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The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military

June 9th, 2010 by Paul Chambers, Guest Contributor · 52 Comments

Guaranteeing Civilian Control: Thailand’s Arch-Royalist Military Today and its Coming Challenges

In most countries of the world, civil-military relations involve a nexus of decision-making between military officers and either elected or non-elected civilians.  The case of Thailand is unique in that it involves both.  This owes to the country’s two dimensions of the term “civilian.”  The first dimension represents elected civilians while the second refers to monarchical or regal civilians.  The ability of this second dimension to exert tremendous authority over both elected civilians and the armed forces reflects its political supremacy over each.  In fact, though each is civilian, elected and regal civilians have only sometimes been aligned.  More often, regal civilians have found themselves collaborating with soldiers against elected civilian rule.  Indeed, Thailand’s democratic trajectory was abruptly terminated in 1947 through the joint efforts of the military and royalists.  Bloody 6 October 1976 witnessed a second such palace-endorsed putsch.  The coups of 1991 and 2006 follow the same pattern.  At the same time, elected civilians have not necessarily endeared themselves to regal civilians.  For example, following his landslide election victory in 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra attempted to weaken parts of the system sustaining regal hegemony and increase his own personalist control over Thai politics.  Ultimately, what makes notions of civilian control so particularly interesting with regard to Thailand is the dialectic between these two tiers of civilians: on one side a sovereign who reigns supreme, and on the other elected governments which have proven to be politically peripheral.

Such ambiguity of Thai “civilianness” and sporadic joustings between the two dimensions have made it difficult to adequately analyze civil-military relations in Thailand.  If civilian control is to focus on the palace, then perhaps one could contend that civilians asserted control over the military beginning in 1957, when Gen. Sarit Thanarat overthrew Plaek Phibul Songkram, thus facilitating the political rise of regal civilians.  On the other hand, if civilian control is to concentrate on elected civilians, then weeding out the rise of civilian control becomes more complex. Indeed, the rise of elected civilians in Thailand must correspond with the onset of democratization.  But when did this occur?  One could argue that such democratization began in 1988 when Chatchai Chunhavan was allowed by the military and palace to become Prime Minister following his party’s election victory.  Alternatively, it could be contended that democratization only commenced following the “Black” May 1992 massacre, which led to 14 years of uninterrupted elected governance.   Moreover, one could say that Thailand has only begun tracing democratization since the end of military rule in 2007.  Yet these options raise serious questions.  First, given the continuing cycle of coups in Thailand, can one ever be sure where to analyze the commencement of any Thai democratization?  Second, with the continuing omnipotence of regal civilians and heightened autonomy of the military, to what extent can Thailand even be said to be democratizing?  Ultimately, democratization in Thailand seems lost in transition.

The regal civilians’ political network receives critical assistance from a royally-appointed Privy Council.  Members of this Council, because of their affiliation to the palace, appear to stand above politics, becoming yet another civilian hub of authority—though they officially serve at the sovereign’s pleasure.  Among their duties, Councilors advise the palace but have also succeeded in shaping key political alterations.  Currently, three of the most senior Councilors (ret. Gens. Prem Tinsulanond, Surayud Chulanond, and Pichit Kullavanijaya) are retired military men, making it arguable that the Privy Council has become increasingly militarized or influenced by the armed forces.  On that note, one of the Council’s most notable achievements has included the reinforcement of the “Queen’s Guard,” (the 21st Infantry Battalion of the Second Infantry Division). But the Queen’s Guard is more than just a unit.  Since Gen. Anupong Paochinda became Army Commander in 2007, it has come to represent the leading faction in Thailand’s military.  Since the May 19, 2010 crackdown on Red Shirts, this clique has strengthened its control over the armed forces though the impending October 2010 reshuffle will determine whether factional military fissures remain unchecked.

May 19 in fact represents the eighth nail against Thaksin following the 2006 coup, 2007 constitution, 2008 judicially-enforced fall of pro-Thaksin prime ministers, refusal of the military to protect those governments from demonstrations, the cobbling together of the  current anti-Thaksin government, judicial rulings against Thaksin himself, and the April 2009 “Bloody Songkran” military repression against Red Shirts.   These moves against Thaksin have required a solid armed forces.  For the Queen’s Guard, this has meant a larger military budget and enhanced authority over civilians to control military reshuffles.  Indirectly and informally, this faction takes its lead from Privy Council Chair Gen. Prem Tinsulanond—hence its continued pull over the military.

Prem’s military hegemony owes to four factors.  First, he is a shrewd political player, and has long played a careful balancing game to appease military factions. Second, as Privy Council de facto head since 1988, his voice has been crucial for military reshuffles, which must have the endorsement of the palace—upon his advice.  Third, across a 69 year military career, he has earned tremendous respect among soldiers.  Fourth, the sheer length of this career has allowed him to become patron to rising officers as well as shape the development of the military itself.

By 2010 some might have thought Prem to be a peripheral force since he had just turned 90.  Yet, he has continued to be a cogent and leading participant in Thai politics—second only to the palace.  And through an exceedingly long and successful career, Prem has managed to forge the military consensus enabling the successful sway of an arch-royalist military.

Graduating from the Royal Military academy in 1941, many of his student peers became powerful soldiers or politicians.  These included future Prime Minister Chatichai Chunhavan, Saiyud Kerdpol (godfather of the Internal Security Operations Command or ISOC), Sanga Kittikachorn (brother of Thanom) as well as future Army Commander Serm Na Nakorn.  Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand began as a cadet only one year before Prem.  Prem fought as cavalry officer in the 1941 Indochina War against France and the 1942-45 northern Burma campaign against Britain, where he earned foreign battle experience under the commands of Lt. Gens. Charoon Ratanakul and Phin Chunhavan, but more directly under then-Col.Sarit Thanarat.

But not until Sarit’s own 1957 putsch against Phibul Songkram and Phao Siyanon did Prem’s star meteorically ascend.  Sarit boosted him to colonel in 1959 and placed him on a military-controlled Constitutional Drafting Committee.   Field Marshalls Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusatien raised him to major-general in 1971.  Most importantly, he served as royal aide-de-camp for the palace in 1968 and 1975, reflecting a bond with regal civilians.  Shortly thereafter in 1978, the sovereign reportedly helped to raise him to the position of Army Commander, a move which bypassed senior officers.  Since 1978, Prem has exerted three decades of enormous sway over the Thai military and Thai politics, including a stint as unelected Prime Minister from 1980-88, and afterwards becoming the dominant force on the Privy Council.  Moreover, officers close to Prem or who earned his trust have ascended to leading military positions.   This has included Army Commanders Gens. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1986-1990), Suchinda Kraprayoon (1990-1992), Wimol Wongwanich (1992-95), and Surayud Chulanond (1998-2002).

