State within the state

This concept does not appear in progressive political science literature or research. It was used earlier to refer to the situation in Thailand during the period of the Cold War.

In fact, those who look into the structure and characteristics of the Thai politics and administration will know what this really means. This is not new knowledge. It was since the formation of the Thai Rak Thai party, when Thaksin became the Prime Minister in 2001 that we had tangible evidence that the “State within the state” in Thailand really exists. The evidence also indicates that people no longer have ownership or equal rights in this country as portrayed by current propaganda.

“State within the state” means that there is one “government” on top of another government in Thailand or Thai state, according to international legal definition. One is elected by the majority of people while the other never goes through any election process.

The real  [behind the scenes] “government” is composed of the following elements:

1. Senior government civil and military officers nurtured under the patronage system of the previous authority. These officers take turns to be in power, sharing wealth and privilege. They sometimes compete and even fight among themselves. 
2. Mechanism of absolute control by the state as among certain bodies and authorities such as Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), Special Branch of Royal Thai Police, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Royal Thai Army, Thai Airways, PTT, etc.
3. Income and revenue responsible groups including both the new rich and the old establishment rich as well as development of centrifugal networks to draw either old or new capital into the center.
4. Elements of academia, in particular those who know how to control the nation-state through the process of law – as among those academics with knowledge and skill to draft a constitution and other minor laws that have a hidden agenda or clauses that allow the status quo ante powers and elite privilege to continue.
5. Agreement with the superpower nations, in particular the USA in regards to protecting mutual benefits and to make sure areas of authority/interest doesn’t overlap.

This kind of persisting interest “government” is therefore the real government of this kingdom because it has the absolute power to seek and maintain its power.

The elected government is only there for the sake of the country’s image. It’s like a mask that hides the real image hidden behind. The orders for the elected government will be made through telephone conversations or messengers, the same way as ordering a pizza delivery.

From the origination of PAD, formerly “we love the king” group, the judicial review, the adjudication to null the election on 2 April 2006, the car bomb to assassinate the PM of the elected government [Thaksin], the 2006 coup, the council for national security, the dissolution of TRT and PPP  and most of all the lèse majesté cases were the products of the real  “government” of Thailand. These are but a part of a much wider circuit of interests or products!

There is no possible way that the elected government will be able to fight against the real “government” that is resilient and works in clandestine ways. Besides, an elected government has real work to do and has to face various problems daily and has to bear all sorts of criticisms from all directions. 

The apparatus of the real power or “government” in Thailand exists above electoral interests; bestowing enfranchisement or empowerment to voters through public referendum and a fair court system. From time to time this real “government” will come out to act like a guru to give a lesson to the elected government.

The missions of the real “government”, the “state within the state”, are quite clear. It will never allow a situation to occur where it will lose its power and benefits to democratic competition. Some other main duties of the hidden “government” are:

1. Create a distorted image for the political system; making the electorate feel that they cannot rely on a democratic system in place, for example because of vote buying.
2. Make the democratic government incapable, worthless and deserving to be destroyed, and if it appears worthy and gaining authority, the accusations are immediately raised on corruption, “dictatorship” and lèse majesté which can be deployed immediately to annihilate any oppositional voices.
3. Make the bureaucrat system  [the khaa-ratchakaan system], the real operational system of the hidden “government”; higher in power than the population of the whole country and engender conditions to make people more ignorant and backward than the elite bureaucrats.
4. Constantly reinforce power by creating a competitive condition among the underlings and their operational staff; the ones who fail will be disposed of, while favorites are promoted without credibility or due responsibility to the feeling of others.
5. Constantly promote positive propaganda to build its self-image, as a standard of the morality and good virtue for Thai society; even if there are no productive outcomes, previous outcomes that were accepted will be repeated to familiarize the public so that they dare not challenge it.      
6. Severely punish those who dare to challenge the status quo in public; as in “slashing a chicken’s neck to keep the monkey away” [Thai proverb].
7. Never disclose oneself no matter how much pressure; the leader of the hidden “government” would instead act indirectly when necessary to allow underlings to use their imagination to interpret what is wanted and how; any subversive orders will be passed down through codes and “boys” to avoid traces to the source.
8. Promises to the US, Chinese and British governments that as long as the real “government” is able to maintain its power, mutual benefits of all the three countries will be assured; this principle may be referred to as “I Live, You Live; I die, You die”. Therefore it is clear that the full extraordinary Thai ambassadors to these three countries have been selected carefully and often given special tasks after their retirement too.

