Today is the first anniversary of one of the more important days in recent Thai political history: 7 October 2008.

Soon after the bloody clashes of that day, a photographic chronicle of events was produced by regular New Mandala contributor Nick Nostitz.  It provides a graphic overview of the injuries that resulted when the People’s Alliance for Democracy protesters confronted a Border Patrol Police (BPP) and Metropolitan Police effort to disperse them.  One of the key issues emerging from those protests centers on the use, or misuse, of CS tear-gas grenades.

Here we hope to summarise the role of tear gas in the events of 7 October 2008.

Trawling the source material it appears that six types of CS tear-gas grenades were used by BPP and Metropolitan Police officers in Bangkok on 7 October 2008. Most (about 70 per cent) were fired by Chinese Norinco [North Industries Corporation] 38-mm tear-gas guns, which are 818 mm long, have an effective range of 130-140 metres, and discharge tear-gas canisters at a velocity of about 60 metres a second. According to eye-witnesses, and this video footage, some grenades were fired by M-79s and others were hand-thrown. Four types were manufactured in China, including both gun-fired tear-gas canisters and hand-thrown grenades; the other types were made in the United States and Spain. The BPP were issued only with the Chinese types, while the Metropolitan Police used the US grenades.

The Chinese types use a small amount of RDX explosive to burst the gas container open and hence disperse the gas faster, more uniformly and across a larger area than most other grenades. They are also cheaper. However, the RDX can also make them lethal, especially when they are fired into crowds at short distances. Most of the casualties on 7 October were caused by the 38-mm aluminium canister-type, which had been ordered from China in 1993 and delivered in 1995. They are a variant of Norinco’s NF-02 ‘explosive projectile’, which has a length of 125 mm, carries 40 grams of CS agent, and has five grams of RDX explosive.

Pornthip Rojanasunand, director of the Central Institute of Forensic Science, said on 13 October, after viewing tests of each of the grenade types, that the canisters should be ‘considered weapons, not crowd control devices’. Pornthip also said that ‘the police and military generally use American [rather than Chinese tear-gas], but it’s expensive – much more expensive. But comparatively, the American [tear-gas] is safer’.

The BPP had no training whatsoever with the Chinese grenades. Most had probably never fired or even handled the Norinco 38-mm guns and NF-02 rounds before 7 October. Yet the NF-02 canister is clearly marked with a warning, in English, that it is to be used only by ‘qualified personnel trained in riot control tactics’. It also says: ‘Do not fire directly at persons as serious injury or death could occur’. The Norinco specifications for the NF-02 state that it has a shelf-life of five years from the date of manufacture, and that it should not to be used if it has been ’stored longer than eight years from the date of manufacture’ – i.e., after 2001. The NF-02s used in Bangkok were 15 years old.

On 14 October, the commander of the Royal Thai Police Ordnance Division, Police Major General Phuwadol Wuttaganok, said that approximately 2,000 Chinese-made tear-gas grenades had been recalled from the BPP and the Bangkok Metropolitan Police the day after the fatal crackdown on the protesters; they were being stored at the Ordnance Division, and he expected that the ‘entire supply’ would probably be destroyed. Moreover, he said that police units had been ordered not to use US tear-gas grenades because they had also been found ‘to be deadly’. He also said that the police in charge of dispersing the protesters were unaware of the explosive impact of the Chinese canisters, and that: ‘I guess they just thought all tear-gas canisters were the same. They were told to fire — and they simply fired’.

Since the events of October 2008 the government of Somchai Wongsawat has fallen and the Democrat-led government of Prime Minist Abhisit Vejjajiva has come to power. What, then, is the legacy of 7 October?  Since that fateful day Thailand has seen other efforts to disperse protesters.   Most have involved violence but tear gas has not been a key part of the weaponry used.  The East Asia Summit in April 2009 was abandoned, ultimately, because the Red Shirt protesters could not be controlled.  Days later, the Thai Army displayed its preferred method for clearing protests in Bangkok, as it moved across the city.  The BPP and Metropolitan Police have continued to be involved in policing subsequent protests, although they have not been called upon to fire tear gas in the same way again.

In September 2009 there were reports that Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission will file charges against former Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, former Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and former National Police Chief General Patcharawat Wongsuwan.  With legal proceedings on the horizon this episode of Thai political drama is not over yet.

In fact, while there is still partisan mileage to be made from revisiting 7 October 2008 we will probably be hearing much more about the events of that day.  We hope that our modest effort to consolidate the public information on the use of tear gas will assist New Mandala readers as they revisit this topic.