Prem has actively promoted the growth of the Queen’s Guard.  The unit originated in 1908, though it was severely downgraded with the fall of absolute monarchy in 1932.  1959 marked its re-ascendance thanks to help from pro-monarchist Gen. Sarit. The unit now acted with greater autonomy from the rest of Thailand’s military: its priority first and foremost was to the King rather than the direct chain of command.  In this way it would serve as a model for what the armed forces in 1973 would ultimately become: a servant of royalty.  Development of this unit paralleled the creation of a 60-man elite palace guard trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (and headed by Lt. Gen. Vitoon Yasawad) to guard the royal family.[1] Like the Queen’s Guard, it represented a wellspring of staunchly pro-royalist military sentiment.

Black May 1992, which weakened the military in the eyes of Thai society (and thus tarnished various military factions), allowed Prem to intensify the construction of a zealously royalist, pro-Prem armed forces leadership. The avidly pro-Prem Gen. Surayud Chulanond’s four years as Army Commander (1998-2002) further cemented this trend.  By 2001, senior military reshuffles were being actuated almost completely through Prem’s signing off on them, and one could argue that the armed forces leadership was becoming virtually directed by the Privy Council.

It was Thaksin Shinawatra who brought a serious challenge to this system when, following his 2001 landslide election, he dared to try to confront it with his own politically-charged military promotions and projects.  Such defiance of Privy Premocracy by an elected civilian Prime Minister was an important factor leading to Thaksin’s ouster five years later.

The 2006 coup succeeded in placing the military on a trajectory toward united royalist ascendancy.  Continued annual and mid-year reshuffles have strengthened the grip of the Queen’s Guard.  Cadet classes particularly benefiting from reshuffles have included Armed Forces Preparatory School Class 10 (only those graduates close to current Army Commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda); Class 12 (led by current Deputy Army Commander Gen. Prayuth Chan-ucha); and Class 13 (led by First Army Region Commander Gen. Khanit Sapitak).  Most notably, Anupong, Prayuth, and Khanit have all commanded the Queen’s Guard Second Division.  The military’s April 2010 mid-year military reshuffle of 79 positions further bolstered the dominance over the armed forces of the Queen’s Guard, particularly officers close to Anupong and Prayuth.[2]

Gen. Prayuth has been designated as a likely successor to Anupong when the latter retires at the end of September 2010.  Though Prayuth has long been a close friend and subordinate of Anupong, it is his ties with Prem that are most important.  Indeed, Prayuth has been seen as an unflinchingly anti-Thaksin, ultra-royalist in line with Prem and Surayudh.  If he in fact becomes Army Commander (and this is still not a complete certainty), Prayuth could remain in that position until 2014, when he would be required to retire at age 60.  If the Red Shirts had succeeded in forcing Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vechachiwa from office, it would have been conceivable though not probable that Prayuth would be deprived of his coveted promotion. Yet with the May 19 quashing of the Red Shirt demonstrations, Prayuth’s rise is back on track and the military leadership is set to maintain its tilt against Thaksin.  Meanwhile, the share of budgetary defense spending which in fiscal year 2010 amounted to 150 billion baht and was set to drop to 148,096 billion baht for fiscal year 2011, has now been augmented to 170,285 billion baht (though this figure still needs parliament’s approval).[3]

Yet the proposed elevation of Prayuth Chan-ucha in October 2010 does not amount to the wholesale enhancement of an anti-Thaksin military leadership. The current Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Piroon Phaeopolsong as well as assistant commanders in chief Gen. Wit Thepasadin Na Ayuthaya and Lt. Gen. Teerawat Boonyapradap belong to cadet classes senior to Prayuth.  Yet Prayuth leapfrogged over all of them from First Army Region Commander to become Chief of Staff and then Deputy Commander, a meteoric rise which could have instilled resentment.  Of all three, Wit appears the most sympathetic to any future pro-Thaksin government. He is the son of former Deputy Commander Gen. Yot Thepasadin Na Ayuthaya, who was close to late Field Marshall Gen. Praphas Charusatien.  Yot was also once a competitor with Prem back in 1978 for the post of Army Commander.  Wit is also close to Thaksin’s cousin Chaisit Shinawatra and is a brother-in-law of Gen. Pornchai Kranlert, a pro-Thaksin Class 10 graduate who had been slated to become Army Commander.[4] Neither Piroon, Wit, or Teerawat ever served in the Queen’s Guard nor do they belong to Prayuth’s Class 12.   Indeed, Wit and Piroon each belong to Class 11, the same as the late Kattiya Sawasdipol (Sae Daeng).  Regardless, all three are set to retire in October 2011.  Should the current ruling coalition remain in power until that date, it will be able to influence what soldiers are promoted into these positions.  For greater elaboration, see the table below, which indicates the senior army brass, their graduating class, and connections.

Thailand’s Top Army Officers—Positions, Graduating Class, and Connections

Name Position: 2009-2010 Class Connection
Gen. Anupong Paochinda Army Commander-in-Chief 10 (retires 2010) Ex-Queen’s Guard Second Division Commander
Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha Deputy Commander-in-Chief 12 (retires 2014)* Ex-Queen’s Guard Second Division Commander (close to Anupong
Gen Viroj Buacharoon Chairman of the RTA advisory board 9 (retires 2010) Close to ret.Gen.Sonthi Bunyaratklin and Anupong
Gen Wit Thephasadin Na Ayutthaya Assistant Commander-in-Chief 11 (retires 2011)* Close to Anupong
Lt. Gen. Teerawat Boonyapradap Assistant Commander-in-Chief 10 (retires 2011)* Close to Anupong
Lt. Gen Piroon Phaeopolsong Army Chief-of-Staff 10 (retires 2011)* Close to Anupong
Lt.Gen. Dapong Ratanasuwan Deputy Chief-of-Staff 12 Close to Prayuth
Lt. Gen. Malai Kieowtieng Deputy Chief of Staff 12 Close to Prayuth
Lt.Gen. Thanin Kettad Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Logistics 10 Close to Anupong
Maj.Gen. Aksara Kerdphon Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Operations 13 Close to Khanit, scion of former Supreme Commander Gen. Saiyud Kerdpol
Maj.Gen. Surasak Kanchanarat Assistant Chief-of-Staff for Civil Affairs 12 Close to Prayuth
Lt.Gen. Singsuek Singphrai Chief of Army Training Command 12 Close to Prayuth
Maj.Gen. Podok Bunnag Commander of Special Warfare Command 12 Close to Prayuth
Lt Gen Khanit Saphitak First Army Region Commander 13 Ex-Queen’s Guard Second Division Commander, close to Aksara
Lt-General Wiwalit Jonsamphan Second Army Region Commander 10 Close to Anupong
Maj.Gen. Thawatchai Samutsakorn Second  Army Corps Commander 12 Close to Prayuth
Lt-General Thano-ngsak Apirakyothin Third Army Region Commander 11 Close to Anupong and Wit
Lt.-General Wannathip Wongwai Third Army Corps Commander 12 Close to Prayuth
Lt-General Pichet Wisaijorn Fourth Army Region Commander 11 Close to Anupong and Wit
Maj-Gen. Walit Rojanapakdi