Currently, Thai politics is dictated by the hidden government, the “state within the state”. The elected Abhisit Vejjajiva  is also trying to take good care of itself like the meat in a shell fish, and unable to undertake any productive activities. The elected government that people truly wanted has been suppressed and unable to make itself an alternative choice. If people can choose their own government the real behind-the-scenes “government” will experience the moral law of impermanence; it will no longer be able to exist in the Thai state anymore. We may place blame on many petty details that caused so much suffering for the pro-democracy faction; however, in reality, this is all dog’s shit. The real problem is the behind-the-scenes “government” that places self-interests first, that is regressive and outright wicked and cruel. It is clear that the heart of the Thai political problem is the “state within the state”.

The Thai armed forces have been major players in Thai politics since the 1932 coup which terminated absolute monarchy.  During the 1990s, some suggested that Thai soldiers were increasingly being by-passed by new societal forces, making the armed forces less relevant political players. [1] Others pointed to the disgrace suffered by the military following the 1992 Black May massacre as a watershed event finally compelling the armed forces back to the barracks. [2] This study agrees with McCargo and Ukrist (2005) that during the 1990s, the Thai military was never depoliticized.  Instead, it was “willing to pretend to accept limits and controls, on condition that it remain unreformed….” [3]  Yet there has also been a contention that a “re-politicization” of the Thai military did occur with the election of the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2001 since Thaksin brought with him to office a large team of persons with senior military backgrounds. [4] Thereupon, he appointed relatives, cronies, and pre-cadet academy classmates to high positions of military power.  But by placing responsibility for such re-politicization at the door of Thaksin, one can indirectly fault him for the 2006 coup—in which the armed forces once again took direct political power into their hands.  Following this reasoning, Thaksin himself is ultimately to blame for the heightened role of the armed forces in contemporary Thai politics.

There is an alternative way to analyze the political role of the Thai armed forces: examining the competition for power and prestige among military cliques even after the retirement of faction leaders.  The mandatory age of retirement at age 60 (with some exceptions) has often been viewed as the end of influence for a senior Thai military official given that his/her seniority as an active duty soldier terminates with retirement.  And yet in Thailand we have witnessed retired armed forces personnel forming political parties, serving in cabinets (including Minister of Defense), and taking seats in Parliament.  While in the military, these soldiers have often established close-knit clusters of personalist and class-based comradeship.  Meanwhile, shared service experiences, where an older infantryman commanded a younger one, produces cohesive patron-client linkages.  Such connections tend to survive beyond retirement age.  Factional competition thus links among active duty soldiers with retired officers. 

Examples of retired soldiers who have managed to exert enormous influence on the military corps beyond the age of retirement have included Gen.Praman Adireksan, Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand, Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek, Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and Gen.Prem Tinsulanond.  Gen.Prem is a special case—he has long been recognized as being intimate with the palace.  Not since the dictatorship of Gen.Sarit Thanarat (1958-63) has such a close relationship existed between a military personage and Thai royalty.  Prem’s pull on Thai politics began in 1979 when he was elevated to the concurrent positions of Defense Minister and Army Commander.  He ascended to the premiership in 1980 but was required to retire as a soldier in 1981.  Retirement would have considerably diminished Prem’s clout among active duty officers but it did not.  This is because, when he served as PM (1980-88), “royal support…elevated Prem above the factional struggles and power games in the military.” [5] After stepping down as PM, Prem was appointed to be a Privy Councillor and acting Council President, given that Chief Privy Councillor Sanya Dharmasakdi was, in his last few years, in extremely poor health. [6]  In 1991, the military successfully carried out a coup against PM Chatchai Chunhavan.  Prem did not negatively react to the takeover, possibly because PM Chatchai had initiated a policy of sharply reducing the power of the military in national politics. [7]

Fallout from Black May 1992 represented a massive discrediting of the armed forces in Thai society. Only two military personages and their entourages of supporters remained powerful.  These were Gen.Prem Tinsulanond and Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud, both retired.  Yet Chavalit had once served under Prem and was seen on many issues to be loyal to him.  Moreover, Prem could trump Chavalit because Chavalit had called for a “presidium” form of government in the late 1980s, words which to many (apparently the palace included) smacked of communism. [8] Thus, the 1992 political vacuum of active-duty or retired military leaders allowed retired Gen.Prem Tinsulanond to fill the void.    

Prem continued serving as the King’s de facto Chief advisor until 1998, when he was appointed as Privy Council Chair.  This final appointment cemented his penultimate ascendancy (save for the palace) over the Thai armed forces.  In terms of factional struggles in the military, the early-mid 1990s reflected competition between promotions of soldiers closer to either Prem or Chavalit.

Some may have thought that Prem’s retirement and advancing age would obstruct his influence in the military.  Yet his immeasurable prowess as the king’s top advisor, as an ex-military man having influence with reshuffles and not bound by retirement restrictions, helped to elevate the Privy Council to become an institution to be reckoned with.  And Prem ensured that his clients were rewarded handsomely.