The Thai armed forces have been major players in Thai politics since the 1932 coup which terminated absolute monarchy.  During the 1990s, some suggested that Thai soldiers were increasingly being by-passed by new societal forces, making the armed forces less relevant political players. [1] Others pointed to the disgrace suffered by the military following the 1992 Black May massacre as a watershed event finally compelling the armed forces back to the barracks. [2] This study agrees with McCargo and Ukrist (2005) that during the 1990s, the Thai military was never depoliticized.  Instead, it was “willing to pretend to accept limits and controls, on condition that it remain unreformed….” [3]  Yet there has also been a contention that a “re-politicization” of the Thai military did occur with the election of the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2001 since Thaksin brought with him to office a large team of persons with senior military backgrounds. [4] Thereupon, he appointed relatives, cronies, and pre-cadet academy classmates to high positions of military power.  But by placing responsibility for such re-politicization at the door of Thaksin, one can indirectly fault him for the 2006 coup—in which the armed forces once again took direct political power into their hands.  Following this reasoning, Thaksin himself is ultimately to blame for the heightened role of the armed forces in contemporary Thai politics.

There is an alternative way to analyze the political role of the Thai armed forces: examining the competition for power and prestige among military cliques even after the retirement of faction leaders.  The mandatory age of retirement at age 60 (with some exceptions) has often been viewed as the end of influence for a senior Thai military official given that his/her seniority as an active duty soldier terminates with retirement.  And yet in Thailand we have witnessed retired armed forces personnel forming political parties, serving in cabinets (including Minister of Defense), and taking seats in Parliament.  While in the military, these soldiers have often established close-knit clusters of personalist and class-based comradeship.  Meanwhile, shared service experiences, where an older infantryman commanded a younger one, produces cohesive patron-client linkages.  Such connections tend to survive beyond retirement age.  Factional competition thus links among active duty soldiers with retired officers. 

Examples of retired soldiers who have managed to exert enormous influence on the military corps beyond the age of retirement have included Gen.Praman Adireksan, Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand, Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek, Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and Gen.Prem Tinsulanond.  Gen.Prem is a special case—he has long been recognized as being intimate with the palace.  Not since the dictatorship of Gen.Sarit Thanarat (1958-63) has such a close relationship existed between a military personage and Thai royalty.  Prem’s pull on Thai politics began in 1979 when he was elevated to the concurrent positions of Defense Minister and Army Commander.  He ascended to the premiership in 1980 but was required to retire as a soldier in 1981.  Retirement would have considerably diminished Prem’s clout among active duty officers but it did not.  This is because, when he served as PM (1980-88), “royal support…elevated Prem above the factional struggles and power games in the military.” [5] After stepping down as PM, Prem was appointed to be a Privy Councillor and acting Council President, given that Chief Privy Councillor Sanya Dharmasakdi was, in his last few years, in extremely poor health. [6]  In 1991, the military successfully carried out a coup against PM Chatchai Chunhavan.  Prem did not negatively react to the takeover, possibly because PM Chatchai had initiated a policy of sharply reducing the power of the military in national politics. [7]

Fallout from Black May 1992 represented a massive discrediting of the armed forces in Thai society. Only two military personages and their entourages of supporters remained powerful.  These were Gen.Prem Tinsulanond and Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud, both retired.  Yet Chavalit had once served under Prem and was seen on many issues to be loyal to him.  Moreover, Prem could trump Chavalit because Chavalit had called for a “presidium” form of government in the late 1980s, words which to many (apparently the palace included) smacked of communism. [8] Thus, the 1992 political vacuum of active-duty or retired military leaders allowed retired Gen.Prem Tinsulanond to fill the void.    

Prem continued serving as the King’s de facto Chief advisor until 1998, when he was appointed as Privy Council Chair.  This final appointment cemented his penultimate ascendancy (save for the palace) over the Thai armed forces.  In terms of factional struggles in the military, the early-mid 1990s reflected competition between promotions of soldiers closer to either Prem or Chavalit.

Some may have thought that Prem’s retirement and advancing age would obstruct his influence in the military.  Yet his immeasurable prowess as the king’s top advisor, as an ex-military man having influence with reshuffles and not bound by retirement restrictions, helped to elevate the Privy Council to become an institution to be reckoned with.  And Prem ensured that his clients were rewarded handsomely.

