The National library of Australia recently received the first four issues of ASTV ผู้จัดการสุดสัปดาห์ .  The one featured here is the second issue. The magazine has about 60 pages in colour. Published weekly, it is sold for 40 baht. ASTV ผู้จัดการสุดสัปดาห์ features editorial pieces that reflect the political position of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), it also has popular entertainment, celebrity gossip, and current affairs, as well as selected world and sports news.  Here is the Table of Contents for interested readers.

[This post is provided by the National Library of Australia as part of our Book Zone feature. For further information on the featured publications contact Saowapha Viravong at sviravong@nla.gov.au]

On Sunday, the PAD held a rally on Sanam Luang in Bangkok, showing loyalty to nation and monarchy. This event was attended by about 35,000 people, mostly dressed in colors with royal affiliation. The main tone of the rally was rousing patriotism. National flags dominated the visual scene. Retired General Preecha Iamsuphan gave a fanatical speech calling for a war against Cambodia. Both Thaksin and Hun Sen were attacked on the stage. The crowd was asked, for the foreign media, to recite in English: “We Love The King! We Love Thailand!” Often the foreign media was mentioned on the stage. The event would be seen all over the world.

When Sonthi Limthongkul came on the stage, he talked mostly about protecting the monarchy and how, if the PAD would not have fought for the monarchy last year, nothing might have been left over. In the middle of his speech suddenly a loud blast occurred, maybe 150 meters behind the stage. I saw a small column of smoke rising just opposite from Wat Pra Keow, and rushed to the scene. A few lightly injured people were there, and soon rescue workers arrived. One of the injured was a small boy, about 10 years old, with a puncture wound from shrapnel in his upper leg. Another was a PAD guard. I saw two more injured. Altogether 15 injured were reported. A small melee happened when enraged PAD protesters attacked a young man who was arrested, but was most likely not involved.

The rally closed about 10.30 in the evening, when the Royal anthem was sung while protesters held candles.

[Click on the images for larger versions. Hover on images for captions.]

Saturday Red

Sunday Yellow

Thaksin’s interview is a violation of the monarchy, which is the country’s core pillar and a highly respected institution. It is unacceptable and should have never taken place…Thaksin has also chosen to make a move when the entire nation is joining in wishing His Majesty the King a full recovery and good health. I wonder if he has a hidden agenda or is plotting an inappropriate move.

- Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya quoted in “Govt blasts Thaksin’s interview”, Bangkok Post, 10 November 2009.

The soi leading to the venue was lined with billboards (picture 1) showing what the NPP wanted to stand for: “Dare to change – honesty, sacrifice, courageous, able to work.”

Picture 1

The founding of the NPP included a switch from the previous yellow to green. Picture 2 shows the stall where party members could update their outfits.

Picture 2

The PAD’s satellite TV ASTV has always been in need of funds. Donations were welcome at the stall shown in picture 3.

Picture 3

Voting for the first party chairperson was a major organizational task, and done in a way similar to elections in Thailand. First, party members could check their membership number on alphabetically ordered lists (picture 4).

Picture 4

As can be seen from the following detail (picture 5), Sondhi Limthongul’s membership number is 00005555.

Picture 5

In front of the meeting venue, tents had been erected with rows of tables carrying computers and printers, used by the staff to register arriving members and provide them with their identification cards (pictures 6 to 8). At the end of the procedure, they received the conference documents (picture 9), collected in a booklet entitled, “Agenda of the first general assembly of the members of the New Politics Party” (picture 10).

Picture 6

Picture 7

Picture 8

Picture 9

Picture 10

According to this booklet, as of 30 September 2009, the NPP had 8,922 members, 57 percent of who were women. The regional distribution was as follows: Bangkok 19%, central Thailand 37%, North 16%, South 17%, and Northeast 11%. Most of the members seemed to be shopkeepers since 48% gave their occupation as “thurakit suan tua.” Active and retired civil servants made up 16%, farmers 14%, employees 7%, employees of state enterprises 5%, and students 1%. The remaining 9% provided no information.