As for senior military reshuffles, Prem’s loyalists have been very successful.  His clique has included Gen. Wimol Wongwanich (Army Commander 1992-95), Mongkol Ampornpiset (Supreme Commander 1996-2000) and Surayud Chulanond (Army Commander 1998-2002, Supreme Commander 2002-03).  The election of Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud as PM in 1995 allowed Big Jiew more leeway in the choice of senior military staff. For example, in Chavalit’s capacity as both Minister of Defense and PM, he was able to elevate Gen.Chettha Thanajaro (a Chavalit loyalist to the post of Army Commander).  However, the 1997 financial crisis put a dent in Chavalit’s luster. By Fall 1997, his star had waned considerably and he was pressured to resign from office in November.  It seemed now that there was no military personality or group which could challenge the dominance of Prem over the armed forces.  But Prem seemed to face gargantuan challenges with the election of popular PM Thaksin Shinawatra.  Thaksin brought Chavalit back with him as Defense Minister and used Chavalit’s own military support base to carve out a source of his own authority in the armed forces. [9] Thaksin saw to it that Chavalit-confidante Gen.Somdhat Attanand was reshuffled as Army Commander (2002-3) and then Supreme Commander (2003-04). Thereupon, Thaksin managed to position his minions (who were either relatives or pre-cadet school class 10 schoolmates) in top positions of power.  Indeed, Thaksin’s cousin Chaisit served as Army Commander (2003-04) and Supreme Commander (2004-05).  It seemed as though Prem’s monopoly of influence over the armed forces had all but vanished. 

2004 saw the promotion of Gen.Prawit Wongsawan as Army Commander.  Prawit had served in the 21^st  battalion of the Royal Guards (the Queen’s Guard).  Though he was loyal to Prime Minister Thaksin, he had long been an arch-royalist and was loyal to Prem.  Prawit was from Pre-cadet Class 6 and Army Cadet School Class 17.  His successor as Army Commander—Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin—hailed from these same classes. In 2005, Prem saw to it that Sonthi, who had previously served under Prem-loyalist Surayud, was appointed to become Army Commander (despite the wishes of Thaksin). [10] The two army generals who spearheaded the 2006 coup under Sonthi were Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr of the Third Army and Gen.Anupong Paochinda of the all-important First Army headquartered in Bangkok. Sonthi could count on their backing because Saprang had long criticized Thaksin publicly. On the other hand, Anupong, though he had graduated with Thaksin from pre-cadet Class 10, had served, like Prawit, in the Queen’s Guard.  There have been rumors that the coup was endorsed by Gen.Prem. [11] Though it is difficult to ascertain the certainty of such reports, what is true is that in the post-coup environment, Prem has returned to the apex of control over the military.  Today, the pro-Prem Gen.Anupong Paochinda continues to serve as Army Commander while retired Gen.Prawit Wongsawat acts as Minister of Defense.  Their control over the military reflects the continuing dominance of former Queen’s Guard officers and, by implication, Prem.  Ultimately, the Thai armed forces have never been de-politicized.

As such, the three-decade period of 1979 to 2009 represents the gradual assertion of political control by the Prem military faction over the armed forces. This era encompasses Prem’s own retirement from the armed forces and ascension to the Privy Council.  Indeed, patronage from the palace has been a crucial factor which has enabled Prem to monopolize authority even after the age of retirement.  Though sub-factions within his network of military clientele abound, the group remains united only under Prem himself.  The failure of Thaksin Shinawatra to effectively challenge Prem has represented the end of a final threat to the Privy Council Chair.

Though the elections of December 2007 appeared to revitalize Thailand’s process of democratization, 2008 marked a grim watershed for democracy in Thailand.  The post-2006 coup military leadership was clearly unhappy with the electoral results—which brought a pro-Thaksin government back to office.  But they did not dare stage the conventional coup d’etat.  The coup and military government that followed it had been mostly unpopular both domestically and internationally.  At the same time, damaging events which occurred under the CNS regime (it failed to solve any political or economic problems) caused the armed forces to be seen in an increasingly negative light.  Thus, as Thitinan Ponsudhirak says, the 2006 coup was a “botched” coup. [12]  The military’s alternative to outright takeover in January 2008 was thus to take a back seat to those opposed to Samak Sundaravej and indirectly influence the dis-assembling of the People’s Power party administration.  This it did in on three occasions.   First, the armed forces put little effort into protecting Samak’s government (and later that of PM Somchai Wongsawat) from unruly crowds which took over Government House, attempted to capture Parliament, and hijacked two international airports.  In essence, the Army under Gen.Anupong Paochinda was refusing to protect Thailand’s chief of government—the Prime Minister, though the Army Commander also refused to launch a coup against the government. 