As for senior military reshuffles, Prem’s loyalists have been very successful.  His clique has included Gen. Wimol Wongwanich (Army Commander 1992-95), Mongkol Ampornpiset (Supreme Commander 1996-2000) and Surayud Chulanond (Army Commander 1998-2002, Supreme Commander 2002-03).  The election of Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud as PM in 1995 allowed Big Jiew more leeway in the choice of senior military staff. For example, in Chavalit’s capacity as both Minister of Defense and PM, he was able to elevate Gen.Chettha Thanajaro (a Chavalit loyalist to the post of Army Commander).  However, the 1997 financial crisis put a dent in Chavalit’s luster. By Fall 1997, his star had waned considerably and he was pressured to resign from office in November.  It seemed now that there was no military personality or group which could challenge the dominance of Prem over the armed forces.  But Prem seemed to face gargantuan challenges with the election of popular PM Thaksin Shinawatra.  Thaksin brought Chavalit back with him as Defense Minister and used Chavalit’s own military support base to carve out a source of his own authority in the armed forces. [9] Thaksin saw to it that Chavalit-confidante Gen.Somdhat Attanand was reshuffled as Army Commander (2002-3) and then Supreme Commander (2003-04). Thereupon, Thaksin managed to position his minions (who were either relatives or pre-cadet school class 10 schoolmates) in top positions of power.  Indeed, Thaksin’s cousin Chaisit served as Army Commander (2003-04) and Supreme Commander (2004-05).  It seemed as though Prem’s monopoly of influence over the armed forces had all but vanished. 

2004 saw the promotion of Gen.Prawit Wongsawan as Army Commander.  Prawit had served in the 21^st  battalion of the Royal Guards (the Queen’s Guard).  Though he was loyal to Prime Minister Thaksin, he had long been an arch-royalist and was loyal to Prem.  Prawit was from Pre-cadet Class 6 and Army Cadet School Class 17.  His successor as Army Commander—Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin—hailed from these same classes. In 2005, Prem saw to it that Sonthi, who had previously served under Prem-loyalist Surayud, was appointed to become Army Commander (despite the wishes of Thaksin). [10] The two army generals who spearheaded the 2006 coup under Sonthi were Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr of the Third Army and Gen.Anupong Paochinda of the all-important First Army headquartered in Bangkok. Sonthi could count on their backing because Saprang had long criticized Thaksin publicly. On the other hand, Anupong, though he had graduated with Thaksin from pre-cadet Class 10, had served, like Prawit, in the Queen’s Guard.  There have been rumors that the coup was endorsed by Gen.Prem. [11] Though it is difficult to ascertain the certainty of such reports, what is true is that in the post-coup environment, Prem has returned to the apex of control over the military.  Today, the pro-Prem Gen.Anupong Paochinda continues to serve as Army Commander while retired Gen.Prawit Wongsawat acts as Minister of Defense.  Their control over the military reflects the continuing dominance of former Queen’s Guard officers and, by implication, Prem.  Ultimately, the Thai armed forces have never been de-politicized.

As such, the three-decade period of 1979 to 2009 represents the gradual assertion of political control by the Prem military faction over the armed forces. This era encompasses Prem’s own retirement from the armed forces and ascension to the Privy Council.  Indeed, patronage from the palace has been a crucial factor which has enabled Prem to monopolize authority even after the age of retirement.  Though sub-factions within his network of military clientele abound, the group remains united only under Prem himself.  The failure of Thaksin Shinawatra to effectively challenge Prem has represented the end of a final threat to the Privy Council Chair.

Though the elections of December 2007 appeared to revitalize Thailand’s process of democratization, 2008 marked a grim watershed for democracy in Thailand.  The post-2006 coup military leadership was clearly unhappy with the electoral results—which brought a pro-Thaksin government back to office.  But they did not dare stage the conventional coup d’etat.  The coup and military government that followed it had been mostly unpopular both domestically and internationally.  At the same time, damaging events which occurred under the CNS regime (it failed to solve any political or economic problems) caused the armed forces to be seen in an increasingly negative light.  Thus, as Thitinan Ponsudhirak says, the 2006 coup was a “botched” coup. [12]  The military’s alternative to outright takeover in January 2008 was thus to take a back seat to those opposed to Samak Sundaravej and indirectly influence the dis-assembling of the People’s Power party administration.  This it did in on three occasions.   First, the armed forces put little effort into protecting Samak’s government (and later that of PM Somchai Wongsawat) from unruly crowds which took over Government House, attempted to capture Parliament, and hijacked two international airports.  In essence, the Army under Gen.Anupong Paochinda was refusing to protect Thailand’s chief of government—the Prime Minister, though the Army Commander also refused to launch a coup against the government. 