The number of party members still seems to be small. However, the party’s action plan envisages reaching 500,000 members and establishing 40 branches within the year 2010. At the end of 2011, every province should have one branch, and there should be 200 district as well as 1,000 tambon centers, serving one million party members. One year later, there should be 600 district centers and 4,000 tambon centers with five million members. Thaksin Shinawatra does not seem to be convinced that this will work. In an interview with the Economist (online, 15 October 2009), he said, “I don’t think there are too many hard-core yellow shirts, if not being supported by Democrats and by military, and the reason they were supported by military is because the so-called elite instructed them.”

The NPP plans many activities to train leaders, change agents, and party functionaries. Obviously, this is an ambitious plan. It will also not come cheap. The budget for 2010 is set at 117.9 million baht, while fund raising activities are supposed to generate 214 million baht, 120 million of which should come from membership fees.

Picture 11 shows one of the 12 polling stations. The NPP seemed to have borrowed the equipment from the provincial elections commission of Nonthaburi province (see the ECT emblem on the voting booth). Before counting started, the officials were lined up on the right-hand side of the main stage (picture 12). Voting for Sondhi Limthongkul is under way (picture 13). The result at this counting board (picture 14) was clear: Sondhi: 131 votes, 4 abstentions, and 4 invalid ballots. This outcome was not terribly surprising, because (as shown in picture 15) Sondhi was the sole candidate on the ballot paper. The overall result was 1,741 to 61 to 73 (picture 16).

Picture 11

Picture 12

Picture 13

Picture 14

Picture 15

Picture 16

One wonders why the NPP insisted on this elaborate election procedure when it was clear who had to be elected party leader. When Sondhi went on stage (picture 17) after the “vote” people in the hall greeted him with an enthusiastic ovation. His suggestions for those party board members who he had the right to propose (others had to be elected afterwards) were approved in the most convincing form (picture 18). Picture 19 shows Sondhi on stage with “his” board members. Not surprisingly, the front page of Sondhi’s ASTV Phuchatkan newspaper of 7 October celebrated his new formal leadership position (picture 20).

Picture 17

Picture 18

Picture 19

Picture 20

Dr. Michael H. Nelson is a visiting scholar at the faculty of political science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. He can be reached at mhnelson_kpi@hotmail.com.

Today is the first anniversary of one of the more important days in recent Thai political history: 7 October 2008.

Soon after the bloody clashes of that day, a photographic chronicle of events was produced by regular New Mandala contributor Nick Nostitz.  It provides a graphic overview of the injuries that resulted when the People’s Alliance for Democracy protesters confronted a Border Patrol Police (BPP) and Metropolitan Police effort to disperse them.  One of the key issues emerging from those protests centers on the use, or misuse, of CS tear-gas grenades.

Here we hope to summarise the role of tear gas in the events of 7 October 2008.

Trawling the source material it appears that six types of CS tear-gas grenades were used by BPP and Metropolitan Police officers in Bangkok on 7 October 2008. Most (about 70 per cent) were fired by Chinese Norinco [North Industries Corporation] 38-mm tear-gas guns, which are 818 mm long, have an effective range of 130-140 metres, and discharge tear-gas canisters at a velocity of about 60 metres a second. According to eye-witnesses, and this video footage, some grenades were fired by M-79s and others were hand-thrown. Four types were manufactured in China, including both gun-fired tear-gas canisters and hand-thrown grenades; the other types were made in the United States and Spain. The BPP were issued only with the Chinese types, while the Metropolitan Police used the US grenades.

The Chinese types use a small amount of RDX explosive to burst the gas container open and hence disperse the gas faster, more uniformly and across a larger area than most other grenades. They are also cheaper. However, the RDX can also make them lethal, especially when they are fired into crowds at short distances. Most of the casualties on 7 October were caused by the 38-mm aluminium canister-type, which had been ordered from China in 1993 and delivered in 1995. They are a variant of Norinco’s NF-02 ‘explosive projectile’, which has a length of 125 mm, carries 40 grams of CS agent, and has five grams of RDX explosive.