Secondly, the military at least twice called on PM Somchai to resign. This happened once on October 16, when Gen.Anupong, at the head of a contingent of Thailand’s top brass, appeared on Thai television to call for PM Somchai Wongsawat’s resignation to take responsibility for bloodshed on October 7. [13] In late November Anupong again called on Somchai to either dissolve the Lower House or resign to avert the political storm, rather than face down the PAD demonstrators.  Though the Constitution Court managed to finish off the Somchai government, forcing the dissolution of Palang Prachachon, pro-Thaksin MPs clearly had the numbers to reconstitute a new ruling coalition.  Here the armed forces again entered the fray.   

Thirdly, in mid-December 2008, the military indirectly helped to usher in the anti-Thaksin coalition government of Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa.  A troika of pro-Prem soldiers was apparently instrumental in this oblique intervention: Army Chief Anupong Paochinda, retired Gen. Prawit Wongsawat, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Prayuth Chanucha.  These three “Queen’s Musketeers” had served together in the 21^st Infantry Regiment of the Royal Guards—the Queen’s Guards.  In early December, on the heels of the court verdict, talks began between these soldiers and members of several political parties, including the Democrat, Chart Thai, Puea Paendin, Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana, as well as several members of the new pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party to set up an anti-Thaksin ruling coalition.  The three soldiers also contacted apparent Thaksin loyalist and long-time politico Newin Chidchob—who proved to be less than loyal to his erstwhile patron. [14] 

Newin’s support was crucial for a coalitional realignment to transpire.  Born in Buriram province, in northeastern Thailand, he could perhaps carve into Thaksin’s assumed Isaan constituency.   His father Chai served as Parliament President while Interim PM Chaovarat Chanvirakul, a key member of Newin’s faction, was caretaker Prime Minister. The two men could ensure that dissolution of parliament would never occur—and they did. [15]  Meanwhile, Newin could sway scores of former Palang Prachachon MPs to defect to the anti-Thaksin ruling coalition—something which the Buriram bigwig proved he could easily accomplish. 

Meanwhile, the importance of the military was not lost on Thai politicians.  Against the recent backdrop of the Army’s refusal to protect ex-PM Somchai, MPs were keenly aware of the armed forces’ resurgent relevance to coalition formation and longevity.  As such, “the troika of the 21^st” was perceived as central to a new ruling coalition.  In this way, Thailand’s military became the indirect arbiter in the formation of a new civilian government.

The Democrats’ Secretary-General Suthep Thaugsuban was the key civilian go-between between his party and Thailand’s armed forces.  In an interview, he discussed how these conversations bore fruit for the formation of a Democrat-led coalition:

I had good ties with senior figures in the Military and I particularly admired Gen.Prawit [Wongsawan].  He could be reliable and was respected by younger military officers.  So I got in touch with him. He said the military was ready to follow orders if they were lawful and legitimate…He wished me good luck.  [After meeting potential coalition partners], I told them that I had someone apart from me who could give them assurances. [16]

The military triumvirate’s success in ousting Thaksin’s elected nominee government from office without resorting to a coup and then building an anti-Thaksin civilian government has clearly resurrected its clout vis-à-vis civilians.  However these events have triggered broad repercussions regarding Thailand’s entire process of democratization.  After all, since 1992, the country had followed a trajectory toward greater pluralism and political space.  Though it is true that Thaksin stifled parts of the rule of law, the 2006 coup put an end to democratization (except at the local level).  The election of December 2007 seemed to breathe new life into pluralism but democratic roots proved shallow.  2008 witnessed a military willing and able to involve itself in unconventional, indirect political intrusions—to the point of re-stacking the coalition.

Post-Script

Of late, the Abhisit government has quietly eased Patcharawat Wongsawan out of active office, pressuring him to take a leave of absence until retirement in August 2009.  In Patcharawat’s stead stands acting Police Chief Gen. Wichien Potposri, who appears to be more amenable to working under an anti-Thaksin government as well as perhaps pliable by the military.  However Wichien failed to impress the Police Commission in terms of being selected as the next national police chief—perhaps because he lacked seniority and experience.  Chairman of the Board PM Abhisit nominated Pol.Gen.Prateep Tanprasert, a favorite of the PAD and a few pro-PAD army elements.  But a majority of the 11-member body preferred Pol.Gen.Chumpol Manmai, seen as close to Patcharawat, Prawit, the Bhumjai Thai Party, and pro-Prawit military officers.   The meeting ended inconclusively, though Abhisit promised to renominate Prateep.  The struggle, however, could represent an attempt by the PAD and certain Democrats (including Abhisit) to wrest control of the chief’s position from the current military/police leadership in order to achieve greater control over a police force seen as being generally pro-Thaksin in orientation. [17]

As for Prawit, the government would most probably like to dismiss him from  the post of Defense Minister altogether.  This is possibly because of government fears of Prawit’s military influence, given the state’s decision to indirectly sack his brother Patcharawat.  At the same time, Prawit seems more loyal to Newin Chidchob’s Bhumjai Thai party than to the Democrats.