Secondly, the military at least twice called on PM Somchai to resign. This happened once on October 16, when Gen.Anupong, at the head of a contingent of Thailand’s top brass, appeared on Thai television to call for PM Somchai Wongsawat’s resignation to take responsibility for bloodshed on October 7. [13] In late November Anupong again called on Somchai to either dissolve the Lower House or resign to avert the political storm, rather than face down the PAD demonstrators.  Though the Constitution Court managed to finish off the Somchai government, forcing the dissolution of Palang Prachachon, pro-Thaksin MPs clearly had the numbers to reconstitute a new ruling coalition.  Here the armed forces again entered the fray.   

Thirdly, in mid-December 2008, the military indirectly helped to usher in the anti-Thaksin coalition government of Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa.  A troika of pro-Prem soldiers was apparently instrumental in this oblique intervention: Army Chief Anupong Paochinda, retired Gen. Prawit Wongsawat, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Prayuth Chanucha.  These three “Queen’s Musketeers” had served together in the 21^st Infantry Regiment of the Royal Guards—the Queen’s Guards.  In early December, on the heels of the court verdict, talks began between these soldiers and members of several political parties, including the Democrat, Chart Thai, Puea Paendin, Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana, as well as several members of the new pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party to set up an anti-Thaksin ruling coalition.  The three soldiers also contacted apparent Thaksin loyalist and long-time politico Newin Chidchob—who proved to be less than loyal to his erstwhile patron. [14] 

Newin’s support was crucial for a coalitional realignment to transpire.  Born in Buriram province, in northeastern Thailand, he could perhaps carve into Thaksin’s assumed Isaan constituency.   His father Chai served as Parliament President while Interim PM Chaovarat Chanvirakul, a key member of Newin’s faction, was caretaker Prime Minister. The two men could ensure that dissolution of parliament would never occur—and they did. [15]  Meanwhile, Newin could sway scores of former Palang Prachachon MPs to defect to the anti-Thaksin ruling coalition—something which the Buriram bigwig proved he could easily accomplish. 

Meanwhile, the importance of the military was not lost on Thai politicians.  Against the recent backdrop of the Army’s refusal to protect ex-PM Somchai, MPs were keenly aware of the armed forces’ resurgent relevance to coalition formation and longevity.  As such, “the troika of the 21^st” was perceived as central to a new ruling coalition.  In this way, Thailand’s military became the indirect arbiter in the formation of a new civilian government.

The Democrats’ Secretary-General Suthep Thaugsuban was the key civilian go-between between his party and Thailand’s armed forces.  In an interview, he discussed how these conversations bore fruit for the formation of a Democrat-led coalition:

I had good ties with senior figures in the Military and I particularly admired Gen.Prawit [Wongsawan].  He could be reliable and was respected by younger military officers.  So I got in touch with him. He said the military was ready to follow orders if they were lawful and legitimate…He wished me good luck.  [After meeting potential coalition partners], I told them that I had someone apart from me who could give them assurances. [16]

The military triumvirate’s success in ousting Thaksin’s elected nominee government from office without resorting to a coup and then building an anti-Thaksin civilian government has clearly resurrected its clout vis-à-vis civilians.  However these events have triggered broad repercussions regarding Thailand’s entire process of democratization.  After all, since 1992, the country had followed a trajectory toward greater pluralism and political space.  Though it is true that Thaksin stifled parts of the rule of law, the 2006 coup put an end to democratization (except at the local level).  The election of December 2007 seemed to breathe new life into pluralism but democratic roots proved shallow.  2008 witnessed a military willing and able to involve itself in unconventional, indirect political intrusions—to the point of re-stacking the coalition.

Post-Script

Of late, the Abhisit government has quietly eased Patcharawat Wongsawan out of active office, pressuring him to take a leave of absence until retirement in August 2009.  In Patcharawat’s stead stands acting Police Chief Gen. Wichien Potposri, who appears to be more amenable to working under an anti-Thaksin government as well as perhaps pliable by the military.  However Wichien failed to impress the Police Commission in terms of being selected as the next national police chief—perhaps because he lacked seniority and experience.  Chairman of the Board PM Abhisit nominated Pol.Gen.Prateep Tanprasert, a favorite of the PAD and a few pro-PAD army elements.  But a majority of the 11-member body preferred Pol.Gen.Chumpol Manmai, seen as close to Patcharawat, Prawit, the Bhumjai Thai Party, and pro-Prawit military officers.   The meeting ended inconclusively, though Abhisit promised to renominate Prateep.  The struggle, however, could represent an attempt by the PAD and certain Democrats (including Abhisit) to wrest control of the chief’s position from the current military/police leadership in order to achieve greater control over a police force seen as being generally pro-Thaksin in orientation. [17]

As for Prawit, the government would most probably like to dismiss him from  the post of Defense Minister altogether.  This is possibly because of government fears of Prawit’s military influence, given the state’s decision to indirectly sack his brother Patcharawat.  At the same time, Prawit seems more loyal to Newin Chidchob’s Bhumjai Thai party than to the Democrats.

