On the second day of Christmas my true love sent to me a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the third day of Christmas my true love sent to me a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the fourth day of Christmas my true love sent to me a farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the fifth day of Christmas my true love sent me to Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the sixth day of Christmas my true love sent to me one in three MPs and Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the seventh day of Christmas my true love sent to me PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the eighth day of Christmas my true love sent to me some right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the ninth day of Christmas my true love sent to me a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Somchai Wongsawat.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the tenth day of Christmas my true love sent to me an airport occupation, a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Somchai Wongsawat.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the eleventh day of Christmas my true love sent to me PPP’s destruction, an airport occupation, a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and my new best friend Newin.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the twelfth day of Christmas my true love sent to me 80 MP’s seduction, PPP’s destruction, an airport occupation, a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, 243 MPs  and my new best friend Newin.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

(Rest assured, with practice this can be sung. Here is the music!)

It is a bizarre situation and one where a coup, of some sort, seems almost inevitable.

How did it come to this? Here are some of New Mandala’s stepping stones to the end of the Somchai government.

The 2007 constitutional referendum

19 August 2007: General Sonthi, after casting his vote, refused to rule out future military action against the constitution. As we know, according to the tenets of sufficiency democracy, voters’ decisions are only valued when, as in the case of this referendum, they have no meaningful choice.

20 August 2007: So, of the 45 million Thais registered to vote, 14.7 million have endorsed the proposed constitution. It is a victory of sorts (and key no vote campaigners have accepted it), but not an impressive one. The international reaction will be interesting to watch.

3 September 2007: The explicit request of the military government was that Thai voters endorse a constitution; but the implicit request was that they endorse the future abrogation of that very document if it delivers a government unpalatable to those who wield the power to overthrow it. We can see the ideological groundwork for this being laid already with the usual tired claims about vote buying in relation to the substantial no vote in the northeast and the north. And these claims come from a government that spared little in terms of incentives and expenses for villagers mobilised as part of the yes vote campaign.

The 2007 general election campaign

10 September 2007: Some members of the ruling regime in Thailand have reacted with predicable nationalist outrage to a European Union request to send observers to the forthcoming general election. Why such a defensive response? I don’t think it is because the junta holds out some hope of ballot-box manipulation. Quite the opposite. What the current regime fears most is that the Thai electoral process could be internationally recognised as being relatively clean. The “sufficiency democracy” paradigm that they promote is based on the view that the electoral process is so compromised by money politics that it can be cast aside when it delivers an unpalatable result. Slandering the electoral process is the ideological bread and butter of the coup-endorsing Thai elite. With European Observers on the ground, the elite’s ongoing attempts to discredit electoral democracy will be all the more difficult.

The election

23 December 2007: The central question for Thailand’s democracy is this: will the royalist-military elite that staged the September 2006 coup be willing to accept the election of Thaksin’s proxy party? Finding themselves back at square one after 15 months will be a bitter pill to swallow. Military action against the election result seems highly unlikely, though it cannot be ruled out. More likely is a concerted judicial attack on the elected government. This may take the form of a series of challenges to constituency results. The current military regime has worked hard to keep the spectre of electoral irregularity and vote buying alive and they may waste no time in arguing, as they did in relation to the Thaksin government, that the People Power victory was bought from an ill-informed and easily manipulated electorate.

A coup by stealth?

1 January 2008: Now the issuing of “red cards” to the successful People Power Party has started in earnest with speculation that up to 60 candidates may be disqualified … As expected the common charge against disqualified candidates is the tired old charge of vote buying. This legal manoeuvring is just so predictable. … Just how far the powers that be are willing to go in their current coup by stealth remains to be seen. They will do everything they can to muddy the electoral waters.

The PAD return

7 April 2008: For some so-called pro-democracy advocates, constitutional reform by a democratically elected government seems to be more alarming than the complete destruction of a constitution by military force. The outrage at the proposed amendment of Section 237 of the 2007 Constitution is motivated by anything but democratic principles. Section 237 allows the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party if one of its executives is found guilty of electoral irregularity (or failing to act to prevent such an irregularity).

28 May 2008: Whoever is launching the attacks on the rallies held by the People’s Alliance for (Sufficiency) Democracy in Bangkok is doing the PA(S)D a big favour. With their cause looking increasingly tawdry and discredited, the most the PA(S)D can hope for is that their credibility will be boosted by the impression that they are standing firm against the dark forces of violence and dissension.

