of checks an balances. I associated that phrase with civics lessons on the separation of powers in the US government but the function here is a similar one. I suppose the difference is in the goal. In the US system of check and balances the idea, in theory, is to limit the concentration of power in any one institution (person). In Burma the idea is to limit the concentration of power in any one place at the lower levels so as to give Than Shwe ultimate say. But the fact that he has to work through checking an balancing potentially ambitious and unruly underlings – and semi to fully autonomous militia groups too – puts paid to the idea that one man controls everything. My experience in Burma, and that of many Chinese business people I have contact with there, indicates that one of the biggest problems (opportunities) unstable nature local governing actors power. On the one hand a plethora of poorly or not systematized laws and regulations, as well as multiplicity of semi-autonomous actors means that it is not clear who is in charge of what. But, when a situation becomes sensitive there is a often paralyzing tendency to send question far up the hierarchy. This is kind of a contradiction and means that there is both deference to highly centralized authority in some cases, and a more routine recourse by local authorities to taking advantage of administrative confusion to act to for their own advantage. Whatever Burma’s administrative hierarchy might be I think it is quite clear that is not the “well oiled machine” that one might suppose froma too literal reading of Andrew Marshall’s article.

• 9 Susie Wong // Oct 19, 2009 at 2:27 am

  I wonder if there is difference between Myanmar and Thailand or Than Shwe and Phumipon?

  1.The whole Thailand is also divided into regional military divisions: Bangkok, Central region, Northern region, and Southern region. All four divisions is controlled by Army Chief Anupong Paochinda. Prem is currently working hard to create a new military division for Northeast to suppress the Red shirted. In Thailand those who control the Bangkok Division and Central Region division, control the country because they have the capacity to stage a coup any time.

  2. These divisional commanders also are the regional warlords with absolute power and they are carefully hand-picked from the army by Phumipon. The parallel civilian administrative structure including the courts, police, and civilian bureaucracy is just a tool for the respective warlord for that divisional region. As we have witness the complaints about the different treatment between the Red shirted and the Yellow shirted.

  3. Similarly, all divisional commanders met regularly, every month or even week during crisis-periods, in Bangkok to report to Prem Tinsulanond and Surayudh Chulanond and also to take direct orders from them. Phumipon directly handed pick both of them as Chief of the Privy Council. Prem was former Army Chief and former Prime Minister so did Surayudh.

  4. Likewise, as divide and rule strategy, Phumipon also created mobile infantry divisions called Police Border Patrol (originally headed by his mother) and its commanders as counter-warlords in every region to check against the respective regional commanders.
  In the same manner, Phumipon makes sure that no any military men can rise to any serious de facto power. Depending on the circumstances the Generals fallen from his grace are either shifted to a civilian post or pensioned off. The latest was Police General Patcharawat Wongsuwan who was fired last week by Aphisit Vejjajiwa because Aphisit sided with the Yellow-shirted mob (or the royal mob). Throughout his reign, Phumipon made sure that no two related family members hold key military position. He destroyed GeneralThanom-Prapat, General Suchinda and his brother-in-law, and now former Police Chief Pacharawat and his brother (currently Minister of Defense).

  5. Similarly, Phumipon only deals with four Division Commanders via the Privy Council Chief Prem and Surayudh. There is no checks and balances against Phumipon’s unlimited power.

  I think it is a sacred duty of scholars to transcend biases because selection bias cannot provide light in the darkness tunnel. Furthermore, we have to ask why analysts only focus on Than Shwe but not Phumipon ? Why Thailand Crown Prince Vajilalongkorn flew to Germany? Is there any difference foreign policy between Than Shwe and Phumipon that has led to the selection bias?

• 10 bamar // Oct 19, 2009 at 12:24 pm

  The TIME magazine seems to have changed its tone over Than Shwe, I wonder if this is because the Obama administration is changing its stance towards engaging with the regime.