Pornthip Rojanasunand, director of the Central Institute of Forensic Science, said on 13 October, after viewing tests of each of the grenade types, that the canisters should be ‘considered weapons, not crowd control devices’. Pornthip also said that ‘the police and military generally use American [rather than Chinese tear-gas], but it’s expensive – much more expensive. But comparatively, the American [tear-gas] is safer’.

The BPP had no training whatsoever with the Chinese grenades. Most had probably never fired or even handled the Norinco 38-mm guns and NF-02 rounds before 7 October. Yet the NF-02 canister is clearly marked with a warning, in English, that it is to be used only by ‘qualified personnel trained in riot control tactics’. It also says: ‘Do not fire directly at persons as serious injury or death could occur’. The Norinco specifications for the NF-02 state that it has a shelf-life of five years from the date of manufacture, and that it should not to be used if it has been ’stored longer than eight years from the date of manufacture’ – i.e., after 2001. The NF-02s used in Bangkok were 15 years old.

On 14 October, the commander of the Royal Thai Police Ordnance Division, Police Major General Phuwadol Wuttaganok, said that approximately 2,000 Chinese-made tear-gas grenades had been recalled from the BPP and the Bangkok Metropolitan Police the day after the fatal crackdown on the protesters; they were being stored at the Ordnance Division, and he expected that the ‘entire supply’ would probably be destroyed. Moreover, he said that police units had been ordered not to use US tear-gas grenades because they had also been found ‘to be deadly’. He also said that the police in charge of dispersing the protesters were unaware of the explosive impact of the Chinese canisters, and that: ‘I guess they just thought all tear-gas canisters were the same. They were told to fire — and they simply fired’.

Since the events of October 2008 the government of Somchai Wongsawat has fallen and the Democrat-led government of Prime Minist Abhisit Vejjajiva has come to power. What, then, is the legacy of 7 October?  Since that fateful day Thailand has seen other efforts to disperse protesters.   Most have involved violence but tear gas has not been a key part of the weaponry used.  The East Asia Summit in April 2009 was abandoned, ultimately, because the Red Shirt protesters could not be controlled.  Days later, the Thai Army displayed its preferred method for clearing protests in Bangkok, as it moved across the city.  The BPP and Metropolitan Police have continued to be involved in policing subsequent protests, although they have not been called upon to fire tear gas in the same way again.

In September 2009 there were reports that Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission will file charges against former Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, former Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and former National Police Chief General Patcharawat Wongsuwan.  With legal proceedings on the horizon this episode of Thai political drama is not over yet.

In fact, while there is still partisan mileage to be made from revisiting 7 October 2008 we will probably be hearing much more about the events of that day.  We hope that our modest effort to consolidate the public information on the use of tear gas will assist New Mandala readers as they revisit this topic.

Nick is the first to admit that his reports are only one angle on the presentation of Thai political positions.

Over at the UDD Today website, there are thousands of pictures from Red Shirt rallies, and from Thaksin’s recent years in exile.  Most are taken from angles on political events that few, if any, of us have good access to.  They provide insights about the types of events and people that matter to the Red side of the political chasm.  There is also a list of over 4,000 “Red Members” with accompanying profiles and graphics, and there are hundreds of videos (mostly Thaksin-centric).  It all comes together to give a sense of the way the Red Shirt movement is presenting itself these days.  And it is all contributing to an increasingly sophisticated online battlefield for Thailand’s political warriors.  As I type, @uddtoday is holding its own (among, I might add, many other Thai activist/commentator voices) in the Asia Semi-final of the Mr Twitter competition.

These components of the Red-Shirt self-portrait are worth highlighting because, as the third anniversary of the 2006 coup looms, New Mandala readers who follow Thai political matters will be keeping one eye on the obvious faultlines.  Red-shirt leaders have, not surprisingly, decided that Saturday 19 September will be a good day for a mass rally.  Of course, the September/October window is, we are often told, one of Thailand’s traditional times for political strife.