A ham fisted government

15 July 2008: Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej must dread reading the newspaper each morning. Each day seems to bring a new crisis or an escalation in one of his many existing problems. On Tuesday last week, his deputy party leader and former speaker was found guilty of vote buying. On Wednesday, the health minister was disqualified for not declaring his wife’s assets, and on Thursday the foreign minister resigned after a nationalist backlash against the Government’s decision to support a Cambodian bid for World Heritage listing for an ancient Hindu temple. …  Samak is a rough and tumble politician with a highly-dubious political history. His government has been ham-fisted, arrogant and ill-informed on a number of issues. Street protests, no-confidence motions, court cases and media condemnation are all legitimate in a democratic system. Attacks on the Government have produced some high profile casualties and caused some significant backdowns. But Samak’s Government is less than six months old. Opposition forces calling for Samak to hand over power (presumably to the Democrats) are overplaying their hand.

Royal silence

3 September 2008: The recent escalation of protest action by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has taken Thailand to the brink of civil breakdown. Swathed in King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s royal yellow, the protesters have forced the government of Samak Sundaravej to declare a state of emergency. … Today the king should not wait for more ordinary Thais to suffer the consequences of brinksmanship. The People’s Alliance for Democracy is goading the Samak government to over-react. With the real possibility of more bloodshed in Bangkok in the days ahead, the king’s silence is baffling. His lifelong reservoir of charisma is no good to his people if he does not call off the anti-democratic provocateurs acting in his name.

The cooking show coup

9 September 2008: Hosting a TV cooking show = GUILTY! Staging a coup and tearing up a constitution = NO PROBLEM!

Blood over ballots

14 October 2008: If you do the numbers it is clear that the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leadership has chosen bloodshed over ballots. The PAD has abandoned electoral politics. With no coherent or credible political platform their only hope is that sufficient blood will be spilt to prompt a military or royal strike against Thailand’s democratically elected government.

The “royal institution”

30 October 2008: In the wake of the October 7 violence in Bangkok, the queen made her support for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) abundantly clear. As a result of the queen’s actions, the “royal institution” was publically aligned with an opposition group that had clashed with police, besieged parliament and openly courted a military coup. This public alignment took place when the attention of the national and international media was focussed on the events in Bangkok. … The queen let the genie of a politically engaged royalty out of the bottle. The powers that be are desperately trying to put it back in.

The final battle

24 November 2008: After today’s “final showdown” things are as unresolved as ever in Thai politics. Both sides can claim victory. The PAD succeeded in delaying the joint meeting between MPs and Senators and, although they showed their now familiar disregard for the rule of law, their behaviour was more restrained than many had expected. The government can claim credit for avoiding a confrontation over the parliamentary meeting and for the restrained police handling of the PAD protestors. The pro-government red-shirts wisely kept their distance. Hopefully, if the night ends peacefully, overblown PAD rhetoric will be the only casualty.

25 November 2008: The relative peace of 24 November seemed too good to be true. The PAD have now reverted to their regular strategy of extreme provocation. … “Bangkok International Airport has now been closed by Fascist thugs from the anti-government PAD.”

27 November 2008: The crisis of 1992 produced a powerful image of the king as an apolitical and independent force stepping in to resolve a political crisis. In 2008 this may be much harder to achieve. The royal brand has been thoroughly caught up in the political turmoil and it may prove very difficult to extract it.

Everyone has a right to peaceful protest. Whatever the cause. Even if people want to protest against a democratically elected government amending a constitution imposed by a military regime in a sham referendum. (Not The Nation has some great coverage of the PA(S)D campaign).

Just let the PA(S)D stew in their own juice (with the Democrat-except-when-you-can’t-win-an-election-and-then-a-coup-is-ok Party stirring the pot).

The two new papers are:

• “Thaksin’s 2005 Electoral Triumph:Looking Back From the Election in 2007”, published by the Southeast Asia Research Centre at the City University of Hong Kong.
• “Constitution Referendum in Thailand: Observations from Chachoengsao Province”, published by KPI Politics Update, King Prajadhipok Institute, Bangkok.

Readers looking for more of Nelson’s writings (and pictures) on politics in Chachoengsao province will find these New Mandala posts helpful.

Seven Threats to Thailand’s Democracy
Andrew Walker
Thailand Update Conference
31 August 2007
University House
The Australian National University

Today I will be talking to you about what I see as seven key threats to Thailand’s democracy. Don’t ask me why I chose seven, it just seemed a good number when I nominated the topic and it gave me room to explore some of the complexity of the current situation. And, in fact, I’ve decided to talk about 6 threats and one opportunity.

My aim in doing this is not to provide a detailed analysis of the recent politics of military rule in Thailand. There are others far better qualified than I am to provide that sort of analysis. Instead I will take a more cultural direction – I am an anthropologist after all – and explore some of the more general attitudes, beliefs and social processes that I think pose key threats to the future development of Thai democracy. I should say that I appreciate that some of you may find some of my comments provocative. Some Thai commentators have expressed outrage at Western media and academic commentary on Thaksin, the coup, the monarchy and the recent referendum. In one recent case here at the ANU these complaints took the form of a rhetorical nationalist rejection of what was portrayed as neoliberal western bullying.