  Than Shwe like his mentor before him, have their first priorities as self-preservation, nothing else matters, they have never left any stones unturned in their single pursuit of prolonging their hold onto power.

  Than Shwe, is cruel, tyrannical, ruthless, unpredictable, more cunning than his master before him, whom he had meticulously deposed from all power and influence. He had stopped at nothing, young innocent students, monks, perhaps even his own family if they threaten him from losing power. It is interesting to watch how both dictators Ne Win and Than Shwe think and work where it comes to people who had the potential of harming them — their Intelligence Chiefs. Although there are similarities between how Ne Win disposed of his Military Intelligence (MI) Chief, Tin Oo and how Than Shwe disposed of his MI Chief Khin Nyunt, Than Shwe is at pains to ensure the same fate he meted out for Ne Win does not befall him.

  In answer to N Farrelly,s : “…..if Than Shwe was removed from the equation what would change?”, it would depend on who will be taking over the reins, Than Shwe is most likely to make sure whoever takes over will not have the power to render him powerless. The answer is as enigmatic and opaque as the reclusive dictator.

• 11 Taro Mongkoltip // Oct 19, 2009 at 4:03 pm

  Susie, are you nuts? You have any proof for what you just said here?

  First of all, this topic is about Myanma. Nothing to do with Thailand at all. You must be a real crazy, you woman, all in your head just thinking and plotting to destroy Thailand’s monarchy. In every word every sentence came out of your mouth in this forum is the proof of it.

  Secondly, calling the king just by his name like that, it’s not gonna help you finding any alliance here.

  The King himself did so many damn things during his life. give him some respect. What have you done to the country? what a tool.

• 12 Hla Oo // Oct 19, 2009 at 4:06 pm

  Susie,

  It seems the only difference between Burma and Thailand is the freedom of commerce and trade in Thai system. Apart from that both countries appear to be under the perpetual martial law together for a very very long time now.

  Burma under a shameless and guiltless military dictatorship, Thailand under the revolving rows of generals behind a benevolent lifetime-dictator in the disguise of a constitutional monarch.

  Since two cultures are very similar and their religion same, they should form the United States of Thailand and Burma, USTB in short, very dangerous and seriously cancerous, ha ha.

• 13 Jotman // Oct 19, 2009 at 7:28 pm

  Something for people attacking Suzie Wong to think about:

  Thailand is arguably the most closely connected, most important, most similar ASEAN country to Burma. If someone attempts to draw an analogies between the military of Thailand with that of Burma, it seems to me that this could be quite relevant to the topic at hand. After all, from 2006-2007 Thailand was itself ruled by a military-backed government. In fact, the Thai coup leader expressed strong support for Burma’s generals in the wake of the 2007 crackdown against the monks.

  http://jotman.blogspot.com/2007/09/thailands-leader-speaks-out-in-support.html

  Anyone, such as Suzie, who chooses to explore such comparisons is bound to touch on questions that are considered “out of bounds” for most Thai academics and Thai journalists and Thai bloggers.

  In Thailand today there are security professionals whose job is to figure ways to silence and discredit people like Suzie. They get paid for it. They have the means at their disposal to close down websites, threaten charges, imprison people for years. What I’m trying to say is that Thailand’s competent law-enforcement professionals do not really need your help.

  However, I suspect — like their counterparts in Naypyidaw and Beijing — they welcome it.

• 14 Taro Mongkoltip // Oct 20, 2009 at 12:02 am

  Jotman // Oct 19, 2009 at 7:28 pm
  In Thailand today there are security professionals whose job is to figure ways to silence and discredit people like Suzie.

  Any proof?

  And seriously discredit people like Susie wong? What credit does she have to be discredited?

• 15 Hla Oo // Oct 20, 2009 at 2:14 am

  Bamar,

  Than Shwe will eventually end up like Ne Win no matter what. His corpse will be burned like a mongrel dog like Ne Win and ashes thrown away like Ne Win. History never treats dictators with kindness.

  Khin Nyunt knew very well the fact that every spy chief or intelligence chief working for a dictator will eventually face the gun barrels turning against him.