Chatter about what will happen next — mostly informal and speculative at this stage — is well and truly underway.  It reminds me, in some key senses, of a previous period of uncertainty when many of us were grasping around for a clear analysis of what was going on.  That period of uncertainty ended on 19 September 2006.  When will this one end?

The festivities began with a Brahman ceremony.

Songs were sung on the stage; Red Shirt leaders danced and sang along.  On Sanam Luang a large rectangle was fenced off for the procession.

Red clothed boxes containing the signatures were brought into the fenced-off area. Red shirts with national flags and monks formed up in the procession. I spoke with a construction site laborer who took a day off work to take part. He pointed out that he and his family came by themselves, and were not paid. While his wife breastfed their youngest child, he explained that in his home village in Buriram about half of the people were still supporting Newin Chidchob, the other half were not supporting him anymore.

Soon after Thaksin’s brief phone-in, the procession commenced. It rounded Sanam Luang and stopped in front of the Grand Palace. The boxes with the signatures were lined up at a small stage. One woman fainted – the heat and humidity was almost unbearable.

The Red Shirt leaders went to meet the officials of the Office of the Kings’s Principal Secretary, and handed over the petition. There was a huge crowd of photographers and videographers, and only two small points where we could take pictures. I was lucky to get the image – snapped on my out-stretched arm over the heads of several of my colleagues.

The boxes with the petition were stamped and signed by palace officials, and loaded by police officers into 5 trucks. The count was 383 boxes.

The Red Shirts dispersed. After I heard that at the court nothing happened, and no Blue Shirts appeared, I went home as well.

When I passed ASTV at Phra Arthit Road I saw a small commotion, and parked my motorcycle. 20 to 30 PAD guards in front of ASTV and opposite at Ban Phra Arthit shouted at passing taxis, vans and busses with Red Shirts. Some of the PAD guards shot with slingshots at the vehicles, and threw stones. At first they wanted to chase me away, but after I insisted that I would stay and take photos, we came to some sort of agreement – I could take images, but without showing their faces.  At least, while I was there, they let Red Shirts in tuk-tuks and motorcycles pass, and only fired at the cars and buses. One of the guards said that they did not want to hurt anybody, but just scare them.

Soon police arrived – one car and several motorcycles. The guards went back into the ASTV office and the situation calmed down.

Never before in Thailand has a large political movement filed a petition to the King – this was a historic day. The stakes of the conflict have been raised clearly, and it is difficult to predict where this will lead. The opponents of the Red Shirts are enraged by what they see as an attack on the monarchy and, as I could see already at the end of the petition day, further violence is probable.

Thailand and many scholars of Thailand have long resisted comparative perspectives on that history. The latter have squandered the potential of those perspectives to serve as the bases for a reconceptualization of Thai history. For adoption of comparative perspectives would challenge the myths — along with some fairy tales — of uniqueness whose invocation has long served as national placebo, obviating clear-eyed diagnosis of national pathologies.

The full article is, of course, well worth a look for anyone hoping to understand Thailand’s recent political history.

In a recent posting about Thaksin Shinawatra’s birthday, there were some marvelous pictures of monks taking part in the festivities.  One pair showed some monks removing a curse, with their begging bowls used to signify the removal of the curse.  Other pictures showed live monks in conjunction with pictures of Thaksin (Actually, Mr. Thaksin was not just in conjunction, but looking down on the monks beatifically.  I’m not sure which was more striking: the cut out of Thaksin standing behind the senior monk, or the pictures of Thaksin overlooking a group of chanting monks, hand raised in the sign-language gesture of “I love you.”).  Regarding these monks, one of the comments pithily noted simply, “Rentamonks.”  This was not an unreasonable comment, I suppose, but also troubled me.  Why can’t monks support Thaksin?  What do most monks think about the recent troubles in Thailand?  And what does their relative silence say about Buddhism and politics in Southeast Asia more broadly?  This is not the place to discuss this comprehensively, but it’s interesting to note there have been no four-letter word essays about this central (?) yet silent (?) figure: the monk (auspiciously, if we Romanize the word from both Thai and Dai-lue (ie from Sipsongpanna), we get phra and dubi, both 4-letter words).