But Abhisit and Suthep must be careful.  The quartet of Prawit, Patcharawat, Anupong, and Prayuth has undergirded the Abhisit administration’s survival.  Still, should Prawit depart from the post of Defense Minister, the position may go to one of Prawit’s pre-cadet and cadet school classmates (perhaps either Gen. Sonthi or Gen.Boonsrang Niampradit) or possibly confirmed anti-Thaksinista Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr. If any of these men take the post, we will be witnessing the perpetuation of the 2006 coup group in positions of post-coup power and Thailand’s military game will continue to endure. [18] At the same time, if Saprang assumes the Defense posting, there could be possible conflict within Thailand’s military establishment.  Saprang is supported by Sondhi Limthongkul and the PAD who have hurled criticisms upon Anupong over the last six months and continue to do so. 

Anupong himself is working to secure a stable future for those closest to him.  On June 17, 2009, Anupong transferred/promoted 75 mid-level officers as a reward for their involvement in the 2006 coup.  One of these, Lt. Col.Pattanachai Jintakanont (former Commander of the strategically key 4^th Cavalry Battalion in Bangkok) was promoted to colonel and appointed to be the Army Chief’s Aide.  His replacement was Lt. Col.Chinsorn Ruengsuk, an aide to Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. [19]    With regard to October 2009 military reshuffles, this includes Gen.Prayuth (AFAPS Class 12, Army Cadet School Class 23), who Anupong is keeping on as Army Chief of Staff, in line to be take Anupong’s own position in 2010. At the same time, Anupong will promote another Class 10 army chum, Gen.Teerawat Boonyapradap to become deputy Army Chief. [20] In Teerawat’s place, Anupong is set to appoint Gen. Piroon Phaeopolsong, deputy Army Chief of Staff, as assistant Army Chief.  Piroon graduated with Anupong in pre-cadet school Class 10.  Finally, Gen.Wit Thephasadin na Ayutthaya (Class 11) is to be promoted to be another assistant Army Chief. [21]  The promotions further clinch the ascendancy of Pre-Cadet Class 10 and 12 as well as Army Cadet School Classes 21 and 23 over Thailand’s Armed Forces.  At the same time, at least until 2010 the personal supremacy of Generals Anupong and Prayuth is assured.

In late August 2009, rumors of a military coup were again resonating.  It was said that the supposed takeover would be instigated by Generals Prawit, Anupong, Prayuth, as well as politician Newin Chidchob.  The gossip coincided with an August 17 attempt by red-shirts to petition Thailand’s king to pardon Thaksin Shinawatra during which potential violence might provide the necessary springboard for military intervention. [22]   The rumor has not come to pass but it underlines the continuing popular perception of an extreme lack of civilian control over Thailand’s military.  Such tittle-tattle is not idle chitchat in a country where the army has proved time and again that it can and will continue its role as political umpire where it—and the Privy Council—see fit. 

The military triumvirate’s success in building a civilian government military succeeded in ousting Thaksin’s elected nominee government from office without resorting to a coup.  However it triggered broad repercussions regarding Thailand’s entire process of democratization.  Since 1992, the country had followed a trajectory toward greater pluralism and political space.  Though it is true that Thaksin stifled parts of the rule of law, the 2006 coup put an end to democratization (except at the local level).  The election of December 2007 seemed to breathe new life into pluralism but democratic roots proved shallow.  2008 witnessed a military willing and able to involve itself in unconventional, indirect political intrusions—to the point of re-stacking the coalition.

NOTES

1. Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization,” In Hewison, Kevin, editor, Political Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, pp.54-55.

2. Surachart Bamrungsuk, „Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,“p.77.

3. McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand.  Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.129.

4. McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand.  Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.134.

5. Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.346.

6.  Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy.  Paper presented at the 10^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.

7. Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy.  Paper presented at the 10^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.

8. Handley, Paul, The King Never Smiles, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p.470.

9. See McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen, NIAS Press, 2004, p.137.

10. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Where Will Sonthi Lead “Army of the Land?” The Nation, March 24, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

11. Interview with Jakrapop Penkair, March 3, 2009.

12. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Paper Presented at the 10^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9- 11 January 2008.

13. Wassana Nanuam, „The Coup that Never Was“ Bangkok Post, October 31, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

14. Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong, ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

15. Chai’s occupying the post of Parliament President also gave him the power to call a Special Session of Parliament to officially select a new Prime Minister (which he did on December 15) following Abhisit’s apparent success in garnering enough votes to become Prime Minister.

