Just as the train has always been a symbol of progress, Laos’s unusual distinction among its neighbours of not having a railway system has long demonstrated its lack of development. A rusted locomotive in the far south, the last vestige of early-20th century French efforts to bypass the Khon Phapeng falls on the Mekong River, testifies to unrealised colonial dreams, lying in moribund contrast to the dynamic train-building that took place next door in Siam. Despite being celebrated in Laos itself, the recent opening of a 3.5km stretch of track from outside Vientiane to the Friendship Bridge (which connects the city to Nong Khai in Thailand) has only reinforced Laos’s historic lack of transport infrastructure.
So, as well as promising obvious economic benefits, last week’s announcement that China has agreed to fund a new railway in Laos has great symbolic importance. A century after the first French plans to extend its Indochinese rail network into Laos – ideas that bubbled along until the Second World War – it seems that, thanks to the region’s newest power, Laos will finally be connected to it neighbours by train. The planned train will link Vientiane to China in the north and, via Khammouan Province, Vietnam to the east. This is supposed to happen within five years – an ambitious target, but one that demonstrates the can-do mentality of Chinese investment.
When the French were investigating railways in the first half of the 20th century, it was to link Laos to its greater Indochinese possessions in what became Vietnam. Just as colonialism shaped earlier railway-building plans, now it is the defining narrative of regional integration that rules. The expressed goal is to link Laos to ASEAN and China, by connecting to the Singapore-Kunming railway and, in turn, the greater Chinese network.
But as the parallel with French colonialism suggests, the planned train is also symbolic of the expanding role of China in Laos and Lao development, and questions this raises for national sovereignty. As I wrote before the SEA Games in December last year, the paradox of foreign-funded development is hardly new to Laos. The nation – like the pre-colonial Lao kingdoms and colonial state that preceded independent Laos – has always grown out of engagement with foreign powers. Lao leaders are comfortable with what may seem contradictory to some outsiders, proud of rather than embarrassed by foreign assistance. As long as the Party-State can project itself as conductor of foreign forces, as it did so effectively in the SEA Games, it (with the economy) will prosper with the help of the Chinese.
The question, I would suggest, is how far this development strategy can go. The SEA Games were successful because, in spite of their massive dependence on foreign and particularly Chinese capital, they provided an occasion for celebrating national success, unity and future potential. The controversy over the ‘Chinatown’ development near That Luang – which was condemned by some as treasonous (khai sat, lit. sell nation) and continues to bubble along – did not untimately overshadow the games, perhaps because it affected relatively few people compared to the masses that embraced the festive nationalism of the event. However, opposition to the development did demonstrate public sensitivity to Chinese investment, to the extent that the proposal sparked quite unprecedented popular opposition among those that stood to lose through such investment.
Like the SEA Games and China’s purchase of the Sepon mine in Savannakhet, the Chinese railway deal dramatically demonstrates the latest development paradigm of the post-socialist state in Laos: increasing regional integration through regional – and especially Chinese – investment. But as history tells us, no such paradigm is timeless. The French were once embraced for their trains too.

A nice parody between French and Chinese interest in Laos, very much on track by reference to the beautiful little puffer engine. It is at the present time noted that the French built seven kilometres of track on the southern islands, which is twice that of the current Lao-Thai-Chinese operation. It may also be of interest to note that South Korea will finance restoration of the original French track, using working repro locomotives. This is part of their tourist interests in the Four Thousand Islands and will add to their plans to build a large hotel, golf course and possibly a casino in the area.
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The South Koreans best not go there during the rainy season – when that area is a total wash-out.
I met some very unhappy backpackers second time I was in that area – you guessed it : during rainy season.
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These comments are meant to be another Reply to the Chinese Rail Link comments on the published article “Lao Development on Track”, New Mandala, May 5th, 2010.
The referenced article stated that (1) the “‘Chinatown’ development near That Luang was condemned by some as treasonous, . . . . but continues to bubble along”. And (2) “opposition to the development did demonstrate public sensitivity to Chinese investment, to the extent that the proposal sparked quite unprecedented popular opposition among those that stood to lose through such investment”. Both of these statements should be revalued. Firstly, the trading of the That Luang wetlands in return for the Chinese gift to build the sport facilities for the SEA Games of December 2009 was a political decision which bypassed many impacted government organizations and existing Lao regulations. The reactions by many individuals were not just based on “who stood to lose”. Danida and JICA had spent considerable sums to manage the wetlands for their ecological services as well as flood control and wastewater management purposes. The decision to give the “green light” to the proposed Chinese investment without a proper social and environmental impact assessment bypassed the Lao EIA Regulation and created considerable opposition within The Prime Minister’s Office as well as finding opposition from hundreds of project affected persons. The opposition might be considered “unprecedented” also became it came from a wide group of stakeholders objecting to a decision by a high ranking officer without regards to the law, in this case environmental law (both the Environmental Protection Law (1999) and the EIA Regulation of STEA (now WREA) (2002) which were bypassed by the decision. These laws require the project developer to cover all environmental impacts, similar to the “polluter-pays-principle” and the proposed Chinese commercial project had clearly overlooked such details. A significant environmental and social impact study was needed for the “Chinatown” development near That Luang and this was completely bypassed.
So the same question must be asked for the proposed Chinese railway across Laos. The time schedule (yet to be noted in the article) should be modified to include public involvement meetings, in which various stakeholders can voice their opinions and cast their objections to railway links which cross or impact cultural, physical or ecological sites considered as “valued environmental components” (sites which are sacred, unique or of significant ecological value to stakeholders) and therefore options to the proposed railway route must be studied before approval by the government can be granted. This is a long and detailed process for such a far reaching project. It will be interesting to see if the Lao follow the law on this proposed investment (requiring that an ESIA, EMP, and SDP be completed, reviewed, and approved as part of the project’s development cost) before government approval is granted to the ambitious project.
Submitted by
Richard J. Frankel, Ph.D.
International EIA Specialist (part-time consultant to the SEM II Project, WREA)
Adjunct Professor
Natural Resources & Environmental Management Center
Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, Thailand
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Hello,
My point is less a comment than a question. I’ve tried to find some further information about this project. As of today, I’ve found only an article in The Vientiane Times. Even in the Chinese newspapers and websites, there were only reports based on the Vientiane Times’ story.
Also, are you certain that this project is going on? Do you have any idea of the budget and of the railway’s map?
Thanks in advance
François Gerles
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Plans with map and schedule are available on request at the department “Chemins de Fer’” in the Transportation Ministry near Patuxai. The current planned line continues the current short track and more or less follows the Mekong down to Savannakhet, where it does a sharp left across to Vietnam and joins up the VN network. Scedule for completion: an optimistic six years. The staff at this office are very helpful, but are unaware of plans to have a line VTE-China. If it has been considered, it is still at the pre-planning stage. Opinion suggests it will follow the route VTE-Sayabouli and shadow the new road up to China, NOT take the far more difficult and costly route via the mountains and Luang Prabang. But this is reasoned conjecture, not planned blueprint.
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Dear Mr Cooper
Thanks for your reply.
François
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