For the most part, monks have been largely absent from the public discussion of the colored shirts. This absence is especially noteworthy because within several months of the coup that started the current phase of Thai politics, there were several significant demonstrations by monks over the status of Buddhism in Thailand, and in particular whether or not Buddhism would become an official religion.  To the best of my knowledge, the conversation about the status of Buddhism as the de jure as well as de facto national religion of Thailand was not finished, rather it went private, something to be talked about within monasteries between monks, but not in public, in much the same way that monastic opinions about reds and yellows seems to be taking place.

In June of this year, I was in Bangkok talking with both monks about their views on politics, and also with non-monks (mainly taxi drivers) about monks and politics.  The official line, and that espoused by most lay folk that I spoke with is that monks (and in this context, I mean lifers, not the men who have ordained for a month or a rainy season) in Thailand do not have political views.  I was told that the Supreme Sangha Council has told monks that they are not allowed to express their views on politics (despite the fact that the constitution guarantees this right for all Thai citizens, lay and monastic), and that they should stay away from political rallies in particular.  Those that do go to these rallies (birthday parties, airport closings and so forth) are not exactly committing a sin, but they are in a place inappropriate for monks.  They also open themselves up to criticisms of being “copy monks” (or “rentamonks”). 

There is then a lot of pressure on monks in Thailand to shut up about the political world, and many that I spoke with are just as happy not to be dragged into the discussion.  At the same time, though, there is tension.  Many monks would like to be allowed to vote, and at least some would not mind being able to speak more freely about politics.  Although the monks that I met at the red shirt rally on June 22 looked uncomfortable, they said they weren’t doing anything wrong, and that they weren’t false monks.  They were there, they told me, “because they love democracy.” 

Monks have of course long (always?) been involved in politics in Thailand (as well as other places).  This used to be framed in terms of monastic legitimation for the king and/or state (think for example of the Sinhala monks saying its okay to kill Tamils in the Mahavamsa, or Phra Kitthivuttho saying it’s okay to kill communists).  More recently, there has been a tendency for scholars at least to pay attention to monks as liberal figures, figures who ordain trees or preach against the excesses of modern capitalism.  The reality of course is that the Sangha is filled with monks on both sides of the aisle, and always has been, because monks do not cease to be people with connections and ideas when they shave their heads and take on the saffron robes.  What I think we need to pay more attention to is when it is okay for phra to edge into the political realm in Thailand and how they do so.

Monks throughout the Buddhist states of Southeast Asia of course have different roles in the civil society of their respective communities.  Moreover, I would suggest that what is considered to be appropriate activity for monks changes over time, both in and out of politics.  Monks in Sri Lanka can vote, in Thailand they can’t.  The Burmese Sangha tradition of political protest which flowered under the British means that they can act in ways that the Thai Sangha cannot or will not.  This does not mean, though, that Thai monks aren’t any less political than other monks, or other Thais.  Rather their position constrains (most of) them from making certain kinds of statements in public.  In other words, I would suggest that there is a monastic idiom of political expression.  This idiom is much more muted than lay political expression, and it only rises to public attention in certain contexts.  When monks speak outside this idiom, they risk censure.

Why is trade union bureaucrat David Cockroft of the International Transport Federation supporting the fascist PAD – who want to reduce the number of elected MPs in the Thai parliament to 30%, backed the army coup of 2006 and are extreme Monarchists? These are the guys who have used armed violence on the streets, almost started a war with Cambodia and shut down the international airports in December 2008. The PAD are claiming that British, Australian, New Zealand etc unions are supporting them!!! What a load of bollocks!