The soi leading to the venue was lined with billboards (picture 1) showing what the NPP wanted to stand for: “Dare to change – honesty, sacrifice, courageous, able to work.”

Picture 1

The founding of the NPP included a switch from the previous yellow to green. Picture 2 shows the stall where party members could update their outfits.

Picture 2

The PAD’s satellite TV ASTV has always been in need of funds. Donations were welcome at the stall shown in picture 3.

Picture 3

Voting for the first party chairperson was a major organizational task, and done in a way similar to elections in Thailand. First, party members could check their membership number on alphabetically ordered lists (picture 4).

Picture 4

As can be seen from the following detail (picture 5), Sondhi Limthongul’s membership number is 00005555.

Picture 5

In front of the meeting venue, tents had been erected with rows of tables carrying computers and printers, used by the staff to register arriving members and provide them with their identification cards (pictures 6 to 8). At the end of the procedure, they received the conference documents (picture 9), collected in a booklet entitled, “Agenda of the first general assembly of the members of the New Politics Party” (picture 10).

Picture 6

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According to this booklet, as of 30 September 2009, the NPP had 8,922 members, 57 percent of who were women. The regional distribution was as follows: Bangkok 19%, central Thailand 37%, North 16%, South 17%, and Northeast 11%. Most of the members seemed to be shopkeepers since 48% gave their occupation as “thurakit suan tua.” Active and retired civil servants made up 16%, farmers 14%, employees 7%, employees of state enterprises 5%, and students 1%. The remaining 9% provided no information.

The number of party members still seems to be small. However, the party’s action plan envisages reaching 500,000 members and establishing 40 branches within the year 2010. At the end of 2011, every province should have one branch, and there should be 200 district as well as 1,000 tambon centers, serving one million party members. One year later, there should be 600 district centers and 4,000 tambon centers with five million members. Thaksin Shinawatra does not seem to be convinced that this will work. In an interview with the Economist (online, 15 October 2009), he said, “I don’t think there are too many hard-core yellow shirts, if not being supported by Democrats and by military, and the reason they were supported by military is because the so-called elite instructed them.”

The NPP plans many activities to train leaders, change agents, and party functionaries. Obviously, this is an ambitious plan. It will also not come cheap. The budget for 2010 is set at 117.9 million baht, while fund raising activities are supposed to generate 214 million baht, 120 million of which should come from membership fees.

Picture 11 shows one of the 12 polling stations. The NPP seemed to have borrowed the equipment from the provincial elections commission of Nonthaburi province (see the ECT emblem on the voting booth). Before counting started, the officials were lined up on the right-hand side of the main stage (picture 12). Voting for Sondhi Limthongkul is under way (picture 13). The result at this counting board (picture 14) was clear: Sondhi: 131 votes, 4 abstentions, and 4 invalid ballots. This outcome was not terribly surprising, because (as shown in picture 15) Sondhi was the sole candidate on the ballot paper. The overall result was 1,741 to 61 to 73 (picture 16).

Picture 11

Picture 12

Picture 13

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One wonders why the NPP insisted on this elaborate election procedure when it was clear who had to be elected party leader. When Sondhi went on stage (picture 17) after the “vote” people in the hall greeted him with an enthusiastic ovation. His suggestions for those party board members who he had the right to propose (others had to be elected afterwards) were approved in the most convincing form (picture 18). Picture 19 shows Sondhi on stage with “his” board members. Not surprisingly, the front page of Sondhi’s ASTV Phuchatkan newspaper of 7 October celebrated his new formal leadership position (picture 20).

Picture 17

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Picture 20

Dr. Michael H. Nelson is a visiting scholar at the faculty of political science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. He can be reached at mhnelson_kpi@hotmail.com.

First, the by-elections.

From my quick analysis there are two main messages coming from the 29 by-election contests held on 11 January.

First, there does not appear to be a strong groundswell of anger at the way in which the Democrats have come to power. This was only a small test of the electoral waters, but the results suggest that there is a common view that the Democrats should be given a chance to govern. Many voters were probably attracted by the prospect of political stability.