  His predecessors, Chit Khin and Tin Oo were easily removed once Ne Win’s position was threatened. They didn’t have the backing of a substantial force like army chief Kyaw Htin had then and now Maung Aye has.

  So Khin Nyunt even tried to establish his own armed divisions disguised as Border Patrol Forces directly under the Directorate of Military Intelligence, but Than Shwe foresaw his moves and cut him down with the help of Maung Aye’s troops well before Khin Nyunt had his forces well established.

• 16 Jotman // Oct 20, 2009 at 12:36 pm

  Taro,

  As for proof, I would encourage you to review the evidence for yourself. Several of the recent and well publicized cases:

  Most recently, a report published in September 2009 suggested that the Thai military will monitor the internet and community radio stations for acts of lèse majesté.

  It’s what has happened to individual people that is most disturbing: Harry Nicolaides (someone managed to track down a paragraph he had written in an obscure book and go to the trouble to prosecute him for it) , Giles Ji Ungpakorn (charged with a crime for his scholarly work), Jonathan Head (journalist). A number of people have recently been tracked down, harassed/charged/arrested for Internet-related activity: Chiranuch Premchaiporn, Theepakorn Wutthiphitthayamongkol, or Thossaporn Ruethaiprasertsung. Chiranuch was arrested when the offices of Prachatai were raided by the Crime Suppression police on 6 March 2009. Theepakorn Wutthiphitthayamongkol was questioned twice by Crime Suppression Division police in April 2009 for a comment posted on a website. Thossaporn was arrested for printing leaflets in a photocopying shop in April.

  I think the evidence pointing to a serious and concerted state initiative is quite compelling.

• 17 aiontay // Oct 20, 2009 at 1:00 pm

  I think Hla Oo and Semuren hit on a very important point, namely that the military regime has as one of its goals to fragment the country as a means of control. This is very clear in the minority areas very a variety of militias and paramilitaries have been support by the regime. This may seem an odd strategy for a regime that brooks no opposition, but given the constraints on the military, it is proabably the best strategy. Rather than attempt an all out Orwellian state, the regime simply makes sure it is the biggest and most cohesive faction in the country. Than Shwe controls everything in the country, not through some rigid system. but a patronage system whereby everyone, even the regime’s opponents, must cut with the military or be crushed.

• 18 semuren // Oct 20, 2009 at 5:23 pm

  The discussion since my last comment raises, for me at least, a couple of important points. The first is in response to Suzie Wong’ s provocative comparison of Thailand and Burma. Certainly Ms. Wong has a point, namely, that Burma and Thailand, when viewed from a sufficiently high level of abstraction are both not models of liberal pluralism. True enough there are authoritarian aspects of the Thai system, but I think the difference between the to countries are more important than their similarities. I am not a Thai specialist so my comments on Thailand are more impressionistic than they are based on extensive research. Given that I think it best that I shift the specifics of my point from a Burma-Thailand comparison to China-Burma comparison. (This is the area I work on.) No doubt that will not be to the liking of people who want to use the example of Burma to comment on — neighboring, cultural similar, historically mutually deeply involved — Thailand. But, nonetheless, I think it serves to make the point.

