The challenge of approaching ‘Dialogue’
Next, I would like to raise three concerns on the way we approach the question of interfaith relations with the aim to clarify how we may understand the challenge of inter-religious dialogue, and specifically Christian-Muslim dialogue in the case of Malaysia. These concerns are pertinent because often we may not be talking about the same thing even if we use same terminology.
First, in the discussion on religious dialogue, perhaps we need to clarify what are we describing by the word ‘dialogue’?
Which level of ‘dialogue’ are we discussing?
Is it at the ground level – a personal neighbourly dialogue between Uncle Ali and Grandfather Surin?
Is it the academic ‘dialogue’ between Professor Bakar and Professor Ng?
Is it the dialogue between the church institution and the Home Ministry of the Malaysian government?
Is it a dialogue between an NGO like Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) with the young wing of the Council of Churches of Malaysia (CCM Youth)?
We can add to the list and have different ways to narrow down which ‘level’ we are focusing on. One may assume the ‘rules of engagement’ would be different at different levels depending on who are the participants and the shared goals -implicit or explicit – one has.
Secondly, we may ask what are the different types of ‘Dialogue’?
The contribution from the Federation of Asian Bishop (FABC) is helpful place to start as there has been substantial reflection on this.
Is it a ‘dialogue of life’ where the focus is on the ordinary day to day contact?
Is it a ‘dialogue of action’ where the point of contact is first when different religious communities work together and also reflect together on a shared project?
Is it a ‘Dialogue of discourse’ focused on theology and beliefs? So, besides clarifying the levels of ‘dialogue’ we are addressing, we also consider the types of ‘dialogue’ in operation.
One could even ask whether it is a direct dialogue where we are comparing religious understandings of respective teachings, or more indirect dialogue where we focus on shared concerns and common issues but drawing from the reservoir of the best our faith traditions and the lessons where we have not met up even to our own standards.
Third, and I see this as the ‘biggest’ critical concern because, for each level and types of ‘dialogue’, direct or indirect, there are different conditions that might facilitate or hinder the progress for either subjects or structures.
These conditions have an important impact on pre-existing animosities or suspicions, and also corrective and creative possibilities.
Put in concrete terms, even if we imagine that the Christians and Muslims in ABIM and CCM youth for example, have to at least some extent disciplined their psychological state of minds, the socio-political context that was generated from incidents such as the recent ‘JAIS-DUMC’ controversy, cannot simply be ignored.
In short, the personal or in this case, between two NGOs, while can be distinguished analytically from the political, one might even try hard to ‘bracket’ the political out for a moment, but the complex relation between the two still needs to be attended to, sooner or later. Therefore, the political returns. Or more specifically, the politicians return to the picture again.
The ‘political’ strikes back
Therefore, while one must not get too personal with regards to Mahathir, and after some critical distance, we may entertain a qualified critical agreement that Mahathir probably cannot be held solely responsible for “the failure to bring Malaysians together in a respectful debate about their individual faiths”.
Perhaps we hear the overtone that, “We were all in this together” past, present and future. The implication of Sven’s argument suggests a challenge to the people i.e. religious communities is a welcome one but not at the expense of neglecting the political conditions that the people – religious or non-religious – live in and need to contend with.
We still need to look at the policies or structures during Mahathir’s premiership, and more importantly, for today, what are the policies and structures post-Mahathir during the administration of Abdullah Badawi and now Najib Razak, that are pertinent for our current situation. This is clearly political in both the broad and narrow sense of the term.
What I mean by the political thus far at least is the policies, the existing structures and also one must add the public articulation of the vision of Malaysia especially through the various media networks. Following the Centre of Dialogue, we could consider that at least ‘Dialogue implies a relationship between ‘self’ (in-group) and other (out-group) which is characterised by a degree of empathy, the result of which is to curb the severity of intercultural, inter-religious and international conflicts.” Now applied to the Malaysian politicians across the political divide, how have they fared in fulfilling their responsibility to facilitate the conditions where at least the kind of ‘dialogue’ described in the definition of the centre can be successful?