Second, the by-election results underline the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of the campaign waged by the PAD over the past year. A few months ago, in the wake of the October 7 violence, we argued that the PAD had chosen “blood rather than ballots” in their campaign to overthrow the elected government. In defence of an electoral solution, we argued that only a relatively small proportion of the electorate would have had to change their 2007 general election vote to produce a very different political outcome. Based on a quick analysis of the 2007 constituency results we identified 22 constituencies where a small shift in votes would have sent a Democrat MP, instead of a People Power Party MP, to Parliament.

The by-election results add some support to this argument. The Democrats picked up seven seats. Five were formerly held by the People Power Party and two by Chart Thai. Six of these seven seats were in constituencies that had been closely fought in 2007.  In Bangkok(10) in 2007 the highest ranked unsuccessful Democrat candidate lost by only 0.5%.  In Lamphun(1) the 2007 margin was 1.4%; in Nakhon Pathom(1) it was 1.9%; in Samut Prakan(1) it was 3.9 percent; in Saraburi(2) it was 4.6%; and in Ratchaburi(1) it was 6.7%.  The only “non-marginal” seat won by the Democrats was Singburi(1) where the 2007 margin was a massive 43%. But for the January 11 by-election the Democrats appear to have secured the services of a relative (same surname) of the disqualified Chart Thai MP.

Of course a more detailed statistical analysis combined with local studies of specific constituencies, would show up all sorts of nuance and subtlety. But, overall, the by-elections show that electoral contests are there to be won and lost. The provocative and violent campaign waged by the PAD throughout 2008 was backed by the argument that PPP/Thaksin had an insurmountable electoral stranglehold. The by-elections have shown this to be nonsense.

Good luck to them.

Their path to government has been anything but honourable, but the ultimate decision will be made by parliament. If the Democrat Party can muster the numbers in parliament, they have a right to form government. Those who have defected from the government side will have to face their respective electorates eventually and the voters will be able to make a judgement about their motives and their actions (and any incentives they may have received).

Up until then the Pheua Thai/UDD forces would do well to play the part of a suitably outraged, vigorous and constructive opposition. Some well attended rallies of red shirts would provide a suitable forum for the expression of anger at the Democrat Party’s opportunistic path to government. If the rallies are orderly then the Pheua Thai backers can maintain the hold they have on the high moral ground that has been so comprehensively abandoned by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).

The strategists in Pheua Thai probably fancy their chances against the Democrats in a general election. Given the likely fragility of a Democrat majority, and the fluidity of party allegiances, an electoral contest may well come sooner rather than later.

But all bets will be off if the Democrats move down the “new politics” path laid down by the PAD. Any attempt to move towards an appointed, rather than elected, parliament, will surely be vigorously resisted by parliamentary and non-parliamentary means.  Let’s see if the Democrats can live up to their name.

Thanks to master number cruncher Chris Baker, here are some interesting figures on results from December 2007 in the by-election constituencies.

Some words of explanation. The “members” column lists the number of MPs elected from the constituency in December 2007. The “margin” column shows the percentage difference between the lowest placed winner (the second or third position depending on the constituency) and the top ranked loser (the third or fourth position). So, in the first listed constituency the difference between position 2 (winner) and position 3 (loser) represented 49.2% of the votes cast. The “1st loser” column lists the party that held the top-ranked unsuccessful position.

According to Chris Baker “it is striking that the by-election list has an unusually large number of ‘marginal’ seats. At the 2007 poll, the winning gap was below 5% in only 49 seats (about 1-in-8), but 11 of these 28 seats fall in that range (more than 1-in-3). In 5 of these 11, the first loser was a Democrat, and in 4 it was PPP.”

Remember that the “margin” figure is a simple way of analysing how close the results are across constituencies. It isn’t the same as a “swing” figure – if a party has a margin of 14% it may only take about 7% of voters to change their votes to produce a different result.