  China is obviously an authoritarian regime and in that it is similar to Burma. They both imprison political opponents, have government controlled press, and brook no serious public criticism of the system. But in China the legitimacy of the government is based on nationalism validated by and grounded in economic growth and the growing prestige of the nation on the international stage. (Not being a Thai specialist I can’t really say too much about what this is in Thailand but it is certainly wrapped up with the monarchy and the present king. That explains much including Ms. Wong’s use of the king’s name and the reaction others have too it.) What is the equivalent narrative in Burma? Maybe something about the Tatmadaw saving the union from disintegration at the hands of internal (often but not solely ethnic minority) and neo-colonial enemies. In China the rhetoric of the CCP as saving the nation; bringing it back from national humiliation to (cultural-historical deserved) greatness has purchase; people believe it. Does anyone in Burma believe the Tatmadaw saved the nation from disintegration or neo-colonial domination? Does Than Shwe even believe this? I can’t say for sure but it seems to me that most people in Burma think of the Tatmadaw as a sort of colonial government that is exploiting, not saving, the nation. In my experience this included people in or connected to the Tatmadaw. Many seem to be cooperating with the military because they want to get ahead in life, provide for their family, have food, etc. So the key difference between China and Burma is that, broadly speaking, the party-state has legitimacy and the Tatmadaw dictatorship does not. Economic development and opportunity factor into this but I would suggest that that is a contingent and not a necessary relationship. In other words, the dominant narrative of government legitimacy in China is based, in part, on economic development, but, in theory, it could be otherwise, and the key point is the how accepted (or not) the narrative is.

  So In Thailand I would re-frame Ms. Wong’s argument being that oligarchy that rules Thailand is not benevolent in the way it portrays itself as being. The thing is there seem to be real constituencies that see it as benevolent or at least potentially more benevolent than the populist (and benevolent authoritarian [?]) narrative on offer by the other side. But in Thailand both sides have numerically non-insignificant constituencies. (And, yes, I know a lot of people are just thinking of how either of these regimes of governance might directly affect their economic interests, but that too is part of the narrative in many cases.) In Burma, the system might as well be colonial, with the army having colonized the country. And I doubt that the real ideological supporters of the regime could fill a stadium or even perhaps a large auditorium.

  I hope that was not too convoluted and/or confused (confusing).

  Second, is the notion of how power is exercised in Burma. At first I thought aiontay had misunderstood what I was trying to say above. But on further consideration I think he is correct. The Tatmadaw might or might not want to run an Orwellian state but it does not seem capable of doing so now. I suppose one line of reasoning is that the chaos that is administration in Burma is purposeful, that it is a plan to keep control but keep those who would oppose the government off balance. But I doubt this. I think it is a lack of competence and capacity. They would like to have some sort of Orwellian control – the discipline flourishing bit – and legitimacy -that is the democracy part, but they can’t get either project going too well. So the result is one in which local actors get a lot of autonomy a lot of the time, but have to snap into line when “biggest and most cohesive faction in the country” chooses to focus some specific case/area/problem. Here there is an interesting similarity to China. Often local actors (government and commercial) have a lot of autonomy. But the authority of the central state can be brought to bear with great effect during specific campaigns. So, it seems to me that the way power is exercised in both polities (China and Burma, [I don't know enough about Thailand to say]) has two seemingly contradictory aspects: (1) a high degree of (statutorily questionable) local autonomy most of the time; (2) the possibility for central authority focus on a problem/area/case and override the usual local autonomy. Than Shwe can certainly get any particular thing he wants done done in Burma, but he can’t get things running in the way he wants in a regularized way.

• 19 Taro Mongkoltip // Oct 20, 2009 at 5:42 pm

  Jotman,

  Mmm..argh… What I asked for the proof was when you said “In Thailand today, there are security professionals whose job is to figure ways to silence and discredit people like Suzie.”

  I was asking for the proof about those professional who trying to discredit people like Susie. No one would care about people like Susie Wong at all, if she or he doesn’t start slandering the king first.

  And those professional that keep monitoring people like Susie Wong, because they are doing their job. Because it’s the law of the country, therefore, of course they have to keep monitoring them. Like every police department and defend service around the world. They wouldn’t do it just for fun.

• 20 aiontay // Oct 21, 2009 at 11:07 am

  Semuren,

  I think your last sentence concisely gets at what I was trying to say, Than Shwe can get what he wants done, just not on a regular basis. I might expand it a bit and suggest that he is the only person in Burma who can, and in that sense he controls every thing in Burma.