16. How Suthep Installed a Democrat-led Government,“ The Nation, May 26, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

17. Manop Thip-osod, “Scramble to be the Next Top Cop,” Bangkok Post, August 11, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Pradit Ruangdit, Manop Thip-osod, “Abhisit Loses Police Vote,” Bangkok Post, August 21, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

18. Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Fears Meddling in Lists, Bangkok Post, August 6, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

19. Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,”Bangkok Post, June 19, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

20. Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Urged to Prevent Meddling in Reshuffle,” Bangkok Post, August 7, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

21. Wassana Nanuam, “Source Says Prayuth to Stay as Chief-of-Staff,” Bangkok Post, August 18, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

22. “Puea Thai Blows Whistle on Silent Coup Plot,” The Nation, August 17, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

“I am quite worried our country is going into ruin because people have done things their own way”

- Extracted from Bhumibol Adulyadej’s speech, quoted in “King calls for unity in polarized Thailand”, Reuters, 23 August 2009.  Some more details on the speech, and the campaign to “blacken” Privy Council Chairman Prem Tinsulanonda’s upcoming birthday, are available here.

This excellent Reuters report has all the details.

Prachatai has an interview with her lawyer (in Thai and English) that is also well worth a read.  Political Prisoners in Thailand is, of course, following developments closely and there are other important elements of Daranee’s story available in Thai at LM Watch and at Prachatai.

There will probably be little, if any, coverage of her trial in the Thai media.  However, as I have written in the past:

Experience suggests that dogged media attention [on lese majeste cases] embarrasses the palace and the Thai political elite…Such coverage will put extra pressure on Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva; a man who so clearly enjoys the positive attention that world-renowned bastions of intellectual freedom can provide.  But without taking the lead on reforming lese majeste his legacy will inevitably be tarnished.  Abhisit’s current performance on these cases dictates that he shouldn’t expect an uncritical welcome at free Universities any time soon.

And, before anyone forgets, Suwicha Thakor is still locked up.  So it is worth asking again: why isn’t the international media following up his case?  Google News tells the (sad) story.

Whether the international media thinks this news-worthy or not, what is becoming abundantly clear to me is that every time a Thai citizen goes on trial for lese majeste the palace and the Prime Minister look weak and vindictive.  The wave of critical ideas about the monarchy circulating in Thailand will only increase under these circumstances. There is no escaping that simple fact.

Daranee’s efforts to highlight the injustice of her lese majeste trial will hopefully be broadcast far and wide.  She is an example of courage against incredible odds.  She is, quite remarkably, taking on a system calibrated to deter dissent and designed to intimidate anybody who is unprepared to toe the official line.  And the likely sentence if Daranee is convicted is not to be trifled with.  Based on previous experience she could be sentenced to a decade in prison.

With such a sentence in prospect, her outburst proves that “Da Torpedo” remains a formidable weapon against the lese majeste law.  No wonder the judge wants to avoid giving her free reign in an open court!

As poor Thais learn more about their rights, demand greater transparency and exhibit less tolerance for privilege-based behavior and extraconstitutional interference in government by the army and other quarters in the elite, the pressure to reconcile the needs of different sections of Thai society will increase.

That tipping point may yet be some years off. Yet the elite would do well to acknowledge its imminent arrival and prepare itself. If it faces up to this reality, there is still time to shape the outcome and secure a role — albeit a diminished one — for itself.

- Extracted from Colum Murphy, “Populism Erodes Thailand’s Old Order”, The Wall Street Journal, 5 June 2009.

Where to start?  The average New Mandala reader has at least some exposure to Thailand so I figure that a quick survey of some of that country’s interesting sites is probably in order.

My inclination is to begin by looking for places that I know exist because I have seen their front gate, or read about them elsewhere.  Thailand has a huge number of military bases, palaces and other premises that fit those general criteria.

In a quick exploration of Thailand from above it is possible to peek inside the Phuphing Palace on Doi Suthep near Chiang Mai, Bang Pa-In Palace at Ayutthaya, Chitralada Palace in Bangkok, and the Klai Kangwon Palace in Hua Hin.  It is also possible to zoom in on Thai military installations, such as the 5th Special Forces base on the road outside Mae Rim, the military airport at Don Meuang,  and the naval bases at Sattahip.  There is a house at a golf course development outside Chiang Mai that is marked as “Prime Minister Thaksin’s Mansion”, a handsome compound near Bangkok is attributed to veteran politician Banharn Sipla-archa, and with a bit of hunting it is also possible to pin-point Privy Council Chairman General Prem Tinsulanonda’s famous residence.

And there is much more…

Around the borders of Thailand there are very clear shots of the “Golden Triangle” (with the Paradise Casino on Burmese soil),  the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army base across the river north of Mae Sot, the Chulabhorn Naval Base in the deep south, and the 2nd Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge between Mukdahan and Savannakhet back when it was still under construction.

In the heart of Bangkok we can zoom right in on this bustling area and it is even possible to get right down to roof level in sleepier parts of the country.