With the lines between “government” and “opposition” becoming increasingly blurred, the stage is set for some very interesting local contests.

People Power Party

1. น.พ.ประสงค์ บูรณ์พงศ์ Nakhon Phanom 1
2. นายอนุสรณ์ วงศ์วรรณ Lamphun 1
3. นายสงคราม กิจเลิศไพโรจน์ Samut Prakan 1
4. ร.ท.กุเทพ ใสกระจ่าง Si Sa Ket 2
5. นายทรงศักดิ์ ทองศรี Buri Ram 2
6. นายนิสิต สินธุไพร Roi Et 2
7. นายธีระชัย แสนแก้ว Udon Thani 2
8. นายวีระพล อดิเรกสาร Saraburi 2
9. นายสุทิน คลังแสง Maha Sarakham 1
10. นายอิทธิ ศิริลัทธยากร Chachoengsao 1
11. นายกิตติกร โล่ห์สุนทร Lampang 1
12. นายบุญลือ ประเสริฐโสภา Ratchaburi 1

Chart Thai

1. นายบรรหาร ศิลปอาชา Suphanburi 1
 2. นายสมศักดิ์ ปริศนานันทกุล Ang Thong 1
3. นายณัฐวุฒิ ประเสริฐสุวรรณ Suphanburi 1
4. นายนพดล พลเสน Uthai Thani 1
5. นายกมล จิระพันธุ์วาณิช Lopburi 1
6. นายกูเฮง ยาวอหะซัน Narathiwat 2
7. นายชัยวุฒิ ธนาคมานุสรณ์ Sing Buri 1
8. นายปณวัตร เลี้ยงผ่องพันธุ์ Buri Ram 4
9. นายยุทธนา โพธสุธน Suphanburi 2
10. นายรัฐกิตติ์ ผาลีพัฒน์ Ubon Ratchathani 2
11. นายวราวุธ ศิลปอาชา Suphanburi 1
12. นายศักดิ์ชัย จินตะเวช Ubon Ratchathani 3
13. นายสมพัฒน์ แก้วพิจิตร Nakhon Pathom 1
14. นายศิริพงศ์ อังคสกุลเกียรติ Si Sa Ket 1
15. นายเอกพจน์ ปานแย้ม Pathum Thani 1
16. นายเสมอกัน เที่ยงธรรม Suphanburi 2

If anyone has any thoughts on which may be the more interesting constituency contests please post your comments here.

How will the defenders of democracy in the PAD behave in the by-election campaigns? Will they mobilise their formidable rhetorical and logistical machine to mount local campaigns in support of opposition candidates? Will plastic hand-clappers and iron bars become popular features of local political rallies? Will PAD cadres be walking the streets in the towns and villages of the 26 constituencies to provide some of their much-vaunted political education? Will yellow be the colour of local opposition campaigns? Will banners, leaflets and posters proclaiming the PAD’s “new politics” festoon light poles and shop awnings in the 22 lucky provinces?

I suspect not.

Opposition candidates are likely to keep as much distance between themselves and the PAD as possible. The last thing they want is for the by-elections to become a mini-referendum on the PAD’s recent provocations. The PAD is electoral poison and, as the economic and social impacts of PAD’s airport thuggery start to hit home, the potency of the poison will increase. There are numerous colourful and eccentric characters in Thai politics, but probably not many mad enough to campaign alongside the post-Suvanabhumi PAD.

And, of course, the PAD has never shown any interest in electoral processes. They hold the electorate in contempt. Their fundamental mission is to sabotage electoral politics not to contest it.

It is a bizarre situation and one where a coup, of some sort, seems almost inevitable.

How did it come to this? Here are some of New Mandala’s stepping stones to the end of the Somchai government.

The 2007 constitutional referendum

19 August 2007: General Sonthi, after casting his vote, refused to rule out future military action against the constitution. As we know, according to the tenets of sufficiency democracy, voters’ decisions are only valued when, as in the case of this referendum, they have no meaningful choice.