(severely injured during Red Shirt demonstrations)

Commander, Queen’s Guard Second Division 15 Queen’s Guard; graduated same class as Prayuth’s brother Preecha Chan-ocha.
Major-Gen. Surasak Boonsiri Commander, Second Division Cavalry Regiment, First Army Region 14 Graduated same class as Aksara Kerdpol
Major-Gen. Utis Sunthorn Commander, Ninth Infantry Division, First Army 14 Graduated same class as Aksara Kerdpol
Maj.-Gen. Kampnat   Rudit Commander First Infantry Division, First Army Region 16 Close to Khanit
Col. Apirat Kongsompong Comander, Eleventh Infantry Regiment, Royal Guard 20 Son of former Supreme Commander Gen. Sunthorn Kongsompong
Col. Sansern Kaeowkamnerd Military Spokesperson, CRES 23 Former Spokesperson, National Security Council (CNS)

Notes: *Generals who have a chance to succeed Anupong in October 2010. Positions in bold indicate the “Five Tiger” Army positions or the positions of most significance.

If and when Prayuth ascends to become Army Commander, Piroon might be sidelined to the inactive post of Chairman of the RTA advisory board.  Meanwhile, either Gens. Dapong Ratanasuwan or Malai Kieowtieng, both close to Prayuth, might then succeed Piroon as Army Chief of Staff.  At the same time, First Army Region Commander Lt. Gen.  Khanit Saphitak will undoubtedly move up to a higher position.  After all, he has held his strategically important post for the last two years. And it has been under his command that the Army kept the Red Shirt March-May 2010 Red Shirt demonstrations in check.  Indeed, like Prayuth before him, he could move from the First Army Command position to that of Army Chief of Staff or alternatively, like Anupong he could rise to Deputy Army Commander, though that is less likely.  Once Wit, Piroon and Teerawat retire in 2011, the new top five players in the army (or “five tigers”[5]) could well become Prayuth, Dapong, and Malai (each hailing from Class 12), as well as Khanit and current Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Aksara Kerdpol (each from Class 13).

The rise of Class 12 could provoke greater resentment within the armed forces as its members potentially receive the choicest positions.  This could include Prayuth taking the post of Army Commander, Dapong or Malai ascending to be Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Wannathip Wongwai becoming Third Army Region Commander, Lt.Gen. Thawatchai Samutsakorn becoming Second Army Region Commander, and Queen’s Guard Lt. Gen. Thanasak Phatimapakorn perhaps succeeding Gen. Songkitti Chakkrabat as Supreme Commander in 2011.  Meanwhile, in the Navy, where Class 12 has held few top positions, Prayuth’s rise could help spark the star of Admiral Apichart Suwannachat, currently an Assistant Navy Commander-in-Chief.  Over in the Air Force, Prayuth’s elevation might aid in a higher appointment for Class 12 graduate Air Chief Marshall Khanit Suwannet, currently Assistant Air Force Commander. Yet already, amidst this mostly class-based ascendancy, a segment of mostly non-commissioned, junior officers have become disenchanted with what they see as a biased promotions process in favor of soldiers who served in Class 12 or are in some fashion connected with the Queen’s Guard.  Such disillusionment has contributed to growing military disunity—most visibly illustrated during the recent Red Shirt demonstrations.

Indeed, Class 12’s ascendancy could ultimately shatter the dominance of the Queen’s Guard military faction as officers perceive that only one class lords the benefits of promotions.  The Queen’s Guards’ initial ability to assert control over the armed forces back in 2007 signified the importance of military unit in the bestowing of senior promotions.  This occurred, however, at a time when Class 10 (of both Thaksin Shinawatra and Army Commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda) was severely divided.  Three years later, in 2010, the growing significance of Class 12—which stands united—could re-establish school ties as the crucial ingredient to military promotions rather than unit, not unlike the dominance of Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon’s Class Five 20 years ago.  Indeed, the future could witness increased friction between pre-cadet classes 12 and 13 as each tries to bolster its slots in the military leadership.

At the same time, should the Queen’s Guard continue to hold onto power in the military, it is unlikely that First Army Region Commander Lt. Gen. Khanit Saphitak, though a former Commander of the Queen’s Guard Second division, will ever succeed Prayuth.  Though Prayuth retires in 2014, Khanit must do so in 2015 meaning that he (as with the proposed nomination of Gen. Saprang Kallayamitr back in 2007) would only have one year as Army Commander.     Such a brief term could enfeeble  the current military clique’s grip on power.

To foresee any post-2014 Army leadership, it thus becomes necessary to look lower down the ladder.  The May 19 repression of the Red Shirts won accolades for several First Army Region officers who directed the military triumph on the ground.  This included Major-Generals Surasak Boonsiri (Commander, Second Division Cavalry Regiment, First Army Region), Utis Sunthorn (Commander, Ninth Infantry Division, First Army), and Kampnat Rudit (Commander of the First Infantry Division, First Army Region).  The latter in particular has the potential to move up to become First Army Region Commander, following “the classic route to power” in the footsteps of Sarit Thanarat, Thanom Kittikachorn, and Praphas Charusatien, who once held this position.[6] Yet Kampnat will have to compete with the reality of Queen’s Guard domination.  As such, the successor to Prayuth (should the latter even become Army Commander) could well become Major-General Walit Rojanapakdi, who nominally commands the Queen’s Guard Second Division, hails from Class 15, retires in 2017 and was severely injured during the April 10 violence which claimed the life of his subordinate—rising star Colonel Romklao Tuwatham.  Should Walit recover, he would first follow in the line of Prayuth and Khanit to become First Army Region Commander before ascending further.

As for the impending 2010 annual reshuffle, in addition to senior soldiers, Thailand’s military leadership will also be looking to reward the colonels who more directly led the May 19 charge against the Red Shirts.  This includes Colonels Apirat Kongsongpong (son of 1991 putsch-leader Supreme Commander Gen. Sunthorn Kongsompong) and CRES spokesperson Sansern Kaeowkamnerd (who has become a sort of celebrity among some Thais).  In the end, it is such colonels and other mid-ranking officers who must be appeased to entrench unity across Thailand’s armed forces and reduce any resentment with regard to promotions in the military leadership, thus avoiding the escalation of watermelonage in Thailand’s armed forces.

In the aftermath of the May 19 victory over the Red Shirts and Thaksin, Thailand’s military officer corps appears united above, but fissured below.  The Queen’s Guard faction and Class 12 are increasingly holding mastery over top armed forces positions.   Only if Puea Thai Party wins Thailand’s next general election, might such preeminence be threatened—especially if ret. Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh becomes Minister of Defense.  But the perils facing the Queen’s Guard will be less likely to arise from Thailand’s elected civilian governments given their temporary and frail character—especially with Thaksin still on the run.  Rather, the clique’s greatest challenge will be to diminish internal military resentment from junior officers and thus ensure its enhanced control over the armed forces.  If Prem and Surayud successfully balance various military classes to perpetuate Queen’s Guard military control, then some semblance of unity within an arch-royalist armed forces may well persevere. Yet if such balancing is not undertaken or proves unsuccessful, then internal military divisions could become increasingly violent.