Well, if I fall into the camp of neoliberal bullies then so be it. But I do feel that this crude nationalist stance does little justice to the vigour and sophistication of debate that is going on within Thailand about its future political directions. This is a real debate that is carrying on despite significant restrictions on freedom of expression and the continued application of martial law in many parts of the country. The attempt to construct a dichotomy between Thai insiders and western outsiders is an attempt to paper over the very real political divisions that exist within Thailand.  [I then very briefly reviewed the key political milestones over the past year.]

Rejecting the ballot box

So, lets move on to the key threats. The first is the rejection of the legitimacy of the ballot box.

The Thai coup of 19 September 2006 derived ideological legitimacy from the view that the Thaksin government’s electoral mandate was illegitimate because it had been “bought” from an unsophisticated and easily manipulated electorate. This was not the only rationale, but the denial of electoral legitimacy was fundamental in justifying the removal of a government that had been elected three times. And, with a further election scheduled for late 2006, those seeking to defend the coup relied heavily on the argument that the electorate was in no position to make a reasonable judgement about the Thaksin government’s well-publicised faults. Faced with the likelihood that Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party would win yet another election, the coup-makers argued that the army’s intervention was the only way to resolve the political standoff.

This rejection of the legitimacy of voter’s decision has taken some interesting twists during and after the referendum campaign. Remember, less than a year ago anti-Thaksin and pro-coup advocates were very keen to discredit the validity of the electoral process. Electoral politics was condemned and electors were slandered as uninformed, parochial and self-interested pawns of party canvassers. But in the lead up to the recent constitutional referendum electors were urged to return to the voting booths and to cast their votes in a process that, according to Prime Minister Surayud, would help secure Thailand’s democratic development.

So what changed? Why this new found enthusiasm for electoral politics. In fact, as we know in the referendum voters were given no meaningful choice. The referendum was a take-it-or-leave-it offer: if you want elections and a semblance of stability then vote yes. For those considering a no vote there was only the option of handing power to the military government to nominate a constitution of their choosing. Unlike the referendums that most of us are used to, in this case there was no clearly defined constitutional status quo that would be the outcome of a successful no vote. So, here we have some indication of the shape that sufficiency democracy is taking in Thailand. The advocates of sufficiency democracy, or guided democracy, are very happy to urge electoral participation when the electorate really has no choice. When voters do exercise choices, their electoral judgements are slandered as being the result of money politics.

Resort to the power of the gun

The second key threat is the ease with which resort is made to the power of the gun. One of the most unsavoury aspects of the Thaksin’s government’s term in office was the so called “war on drugs” which is said to have claimed the lives of thousands in a spate of extra-judicial killings. And one of the most unsavoury aspects of Thai political culture is that this brutal campaign (which turned a blind, and sometimes even approving, eye to official abuse and the violent settling of numerous local scores) proved to be a substantial electoral asset. Respect for people’s electoral wishes does amount to an endorsement of specific electoral motivations. People make electoral decisions for all sorts of reasons, some of them repugnant. That’s how a warts and all democratic system works. And it’s important to remember that support for the hardline action taken during the war on drugs extended to the highest levels of Thai society.

Of course, as we know it was resort to the gun of quite a different type (this time with a yellow ribbon tied around its barrel) that bought about Thaksin’s demise. Some commentators have argued that the coup was justified given Thaksin’s record of human rights abuse. Of course this is very much a retrospective justification. It is fanciful to suggest that the coup was motivated by Thaksin’s human rights abuses and that it represented some sort of turning point towards greater recognition of human rights.

My preference is to see a continuity between the extra-judicial gun culture that Thaksin endorsed and the extra-judicial, extra-constitutional and extra-electoral military intervention staged in September last year. In both cases the political assertion is made that force can resolve complex and seemingly intractable problems. Engendering respect for human rights and the rule of law is hardly served by using military force to tear up a constitution.

The constitution

So let’s consider this new constitution.

First let me make one empirical point. In the referendum held on the 19th August the constitution was endorsed. But not endorsed very strongly. 14.7 million out of 45 million voters voted yes. About 10 million voted no and about 20 million didn’t vote. But I don’t want to dwell on the referendum as I don’t think we yet have enough good quality data to make more than the most general speculation.