It is simply amazing what can be seen on these high resolution images.  I expect that many of you have your own places of interest to point out.  Please feel free to identify any particularly interesting coordinates in your comments.

Finally, it strikes me that there must be a number of important research agendas that could be fruitfully pursued in conjunction with some of these images.

First, if democracy means that, “Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens” (Dahl), how does Thailand score on this issue? Thai elected governments have to accept their limited policy-making capabilities. Security policy has been the prerogative of an independent-minded military, while the civil bureaucracy has maintained its own policy plans vis-à-vis their ministers, who they often despise. Many technocrats still do not see why elected politicians are an improvement compared to authoritarian times. The 2007 Constitution even forces governments, in its long chapter V on “Directive principles of fundamental state policies,” to implement a wide range of policies. This essentially reduces the policy-making government to a set of elected managers of a constitutional policy agenda. And this agenda was made compulsory by a democratically illegitimate group of academics and bureaucrats serving on constitution-drafting committees established by the coup-plotters. Thus, the chapter on state policies fundamentally contradicts the key democratic principle stated in article 3, “The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people.”

Second, the Thai polity has not yet developed what for European political history has been referred to as “nationally available categories” (Tilly) of political contestation (for example, Labor-Conservatives-Liberal Democrats). Rather, politics remains “highly localized and territorialized” (Caramani). The political party system, therefore, shows a very low degree of institutionalization. Parties have largely remained exclusive clubs of local notables and their supra-provincial factions. This seriously undermines the policy-making and administrative capabilities of national-level political personnel (in fact, all societal areas in Thailand have similarly serious capacity building problems). This way, the performance advantages of a mature democracy cannot be realized. Not surprisingly, this situation in some circles has undermined the ideas of freedom and democracy as the most desirable foundations of governance.

Third, although citizens are allowed to vote in elections, the political system mostly lacks inclusive formal mechanisms that would allow ordinary people interested in active political participation to access institutions of decision-making. There remains a “wide gulf between political elites and citizens” (Carothers). At the provincial level, political structures are largely informal and invisible. Rather than being expressions of democratic public affairs, up-country politics are mostly treated by its important personnel as mere extensions of their family households and personal friendship networks (phuak). This situation fundamentally contradicts the principle of equal democratic citizenship.

Together with the preceding point, it is thus not surprising that voting is largely determined by local conditions, rather than being an expression of a nationally homogenized electorate (the proportional vote, though, does have a strong element of nationalization).

From the perspective of the Thai socio-political and monarchist Establishment representing the old hierarchical nature of the Thai polity as well as subsequent long periods of military and bureaucratic rule, the preceding three observations are unproblematic. On the contrary, they only confirm that the present form of democracy, including the lack of democratic qualification supposedly exhibited by politicians and voters, does not serve “the country/nation” well, which is the reason used to justify continued paternalist elite rule, though in a democratized way. The following three ideological issues are more problematic, certainly to the Establishment (no malicious intent here; the following issues merely serve to highlight certain causal elements of the current political conflicts; these elements will have to be considered in search for solutions).

First, the monarchy and the actions of the royal family are strictly removed from any public debate, even if such actions and the monarchy as an institution are politically significant. This relationship between the monarchy and the citizens of Thailand’s democratic polity has recently gained publicity under the label of lèse majesté. The king himself-in his speech given on the eve of his birthday anniversary on December 4, 2005-had said that the king can be criticized, and that it was actually the king who was in trouble if people were punished for lèse majesté. Grant Evans made a pertinent remark on this issue in the Bangkok Post:

With each charge of lese majeste people are being asked to chose between monarchy and democracy and ultimately this will work against the former’s stature. … vigilante monarchists seem to be the main threat to the monarchy’s longevity.

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has sent a few signals about changing the application of lèse majesté. However, one might doubt-given strong opposition-whether key issues will be tackled, such as the transfer of the right to initiate complaints, a significant reduction of penalties, the permission of academic and journalistic analysis, and the dissociation of lèse majesté from the issue of national security.

The broader context of lèse majesté is a reframing of the relationship between monarchy and citizens. There are at least two opposing ways of handling this issue. The PAD, for example, adhered to the official ideology that the outstanding feature of Thai society was that “the king is at the center of the people’s soul” (Sondhi Limthongkul; sunruam chitwinyan khong prachachon). However, since the PAD also knew that this was rather more a normative statement than a reflection of reality, they wanted to impose this position upon the people by expanding the constitution’s chapter on the monarchy by a stipulation that would have made it a duty for every Thai to protect and worship the monarchy.

