No matter how the elite power struggle ends, the future of Thai democracy will depend on the political orientation of the middle classes. Will political entrepreneurs continue to mobilize mass protests for elite interests, or will the middle classes settle for a social compromise to safeguard their own interests? In order to bring the Bangkok middle class back into the democratic flock, it is important to understand the root causes for its rage. Middle class rage is driven by fear and anger. If Thai society wants social peace, middle class fear and anger must be addressed.
Two games in town
The protracted political conflict in Thailand plays out on two different, yet deeply interwoven levels. The elites fight over the control of the country for the next generation while, the society at large demands clean (‘yellow’) and responsive (‘red’) governance.
In the most recent escalation, much attention is given to the whistle mob on the streets, while the power struggle behind the scenes has been left mostly unmentioned. Much is at stake here; aware of the dramatic shift in the balance of power, the old elites are making one last stand to bend the rules in their favor. In the short run, the political conflict will be decided by which elite faction manages to win the upper hand.
This does not mean the street protests are irrelevant. Their role is to put pressure on both the government and the military. This is not to say that the grievances of hundreds of thousands of protesters over corruption, clientelism and nepotism are unfounded or illegitimate; on the very contrary, holding those in power accountable is a key factor for the consolidation of democracy. The majority of whistle blowers seems to be unaware of the power struggle behind the scenes and may genuinely believe to be on a crusade to purge Thailand from the scourge of corruption. In the bigger picture, however, the role of the protests is to lend legitimacy to an illegitimate power grab.
This leads to a key player in the greater transformation crisis, the middle class. In the long run, the political conflict will be decided by the ability (or lack thereof) of elite factions to mobilize the middle classes to safeguard their interests. At this critical juncture between a democratic and an autocratic path, Thailand’s future will depend by upon the sway of the middle class. Hence, it is therefore of utmost importance to understand what causes middle class rage.
Middle class rage from Bangkok to Istanbul
Middle classes from Bangkok to Istanbul, from Cairo to Kiev seek to overthrow elected governments outside of the electoral cycle. Wary of majority rule, the middle class in the capital is ready to form alliances with traditional elites to disenfranchise ordinary citizens and even overthrow electoral democracy. Like their Egyptian peers, well-heeled Bangkokian protesters called for military intervention to deal with the rural masses and their “populist” masters. This anti-democratic behavior seems to contradict liberal notions of the middle class. In Seymour Martin Lipset’s modernization theory, the equation was straightforward: the more middle class, the more democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville should however serve as a reminder that the middle classes have always been wary of “the tyranny of the majority”.
What grievances drive the middle classes to the streets by the hundreds of thousands? What causes the contempt for the majority population, or the fierce resistance and sometimes even hatred of elected governments?
Well, obviously first and foremost the missteps and wrongdoings of these elected governments. Drunk with the power of the electoral mandate, governments tend to display arrogance of power, and blatantly disregard constitutional checks and balances. Endemic corruption, nepotism and cronyism act as the lightning rod for middle class outrage.
But why do some protesters march for more democracy, while others demand less? Grievances over incompetence, lack of responsiveness of those in power and fears over social decline have driven the middle classes to the streets from Spain to Greece. Even in sleepy Stuttgart, outrage over the arrogance of power triggered clashes between riot police and Swabian housewives. However, while there is a vibrant debate about the decline in substance and quality of democracy, these middle classes demand more democracy, not less.
The political economy of development: The uncomfortable sandwich position
Political economists point to the sandwich position of the middle class in the capital between abusive elites on the one side, and emancipating peripheral middle classes[i], urbanized villagers[ii] and rural poor on the other side. The Bangkok middle class, called for democratization and specifically the liberalization of the state with the political rights to protect themselves from the abuse of power by the elites. However once democracy was institutionalized, they found themselves to be the structural minority. Mobilized by clever political entrepreneurs, it was now the periphery who handily won every election. Ignorant to the rise of a rural middle class demanding full participation in social and political life, the middle class in the center interpreted demands for equal rights and public goods as “the poor getting greedy”. In the wake of the euro crisis, majority rule was equated with unsustainable welfare expenses, which would eventually lead to bankruptcy.
In Thailand, such a perception is surprising: tax levels as well as state debt are rather low by international standards. Both in direct and indirect taxes, the middle class does not bear a disproportionate burden. In fact, research shows that it is the poor who still bear the brunt of overall state income. [iii]
Populism deconstructed: Anger over being robbed
However, such a numeric perspective overlooks the political basis of the social contract: a social compromise between all stakeholders. Never has any social contract been signed which obligates the middle class footed the tax bill, in exchange for quality public services, political stability and social peace. This is why middle classes feel like they are “being robbed” by corrupt politicians, who use their tax revenues to “buy votes” from the “greedy poor”. Or, in a more subtle language, the “uneducated rural masses are easy prey for politicians who promise them everything in an effort to get a hold of power”. From this perspective, policies delivering to local constituencies are nothing but “populism”, or another form of “vote buying” by power hungry politicians. The Thai Constitutional Court, in a seminal ruling, thus equated the very principle of elections with corruption. Consequently, time and again, the ‘yellow’ alliance of feudal elites along with the Bangkok middle class called for the disenfranchisement of the “uneducated poor”, or even more bluntly the suspension of electoral democracy.