In relation to the provisions of the constitution there are clearly mixed opinions. On the one hand the constitution has been praised for its provisions in relation to human rights and the participation of civil society in the political process. On the other hand it is clear that one of the key aims of the constitution is to limit the power of elected representatives and to minimise the chance of single party dominance. But others are much better placed to talk about these specific provisions than I am.

The point I would like to put today is that, in a sense, the specific provisions of the constitution don’t matter. Rather than providing a general framework for government this constitution is a tool for achieving specific political objectives. What Thai voters were asked to endorse was a process whereby constitutions are only as good as the limit of military tolerance. In the wake of the September 2006 coup, the promise of a future election was undoubtedly attractive but it was also hollow, precisely because the reinvigorated threat of a coup strips legitimacy and moral force from the electoral process. The explicit request of the military government was that Thai voters endorse a constitution; but the implicit request was that they endorse the future abrogation of that very document if it delivers a government unpalatable to those who wield the power to overthrow it.

We can see the ideological groundwork for this being laid already with the usual tired claims about vote buying in relation to the substantial no vote in the northeast and the north. And this claims come from a government that spared little in terms of incentives and expenses for villagers mobilised as part of the yes vote campaign.

Sufficiency Economy

The fourth key threat may take some of you by surprise given its benign public face.

Let me introduce sufficiency economy by reading a short extract from a fairy story produced in Thailand. It is the story of a little kingdom and its good king, who triumphs over a series of dark forces. One of the king’s triumphs occurred during his many travels around the kingdom.

In a far off place, the king came across a village that had almost no one living there. “Where has everyone gone” the king asked the small group of remaining villagers. The villagers answered their king: “A demon of the dark called “GREED” came and visited and asked the people to leave the village. Most of the villagers abandoned the village and went to live in the “City of Extravagance”. The king thought for a moment and then gave the villagers a radiant seed. The villagers took the seed and planted it and it grew into the “radiant tree” that grew large branches and spread its radiance in all directions. The king told the villagers that the “radiant tree” is called “SUFFICIENCY.” The radiance of the tree shone to far off places, as far as the City of Extravagance. And many of those who saw it travelled back to return to their village.

This should give you some idea about the sufficiency economy philosophy. I don’t have time to go into it in detail today. Suffice to say that it is a theory proposed by the Thai king that places a strong emphasis on a “firm foundation in self reliance” as a basis for human development. The concept has been embraced with a passion by the current regime to help discredit Thaksin’s market driven model of economic development. Much of this adoption of sufficiency is rhetorical with local development projects funded by Thaksin quite literally re-badged as sufficiency economy or sufficiency agriculture projects. This is amusing and relatively trivial.

But there is a more fundamental issue. Sufficiency economy has become an ideological tool that seeks to moderate rising rural expectations for economic and political inclusion. Whatever sufficiency economy thinkers may have to say about urban consumers or businessmen, it is towards rising rural expectations for economic and political inclusion that the sufficiency economy urgings of moderation, reasonableness and immunity are most clearly directed. Not only are rural people to be shielded (or excluded) from full and active participation in the national economy but their full and active participation in electoral democracy is also delegitimised and the power of their elected representatives constrained. In this elite vision of electoral participation the problem lies in money politics – the demon of greed. The solution lies in the royally bestowed tree of local sufficiency.

Cultural Elitism

This issue leads us more fully into the cultural domain. Here, when I refer to cultural elitism I am using a rather crude term to describe a complex process. And in discussing this I want to get even more speculative.

One of the interesting characters to emerge from the puppet government established after the coup is the Culture Ministry’s Mrs Ladda Thungsupachai who is said to be the director of the Cultural Surveillence Centre. She’s not a big political player but she’s been involved in some interesting public discussions which, I think, are relevant to the current directions of Thai democracy. Let’s have a look at a couple of these.

The first relates to the so-called Coyote Girls. After Loi Kratong in 2006 the queen raised concerns after seeing television footage of a temple fair in Nong Khai at which Coyote dancers performed. The Culture Ministry stepped in and Ladda was quoted as saying that “Coyote Girls have to be in the right place, like an animal has to be in the zoo.” Eventually a ban was put in place on such performances in the proximity of temples and the Education Ministry was encouraged to provide the girls with training for alternative livelihoods.

Mrs Ladda reappeared in the press in May this year when she condemmed Thailand’s Miss Universe contestant, Fahroong Yutitam, for appearing at the competition in Mexico in a costume that clearly had strong ethnic minority elements. Ladda condemned her for not appearing in Thai national dress. Thai National dress, Ladda said, must be Thai. “It also must be in line with the official, royal designs and it must be used for proper occasions. Miss Fahroong has failed in her duty as Miss Thailand. She should show the outside world an authentic national Thai dress. Wearing an ethnic dress but calling it Thai could confuse young Thai minds and set a bad example for the youngsters to emulate.”