20 August 2007: So, of the 45 million Thais registered to vote, 14.7 million have endorsed the proposed constitution. It is a victory of sorts (and key no vote campaigners have accepted it), but not an impressive one. The international reaction will be interesting to watch.

3 September 2007: The explicit request of the military government was that Thai voters endorse a constitution; but the implicit request was that they endorse the future abrogation of that very document if it delivers a government unpalatable to those who wield the power to overthrow it. We can see the ideological groundwork for this being laid already with the usual tired claims about vote buying in relation to the substantial no vote in the northeast and the north. And these claims come from a government that spared little in terms of incentives and expenses for villagers mobilised as part of the yes vote campaign.

The 2007 general election campaign

10 September 2007: Some members of the ruling regime in Thailand have reacted with predicable nationalist outrage to a European Union request to send observers to the forthcoming general election. Why such a defensive response? I don’t think it is because the junta holds out some hope of ballot-box manipulation. Quite the opposite. What the current regime fears most is that the Thai electoral process could be internationally recognised as being relatively clean. The “sufficiency democracy” paradigm that they promote is based on the view that the electoral process is so compromised by money politics that it can be cast aside when it delivers an unpalatable result. Slandering the electoral process is the ideological bread and butter of the coup-endorsing Thai elite. With European Observers on the ground, the elite’s ongoing attempts to discredit electoral democracy will be all the more difficult.

The election

23 December 2007: The central question for Thailand’s democracy is this: will the royalist-military elite that staged the September 2006 coup be willing to accept the election of Thaksin’s proxy party? Finding themselves back at square one after 15 months will be a bitter pill to swallow. Military action against the election result seems highly unlikely, though it cannot be ruled out. More likely is a concerted judicial attack on the elected government. This may take the form of a series of challenges to constituency results. The current military regime has worked hard to keep the spectre of electoral irregularity and vote buying alive and they may waste no time in arguing, as they did in relation to the Thaksin government, that the People Power victory was bought from an ill-informed and easily manipulated electorate.

A coup by stealth?

1 January 2008: Now the issuing of “red cards” to the successful People Power Party has started in earnest with speculation that up to 60 candidates may be disqualified … As expected the common charge against disqualified candidates is the tired old charge of vote buying. This legal manoeuvring is just so predictable. … Just how far the powers that be are willing to go in their current coup by stealth remains to be seen. They will do everything they can to muddy the electoral waters.

The PAD return

7 April 2008: For some so-called pro-democracy advocates, constitutional reform by a democratically elected government seems to be more alarming than the complete destruction of a constitution by military force. The outrage at the proposed amendment of Section 237 of the 2007 Constitution is motivated by anything but democratic principles. Section 237 allows the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party if one of its executives is found guilty of electoral irregularity (or failing to act to prevent such an irregularity).

28 May 2008: Whoever is launching the attacks on the rallies held by the People’s Alliance for (Sufficiency) Democracy in Bangkok is doing the PA(S)D a big favour. With their cause looking increasingly tawdry and discredited, the most the PA(S)D can hope for is that their credibility will be boosted by the impression that they are standing firm against the dark forces of violence and dissension.

A ham fisted government

15 July 2008: Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej must dread reading the newspaper each morning. Each day seems to bring a new crisis or an escalation in one of his many existing problems. On Tuesday last week, his deputy party leader and former speaker was found guilty of vote buying. On Wednesday, the health minister was disqualified for not declaring his wife’s assets, and on Thursday the foreign minister resigned after a nationalist backlash against the Government’s decision to support a Cambodian bid for World Heritage listing for an ancient Hindu temple. …  Samak is a rough and tumble politician with a highly-dubious political history. His government has been ham-fisted, arrogant and ill-informed on a number of issues. Street protests, no-confidence motions, court cases and media condemnation are all legitimate in a democratic system. Attacks on the Government have produced some high profile casualties and caused some significant backdowns. But Samak’s Government is less than six months old. Opposition forces calling for Samak to hand over power (presumably to the Democrats) are overplaying their hand.