The post-2006 alliance between regal civilians and military officers today finds its nexus in the two top members of the Privy Council who have informally guided military reshuffles since the fall of Thaksin. However, in the next few years, drastic changes in Thailand’s political landscape could well offer challenges to the Council’s sway.  This may result in an even more direct role for Thailand’s armed forces.  Regardless, Thailand remains a case study of competing civilian realms of control over the military.  As such, while unelected regal civilians informally dominate civil-military relations in Thailand, elected civilians have—since the 2006 ouster of Thaksin—returned to being a politically peripheral sideshow.  The enabling factor ensuring the durability of regal civilian supremacy has been the forging of an unquestioning and united arch-royalist military.  Maintaining such unity, however, will become a growing challenge as Thailand looks toward a future marked by intensified turmoil. In this respect, the enduring hegemony of the Queen’s Guard over Thailand’s armed forces is an essential ingredient.

[Paul Chambers is concurrently Senior Research Fellow at Heidelberg University’s Institute of Politics, Heidelberg, Germany, and Senior Researcher at Payap University, Chiang Mai, Thailand.]

Notes


[1] Cable from Secretary of State to US Embassy, Bangkok.  Subject: “Anderson Alleges CIA Influence in Palace Guard,”Feb. 1975, Declassified /Released  US Department of State 5 July 2005.

[2] “Mid-Year Reshuffle Involves 79 Positions,” Daily News, April 2, 2010, http://www.dailynews.co.th/newstartpage/index.cfm?page=content&categoryId=8&contentID=57673.

[3] See “Military budget of 51-54 ครับ,” http://www.thaifighterclub.org/webboard.php?action=detailQuestion&questionid=4624&topic=%A7%BA%B7%CB%D2%C3%20%BB%D5%2051-%2054%20%20%A4%C3%D1%BA&PHPSESSID=76c45735df5098d3320a808f1619c472; “เตรียมยกเลิกแผนกู้เงิน4แสนล้านบาท,” Daily News, April 28, 2010.

[4] Wassana Nanuam, “The Big Five: Army Chief and his Big Four Deputies,” Bangkok Post, February 4, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

[5] The “Five Tigers” are those Army officers holding the key posts of Army Commander, Deputy Army Commander, Army Chief-of-Staff, and the two Assistant Army Commanders.

[6] Chai-anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks, Singapore: ISEAS, 1982, pp.20-21.

Tags: Militaries · Thailand

52 responses so far ↓

  • 1 David Brown // Jun 9, 2010 at 10:42 pm

    Interesting to see Prem and Sarayud classed as royal “civilians”

    Particularly as the King is also nominally “military” as commander of the armed forces

    A fine distinction perhaps but crucial to the claim of two ranks of civilians vs the military

    I think its more correct to say the political civilians (some of whom are retired military of course) are sandwiched between an unarmed but ultimately powerful military and the armed military

    also, perhaps quite close to home is the probability that the two most significant of the royal “civilians”, the King and hoping-to-be-regent Prem may die, it would be interesting to speculate on the impact that would have

    Quality comment or not? Thumb up 21 Thumb down 1

  • 2 polo // Jun 10, 2010 at 2:37 am

    A great description of what is really at the core of politics. But could we avoid bringing “Privy Premocracy” into common usage? “Network Monarchy” was bad enough. :-)

    Quality comment or not? Thumb up 12 Thumb down 3

  • 3 Jak // Jun 10, 2010 at 2:37 am

    What was it about General Prayuth?

    If I recall it correctly, one of the reasons of the Reds protests was to prevent General Prayuth from succeeding General Anuphong as Army Chief. The Reds actually rejected Abhisit’s Nov. 14th election date offer because by that time the army shuffle would be over with General Prayuth taking over as Army Chief.

    Why NOT General Prayuth and who was the Reds Army Chief preference?

    Quality comment or not? Thumb up 8 Thumb down 2

  • 4 Athita // Jun 10, 2010 at 3:04 am

    Great article.

    I found Bangkok Pundit has just brought a news from the Independent

    (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/inquiry-into-sale-of-fake-bomb-detectors-expanded-1994769.html)

    saying police raided GT200 manufacturer’s office. The GT200 is a device used by Thai military to detect the bomb in the south. Maj. Gen. Kattiya (Sae Dang) once said it’s useless and the Army had made some profit from purchasing this. The Thai government asked Ministry of Science to test the detector, it found 4 out of 20 or 25% accurate. However, the Army insisted it is working just fine, despite the British government said it is a fraud one.

    Quality comment or not? Thumb up 23 Thumb down 1

  • 5 john francis lee // Jun 10, 2010 at 12:03 pm

    The military seems to me to be the gordian knot of Thai society and must be cut as it cannot be untied… as this article so amply demonstrates.

    The first dimension represents elected civilians while the second refers to monarchical or regal civilians. The ability of this second dimension to exert tremendous authority over both elected civilians and the armed forces reflects its political supremacy over each.

    I see the military riding the monarchy, not the other way round. Certainly the ability to project its own actions as being in consonance with the monarchy’s desires is an essential equestrian skill.

    More often, regal civilians have found themselves collaborating with soldiers against elected civilian rule.

    Exactly the point. The military labors, the monarchy collaborates.

    Ultimately, what makes notions of civilian control so particularly interesting with regard to Thailand is the dialectic between these two tiers of civilians: on one side a sovereign who reigns supreme, and on the other elected governments which have proven to be politically peripheral.

    Interesting to a specialist therein, perhaps.

    Civilian control of the military seems to me to be an illusion, no matter the classes of civilians conjured up.

    The military’s aims seem to be the enrichment and immunity of its senior officers. Its attention span to other things is such that it is willing to allow others to run things day-to-day as long as its primary interests – wealth and immunity – are met. So it may appear that civilian governments are “in control”… so long as the military’s primary “needs” are being met.

    When those needs seem to imperiled… or when the opportunity to increase its wealth or reassert and expand its immunity seems to present itself… the military “swings into action”, as it has done since 2006.

    To cut the gordian knot would seem to require a super majority of Thai citizens, 51% simply will not do. The military could quickly disappear and/or slay 2 or 3% of the population.

    And the super-majority of Thais will have to be as active as the redshirts are. Clearly the South, Lanna, and Isaan are the nucleus around which this super-majority will be built.

    This must be a non-violent revolution. Fighting with the military on military terms makes no sense at all. I hope they are organizing as we speak.

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  • 6 Unknown poster // Jun 10, 2010 at 12:13 pm

    How long will this website be in business I wonder.
    Surprised the The Junta didn’t ban this place.

