The problem is that engagement with Burma has been tried many times before, and always without success. Nor is it the first time the regime has promised to free Suu Kyi, or that Suu Kyi has expressed her willingness to meet the generals. The patterns are all too familiar, the accommodating noises from the generals eerily similar to those uttered before.

- Extracted from Graham Reilly, “Burma engagement offers false hope”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 2009.

Mathieson makes a number of very fair points about Australia’s “well-rounded” policy on Burma and offers some useful suggestions on “diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and sanctions”.  He also takes aim at the recent pro-sanctions lobbying of the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Burma Campaign Australia.  Regular New Mandala readers will recall that I have also questioned their intevention in the Burma sanctions debate (here, here and here).  Mathieson introduces a handy turn of phrase when he reflects that the current campaign for tougher sanctions “hark[s] back to the consumer boycotts of the 1990s”.

As far as I know, the few serious reflections on that era of sanctions suggest that, by almost any measure, they were profoundly ineffective.  If the pro-boycott/pro-sanctions advocates are hoping to win this debate I think they will need to do a better job of persuading us that there is more than “limited, Western, symbolic” value in their arguments.

Standing up for human rights in Burma is, without any doubt, a big and important job.  But the experience of decades suggests that finding good levers for improving the lives of ordinary people in Burma is the really hard part.  Earlier efforts to beef up sanctions have only left us puzzling at their limited impact, and the ongoing stalemate they have left behind.

I remain unpersuaded that such a sanctions push, particularly at this late hour, does anything but reinforce the “limited, Western, symbolic” character of so much of our Burma policy. 

According to its 2009 Annual Report, Specialty Fashion Group (the owner of Millers, Katies, etc.) had revenue of over half a billion dollars in each of the past two years. That is a proverbial truckload of “multi-branded women’s apparel”.  I would be fascinated to learn what proportion of this revenue came from the sale of products made in Burma.  If any New Mandala readers can point to some numbers I would be very appreciative.  I think we should try to find out –is this step from Specialty Fashion Group anything but symbolic?

And if it isn’t, if there is, in fact, some practical value in this move; then how many Burmese Mums and Dads will be looking for work in the months ahead?  Are their factories going to fall on even harder times now that Australian consumers aren’t buying their products? We must remember that they didn’t vote for the Burmese military government either. 

Success in a pro-sanctions campaign of this sort is, dare I say, hard to measure.

On the one hand any such change in United States policy will be greeted as a victory by the generals. The senior leadership rejoices in its survival and in the combative instincts that have seen it weather years of critical international opinion and bad press. As self-proclaimed custodians of Burma’s independence they are prepared to wear a damaged reputation if the country remains united. It is, after all, a nationalist mission that defines their esprit de corps. On the other hand we should not assume that a shift away from sanctions-led policies means that all international pressure will evaporate. A well-crafted strategy for re-engaging with key parts of Burmese society, including the military and bureaucracy, is likely to increase pressures in ways that make the generals uncomfortable.

In terms of engagement, we intend to begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out a path towards better relations. The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counternarcotics and recovery of World War II era remains.

In terms of sanctions, we will maintain existing sanctions until we see concrete progress towards reform. Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.

- Extracted from Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. policy toward Burma”, 28 September 2009.

The president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Sharan Burrow, is lobbying for Jetstar to stop its flights to the country.  All of the usual arguments for beefing up sanctions against Burma are trotted out.  According to Burrow, “We [Australia] now should be part of increased sanctions, increased pressure to make sure that everything is done to bring this military rule to an end”.

It is precisely because (limited, Western, symbolic) sanctions do not bring this (or probably any) military dictatorship to “an end” that after two decades of such rhetoric the Burmese government is arguably as strong as it has ever been. 

What is needed is less of these tired rhetorical flourishes.  Perhaps Australia’s Union heavyweights could, instead, fund a study, starting from first principles, into the efficacy of sanctions against the Burmese government.  The existing research around this question suggests that sanctions against Burma are “folly”,  “caused hardship for ordinary Burmese people without significantly impacting the State Peace and Development military regime”, and have “proven to be a failure on all fronts”.  None of these analyses are particularly new but they should, together, raise some serious questions for those hoping to justify an ongoing sanctions policy.

Or, if we’re too busy to read some of these deeper reflections on the topic, we could just run with the assumption that (limited, Western, symbolic) sanctions do not work except in (limited, Western, symbolic) ways.

If the goal is to unseat Than Shwe and the boys then, based on the modest available evidence, I am happy to hypothesise that the quickest way to change the terms of military rule in Burma is to make it politically viable for all the Jetstars (and McDonalds, KFCs, etc, etc) to make their Burma push.  Tough-minded Western investors, competing with their Japanese, Singaporean, Thai and Chinese counterparts, will probably change Burma far more quickly than any sanctions we could ever consider.

My guess is that some of those changes would be “good”, others would probably be “bad” and a fair few would be simply indifferent.  But would such an approach lead to political change in directions that are appealing to Australia’s Union bosses?  I would bet on it.  For many of us, this is, I’d suggest, an unpalatable realisation. 

I am open to anybody who can put the counter-case, with evidence that shows how (limited, Western, symbolic) sanctions will “bring this military rule to an end”.