Royal silence

3 September 2008: The recent escalation of protest action by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has taken Thailand to the brink of civil breakdown. Swathed in King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s royal yellow, the protesters have forced the government of Samak Sundaravej to declare a state of emergency. … Today the king should not wait for more ordinary Thais to suffer the consequences of brinksmanship. The People’s Alliance for Democracy is goading the Samak government to over-react. With the real possibility of more bloodshed in Bangkok in the days ahead, the king’s silence is baffling. His lifelong reservoir of charisma is no good to his people if he does not call off the anti-democratic provocateurs acting in his name.

The cooking show coup

9 September 2008: Hosting a TV cooking show = GUILTY! Staging a coup and tearing up a constitution = NO PROBLEM!

Blood over ballots

14 October 2008: If you do the numbers it is clear that the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leadership has chosen bloodshed over ballots. The PAD has abandoned electoral politics. With no coherent or credible political platform their only hope is that sufficient blood will be spilt to prompt a military or royal strike against Thailand’s democratically elected government.

The “royal institution”

30 October 2008: In the wake of the October 7 violence in Bangkok, the queen made her support for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) abundantly clear. As a result of the queen’s actions, the “royal institution” was publically aligned with an opposition group that had clashed with police, besieged parliament and openly courted a military coup. This public alignment took place when the attention of the national and international media was focussed on the events in Bangkok. … The queen let the genie of a politically engaged royalty out of the bottle. The powers that be are desperately trying to put it back in.

The final battle

24 November 2008: After today’s “final showdown” things are as unresolved as ever in Thai politics. Both sides can claim victory. The PAD succeeded in delaying the joint meeting between MPs and Senators and, although they showed their now familiar disregard for the rule of law, their behaviour was more restrained than many had expected. The government can claim credit for avoiding a confrontation over the parliamentary meeting and for the restrained police handling of the PAD protestors. The pro-government red-shirts wisely kept their distance. Hopefully, if the night ends peacefully, overblown PAD rhetoric will be the only casualty.

25 November 2008: The relative peace of 24 November seemed too good to be true. The PAD have now reverted to their regular strategy of extreme provocation. … “Bangkok International Airport has now been closed by Fascist thugs from the anti-government PAD.”

27 November 2008: The crisis of 1992 produced a powerful image of the king as an apolitical and independent force stepping in to resolve a political crisis. In 2008 this may be much harder to achieve. The royal brand has been thoroughly caught up in the political turmoil and it may prove very difficult to extract it.

The ongoing rally of the People’s Alliance for (Sufficiency) Democracy (PASD) in Bangkok demonstrates the power of this form of political protest. In the face of determined dissent the Samak government has been forced into some significant backdowns. Hasty plans to amend the 2007 constitution have been referred to a parliamentary committee. And the government seems to be rushing to reposition itself on the Preah Vihear world heritage listing, an issue that has come from nowhere largely on the strength of the PA(S)D’s street campaign. The protests also provided an energising backdrop to a vigorous no-confidence debate in parliament, during which the opposition was said to have “chopped up” Samak and his cabinet colleagues. On the back of the PA(S)D protests the media have been feasting on the morsels.

Some of the key checks and balances of a democratic system appear to be working.

So will the PA(S)D go home, satisfied with a job well done? They have embarrassed the government and forced backdowns on key items in their list of demands. Their dissenting cause has received massive publicity. There can be little doubt that the public is well aware of the of the failings of Samak and his colleagues. 

But I strongly suspect that the PA(S)D doesn’t want to go home (though court orders and a lack of mass support may force them to). They don’t want to leave the streets because they are not really interested in the specific issues that they have used to attack the government. These issues are just convenient tools. Government backdowns mean nothing because the PA(S)D has a much more ambitious agenda.

Their agenda is to bring the elected government down. Their agenda is to campaign for a perverted form of democracy-“sufficiency democracy”-in which representation is achieved by appointment. Their agenda is to impose a minority viewpoint on Thailand’s political future.