Of course, these are relatively trivial incidents. But as with the re-badgeing we saw in relation to sufficiency economy there is something rather more important going on. Of course there is nothing new or particularly Thai about this sort cultural elitism. But I would suggest that in the current political context it both draws some strength from, and helps to reinforce the view, that the “masses” are not completely legitimate participants in shaping the country’s future. As with sufficiency economy we have the notion that large segments of the population, and especially the rural population, have become detached from appropriate cultural values. And once again the solution is expressed in terms of the need to return to relatively narrowly, and sometimes royally, defined sense of morality.

But I also think there is something more specific going on. And here I admit to being quite speculative. One of the anxieties produced by the Thaksin government is that he had derived influence from cultural forces that lay outside the domain of the centre. Of course, part of this anxiety lies in his clear electoral power in the north and northeast. But it’s not just about electoral power. There was also concern, I think, that Thaksin tapped into and perhaps even created or energised aspirations and forms of social and cultural expression that were seen as in some way inappropriate. One example of this is the regular condemnation of Thaksin’s village fund as enabling farmers to purchase motor bikes and mobile phones. A more extreme expression of this elite anxiety and outrage were the common references to Thaksin’s dealings with hazardous spiritual forces which were often defined in explicitly non-Thai terms – the Burmese astrologer and the khmer voodoo. Efforts since the coup to define appropriate forms of cultural expression – including the semi-obligatory wearing of yellow shirts on certain occasions – can be party seen as an attempt to re-establish the royal centre as the primary source of cultural inspiration.

Silence

Which leads us back to the key silence that lies at the heart of Thai political debate. This is, of course, the legally enforced silence about the monarchy.

As we all know open discussion, let alone criticism, of the role of the king in Thai political matters is exceptionally difficult. One illustration of this is the fact that Paul Handley’s scholarly biography of the king is banned in Thailand, though scans of the book circulate widely on the internet. In the absence of open public discussion there is, of course, a proliferation of rumour, gossip and even the occasional video. There is also some vigorous debate about the role of the monarchy on some Thai web boards. This may represent some opening up of discussion but there is a lack of serious and concerted public discussion about the role of the monarch in the Thai political system.

It is not necessary to take a strong anti-royalist position to recognise that the king’s contribution to political events, to rural development and to human rights has been uneven. This uneven record is natural and normal for any leader. But this natural and normal situation is silenced.

This silence has an important implication for the development of Thai democracy. What it allows is the persistence of a largely uncontested image of virtuous and disinterested leadership. This becomes an ideologically potent standard of leadership against which elected politicians are assessed. And it is an ideologically convenient standard that can be readily drawn upon by those seeking to overthrow elected governments. The ideological potency of this unrealistic image of leadership would be diluted via more open public debate and discussion.

An opportunity

I thought it would be good to end on a positive note. So I would like to discuss what I see as one of the key, and often unrecognised, opportunities for the development of Thai democracy.

In a recent paper I have written about what I call a “rural constitution”. The rural constitution is made up of the various values that inform peoples’ electoral decisions about political leaders. Based on my research in the north of Thailand these values relate to things like effective and accessible local representation, support for economic development, sound administration, strong leadership and an appropriate balance between private and public interests.

I am certainly not trying to romanticise rural political culture – as in any political system there is plenty that is ugly and unpleasant about it. But what I am suggesting is that there is a rich store of sound democratic sense within the Thai electorate. The notion that Thaksin’s electoral support was rock solid and readily mobilised through patronage networks is highly misleading. The 2006 election was sabotaged by the Democrat Party, who were too scared to contest it, but the result did show that the Thai Rak Thai vote was soft, even in its electoral heartland. It is very likely that Thaksin would have won the election scheduled for late 2006 but in all likelihood his parliamentary dominance would have been diminished.

We are often told that the democratic checks and balances failed during the Thaksin era and that the military had to intervene to put things right. But I’m not convinced. The fundamental check and balance of electoral judgement was in place. Thaksin’s faults were well known and they were having an electoral impact. Just because a party is elected two, three or even four times in a row does not mean that this judgement has failed. The rural constitution is alive and well.

Political elites in Thailand often like to pontificate about the need for democratic education. After the coup General Sonthi declared:

Many Thais still lack a proper understanding of democracy. The people have to understand their rights and their duties. Some have yet to learn about discipline. I think it is important to educate the people about true democratic rule.

But perhaps the most pressing need for political education is at this elite level. Some concerted exposure to the rural constitution may be a good place to start.

Rather than summarise each presentation I will set out the main themes and lines of argument raised by the speakers. (Note that the main presentation by Surat was very similar to that presented at SOAS earlier this year.) Let me emphasise that this summary is based on my notes and recollections. Anyone else who was present is very welcome to contribute additional comments or suggest corrections.

