An article entitled “Lessons from the Operation Encirclement at the Ratchaprasong area during 14-19 May 2010” reveals the military perspective on their success during the crackdown on the Red Shirt movement in April-May 2010. It is published in Senathipat (Vol.59, No.3, September-December 2010), an academic journal published by the Centre of Doctrine and Strategic Development, Army Training Command, and written by an army officer under his pen name, Chief Khuang, an Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Cadet Class 32. This article is said to be part of the “Guidelines Document for Military Operation: A Case Study of Conflict Resolution in Urban Area” as an attempt to redesign the Army’s role in dealing with a new form of conflict in urban areas.
The article has many interesting points regarding the direct involvement of the government in commanding the military operation and the unity of the government and the military. Many points mentioned in the article are in sharp contrast to what leaders of the Democrat Party presented to the public during their campaign rally on Thursday night last week.
1. The article clearly shows that the government had a clear policy that it wanted the military to use its operation to “end the demonstration, not to pressure them for negotiation”. The Prime Minister is also mentioned as ordering the military to commence its operation as planned by himself in the Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation (CRES) meeting of 12 May 2010 (p. 58).
The operation was planned to have three stages: (1) the primary encirclement on 14 May; (2) strategic retreat for assessment during 15-18 May; (3) the full encirclement on 19 May (p. 58). Matichon newspaper suggests that the failure of the offer by Senators to act as mediator on 18 May may be attributed to this well-planned strategy to “end” the Red Shirt protesters. This may also be contrary to Suthep’s claim last Thursday that he was the one who commanded the operation, not Abhisit.
2. The author also concludes that one of the reasons for the success of the encirclement operation was the withdrawal of Veera Musikapong and the death of Major General Khattiya Sawasdipol or Sae Daeng. These events weakened the UDD considerably, as it suddenly lacked both political and strategic masterminds (p. 60). This analysis works against Suthep’s earlier statement casting suspicion on Jatuporn’s faction for involvement in the assassination of Seh Daeng.
3. This article also delineates most of the operational plan and military units involved (pp. 60-61). It also admits the operation was “a full-scale military operation.” The military were fully equipped with real ammunition including the Sniper Unit, modern weapons, and armoured fighting vehicles. The use of real ammunition is claimed to have lifted the morale among soldiers whose morale had plunged since the operation on 10 April 2010 (p. 62).
4. The article mentions that the Sniper Units were deployed into the area especially on the high-rise buildings for counter-ambush. They were the first groups that seized the elevated areas particularly buildings in Wireless Road and around Sarasin Junction (p. 63).
5. CRES’ intelligence pointed to the existence of around 500 terrorists disguised among UDD. They were equipped with ambush weapons and ammunition such as M-79, M-16, Ak-47, and Travo-21 (p. 63).
6. The article also proposes some tactics for urban area conflict resolution (pp. 64-68). It suggests that the soldiers involved in such kind of operation should bear in mind that the most important principle is to protect and save lives of the innocents. The firing of weapons must be done under a careful judgement without the intervention of anger or vengeance. It warns that soldiers should carry and use weapons in the safest manner according to the training instructions and should remind themselves that one shooting may cause the government to collapse (p. 67).
7. It also points to the obstacle of the operation caused by UDD’s sniper unit and suggests that the Army should urgently train more snipers so that it can use these sniper units more effectively both in Bangkok and in other provinces (pp.67, 68).
8. The article, however, states that the army should further study and find an appropriate model to implement the “fire zone by real ammunition”. This practice is not universally accepted or found in any other country as a means to suppress riots (p.68).
Well who knows what to make of this.You can’t trust a single word from this military/goverment.Who can trust a single word they write down either ?Written AFTER they had butchered scores of “innocent”…..We have heared it all before,i.e.:”The most important principle is to protect and save lives of the innocent.” they say,AFTER the body count reveals most deaths were “innocent”.How many more “We did not fire cluster bombs” “Soldiers only fired in self defence” ect ect…have we got to put up with ? god it’s sickening….I won’t go on. They seem to take credit for the death of Sae Daeng which they say contributed to a sucessful operation.But deny killing him publicly,or even revealing to the reconcilliation panels how or who done this. Pathetic.