So, from the perspective balancing the ‘weight of responsibility’ on the people or the politician, the weight should lean more on politicians, especially current and future politicians who desire to be remembered as ‘Statesmen’ defined even in its simplest, “a wise, skillful, and respected political leader”. I would like to stress the whether one is wise and respected, it will depend on how the politician concerned carries out their ‘responsibilities’ mentioned briefly above as the elected representatives of the people. The final verdict is rightly up to the jury of the Malaysian public to decide, and perhaps with the hindsight of history a more complete picture in due time. It appears at the mean time that religious communities are engaged in ‘meaningful inter-religious dialogue’ in spite of unfavorable conditions.
Moving forward
After all is said and done, we still need to keep the conditions that enable or disable religious dialogue on the table for critical discussion. In that way, the people of Malaysia are then included in two ways, first, to have the potential and capacity to change the personal conditions, i.e., addressing possible uncritical inheritance of animosities and suspicions (as recommended in Sven’s argument). And at the same time, the people – yes, even religious people can then be empowered to address the political conditions in ways that will hold our elected representatives responsible on how they are helping or hindering the shared project of religious people with the wider civil society that is “to build consensus for action on the truly great issues facing humanity, including pervasive greed, the increasingly unjust and inequitable distribution of wealth and power, racism and hatred committed in the name of God, nuclear proliferation, violence and exploitation of earth’s finite resources.”
I must confess it is hard to keep the ‘political’ out considering the grand vision for a better humanity implied in an earlier paragraph! It is almost a common mantra to hear that we should not ‘politicize’ religion. If that means religion must not be abused for political mileage, who is to disagree? However, with a cautious note, we are reminded that “Everything is political, even though politics is not everything!” Perhaps, in our reflections, we are tempted to simply ignore or separate the religious from the political since it might be too ‘sensitive’, or maybe what we really need is actually to critically reclaim ‘the religious’, and at the same time, we might as well reclaim ‘the political’ in the process. Hopefully, through confronting the issues head on respectfully we will then live happily ever after – yes, maybe inMalaysiathat is still possible.
In closing, I offer a counter hypothesis:
“The biggest impediments to a more meaningful inter-religious dialogue” in the case of Malaysia is not “historically grown animosities and suspicions” assumed to be in religious leaders or religious people.
On the contrary, the biggest impediments are the social-political conditions generated by the concrete actions of politicians directly or indirectly, through the government institutions, agencies and media networks.
Over to you now – the ones who have the ability to respond – the people!
P.S. perhaps the politicians too?
Sivin Kit is a founding member of Friends in Conversation and one of the initiators of the Micah Mandate. He served as the pastor of Bangsar Lutheran Church from 2000 to 2010 and has been actively engaged in civil society in Malaysia since 2007. Currently, he is pursuing his Ph.D in Religion, Ethics and Society at the University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway. Sivin is addicted to potato chips and thinks the new “Battlestar Galactica” is educational.
Part 1 of this article is HERE
This article is part of a series of articles under the theme, “Faith in Malaysia.”
Hopefully, through confronting the issues head on respectfully we will then live happily ever after – yes, maybe inMalaysiathat is still possible.
You are much more optimistic than I am. Currently the zietgeist of the Muslim world is best represented by the slogan, Islam din wa dawla (Islam is a religion and a state). While the antiquity of this concept in Islamic thought is currently hotly debated by scholars, there is no denying its modern-day popularity with Muslims all around the world.
Indeed, look at the political parties that are succeeding in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring”. Islamist parties currently form the majority in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. This situation is relevant to Malaysia because Egypt is the spiritual, and now physical, home of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). The Ikhwan has a very strong presence in Malaysia; Anwar Ibrahim, and Mahathir Mohamad are but two very well-known members of the Ikhwan. Furthermore, Mohammed Abdul Rauf, a high ranking member of the Ikhwan personally founded four Islamic study centers in Malaysia, including the International Islamic University of Kuala Lumpur.