The major argument was that the Thaksin government had an appalling human rights record. The extrajudicial killings that took place during the war on drugs, in particular, were discussed at length and some specific cases were outlined in confronting detail. Particular outrage was expressed that western commentators, governments and embassies in Thailand had done little to condemn the war on drugs. Various other negative aspects of the Thaksin government were also emphasised – corruption, abuse of power, surrendering to market principles, free trade agreements, manipulation of institutions and electoral fraud.

The second key argument was that the appalling record of the Thaksin government justified the coup. All coups are not the same. The coup did not overthrow a democratically elected government given that the 2006 election had been annulled and Thaksin had outstayed the 90 days permitted for a caretaker prime minister. There was some anger at the western response to the coup. Surat attacked both Alexander Downer and Kevin Rudd for their statements following the coup.

There was some description and defence of the new constitution, particularly by Charas.  There was little attempt to discuss the referendum result in any detail.  Again, Surat attacked the western media’s portrayal. Accounts of the referendum in the Australian and the Sydney Morning Herald were singled out as misleading and inaccurate (and disrespectful to those who voted yes because their relatives had been murdered by Thaksin!). Surat was determined to give us “the facts.”

Speaker presentations were followed by an extended period of questions, comments and response. I expressed my concerns (previously discussed on New Mandala) about a university hosting a Thai government organised forum where the Thai government nominated the speakers and vetoed a proposal for additional speakers. I made two other points relating to the presentations:

First, all in the room would agree that there were significant human rights abuses during the period of the Thaksin government. But to suggest that the coup was staged in response to human rights abuses was fanciful. In response to Surat’s condemnation of western nations for their alleged silence in relation to human rights abuses I asked what the panel’s view was about the silence, and possibly even endorsement, of the Thai king in relation to the war on drugs (for extensive discussion on this issue see the comments on this post).

In relation to the referendum I made the point, made previously on New Mandala, that the constitution had attracted less support than Thaksin did, at the height of the political crisis, in April 2006. In relation to the regime’s preoccupation with the issue of vote buying I asked why the referendum count had been undertaken at polling booth level.

 On the issue of the king’s attitude to the war on drugs, the panel members denied that he had endorsed it. Surat stated vigorously that whether or not the king had made any comment was irrelevant and did not change his (Surat’s) approach to the issue. He asked, to some audience applause, why it was necessary to bring the king into this matter. 

On the issue of the referendum count. Surat asserted that there was evidence that vote counting at electorate (rather than booth) level had facilitated ballot box stuffing during the Thaksin era. I may have misheard, but I think he made reference to “six million” stuffed ballots! Charas also argued that the turnout in the referendum was relatively low because voting was non-compulsory. There were many people from Isan, he suggested who did not travel back to their village to vote (perhaps not such a good example given the strong no vote in Isan!).

Other questioners addressed a range of issues – the appropriateness of the opposition boycott of the 2006 election, the need to overcome Thailand’s culture of corruption, the need for more open discussion in Thailand about the role of the monarchy in political affairs, the future of Thaksin-era health care reforms, the extent to which the constitution had been overly focussed on countering Thaksin, and the amnesty granted to the 2006 coup makers.

All in all the public relations and propaganda purpose of the event was clear. There was limited discussion of the current political situation, which was the advertised purpose. The primary purpose was to justify the coup by highlighting the human rights abuses that occurred under the Thaksin government. In terms of the quality of the presentations I suspect a good number of members of the audience were surprised at what a loose cannon Surat, as the main speaker, was. His presentation was an emotion-charged diatribe against Thaksin and his “cronies.” And many of his arguments seemed to be motivated by nationalistic resentment of “neoliberal” western criticism of the coup . His claim that the western media had never criticised the United States after the controversial Gore-Bush presidential election, was so ridiculous that even audience members with the most yellow-tinted glasses may have had doubts about his grip on reality. By contrast the presentations by Charas and Somchai were much more sober affairs (Kraisak was Kraisak – lets talk about me!). I had some sympathy for Somchai who clearly has very strong human rights credentials. But I was left wondering why he feels that participating in this tawdry public relations exercise is the only way he can take his case to the world. I have no doubt that human rights organisations and academic institutions around the world would welcome him with open arms. Allowing his case to be cynically used to justify a coup, staged by those who care little about human rights, does his cause no good at all.