In other words: middle class rage in Thailand cannot only be explained by numbers alone. At the root of this middle class anger lies the fear of being crushed by an alliance between the elites and the poor.
Anger over “being robbed by corrupt politicians buying off the greedy poor” is the incentivizing factor which has brought hundreds of thousands to the streets. Corruption is the number one grievance of both sides, with slight differences; the ‘yellows’ demand clean governance, while the ‘reds’ demand responsive governance. To be very clear: endemic corruption is indeed a serious problem which hinders social and economic development. To protest against corruption, or even better for good governance, is not only legitimate, but a key driver for the consolidation of democracy.
The political economy of corruption: Capitalism undermines the patronage system
However, in order to effectively decrease the social practice coined “corruption”, we must understand its functional logic in a social order. In a feudalistic regime based on personal relationships between patron and client, resource distribution and patronage of networks are not only vital, but embody the very functional logic of the system. Without the distribution of resources, the patronage system, behind the democratic facades the regime which matters would often collapse. In other words, corruption, nepotism, patronage are not illnesses to be cured, but are the very DNA of the patrimonial system. In a modern order, based on impersonal exchanges between much bigger groups of people over long distances, this social practice to prefer kin over strangers undermines the trust necessary for economic development. Modern polities therefore replace personal relationship based institutions with rules and merit-based institutions. This fundamentally changes the limit of authority of those in power: where the feudal lord had a birthright to “the fat of the land” (but would be wise to distribute it to buy the loyalty of his clients), the modern official can be sanctioned for the use of public funds for anything but the common good.
Corruption deconstructed: Rooting out the Enemy within
To understand the politics of corruption, however, it is important to deconstruct how corruption is framed.
In the progressive discourse, the social practice of distributing resources into a private network is framed as a misappropriation of public funds. In other words, the corrupt official takes something which belongs to the public and uses it for his own personal gain. This is rooted in a deep feeling of social injustice, as the official owes his position either to his professional merit or the public who elected him.
As it is the raison d’être of conservatism to uphold the traditional system, conservatives fail to see or acknowledge that the system is inherently flawed. Hence, in the conservative discourse it must be immoral individuals who ‘corrupt’ society. Consequently, “bad people” must be “rooted out” and replaced with “good people”. ‘Good people’, meaning the traditional feudal and technocratic elites, who cannot be corrupted by the logic as they are not elected. In Thailand, this belief is rooted in a discursive justification built upon Theravada Buddhist culture, which attributes moral integrity to high social status as this status reflects the good karma collected in a former life. Consequently, to “root out” a corrupt politician, the yellow alliance seeks to suspend the very mechanism which elevated these immoral usurpers into their (not rightful) place: elections.
In the vertigo of change: Angst of identity loss
Middle class anger is fueled by more than moral outrage and economic fear. It is rooted in the fear of losing one’s identity in the vertigo of change. Rapid economic modernization has deeply transformed societies and led to the pluralization of lifestyles, identities and values. Traditional roles- between genders, in families and at the workplace are being questioned. Those who seek change challenge traditional authorities and attack the symbols of the traditional order.
In Thailand, the symbolic struggle over the role of the monarchy threatens those who base their identities in the traditional order. Conservatives interpret challenges to the traditional order not as calls to build a better society, but as threats to their way of life. Mistakenly or not, these fears seemed to have been validated when several shopping malls in the center of Bangkok were torched in the course of the crackdown against the red shirt demonstrations in May 2010. Located near “Siam Square”, in the eyes of Bangkokians the center of the country, conservatives’ worst nightmares seemed to come true: “the buffalos have burned down the City of Angels”. This traumatic event was interpreted as another ominous sign that “Thai society is in decay”.
Socialized in a static cosmological order, many perceive change in itself as a threat. Unaccustomed to the idea of constant change, challenges to the only true, virtuous and natural order of things are perceived as immoral rot. Those who seek “unity in harmony” are therefore traumatized by the chaotic and often violent politics of transformation. Different lifestyles, identities and values seem to undermine national unity, and corrupt ‘The Good Order of Things’. The permanent conflict and ‘moral decay’ of pluralistic societies are interpreted as existential threats. Again, it is the fear of the ‘collapse of civilization’ which motivates ‘holy rage’ and ‘crusades to root out evil’.