    Quality comment or not? Thumb up 3 Thumb down 2

  • 7 R. Dayley // Jun 10, 2010 at 2:30 pm

    Chamber’s one article on military reshuffling is more useful than a dozen on coalition reshuffles that get all the attention from the day- to-day press. That we are in 2010 and still must read the tea leaves of intra-military politics to understand Thailand’s democratic future shows that political development in Thailand as bleak as ever.

    As for his question when democratization in Thailand experienced its latest “onset,” I would contend that democratization is ongoing as long as the discourse of democracy dominates a society. Thailand is unfortunately trapped, yet again, between significant periods of episodic “reconfiguration” in its long attempt at transition.

    Ultimately, until the concept that basic law is only minimally to be trifled with is accepted by military leaders (whatever their class #), civilian leaders (regal or not), and supporters and opponents of any elected government (whatever its virtues or sins), Thailand will never experience a final or lasting reconfiguration. Sadly, until all these stakeholders develop such a mindset it may not really matter which specific general ends up on top or when. The country’s recent events and past record suggests that the country is nowhere near some “final reconfiguration” that could progress toward democratic consolidation. Idenfying the onset of democratization is less significant than the identifying a broad committment to basic law and constitutionalism.

    The Yellow-Red divide is so deep now that episodic reconfigurations will seemingly continue indefinitely for the foreseeable future. What is so disconcerting in the current phase of reconfiguration is that much of the Yellow camp (and its top brass backers) may not be attempting to reconfigure democracy at all.

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  • 8 Yuri // Jun 10, 2010 at 2:35 pm

    Perhaps Prof. Chambers can explain why Gen. Chavalit (Big Chiew) dared to ignore Gen. Prem’s warning against joining Pheu Thai party ?
    To join something as risky as being labeled a traitor needs very strong motivation and clear understanding of the situation.

    Quality comment or not? Thumb up 13 Thumb down 0

  • 9 Nicholas Farrelly // Jun 10, 2010 at 2:45 pm

    Thanks Unknown poster,

    New Mandala has been operating for just shy of four years — indeed our birthday falls next week. Occasionally pages are blocked in Thailand, but this is a sporadic, haphazard and incomplete process.

    Best wishes to all,

    Nich

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  • 10 StanG // Jun 10, 2010 at 3:48 pm

    Invaluable insight into the armed forces power plays.

    What relevance it has to the rest of the country, however? The author himself acknowledges the possibility of PTP taking power, for example.

    What interests do these generals have beyond their 150-170 bil budget?

    Stopping Thaksin? Preventing another violent revolution attempt?

    Only die hard reds would argue against those goals?

    How does succession fits in all this? Seems like they are not making any particular plans and are not overly concerned.

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  • 11 FredKorat // Jun 10, 2010 at 4:54 pm

    Yuri. I think you read far too much into Big Jiew’s actions. He was corrupted by CIA money right back in the Vietnam War era, and has been incapable of thinking beyond his own pocket (or rather his avaricious Indonesian’s wife pocket) ever since. If Big Jiew made the decision to join Pheua Thai, it was almost certainly because Thaksin paid him massively to do so. I mean, how else do you think the bankrupt ex-PM Samak paid for expensive cancer treatent in the US. John Francis Lee is right to talk about the military gordian knots, but may have to face the fact that the military is also matched in this respect by the police, various civil servants and even self-interested big business here. The problem is with New Mandala is that it always wants to play the radical, while never really acknowledging that there are no real clean players here for it to throw its whole-hearted support behind.

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  • 12 Steve // Jun 10, 2010 at 6:12 pm

    c10

    “What relevance it has to the rest of the country, however? The author himself acknowledges the possibility of PTP taking power, for example.”

    And an elected PTP-led government would be allowed to govern for how long? As long as PPP – but not as long as TRT? The author himself also cites “refusal of the military to protect those [2008] governments from demonstrations” – evidently (post the 2006 coup debacle) now the preferred route (in tandem with appropriate judicial action) to removing elected governments the military and its posse of civilian partners don’t like – with consequences we have now seen twice and will almost certainly see again.

    Personally, I’d say that this has “relevance….. to the rest of the country”. What’s being discussed by Chambers is about rather more than just a bunch of uniformed primadonnas bickering over who gets what status and what slice of the spoils.

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  • 13 StanG // Jun 10, 2010 at 7:15 pm

    Steve #12

    For all the details recorded in this article you seem to concentrate on what is not there and make the biggest deal out of it.

    There’s no evidence of the military preparing to overthrow a possible PTP government. They are trying to prevent Thaksin’s return but that’s not the same thing.

    I don’t think Paul Chambers left out the most juicy parts, military plans for world domination, on purpose.

    We’ve been fed “this government is a military puppet” line for over a year, now Thaksin himself lambasted Anupong for kowtowing to Abhisit.

    Someone should send him a link to New Mandala, I guess.

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  • 14 Tarrin // Jun 10, 2010 at 7:27 pm

    Yuri – 8

    Despite his somewhat retarded look and greedy nature, Big-Jiw is one of the cream of the crop of the Thai Army, if you look at his track record you will know that the guy got serious brain power. Big-Jiw has influence over many of the high-quality officers in the Army, those that not simply following order but smart enough to stay quiet and make the move when time has come. You can see how much influence he got by simply look at the day when he gave the 11th Regiment a visit with a brown envelop, then suddenly everyone seems to forgot about the over-throwing monarchy charge. Yes, FredKorat is right about Big-Jiw greed, but he’s certainly wrong about Big-Jiw ability to think beyond his own pocket. I suspected that Big-Jiw might think that this sinking boat is not going to last for long, that’s why he decided to abandon ship and join a new one instead.

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  • 15 Jim Taylor // Jun 10, 2010 at 7:35 pm

    Paul a couple of points: you say “Moreover, one could say that Thailand has only begun tracing democratization since the end of military rule in 2007″…I’d say military rule never ended! Secondly, there is talk now that Surayud (seemingly quiet) was actually behind organising the snipers. he is absolutely tough, ideologic and uncompromising. There is a great deal of detail here in this article. It is clear to me that Thailand will close iteslf like Burma; Somyot Pruksakasemsuk , editor of the now banned Voice of Thaksin (VOT), currently under detention, said much the same thing (which is why he was put away). He also indicated that, as many of us thought, three days before the crackdown there was a coup which saw Prayut come into dominance. The actions fo the present regime indicate a lack of concern for domestic/electorate and international human rights and show lack of a civilised way in dealing with opposition. The only way forward is backwards and dictatorship. The first principals of fascism are already in place. New appointments in October will show the line up in power among the amaat/military as I suggested elsewhere in a blog. This is a movement to uproot Thaksin and his support base (Red Shirts). I think we should be concerned that Red Shirt core leaders will be killed, as indeed Somyot. The country is already in the first step to closure: media opposition blocked; information controlled; opposition not to be tolerated; opposition figures banned from financial transactions, etc…We should all take notice. Dr Athit Urairat, owner of the rabid “Yellow” Rangsit University said that the 2006 coup was sloppy and needs to be finished properly this time…

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  • 16 From Prem to Prayuth and Beyond « Werewolf's Lair // Jun 10, 2010 at 8:02 pm

    [...] http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/06/09/the-challenges-for-thailand%E2%80%99s-arch-royal... [...]

