The problem is that engagement with Burma has been tried many times before, and always without success. Nor is it the first time the regime has promised to free Suu Kyi, or that Suu Kyi has expressed her willingness to meet the generals. The patterns are all too familiar, the accommodating noises from the generals eerily similar to those uttered before.

- Extracted from Graham Reilly, “Burma engagement offers false hope”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 2009.

The show goes on. The military has a clear vision of what kind of state Burma should be—and that is not a democracy. It is sometimes argued that the hopes for a more pluralistic society rest on the next generation army officers. Aware of this danger, officers have been given unprecedented privileges and business opportunities in order to retain their loyalty to the regime. There are no Young Turks lurking in the wings.

- Extracted from Bertil Lintner, “Reaching Out to Burma”, The Wall Street Journal, 3 November 2009.

Mathieson makes a number of very fair points about Australia’s “well-rounded” policy on Burma and offers some useful suggestions on “diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and sanctions”.  He also takes aim at the recent pro-sanctions lobbying of the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Burma Campaign Australia.  Regular New Mandala readers will recall that I have also questioned their intevention in the Burma sanctions debate (here, here and here).  Mathieson introduces a handy turn of phrase when he reflects that the current campaign for tougher sanctions “hark[s] back to the consumer boycotts of the 1990s”.

As far as I know, the few serious reflections on that era of sanctions suggest that, by almost any measure, they were profoundly ineffective.  If the pro-boycott/pro-sanctions advocates are hoping to win this debate I think they will need to do a better job of persuading us that there is more than “limited, Western, symbolic” value in their arguments.

Standing up for human rights in Burma is, without any doubt, a big and important job.  But the experience of decades suggests that finding good levers for improving the lives of ordinary people in Burma is the really hard part.  Earlier efforts to beef up sanctions have only left us puzzling at their limited impact, and the ongoing stalemate they have left behind.

The capital’s labour force is still busy constructing the capital’s future – an impressive parliament complex and a presidential house are emerging in anticipation of the 2010 general elections. The total cost of building Naypyidaw remains a mystery, although a local businessman points out that about $2 million has been spent for each high-ranking official’s house, and there are at least 50 of them.

- Extracted from Nina Martin, “Living in a ghost town”, Bangkok Post, 18 October 2009.

A New Mandala post from earlier in the year is relevant for those who want a different perspective on Naypyidaw’s construction.

While I appreciate the intent of this jab — and recognise the significance of TIME’s biographical article — it strikes me as a big, almost impossible, thesis.  Certainly, Than Shwe is a powerful and influential figure.  But is his government so different to the government of Thailand or Bangladesh that this claim seems even half-way sensible?  Could we, with a straight-face, make a similarly grand assertion about  any of the world’s countless other despots?  Than Shwe has, of course, sometimes cultivated an illusion of omnipotence, but couldn’t we start examining the very real limits of his “control”?

Do we know enough about top level decision-making in Burma to even start down the path of defending this thesis?  The TIME article doesn’t do justice to the claim.  So I think it is worth asking — is Than Shwe really that important?  Or to tilt the question in a slightly different direction — if Than Shwe was removed from the equation what would change?

I remain unpersuaded that such a sanctions push, particularly at this late hour, does anything but reinforce the “limited, Western, symbolic” character of so much of our Burma policy. 

According to its 2009 Annual Report, Specialty Fashion Group (the owner of Millers, Katies, etc.) had revenue of over half a billion dollars in each of the past two years. That is a proverbial truckload of “multi-branded women’s apparel”.  I would be fascinated to learn what proportion of this revenue came from the sale of products made in Burma.  If any New Mandala readers can point to some numbers I would be very appreciative.  I think we should try to find out –is this step from Specialty Fashion Group anything but symbolic?

And if it isn’t, if there is, in fact, some practical value in this move; then how many Burmese Mums and Dads will be looking for work in the months ahead?  Are their factories going to fall on even harder times now that Australian consumers aren’t buying their products? We must remember that they didn’t vote for the Burmese military government either. 

Success in a pro-sanctions campaign of this sort is, dare I say, hard to measure.

On the one hand any such change in United States policy will be greeted as a victory by the generals. The senior leadership rejoices in its survival and in the combative instincts that have seen it weather years of critical international opinion and bad press. As self-proclaimed custodians of Burma’s independence they are prepared to wear a damaged reputation if the country remains united. It is, after all, a nationalist mission that defines their esprit de corps. On the other hand we should not assume that a shift away from sanctions-led policies means that all international pressure will evaporate. A well-crafted strategy for re-engaging with key parts of Burmese society, including the military and bureaucracy, is likely to increase pressures in ways that make the generals uncomfortable.

In sum, this is one of the better, and pithier, defences of sanctions policy that you are likely to read. Comments from New Mandala readers are very welcome here.

In terms of engagement, we intend to begin a direct dialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out a path towards better relations. The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counternarcotics and recovery of World War II era remains.

In terms of sanctions, we will maintain existing sanctions until we see concrete progress towards reform. Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.

- Extracted from Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. policy toward Burma”, 28 September 2009.

The president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, Sharan Burrow, is lobbying for Jetstar to stop its flights to the country.  All of the usual arguments for beefing up sanctions against Burma are trotted out.  According to Burrow, “We [Australia] now should be part of increased sanctions, increased pressure to make sure that everything is done to bring this military rule to an end”.

It is precisely because (limited, Western, symbolic) sanctions do not bring this (or probably any) military dictatorship to “an end” that after two decades of such rhetoric the Burmese government is arguably as strong as it has ever been. 

What is needed is less of these tired rhetorical flourishes.  Perhaps Australia’s Union heavyweights could, instead, fund a study, starting from first principles, into the efficacy of sanctions against the Burmese government.  The existing research around this question suggests that sanctions against Burma are “folly”,  “caused hardship for ordinary Burmese people without significantly impacting the State Peace and Development military regime”, and have “proven to be a failure on all fronts”.  None of these analyses are particularly new but they should, together, raise some serious questions for those hoping to justify an ongoing sanctions policy.

Or, if we’re too busy to read some of these deeper reflections on the topic, we could just run with the assumption that (limited, Western, symbolic) sanctions do not work except in (limited, Western, symbolic) ways.

If the goal is to unseat Than Shwe and the boys then, based on the modest available evidence, I am happy to hypothesise that the quickest way to change the terms of military rule in Burma is to make it politically viable for all the Jetstars (and McDonalds, KFCs, etc, etc) to make their Burma push.  Tough-minded Western investors, competing with their Japanese, Singaporean, Thai and Chinese counterparts, will probably change Burma far more quickly than any sanctions we could ever consider.

My guess is that some of those changes would be “good”, others would probably be “bad” and a fair few would be simply indifferent.  But would such an approach lead to political change in directions that are appealing to Australia’s Union bosses?  I would bet on it.  For many of us, this is, I’d suggest, an unpalatable realisation. 

I am open to anybody who can put the counter-case, with evidence that shows how (limited, Western, symbolic) sanctions will “bring this military rule to an end”.