By definition, within an Islamic state, faith groups engaging in religious dialogue as equals is impossible. One of the cornerstones of political Islam is the supremacy of Islam in all spheres of life. Therefore, there are only a few ways in which to deal with minority faith groups. One method is political Confessionalism (taifiyya). Taifiyya was developed by the Ottoman Empire and is currently found in modern-day Lebanon and Iran. Taifiyya reserves a certain amount of political representation for recognized religious minorities. Of course, political power is controlled by the Islamic majority in this system as recognition is based solely on the fiat of the ruling body.
A second method is known by the controversial term “Dhimmitude”. Within this system, certain religious minorities are tolerated as long as they recognize the supremacy of Islam within the state. Unlike Taifiyya, the religious minority groups do not hold even the slightest bit of token political power; however, they are granted certain rights. Again, religious inequality is inherent in this system.
Finally, the last method would be that of Holy War. Obviously, this is the antithesis of religious dialogue; however, certain schools of thought argue that a truly Islamic state cannot have any non-Muslims living in it.
The failure of pan-Arab socialism, as seen in Iraqi, Syria, and Palestine, has led to it being replaced with a pan-Muslim political Islamism. The success of the revolutions in North Africa and the Levant will only embolden political Islamists in Malaysia. As long as the concept of Islam din wa dawla has currency in the Malaysian Muslim community, there can be no true dialogue.
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The “real-politik” does indeed suggest that inter-faith dialogues and by extension inter-faith relations are extremely difficult.
But do minorities have any other choice?
Dialogue appears to be the “only peaceful way” to engage with the majority community to find an “acceptable settlement”.
In an earlier analysis on inter-faith dialogue with Muslims, Dr. Ng Kam Weng, the research director at Kairos noted that:
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re: Lopez
The “real-politik” does indeed suggest that inter-faith dialogues and by extension inter-faith relations are extremely difficult.
But do minorities have any other choice?
Yes, minorities do have another choice: emigrate.
Let them leave and allow Malaysia to experience what Uganda did after Idi Amin ordered the expulsion of Uganda’s Asian population.
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@ Lleij Samuel Schwartz #3
For many, and in fact the most vulnerable and those who suffer the most – emigrating is not an option.
They neither have the means (money) and often the information (which country, what skills, what processes, etc).
Do you think it would be good idea if there were non – profit organisations that assisted people in migrating legally and accept a fee only when the client/migrant is successfully employed in the new country?
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@ Lleij Samuel Schwartz #1
The issue of ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ as a significant one, I see more as one of ‘how’ they are related in Islam. This is ‘how’ is what other religions wrestle with too. I’d add that even ‘secularism’ in various forms is in the same boat when it comes to ‘how’. Christianity for example, went through a range of historic circumstances that challenged and shaped its various theologies. We could start all the way back to Constantine, through to the Christendom of Middle Ages (a Political Christianity?), through to the mini-Christendoms after the Reformation, as well as minority voices within Christianity as a whole. Not to forget in the 20th Century, the important contribution of European Political Theologies and also Latin American Liberation Theologies, and so forth all demonstrate a highly sophisticated nuanced ‘critical discourse’ (cf. Critical theory) within at least one religious tradition.