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  • 17 Jim Taylor // Jun 10, 2010 at 8:37 pm

    one more thing, Paul see “Matichon Weekly” (28 May, 2010 [2553], vol.1554, pp 16-17) which gives a full dislosure of the game play but emphasises two unsavoury individuals to watch: Prayut, which you mention, and equally hardcore junior Lt. General Daopong Rattansuwan (พล.ท.ดาว์พงษ์ รัตนสุวรรณ รอง เสธ.ทบ) who was involved in the “Bloody May” 1992 killings. Both have to please Abhisit because they are in line for the top job, though Prayut will be “first cab off the rank”. Both were hailed as heroes by the Democrat Party alliance after their killing spree of innocent protestors.

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  • 18 michael // Jun 10, 2010 at 11:32 pm

    re. #16: on the first photo @ Werewolf’s Lair, when one runs a mouse over it, the message “prem_tinsulanonda_cropped” comes up. Is this an in-joke?

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  • 19 chris beale // Jun 11, 2010 at 2:11 am

    Tarrin #14 – if Big Jiw has such brains and influence, how come he was able to get a better outcome for the Red Shirts than this ?

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  • 20 Bangrak // Jun 11, 2010 at 3:34 am

    I think the contributors are so far missing a trick here, something that has not escaped the attention of Paul Chambers.

    The author mentions several times that all the military reshuffling is revolving around the Queen’s Guards corps. I think there is a sub-text here that Mr. Chambers would like us to consider

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  • 21 FredKorat // Jun 11, 2010 at 3:36 am

    #14

    Serious brainpower? You have far too much respect for a man who is a walking political flip-flop. You also seem to have a fairly strange notion of what makes a ‘high-quality’ officer. You mean the sort of man who manages to get his comparatively well-equipped unit completely routed by a rag-tag bunch of Laotian irregulars, abandoning dozens of casualties in the process. It is all too obvious that his ability as an officer was compromised by his constant desire to engage in far too many dirty tricks. Likewise Thaksin.

    Some people spend a life time complaining about the parlous state of the country, but still want to hero-worship these dubious criminal elements,because they superficially look like ‘hard men’. Therein lies Thailand’s failure. Political ‘strongmen’ have completely failed this country. Why crave for more?

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  • 22 polo // Jun 11, 2010 at 6:00 am

    Regarding Gen Chavalit, I think the best way to see him is having always sought to break out of the shadow of Prem and, as well, find a way to erode the lock Prem has on the military hierarchy as Chambers has described. He’s never absolutely disloyal to Prem — he’s not a direct critic — but he’s never been loyal/subservient enough to be like Surayud, a part of the court. Chavalit’s motive is never really clear — a Thaksin-like vanity, a coherent view of Thai political evolution (1988′s “presidium comments?), or just Banharn-like avarice. But, besides his many obvious shortcomings, the ultimate barrier to his success always seems to be Prem. Prem has never backed his efforts to become PM, something Big Jiew seemed to have expected in the 1980s.

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  • 23 Tarrin // Jun 11, 2010 at 12:10 pm

    chris beale – 19

    Tarrin #14 – if Big Jiw has such brains and influence, how come he was able to get a better outcome for the Red Shirts than this ?

    Because he’s not the one who call the shot, furthermore, he’s smart enough not to get into trouble as well, he is smart but in a slimy way, you know what I mean. Moreover, there could be no other way to save the protest since the day of its inception in March, the demand for house dissolution is simply too weak and wouldn’t solve any of the fundamental problems or attract enough support from the population.

    FredKorat –

    If you really read the record the reason why Thailand lost the secret war to Laos was because, a radio man give the wrong coordinated to the attacking plane thus the plane attack their own position and the Laotian Army overrun a very important tactical position thus lead to a stalemate and cease-fire agreement thereafter. Is that his fault? could be, that’s up to debate. If you really know how to Army works you would know that there are various type of personal working for the Army, there are some people in the Thai Army who graduate from West-point or even MIT, that’s the type of people that Big-Jiw have connection with.

    If my reason still doesn’t sound convincing then don’t you wonder why the government is so reluctant to put a charge on him? he never go to the court, he dodged most of the political cases while the 111 of TRT and some from PPP got banned from politic. Despite all that he is able to support the PTP indirectly. If he’s stupid he would have been shot like Dae Dang long time ago.

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  • 24 FredKorat // Jun 11, 2010 at 1:50 pm

    Tarrin, as a non-supporter of this government I am not in the least bit surprised they let him off the hook. If soldiers dabble in politics, they inevitably get it wrong. They have the wrong set of skills. and it’s time they learned that plain & simple fact. The MIT boast doesn’t impress this mere mortal. In Big Jiew’s case, one wonders whether his military skills are really up to much either. Perhaps it would be better for him to concentrate on running his optical business to actually make money and provide better glasses to read the fine print. Some people think they can run before they have learned to walk.

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  • 25 FredKorat // Jun 11, 2010 at 1:58 pm

    And basically Tarrin, every time you talk about this issue, it is really easy to figure that you are a bit of an inside admirer of certain elements of the military. Take this advice. it’s time for them to stop trying to be God in this country and do the job they are paid to do, regardless of whether they have an MIT education or not. I’ve met MIT grads in this country, in top jobs. They have failed to impress me, since they are still locked into the worst kind of grayngjai with people they perceive to be of their own sort. It’s either that or they are locked in a conflicts in which the bystanders always get all the blame.

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  • 26 Tarrin // Jun 11, 2010 at 2:52 pm

    FredKorat – 24,25

    Sorry to hear that even MIT grad even fail you, but comparing to the people that graduated from the supposedly Thailand’s oxford or Thailand’s west-point you might actually felt 3-tier US graduated is a least 3-leaps ahead. The point why I brought this up was because I want to show you that, there are many quality people in the Army that really want the Army to reform but because of the current corrupted system forced them to go with the flow like staged coup, sell drugs, and kill their own citizen even if they don’t want to but they have to do it anyway for career advancement or whatever the reason might be.

    However, I agreed with you that they have to stop trying to be God (father). Now at least suspected that Big-Jiw knows what is going on and what’s the proper cause of action that Thailand needs to take to fix this fundamental problem. His decision to join the group that thinks that Thailand needs to change is a testament to that( however, I’m not talking about PTP or the red but liberal-leaned population as a whole) that’s why he doesn’t mindlessly listen to the order from the “top” like what Prayuth has been doing. I honestly felt that Big-Jiw might actually be one of the changing force in the Army, but I still think that Big-Jiw is too slimy to be seriously committed to movement unless he is certain that he has join the winning side.