  As for what would happen if he were removed from the equation, that is the question isn’t it? I would agree that the main problem is the lack of competence and capacity, although I do think the chaos is sometimes purposeful, particularly in the ethnic minority areas. My guess, and it is only a guess, is that after Than Shwe the lack of capacity and competence will mix with the purposeful chaos in ways that the biggest faction won’t be able to control.

• 21 Hla Oo // Oct 21, 2009 at 1:24 pm

  Is Burmese Army seen as a colonial rulers by its own people? No, most Burmese do not think so. They are rather seen as a revival of old imperial class by the brutally patronizing ways they behave and treat their own people.

  The generals started from Ne Win and now Than Shwe also consider themselves as stepping on the traditional foot-steps of Burmese warrior kings. Almost all of the famous Burmese kings were self-made generals like them, not from the blood lines of kings.

  The current Burmese administrative system based on the divisional warlords is very similar to the old imperial system in which every village and town is classified as a group of basic military unit.

  In the old imperial system every ten households in a village has a group leader, Sae-ein-goung in Burmese, and as a group they had to provide ten voluntary soldiers complete with their own weaponry, bed rolls, and cooking utensils whenever the king of the day summoned his volunteer or people army.

  Villages are classified as 50 or 100 village depending on the number of soldiers they had to send. Towns also are classified as 1000, 2000, or 5000 town.

  Traditionally every Burmese boy had to learn martial arts and been tattooed heavily for protection in the battle and also for exciting mindless aggression and extreme violence when they face the enemy. War is in their blood and they will madly fight to death for no reason other than just for the sake of fighting.

  The Burmese armies which looted and destroyed Thailand’s Ayutaya were these volunteer soldier villagers. For Burmese then these regular marauding expeditions into Thailand or Assam or Manipur not only quenched their serious militaristic aggression but also the at least 20% of the loot they could customarily keep as wages for their voluntary service.

  Even now the Burmese army is still a volunteer army, unlike Thailand, as there are plenty of young men and boys willing to fight for pittance. Still almost every town, large or small, in Burma has an army unit stationed there. The way the army recruits, trains, and places new troops also has a heavy local flavor as most soldiers are locals.

  Even when a soldier retires from the army for disability or old age he gets a post in the local civilian administration or the militia and still serves the army till his death as a part of the overreaching tentacles of the army.

  I once read that during the century-long rule of India by the British-East-India Company, only 5000 odd British officers and just over 350,000 Indian soldiers were needed to brutally govern almost half-a-billion natives.

  Now Burmese army has over 400,000 strong active army and almost triple that number ex-soldiers among the populace the 60 million people of Burma has a serious trouble shaking these blood suckers off their society.

• 22 Susie Wong // Oct 21, 2009 at 2:36 pm

  In my opinion, the discussion here lacks theoretical framework of analysis concerning democracy, growth, and the role of the State. Analysis based on personal opinions without theoretical foundation offers no solution. Of course, everyone carries his/her own philosophical preference and bias i.e. liberal, conservative, realist, Marxist, etc. However, if we analyze the situation with knowledge regardless of our biases, we can agree with solution best suitable for Myanmar. Theory gives clarity and order.

  I have two pertinent issues that I would like to address:

  1. Chicken-and-egg debate
  When we review the literature, there are many scholarly works on this debate. Western countries become economic powers because they were democratic societies or they are democratic society because they became economic powers. Which comes first? The choice has policy implications. Economic growth should come first or political reforms and democratization should come first. Hong Kong succeeded with laissez-faire while Singapore succeeded with strong one-man rule.

  2. Stage of development
  U.S. and U.K. were the first to industrialize with market led economy and democratic form of governance. However, Germany and Japan were the second wave, they know that in order to catch up with U.S. and U.K., they cannot use the same mode. Germany and Japan had strong State (Developmental State) in collaboration with the Bank. They had Zaibatsu played the key role with the State in its development. Most developing countries follow this model: authoritarian Developmental State for the short cut to economic growth.

  I thin the debate should focus on these two issues: chicken-and-egg, and the role of the State: Developmental State or Laissez-faire. An which is best for Myanmar.

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