Now, if we turn the attention to ‘Islam’, could it be that to some extent, this is happening in an even more intense manner. I’m no expert in the Middle East, but perhaps the complexities of the ‘Arab Spring’ (another term generated by the Media), will need time to play itself out. A close look at the post-’Jasmine Revolution’ Tunisia and how they navigate to the future will be illuminating (cf. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2012/01/201212612029993814.html). The story still seems to be unfolding …
In the case of Malaysia, I’d like to suggest there is a vibrant debate within the Muslim Discourse on this matter, well summarized here under the title “Towards a Peaceful Malaysia: What Role Can Muslims Play?” http://www.al-ahkam.net/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7014%3Atowards-a-peaceful-malaysia-what-role-can-muslims-play-&catid=69%3Aartikel. On a side note, could you furnish more ‘evidence’ or ‘elaboration’ on what you mean by Mahathir and Anwar being ‘members of the Ikhwan’? Is it a self-description or one from the ‘outside’? (I’m not sure I understood you correctly)
Of course, regardless, you are right to point out to some extent, there maybe a kind of ‘cross-fertilization’ of ideas within the ‘Muslim Discourse’ that is linked to developments in the Middle East, but I’m less confident than you on a direct causal relationship between the two. And even if one can argue about ‘influence’, we still need to ask ‘how is it influential’ and ‘in what way’.
I think there are other contextual factors that will mitigate the kind of thinking that can be generated – and I think the example of the Forum on in the article I linked above shows how this is being played out. We need more empirical evidence to help us understand this better.
Next on “Dhimmitude”, while conceptually this contested term might have some currency in mindsets and attitudes, but empirically it’s simply not the case, currently in Malaysia, at least not yet. I see this as an ongoing struggle in the trajectory Malaysia is heading. The fact is while Islam is the Religion of the Federation of Malaysia, similar to Lutheranism is the State Religion of the Kingdom of Norway brings before us some ‘constitutional’ limitations that we have inherited historically – perhaps to some for the better, and to others for the worse, but it’s there. of course, the separation of religion and state is clearer in the minds of Norwegians, but that’s another story (which relates to my earlier comments on how Christianity as a religion adapts to the social-political contexts of its time.)
There is no denying that with the different State enactments, the inability of the courts to rule clearly when it comes to controversial issues related to Religion as well as ‘Islamization’ defined as a kind of ‘Islamic Engineering’ by UMNO as argued strongly in Liow’s “Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia ” (2009) complicates the matter further. These are key issues to be analyzed and I suspect the interpretations of different scholars will be determined by the hermeneutical orientations they start off with. But, I think we’re still not in the position to play ‘Nostradamus’ in offering ‘predictions’ absolutely.
On the point of Holy War, it will be interesting on whether it is even possible to argue for an Islamic State without any non-Muslims in Malaysia living in it. I doubt one can even argue that for Indonesia as a nation. Unless, you want to have a kind of one nation but some Muslims reside in State A, then ‘others’ in State B. I’m not sure how we could imagine this is possible at all in Malaysia.
To press it further, one might ask how this notion of ‘Holy War’ relates to the notion of Islam as a religion of ‘Peace’. This has also been the challenge for Christianity from the ‘Crusades’ to ‘Post-Sept 11 wars’. I think it’s important not to dismiss too quickly the kind of capacity religious communities may have within them at all the levels from the scholars to the people on the ground on how they are negotiating all these complexities. In short, perhaps one might argue that there is a ‘Critical theory’ approach that can be shown to be present historically in the Islamic tradition for example.
@ Greg Lopez #2 & #4
‘Real-Politik’ is probably the starting point for most given the circumstances of a given situation. But for religious communities, it cannot be the only point of departure, because that will go against the more ‘transcendent’ motivations, or ethical demands from their respective traditions. So, the motivation has to dig deeper.
I think of the Orang Asli friends I have in Cameron Highlands, I doubt they can emigrate even they want to (unless we totally forget about ‘nation-state boundaries). A friend of mine coined the term ‘Hope-timist’ – it’s a nice twist from the usual optimist-pessimist spectrum. I think simply asking people to emigrate, and especially for those who can’t is telling them to give up ‘hope’ for a future they can in some way contribute to.
so the discussion turning our attention to “the most vulnerable and those who suffer the most” keeps us from reducing our discussions in New Mandela to the level of “bourgeois” echo-chamber talk.
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