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  • 27 E. Falang // Jun 13, 2010 at 4:24 am

    “There are many quality people in the Army that really want the Army to reform but because of the current corrupted system forced them to go with the flow like staged coup, sell drugs, and kill their own citizen even if they don’t want to but they have to do it anyway for career advancement or whatever the reason might be.”

    How is it I know the comment above was written by a Thai?
    What is it in the culture that allows someone to write this without critical thought and others (I hope) to act like this.
    Change this attitude and you change Thailand.
    ”someone else can do it”
    “‘Leave it to Father to sort out”

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  • 28 Tarrin // Jun 13, 2010 at 1:39 pm

    E. Falang – 27

    I’m assured you that I’m as Thai as I can be, I was born and raise in BKK. My family even got some people working with the Thai Military and the Police. I know what’s the deal here, this is not about personal attitude but the system so corrupted that if you even show a slight intention to of disrupting it, you will be punish dearly. However, if you lick your way hard, you will be rewarded handsomely. Believe me, if I don’t know what is so rotten in there I wouldn’t dare to say all those harsh criticism.

    If you don’t believed me then take a look at what happen to the person responsible for 14 Oct 1973 massacre, Thanom Kittikachorn, he was responsible for 77 deaths during the massacre. What happened to him? He was nominated to become a member of the honorary Royal Guard by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, fortunately he turned down the offer. Moreover, all of his medical spending was being paid by palace. This is just one obvious example, if you dig into Thailand’s history to will no that there are so many things that have gone wrong.

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  • 29 Nuomi // Jun 14, 2010 at 1:22 am

    Yuri: (Re your qn abt Big jiw)

    While this is a fascinating and from my perspective fairly accurate description of what is going on in the army, at the end of the day, this article seeks to explain the situation from a facet of the army perspective. While it is true that the army do exert undue influence on Thai politics, one must not underestimate the more indirect influence of the Families, and of course the white elephant. Power is after all judiciously and carefully and delicately divided between all of the above players.

    The heart of everything that recently ended with parts of Bangkok burning can be simply traced back to – Generational Change.

    The King was in ill health. Prem is also getting on his years. The next generation is jostling amongst themselves, and itching to take over. Imagine all the potential for back room deals and fights that is certain to take place in such a situation.

    To say that Jiw was bought by Taksin with money is a very naive way of looking at the whole. It is true that Taksin’s wealth bought him some allies, but by and large, the most powerful that sided with Taksin is motivated by more than money – it is power, and long term power after Prem that all the big players are looking at.

    I’m sorry, I think I need to think more carefully about phrasing what I would like to write.

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  • 30 FredKorat // Jun 14, 2010 at 2:26 pm

    #29 “To say that Jiw was bought by Taksin with money is a very naive way of looking at the whole. It is true that Taksin’s wealth bought him some allies, but by and large, the most powerful that sided with Taksin is motivated by more than money – it is power, and long term power after Prem that all the big players are looking at. ”

    Money or Power? Who cares what really spoils them. The net effect is the same.

    I would contend it is also very naive of you to make such statements about Thaksin’s money. You don’t have to look very far to find the dirt trails. But of course we can’t ever prove it with a police force and judiciary that usually works for the highest bidder.

    So what is it that you NMers are frightened of here. Perhaps it’s waking up one morning and finding that there isn’t a single party here worthy of your support. Do you ever get lonesome because you are left with no one to grayngjai?

    My advice to Thai politicians is simple. It is up to YOU to prove your innocence to ME. Not the other way round. That is your burden for operating a system which you have deliberately tampered with to obscure the facts. Thus, “Thaksin bought Big Jiew ” in my book, until such time as they are both prepared to stoop to comprehensively prove their innocence. But of course neither of them will ever do that, since they are both locked into a vicious cicle of compulsive lying to save their own skins.

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  • 31 David Brown // Jun 14, 2010 at 10:43 pm

    Stan G #13
    (are you, like Vichai N, employed by Webair International, or some other similar agency paid by CRES to troll these blog comments? just asking, yes or no?)

    Fred Korat #30

    in a working democracy:

    a. regular elections allow the voting citizens to pick and choose their representatives
    b. the only other critical element is that the people of the country must accept the result of elections and permit the elected representatives to resolve their differences in the parliament

    while a working judiciary is useful, and corruption-free MPs, etc, etc are highly desirable it is the democratic processes a. and b. above that eventually weed out the objectionable elements

    in Thailand’s case, as we all know and shown in this article and the comments, it is the unwillingness of the Military/amart to accept the democratic process and resort to force that maintains peoples cynicism and desire for “stability” in lieu of human and political rights

    Thailand is in a bad and declining state right no, the only options I see are:

    a. the royal family to scrape together whatever reputation and influence it still has, repudiate their links with the military (Border Patrol Police, Village Scouts, etc) and declare support for democratic elections under the 1997 Constitution

    b. the ordinary majority of Thais, under redshirt or some other leadership, to rise up and demand the military generals withdraw from all involvement in politics, legal and illegal businesses, any operations within Thailand including in the south, with refugees and border operations except as explicitly authorised from time to time by the elected government.

    Neither of these seem probable now but we need to live in hope.

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  • 32 FredKorat // Jun 15, 2010 at 4:40 pm

    #31 Live in hope, yes. Live in abbeyance to the god-king of chiangmai and his sychophants, no.

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  • 33 Tarrin // Jun 15, 2010 at 6:51 pm

    FredKorat’s comment about living under god-king sound so ironic to me….

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  • 34 StanG // Jun 15, 2010 at 7:26 pm

    DB #31,

    No, I “troll” this blog out of sheer stupidity.

    How about some pointers instead? Where in the article there’s any evidence the military is looking to dominate politics beyond keeping Thaksin at bay?

    What is their contingency plan if/when PTP forms a government?

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  • 35 David Brown // Jun 15, 2010 at 9:04 pm

    Stan G #34

    would it be stupid to work for Webair?

    anyway, to answer your first request – the first sentence seems to represent the situation in Thailand

    to say its applies in most countries, maybe, but not in any sensible democracy… whats this bullshit of a nexus? the military must be wholly subservient and obey the civilian rulers otherwise the country, like Thailand, is in deep trouble

    their plan is to get rid of any government, including the Democrats, if they dont do what they are told

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  • 36 Tarrin // Jun 15, 2010 at 9:35 pm

    StanG – 34

    If those information is readily available we wouldn’t be discuss about this, it was because the Thai military is one of the most secretive and shady organizations in Thailand. Writing an article or research that pain the military bad will get you into serious trouble here. Aint you wondering why there’s nobody interested in making movie about 6 Oct 1976?