The posts are:

• 23 July 2007 - All quiet in Chachoengsao
• 3 August 2007 – Still quiet in Chachoengsao
• 13 August 2007 – Some noise in Chachoengsao
• 19 August 2007 – More noise in Chachoengsao
• 20 August 2007 – Brief note from Chachoengsao
• 22 August 2007 – All over in Chachoengsao 

Compared to the weeks immediately before the voting in elections or, in this case, the referendum, polling day usually is a rather boring affair. It mainly concerns the processes in polling stations, which may be located in schools, tents (Image 1), temples, or other public places. This referendum was also rather boring for the polling station committees, simply because voter turnout in Chachoengsao dropped from 76.36% in the 2005 election to a mere 57.07% in the referendum—notwithstanding all the state’s concerted efforts to mobilize voters by all sort of means. While there were often long queues during the entire period of voting in 2005, people rather more trickled to the polling stations this time around (see Image 2).

Image 1

Image 2

Below is the obligatory picture showing a voter putting his ballot into the ballot box (Image 3).

Image 3

The ballot itself was much smaller than usual, because there were only two boxes—“hen chob” (accept) and “mai hen chob” (reject). In fact, people did not have to answer a question, but rather react on a statement, namely “Voting in the referendum to accept or reject the draft constitution of B.E….” (Image 4).

Image 4

Besides the 819 ordinary, community-based polling stations, there were also four polling stations for voters who had registered with the office of the provincial election commission to cast their votes in Chachoengsao, although their residences were registered in another province. In 2001 and 2005, 229,709 and 348,739, respectively, registered, while only 275,692 and 143,153 people actually turned their registration into a vote. For the referendum, only 3,050 voters registered, and only 1,407 of them actually turned up at the nok khet changwat polling stations (see Image 5). Of them, 946 voted hen chob, 450 mai hen chob, and 11 ballots were invalid.

Image 5

Immediately after the polling stations closed at 16:00, counting started. I observed this exercise in two adjacent tent-based stations on the left and right hand sides of what used to be a small market in the Chachoengsao municipality (talat kueakun). I arrived just in time on a motorcycle taxi from the nok khet changwat polling stations. As usual, one person would take a ballot at a time out of the box, unfold it, and hand it over to the second official. He would hold up the ballot for observers to see and clearly and loudly announce were the cross was made—“hen chob” – “mai hen chob” (Image 6). A third official would receive the ballot paper from the announcer, refold and perforate it to indicate that it had been counted. Meanwhile the fourth member of this team would have put the proper mark on a big counting sheet affixed to a counting board.

Image 6

After a short period of counting, it became clear that the constitution—or whatever voters had on their minds when they made their decisions—had won a clear majority. A 16-years old boy who had participated in the Chaisaeng’s “we vote no” march the day before came to me saying, “Lung (uncle), our march does not seem to have had much of an effect.” Indeed, the result of the counting was clear, as is shown in Image 7. After polling station committees had finished their job, they returned their electoral utensils to the meeting room of the Amphoe Mueang district office (Image 8).

Image 7

Image 8

The local stringers of national media hung around the office of the Provincial Election Commission for some time, until they could get the results (see Image 9). On Monday, which the government had declared a special public holiday, a big signboard with the results was erected in front of the old provincial hall (Image 10). Finally, on Tuesday, the provincial election commissioners were also formally informed about the national and local results of the referendum by an official from their office.

Image 9

Image 10

Image 11

As for Chachoengsao, it is noteworthy that voters in Sanam Chai Khet district contradicted the trend in the province by producing a slight majority for rejecting the charter. Thatakiap district had a relatively narrow majority for acceptance. Both areas belong to the political sphere of influence of former TRT MP—now disqualified—Suchart Tancharoen. In the ill-fated 2006 election, he was the only one of Chachoengsao’s four TRT MPs who received greatly more votes than “no votes” and invalid ballots combined. All of his three fellow MPs were defeated by those who abstained or invalidated their ballot papers. Reportedly, Suchart plans to field an elder brother in the election. Since his father—whose barami (“charisma”) was the source of Suchart’s strong voter base—died last year, it remains to be seen whether this will have an impact on his electoral prospects.

The Chaisaengs did not only lose in the election of April 2006, but also publicly placed themselves in the camp of die-hard loyalists of Thaksin, now assembled in the People’s Power Party, during the referendum period—and lost again. One wonders whether voters will keep both events in mind and thereby open up the possibility of better election results for the candidates of the Democrat Party. However, these candidates would have to depend on voters’ preferences for the Democrats, because they themselves are unattractive. Electoral prospects will probably also depend on what sort of winning coalition options might occur in the run-up to the elections. The Chaisaeng situation certainly is much different from the time of the 2005 elections, in which they substantially benefited from Thaksin’s overwhelming popularity. Their campaign would not become any easier if a relatively clear anti-(former)TRT coalition, including the Democrat Party, formed ahead of the elections. The fourth MP had his origin in the Chart Pattana Party; he might thus return to follow Suwat Liptapanlop, who has steered a low-key middle path after the coup.