First as a tragedy, then as a farce?
If European history is any lesson, middle class angst and anger can be fertile breeding grounds for fascism. Against the vertigo of change, fascism promises to restore unity and order. The “disease of plurality” must be healed by uniformity. ‘The Other’ outside and inside must be “rooted out” to heal the societal body. Those who are framed as “The Enemy Within” were being dehumanized, threatened to leave the country, verbally attacked and physically destroyed. Internal conflicts were exported by constantly blaming and attacking outsiders. As this cannot be done without violence, fascism idealizes the use of force, and glorifies the purification through war.
Contrasting the “decay” of the present against an imagined golden past, fascist movements aim to turn back the wheel of history. The fascist utopia is basically the anti-thesis to the modern, pluralist and capitalist society. Fascism seeks to overcome the divisions of a fragmented society and the noise of a pluralist culture by melting all differences into a homogeneous, “people’s community”. The trinity of “One Nation, One People, One Leader” aims to purge the chaotic plurality of the industrial society and return to the mythical unity and simplicity of the “agricultural community”.
Given its objective to purge all diversity from the body politic, fascism sees no need in representing social groups in the political regime. The fascist political regime does not need elections, because the will of the (singular) people is identical with and personalized in the Great Leader. The will of the (singular) People is, by definition, already symbolized in The Great Leader. All state authorities have to pledge allegiance directly to the leader. All obstacles to the execution of the will of the People symbolized in the Great Leader – such as checks and balances and indeed the rule of law – must be removed. Hence the aggressive, violent and authoritarian tendencies of fascism are directly rooted in its ideology of fear.
The historical context, conflict dynamics and actors of today’s Thailand are different from Germany and Italy of the 1920s and 1930s. However, in the famous dictum of Karl Marx, history repeats itself first as a tragedy, then as a farce. Fascism is thriving on the soil of fear and anger. In Thailand’s supercharged political conflict, with uncompromising elites, increasingly aggravated protesters and violent-prone groups on both sides, Europe’s tragic history should be seen as a warning not to repeat its mistakes.
Bringing the middle class back into the flock
With Thai society inching ever closer towards a politically motivated violent conflict, the consolidation of democracy seems all but a distant dream. However the middle class may not be the main driver of democratization, as previously thought and without a solid foundation in the middle class, democracy cannot survive. This outlines the need to bring the middle class back into the fold. To undermine the ability of political entrepreneurs and the allure of fascism, the fear and anger of the middle class must be addressed.
Thailand needs to find a new balance between the legitimate demands of emerging classes for equal political and social rights and the fears of old elites and the Bangkok middle class to be crushed by majority rule. Governments must understand that electoral mandates are not a free ticket to ram through their agenda. In a mass democracy, the acceptance of the middle class is imperative for successful governance. Winner-takes-it-all attitudes are not appreciated by this key constituency. Institutional arrangements to check the abuse of power and safeguard minority rights are plenty to be found in constitutions around the world. However, these anti-majoritarian institutions are unacceptable to the majority if they act in a partisan way outside the rule of law. In sum: social peace cannot be restored by institutional engineering alone, but must be founded upon a new social contract.
Thailand needs to re-negotiate its social contract
The social contract cannot be imposed by one side, but must be a negotiated compromise. It is this universally accepted social compromise where the difference between a facade democracy and a real democracy lies. When the middle class realizes that their interests are best guarded by social justice, the doors to new social development will open.
However, the re-negotiation of the social contract will not be easy to achieve. Threatened by majority rule and mass politics, elites seek to safeguard their interests outside the constitutional framework. Given their financial, ideological and coercive power, these elites have the muscle to take any democratization process hostage.
Hence, building a democratic polity policy requires the political muscle. Unfortunately, genuinely democratic movements are marginal in Thailand. Protest movements are time and again abused by political entrepreneurs to advance their vested interest. Hopefully, those being abused will eventually understand that change needs more than protest and criticism. What is needed is a broad societal where pro-democratic actors can join forces to struggle together for a democratic polity.
Marc Saxer is a political analyst holding political science and law degrees. Working and living in Bangkok, he has been a long-time observer of Thai politics.
[i] Andrew Walker, Thailand’s political peasants: Power in the modern rural economy, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,Wisconsin, 2012.
[ii] Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia, Picador, 2013.
[iii] Salisa Yuktanan, Thammasat University; Chairat Aemkulwat, Chulalongkorn University; Pasuk Pongpaichit, Matichon online, คอลัมน์ ดุลยภาพ ดุลพินิจ โดย ผาสุก พงษ์ไพจิตร (มติชนรายวัน 26 ก.ค.2556).