Previous coverage of this incident is available here, here, here and here.  By resolving this consular matter, the Americans have done well by their citizen.  To mark the triumph, Senator Jim Webb even has a picture on his website posing with the Marines stationed at the US Embassy in Yangon.  There is now the natural speculation that Yettaw’s release will change the character of the relationship between Washington and Naypyidaw.

With the aquatic intruder now free from custody it would appear that this bizarre episode is pretty much over. This will be little consolation to Aung San Suu Kyi, and her supporters, as she continues her new stint of detention.  I wonder what the vibe on the streets of Yangon will be like once it becomes apparent that the Lady languishes well after the Americans have got their man home?

Colourless, uncharismatic and relatively uneducated Than Shwe rose through the ranks by simply obeying orders and showing loyalty. Indeed, his apparent lack of flair, initiative and intellect were precisely the qualities the army rewarded. He was not perceived by his superiors as a threat – and was rewarded accordingly. Far from showing courage or prowess on the battlefield, he led his troops into numerous defeats at the hands of the Communists – but that did not appear to have been a barrier to promotion.

- Extracted from Benedict Rogers, “Burma’s ruler: brutal, reclusive – and a skilled manipulator”, The Independent, 3 August 2009. 

Rogers is currently writing a much more substantial study of Than Shwe, his life and times.  It promises to be a very interesting read.  The one word in this extract that particularly sounds an alarm for me is “simply”: right there in the first sentence. 

I wonder if, in fact, there was nothing simple about Than Shwe’s capacity to obey orders and show loyalty?  I am very happy to be proven wrong.  Surely he was manipulating his allies and enemies from very early on…in the 1970s, the 1960s, the 1950s?

No doubt Rogers’ full biography will include details on all of this, and much, much more. If somebody could do a Paul Handley on Than Shwe then that would be very special indeed.

Instead of silence, a series of pointed questions to Prime Minister Abhisit would have indicated a U.S. commitment to an end to impunity and a return to accountability:

1. Will Thailand release the national security detainees and others being arbitrary detained in southern Thailand? Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat – the southern border provinces of Thailand – were placed under martial law in January 2004, and have been under emergency rule since July 2005.  The central Thai state has offered rising Islamic insurgency as the explanation for the abrogation of rights under martial law, and then the intensification of repression under emergency rule.  Since 2004, thousands of people have been arrested.  Martial law permits detention for seven days before charges need to be brought against someone being held suspected of threatening national security, and the emergency decree adds another thirty days before charges need to be brought.  Detainees do not have access to lawyers during the initial 37-day period of detention.  The International Crisis Group has noted that during the first seven days, detainees are often held in temporary sites of detention and cannot see family members or other visitors, which means that the risk of torture is greatest during this period.  Some of those arrested have been extralegally detained, re-educated, and released without ever passing through a court and others have been charged with crimes of national security under the Criminal Code.  For those who become national security detainees, an additional eighty-four days of detention are possible before they must be charged with a crime.  National security cases move very slowly through the judicial system, with months of detention possible between court hearings.

2. Will Thailand stop the use of the torture and honor its commitments as a ratifier of the UN Convention Against Torture?  Thailand ratified the UN Convention Against Torture on 2 December 2007.  Yet in January 2009, Amnesty International reported that state forces in southern Thailand systematically use torture against civilians. The most notable is the case of Imam Yapa Kaseng, who was arrested as a suspected insurgent in Narathiwat province on 19 March 2008.  Imam Yapa died on 21 March 2008 from wounds inflicted from being tortured while interrogated.  The autopsy ruled that he died from “blunt force trauma.”  The military officers who carried out the torture that killed Imam Yapa have not been held accountable.

3. Will Thailand continue using the lèse majesté law (Article 112 of the Criminal Code) and the Computer Crimes Act of 2007 to censor speech and repress dissent?  Clinton called for the immediate release of imprisoned Burmese Nobel laureate and leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, but left unspoken the names of Suwicha Thakor and others imprisoned or accused of lèse majesté in Thailand. While the lèse majesté law - which prohibits any speech critical of the royal institution and allows any citizen to make a complaint – has been in existence for many years, its use has been stepped up in the last year.  In April 2009, Suwicha Thakor was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for allegedly posting YouTube clips insulting to King Bhumipol, Thailand’s 82-year-old monarch. Chotisak Onsoong, a young activist, has been charged with lèse majesté for not standing up during the royal anthem before a film.  Journalists and web editors have been accused of the crime for their words, or their refusal to censor other’s words.

Or Secretary Clinton and the Obama administration can choose silence.  As Clinton was at pains to mention while in Bangkok last week, the United States and Thailand have had a cordial relationship for over 175 years.  During the Vietnam War, Thailand was the closest ally of the United States, providing soldiers, space for military bases, and the pleasures of R and R.  In the past thirty years, Thailand has remained a major economic and security partner of the United States, most recently providing space for a controversial CIA black site prison. Why jeopardize the relationship by raising thorny issues of human rights and violence?  The answer is simple: because people’s lives are at stake.

We remain far from the day when Burma will be considered a “normal” country. But the elections of 2010 are supposed to bring that distant future closer to reality. Managing this difficult period will test all of the resources of the generals, and those who seek to break their yoke. Although Ban Ki-moon, Aung San Suu Kyi and others like them will have a part to play in these battles, it is increasingly obvious that international efforts to undermine the Burmese government must first come to grips with the day-to-day mechanics of military rule. A critical and unflinching understanding of the generals and their objectives is the best starting point for any future effort to bring them down.

The full text is available here.