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  • 37 Robert Albritton // Jun 16, 2010 at 5:18 am

    The essential weakness of Thai government is that “the government” does not control the military, the police, or the civil service. The government issues orders that these groups blithely ignore. Of course, the Constitution specifies that the primary allegiance of the military is not to a democratically-elected government, but to the king. “Permanent secretaries” handle the issue as far as the bureaucracy is concerned. This arrangement means that actions of the three in opposition to the government are “legitimate” if they have the blessings of higher authority which, historically, has been forthcoming. Under these conditions, democracy is impossible.
    While the lack of confidence in democratically-elected governments gives many Thais pause about entrusting the future of Thailand to “the government,” democracy is not possible until government is supreme over the military, the police, and the civil service. What is necessary is for Thais to learn to live with governments chosen by ballot of the people, no matter how disreputable they might be, and to change the government only at the next available ballot. If citizens are patient for the next ballot, then they must accept responsibility for the government they get (whether bought or not). Democracy is about citizens being able to choose who governs in their behalf – nothing else. All other considerations (patronage, vote-buying, etc.) tend to make the perfect the enemy of the good.

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  • 38 StanG // Jun 16, 2010 at 12:20 pm

    The title is “The challenges for Thailand’s arch-royalist military” and it’s the most detailed description of military factions and infighting so far and there’s nothing about plans to dominate civilian politics or deal with the succession, much less about plans “to get rid of any government” – the self-evident truth to some of NM extra enlightened commentators.

    Oh, yeah, Chambers didn’t include it because he was scared of the govt persecution…

    Tarrin, weren’t you the one arguing that army chiefs have no control over such basic things like the size of the army and they are entirely in the civilian Cabinet domain?

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  • 39 Srithanonchai // Jun 16, 2010 at 3:36 pm

    StanG #38

    You belong to the type of member of the “commentariat” who can come up with a comment even though he has to say nothing…

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  • 40 StanG // Jun 16, 2010 at 6:53 pm

    My point is rather clear and simple – the “military wants to destroy the democracy” theory has no supporting evidence even in the most detailed description of what is going on in the ranks, and neither does the theory that all Thai power plays boil to a single issue of succession.

    What was the contribution of Sritanonchai in #39? Nothing, just further personalizing the discussion.

    What is Webair International, btw. I couldn’t find any references to it on the Internet, only quotes from David Brown’s standard question he posted at least twice.

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  • 41 Srithanonchai // Jun 16, 2010 at 10:01 pm

    StanG #40

    “What was the contribution of Sritanonchai in #39? Nothing, just further personalizing the discussion.”

    Since when is peculiarly personal blah blah called a “discussion”? Don’t readers have any human rights on this blog, or should this be “readers’ rights”? Should there be, in addition to quality assessment points, also a “readers’ charter”?

    By the way, you haven’t congratulated NM yet, which provides you with yet another outlet for your highly instructive commentary.

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  • 42 Tarrin // Jun 16, 2010 at 10:47 pm

    StanG – 38

    Tarrin, weren’t you the one arguing that army chiefs have no control over such basic things like the size of the army and they are entirely in the civilian Cabinet domain?

    Yep, and it is still the case. When I said the chief of Army has no control over things like size of the army, I really mean it and that’s what it still is today, but I didn’t say the army chiefs doesn’t have “influence” over the cabinet, its a 2 separate issue here.

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  • 43 Tarrin // Jun 16, 2010 at 10:50 pm

    StanG – 40

    The past 18 coup detat is in itself evident enough to prove that the military is anti democracy.

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  • 44 StanG // Jun 16, 2010 at 11:36 pm

    Well, since no discussion on military plans for world domination is forthcoming I’ll just take my coat.

    As I said earlier – I engage with some of you people here out of sheer stupidity.

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  • 45 StanG // Jun 16, 2010 at 11:46 pm

    Tarrin, I’ll leave you with your fantasy where the army chief has no control over the army but is in control of civilian cabinet instead. It’s too convoluted to consider seriously.

    The history of the last coup is that even after taking power the generals need democracy, and they have no desire to run the country themselves.

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  • 46 Tarrin // Jun 17, 2010 at 11:50 am

    StanG – 45

    When did I say the Army chief has no control over the army? I think you just want to argue until you can’t read properly anymore, I said the Army chief has no control over the “size” of the army. If the Army chief have the control on the issue then damn if I am the chief of army I would have enlisted every able man in Thailand and make the largest army in the world.

    The history of the last coup is that even after taking power the generals need democracy, and they have no desire to run the country themselves.

    You mean the democracy that all the opposing political parties that the army doesn’t support can be ban on spot if they dare to challenge the establishment power?? that is not democracy, that fascism. Even if they have no desire to run the country but they had suck a good portion of the tax payers money into their own pocket, where do you think Sondhi, a C10 level civil servant get the money to buy his Rolex or setting up his own political party from???

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  • 47 StanG // Jun 17, 2010 at 3:38 pm

    When Surayud was the army chief he planned to reduce the army size.

    Not long time ago Prem suggested that they created a new division, based in Korat, if I’m not mistaken.

    In both cases they didn’t even consult the civilians in the Cabinet though technically they probably need the Cabinet consent, for funding issues if nothing else.

    Apart from major moves like that, I don’t think Cabinet oversees their “lucky draws” and so they can recruit more or less soldiers each year as needed.

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  • 48 chris beale // Jun 17, 2010 at 6:26 pm

    StanG #48 :
    Re – “Not long time ago Prem suggested that they created a new division, based in Korat, if I’m not mistaken.”
    I’m pretty certain this new division was to be stationed at Khon Kaen, Korat already having two huge military bases staffed over decades with rock-solid Prem loyalists.
    The new division was to be a cavalry (i.e. tank) division like that within which Prem himself long ago served.
    Prem was reported as saying that he wanted to see this new division established before the end of his life, and to be an important part of his legacy.
    What surprised me, was that such a division had not been established years ago, given the very long tradition of Isaarn rebellion, and the crucial role of Thailand’s two other tank divisions in numerous coups.

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  • 49 StanG // Jun 17, 2010 at 10:27 pm

    Thanks, Chris, I don’t remember these details very well.

    The talk has gone quiet, though.

    The first thing that comes to mind is that they need more troops on the ground to control reds there, ISOC style, explaining the meaning of life and such.

    I’m pretty sure Prem hasn’t run it by Abhisit yet.

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  • 50 What has Prem been up to? « Political Prisoners in Thailand // Jun 28, 2010 at 9:03 am

    [...] Chambers had some useful comments on this at New Mandala not that long ago and they are worth citing in this [...]

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  • 51 Bill W // Jun 28, 2010 at 5:29 pm

    No matter how bad things look at the moment and how much control all these elites have today, they cannot live forever. There days will all come to an end as happens to everyone.
    Hopefully as evolution progresses and the population gets more educated and becomes more informed and sickened by the oppression that is now put upon the majority by these self righteous elites, the government will be returned to the people by majority rule, not rule of a few for their own gain.
    All you have to do is wait. Change is coming, slow but sure!

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  • 52 Thailand’s Generals Play Musical Chairs – Part 2 « Saiyasombut // Aug 5, 2010 at 12:04 am

    [...] inside the army to ascend through the ranks, I recommend reading Paul Chamber‘s lengthy, but in-depth essay on New Mandala. It also contains a handy list of all the current top army [...]

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