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Analyzing the heroic victory of the great Thai Army over protesters armed to the teeth with slingshots and som tum pestles.
Urban warfare? Hardly — they should have gone to Fallujah or Mogadishu for a a dose of that, against an enemy who’s actually armed, entrenched, closely familiar with the terrain, and prepared for a drawn-out fight (asymmetric as it may be).
This was just a riot dispersion operation gone wild… and a spectacularly unsuccessful one, given the failure to prevent both high civilian casualties *and* major property damage (especially burning of Center One mall which wasn’t close to the action or in an area occupied by the Red Shirts).
Yes, the army *won* and cleared out Rachaprasong of protesters — who would have expected otherwise? Last time they fought a semi-competent foreign army (of mighty Laos), they actually lost…
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The fact that they wrote an article on it, suggested that they took pride in what they know they are best at – Shooting Civilians. It’s probably the core basis on which the RTA is founded for.
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Fact is, UDD spokesman Sean Boonpracong after the April 10th bloodbath said militants intervened on UDD’s behalf (Reuters) – Seh Daeng himself claimed to have 300 men armed with M79′s under his command (The Age)
Having been in the military myself and knowing full well what the weapons the Thai military employed are capable of doing, had they been really “massacring” people, 100′s would be dead per day. I observed just what they described in this report -and in your heart of hearts anyone who witnessed 2010′s events knows this is true.
The report itself says they suspected around 500 armed militants to be amongst the protesters. Everyone in Bangkok during April/May 2010 remembers the nightly gun battles – you know there were armed elements and even HRW & the foreign press has to admit it even if they use weasel words like “mostly unarmed.”
How else should you deal with a situation like this? And in the report they mention “UDD snipers” of course they are the ones that killed Col. Romklao on April 10, and most likely were the ones at least partly responsible for killing people throughout the remainder of the operations.
Just as we see in Yemen and Syria now, there are violent groups purposefully killing civilians AND security forces alike to escalate the violence to reach a “critical mass.”
If you are mad about the loss of life – be angry at protest leaders who allowed their protests to serve as cover for armed militants EVERYONE admits were there. Be angry at how they attempted and still do attempt to leverage the loss of life to this very day as a political ploy. Be angry at the leaders who duped their followers into a “peaceful” protest they knew they were preparing to spring as a bloodbath. After April 10th, negotiations were out of the question. No government on Earth would negotiate with a group that sanctioned the murder of government troops.
The govt. is guilty of all sorts of shenanigans, dishonesty, and coverups of various failures in the above stated operation – however it is a stretch – a very malicious one at that – to assert the military purposefully “massacred” civilians. Having been a Marine – a single competent marksman, not even a sniper, could have killed HUNDREDS of people a day. The Thai military had thousands of troops in the city for weeks – do the math.
Of 91 dead – 9 were police and soldiers. 1 was a woman killed by a UDD M79 fired via indirect fire from Lumpinee Park, and at least 1 protester died of smoke inhalation when looting a building fellow protesters had lit ablaze. Over the weeks of unrest, 91 is a shockingly low number for a “bloodthirsty military machine” bent on massacre.
Use some commonsense – however – already I see people cutting parts out selectively and totally ignoring the fact that the whole strategy was built around countering heavily armed militants using the protests as cover. There are camps on both sides, but then a silent majority that eclipses both – by far a majority. They will read this report and arrive somewhere in between the government coverups and the UDD apologists who attempt to whitewash their role in the violence.
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Tony – 6
, there are violent groups purposefully killing civilians AND security forces alike to escalate the violence to reach a “critical mass.”
Its so easy to prevent that situation, just not bring the military in and use riot police instead. Then if someone start shooting we know for sure its not the government.
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