THAILAND: A long road back to human rights and the rule of law

Predictably, the military junta in Thailand has coerced, threatened, bought and cajoled part of the electorate into passing its 309-article constitution on August 19. From results to date, just over 14 million people out of the country’s 45 million eligible voters crossed the box in favour of the charter. As only 25 million bothered to turn up at the poll booths, despite the saturating propaganda campaign in the weeks beforehand, this number was sufficient to carry the draft.

The number of voters was far lower than in previous recent elections, which have all been at least 62 per cent. In fact, the last time that there was a less than 60 per cent voter turnout was in the March 1992 general election that was hosted by the previous military dictatorship; its leader then took over as prime minister and was ousted by massive street protests a couple of months later, precipitating the period of nascent democracy and moves towards genuine constitutionalism of the 1990s, culminating in the abrogated 1997 Constitution. Unsurprisingly, the low percentage of votes cast has been played down, lest it suggest a heavy scepticism about the referendum and weariness about the persistent presence of the military in Thailand’s politics and public affairs.
The conditions under which the constitution was passed bode ill for the days and months ahead. Martial law remained in effect across half the country. Opponents of the draft were intimidated and materials confiscated from houses and post offices. Protestors against the coup have been charged with criminal offences. Villagers were reportedly paid to attend government-backed rallies: precisely the sort of practice that the interim administration accused its predecessors of using to win elections. The army and bureaucracy were mobilised to see that the document, jacketed in yellow as an unmistakable reference to the monarchy, was accepted. The entire event was conducted under a heavy anti-democratic atmosphere: precisely the sort of referendum that dictators have used throughout history to give the false impression of public endorsement for their actions. History also has many lessons about the types of repressive regimes and social turmoil that emerge from such deceitful public rituals. 

The people of Thailand are now caught in strange and contradictory circumstances. On the one hand, the social and economic life of their country is undeniably in the 21st century. On the other hand, its political and legal life has now been firmly thrown back to the 1980s. As a result, many good persons will likely withdraw from those areas completely, while others who may have contributed to them will now be reluctant or unwilling to do so. The parliament, courts and legal profession will likely lose good people, as the former returns to an elite bureaucratic mode of government and the latter become more and more politically compromised and corrupted. Fewer persons also will seek to obtain redress for grievances through these institutions, and will instead turn to outside avenues and feudal remedies in order to gain partial satisfaction, rather than get nothing at all.

The coming general election too will do nothing to solve the country’s problems. The junta will undoubtedly continue to manipulate and malign others throughout the coming period. The military has re-cemented its position at the centre of key institutions and regardless of whatever else happens it will use its renewed authority to full effect. Political parties will have only a small window for organising and campaigning. Those that sided with the regime can be expected to obtain the greatest advantages in the lead-up to the vote, while meanwhile over a hundred executives from the former ruling party have had their political rights revoked for five years under an order of the coup leader, shamefully endorsed by the proxy constitutional court set up after last September. In view of the current circumstances, the European Union and others would be wrong to send observers as has been proposed, as they would only serve to lend credence to another sham.

The Asian Human Rights Commission deeply regrets the passing of this regressive charter, not only for the people of Thailand but the people of the entire region. In the 1990s Thailand emerged as a place of hope and possibility for persons concerned with human rights and the rule of law in Asia. It set an example that encouraged others in more repressed societies. While the former government did much to damage this positive atmosphere, it took the army to destroy it completely. To rescue their country, the people of Thailand now have another long road ahead of them. For the sake not only of themselves but for the people in every other part of Asia that looked to them for inspiration and guidance, they should find the stomach and determination to carry on.

He writes:

I stayed at the Provincial Election Commission (PEC) until 23.15, when the final results covering all districts were completed. Luckily, a member of the PEC took me home since there is no transportation around here at that time. Now it is Monday, and I have just returned from the PEC. People could contest the polling within 24 hours after the polling stations closed, so some staff members had to turn up, although they had worked until midnight the day before. There were no complaints.

Tomorrow, there will be a meeting of the PEC. They will use it to get the results for the municipal areas and the sub-districts. Turnout in the end was 57.08%. Only one district voted against the constitution, while another one was quite close. Both are the most backward districts in this province. Altogether, there were 172,227 votes in favor, and 94,995 votes against the constitution.

Country-wide, the result is 14,727,407 (57.81%) to 10,747,310 (42.19%), with strong regional disparities (South vs. Isarn, with the North split). National turnout stands at 57.61% of eligible voters, so Chachoengsao is in the average range.