Is this part of the tradition of democratic protest? I don’t think so.

Two recent articles by American anthropologist Katharine Bowie, provide some further  insight into the informal provisions of this “rural constitution” in northern Thailand. Both articles focus on a sub-district head (kamnan) election held in Chiang Mai province in 1996. Bowie is not one to romanticise local political life. This is a warts-and-all discussion of money politics, local political rivalry, intrigue, betrayal and recrimination. But running through both papers is the powerful message that electoral politics needs to be understood in terms of its embeddedness in local social relationships. One paper focuses on the ways in which matrilocal principles give women an often over-looked role in mobilising electoral support and brokering political relationships (bowie-2008a). The other examines how intensified political conflict in local government elections is, in part, a product of the intersection between modern laws aimed at decentralisation of power and older laws that had much more centralising objectives bowie-2008b.

Bowie’s conclusions in relation to vote-buying are worth quoting at some length:

Prevailing explanations of village vote buying range from a portrayal of villagers as embedded in a simple, rational capitalist calculation of selling their votes to the highest bidder to a portrayal of villagers as mired in a traditional moral economy of exchanging votes for gifts and hopes of protection. However, my anthropological case study of a village election suggests that these explanations suffer from five major flaws. First, these portrayals are ahistorical, failing to recognize that vote buying has not typified village electoral politics but rather has emerged in particular historical contexts. Second, these descriptions do not recognize the very different dynamics that characterize electoral politics at the village, tambon, provincial, and national levels; the more local the election, the more vote buying threatens village preferences for unanimity and anonymity. Third, such portrayals fail to recognize the dynamism of village politics, ignoring the complex and ever-shifting calculus by which village support for various candidates changes. Fourth, by failing to include a historical perspective, the explanations have minimized the importance in variations in patterns of vote buying; offering free pencils and free legal advice is different from bribing government officials, making private payments to individual villagers, or negotiating with a village community regarding proposed development projects. Finally, these characterizations fail to recognize how lacunae and ambiguities in the overall development of the national legal and administrative framework have complicated villagers efforts to protect democratic practices.

There will, of course, be some electoral prudes who point their moralising finger at any evidence that cash has a role to play in politics. Prudes are always fixated with the naughty bits. But cash payments before elections don’t necessarily signal the absence of electoral values. As I have argued in detail in my paper on the “rural constitution,” and as Bowie’s papers also demonstrate, distribution of cash prior to elections are assessed locally in terms of a range of interlinked political values that address issues of personal status, capability and morality.

Cash payments call political values into play. It is those who rely on the stereotype of votes readily exchanged for money who lack an appreciation of the importance of political values.

In this spirit of nouveau-elitism New Mandala would like to invite innovative suggestions from readers on alternative ways of selecting political representatives. Elections have clearly fallen out of favour in some influential quarters (perhaps they were never in favour!?), so let’s move with the spirit of the times and come up with some new options.

I have previously proposed a “New Sakdina” system whereby votes would be weighted according to a voters level of education. Here is a brief extract from my proposal:

With the lowest weight, of course, would be the completely uneducated. Some may be shocked to learn that there are still people wandering the remote regions of Thailand who have never been to school. In fact, I have even seen some of them casting a vote (and signing their name beforehand with a crude thumb-print). Shocking! Their weighting should clearly be so low as to make voting hardly worth lining up in the queue. …

At the peak of the system would, of course, be the peak of educational attainment – the honorary degree. I would propose a maximum New Sakdina rating for the rare class of individuals who can receive a degree without even studying for it!

I still think my proposal has merit (and not just because I am contemplating my own hefty New Sakdina rating). But it was ignored by the drafters of the 2007 constitution. So put your thinking caps on and come up with some alternatives. Elections are well and truly old-hat, especially given their tendency to produce politicians.

As the PA(S)D protestors have shown us, there must be a better way!

I may even be persuaded to offer a prize for the best alternative. We won’t vote for the best, of course. I will chose!