Obviously, this attempt to create artificial unity in the face of empirical diversity would face enforcement problems, not to mention that it collides with the normative and practical requirements of a democratic political order. Senior citizen and monarchist Prawase Wasi offered a view much more liberal than that of the PAD, saying

In a pluralistic society, people think differently. There are people who worship the monarchy and those who don’t-it is natural. The key is how to channel the differences towards creative collaboration and output. (Bangkok Post, April 18, 2009)

Prawase’ statement thus goes far beyond the usual ideological emphasis on national unity by stating that Thailand is pluralistic. (The “White Shirts” seem to regress to a nationalism-based unity, and thus do not show the way to a “new democratic deal” for Thailand. Matichon, May 7, 2009, headlined a major article, “Stop harming the country – dissolve the colored [political] camps by using the national flag.” At the end of this piece, we read, “Consider the following words, ‘We must join our hearts and stand in respect of our national flag with pride in our independence and the sacrifice of our Thai ancestors.’ Afterwards, we can join in singing the Thai national anthem before there will not be any nation left to respect.”)

This brings me to the second point. The official Thai state ideology of “Nation, Religion, Monarchy” (chart satsana phramahakasat) sees people as conformist subjects, not as responsible citizens. According to this trinity, the Thai state depends in its existence on the unity and functioning of these three “institutions,” or “pillars,” not on the democratic capacity of its citizens. The latter merely have a role in uncritically submitting to these three elements, and thereby secure the survival and the unity of the Thai nation.

Here, “nation” is conceptualized as an abstract entity that possesses its own inherent and superior interests, as defined by Thailand’s socio-cultural elite. It is actively promoted by state organizations (government offices, local authorities, schools). In a democracy, such an ideological subjectification should probably not exist, because it collides with the normative-democratic idea of a majoritarian will as formed in an ongoing pluralistic discourse among equal citizens. Ideological products such as “Nation, Religion, Monarchy” normally are key tools for the support of authoritarian regimes. Until today, state officials legitimize their operations by reference to this trinity, although the only reason for their existence is the constitution, based on the sovereignty of the people.

My final point concerns the latent (and sometimes manifest) conflict between monarchism and democracy that has not been resolved since it occurred in 1932. When the civilian leader of the revolution, Pridi Banomyong, had to leave Thailand for good after his failed anti-military “Grand Palace Rebellion” in 1949, much of the political potential for a more citizen-oriented conception of democracy was also lost. Thailand’s oldest political party, the Democrats, was founded in 1946 as a royalist-aristocratic defense of monarchist values against incipient citizens’ politics symbolized by Pridi. Six decades later, during the protests by the “People’s Alliance for Democracy” (PAD) in 2006 and 2008, which were heavily framed by royalist symbolism, the Democrats chose the side of the PAD. The protests of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), on the other hand, conspicuously lacked any royal symbols. Rather, their attacks against members of the king’s Privy Council indicated a conception of the Thai monarchy that is very different from what the PAD, the Democrats, and the amatayathipattai stand for.

This fundamental tension between the remains of an earlier stratified top-down societal order, in which all power was vested in the king, and the egalitarian and liberal implications of a democratic polity remains unresolved. In 1982, a well-known academic (PAD ideologue Chai-anand Samudavanija) wrote, “The tensions evident since 1973 are the result of a conflict between two alternative bases of legitimacy: one emanating from traditional hierarchical traditions, the other based on popular sovereignty”. More than a quarter century later, this conflict still exists, and it has gained additional urgency by the imminent issue of succession.

Michael H. Nelson is a Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.  These are his notes for a presentation at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT), 13 May 2009.

Now I’m trying to turn to Dharma, particularly the 3 characteristics of all things, Anicca (impermanence), Dukkha (suffering), and Anatta (illusion of self). I’ve been trying to seek freedom like a fish stuck in a net; the more you struggle, the tighter it gets. Looking around, I see other convicts still smile, laugh and make jokes among themselves. But I feel tortured. My wife cries. I don’t know how my children are living. I cry each time I think of them. I feel sorry for my youngest child who has yet to learn about this [lese majeste conviction] because his mother has not told him, sparing him the pain that his brother and sister have felt.

- Quote from lese majeste convict Suwicha Thakor (สุวิชา ท่าค้อ), reported in “Suwicha Thakor’s life after sentencing” (also available in Thai), Prachatai, 13 May 2009.

Previous New Mandala coverage of Suwicha Thakor and his predicament is available here and here.  As I wrote last month, “There are now the inevitable efforts to ensure that Suwicha is quietly forgotten.  I don’t think that should be allowed to happen.  His story would be of great interest to the many millions who have recently seen Thailand on their television screens and who are wondering where the deeper faultlines actually lie.”

Thanks to the always on-the-ball Political Prisoners in Thailand for bringing this outstanding Prachatai work to my attention.  At least in their editorial offices Suwicha has not been forgotten.

But surely his case, and its clear public interest components, merits a detailed report in the international media?  Or is Suwicha going to be put in the too hard basket?  Do we only care when it is Australians and Swiss doing hard time for lese majeste?