But Abhisit and Suthep must be careful.  The quartet of Prawit, Patcharawat, Anupong, and Prayuth has undergirded the Abhisit administration’s survival.  Still, should Prawit depart from the post of Defense Minister, the position may go to one of Prawit’s pre-cadet and cadet school classmates (perhaps either Gen. Sonthi or Gen.Boonsrang Niampradit) or possibly confirmed anti-Thaksinista Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr. If any of these men take the post, we will be witnessing the perpetuation of the 2006 coup group in positions of post-coup power and Thailand’s military game will continue to endure. [18] At the same time, if Saprang assumes the Defense posting, there could be possible conflict within Thailand’s military establishment.  Saprang is supported by Sondhi Limthongkul and the PAD who have hurled criticisms upon Anupong over the last six months and continue to do so. 

Anupong himself is working to secure a stable future for those closest to him.  On June 17, 2009, Anupong transferred/promoted 75 mid-level officers as a reward for their involvement in the 2006 coup.  One of these, Lt. Col.Pattanachai Jintakanont (former Commander of the strategically key 4^th Cavalry Battalion in Bangkok) was promoted to colonel and appointed to be the Army Chief’s Aide.  His replacement was Lt. Col.Chinsorn Ruengsuk, an aide to Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. [19]    With regard to October 2009 military reshuffles, this includes Gen.Prayuth (AFAPS Class 12, Army Cadet School Class 23), who Anupong is keeping on as Army Chief of Staff, in line to be take Anupong’s own position in 2010. At the same time, Anupong will promote another Class 10 army chum, Gen.Teerawat Boonyapradap to become deputy Army Chief. [20] In Teerawat’s place, Anupong is set to appoint Gen. Piroon Phaeopolsong, deputy Army Chief of Staff, as assistant Army Chief.  Piroon graduated with Anupong in pre-cadet school Class 10.  Finally, Gen.Wit Thephasadin na Ayutthaya (Class 11) is to be promoted to be another assistant Army Chief. [21]  The promotions further clinch the ascendancy of Pre-Cadet Class 10 and 12 as well as Army Cadet School Classes 21 and 23 over Thailand’s Armed Forces.  At the same time, at least until 2010 the personal supremacy of Generals Anupong and Prayuth is assured.

In late August 2009, rumors of a military coup were again resonating.  It was said that the supposed takeover would be instigated by Generals Prawit, Anupong, Prayuth, as well as politician Newin Chidchob.  The gossip coincided with an August 17 attempt by red-shirts to petition Thailand’s king to pardon Thaksin Shinawatra during which potential violence might provide the necessary springboard for military intervention. [22]   The rumor has not come to pass but it underlines the continuing popular perception of an extreme lack of civilian control over Thailand’s military.  Such tittle-tattle is not idle chitchat in a country where the army has proved time and again that it can and will continue its role as political umpire where it—and the Privy Council—see fit. 

The military triumvirate’s success in building a civilian government military succeeded in ousting Thaksin’s elected nominee government from office without resorting to a coup.  However it triggered broad repercussions regarding Thailand’s entire process of democratization.  Since 1992, the country had followed a trajectory toward greater pluralism and political space.  Though it is true that Thaksin stifled parts of the rule of law, the 2006 coup put an end to democratization (except at the local level).  The election of December 2007 seemed to breathe new life into pluralism but democratic roots proved shallow.  2008 witnessed a military willing and able to involve itself in unconventional, indirect political intrusions—to the point of re-stacking the coalition.

NOTES

1. Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization,” In Hewison, Kevin, editor, Political Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, pp.54-55.

2. Surachart Bamrungsuk, „Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,“p.77.

3. McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand.  Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.129.

4. McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand.  Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005, p.134.

5. Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.346.

6.  Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy.  Paper presented at the 10^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.

7. Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional Monarchy.  Paper presented at the 10^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.

8. Handley, Paul, The King Never Smiles, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p.470.

9. See McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen, NIAS Press, 2004, p.137.

10. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Where Will Sonthi Lead “Army of the Land?” The Nation, March 24, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

11. Interview with Jakrapop Penkair, March 3, 2009.

12. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Paper Presented at the 10^th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University, Thailand, 9- 11 January 2008.

13. Wassana Nanuam, „The Coup that Never Was“ Bangkok Post, October 31, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

14. Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong, ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

15. Chai’s occupying the post of Parliament President also gave him the power to call a Special Session of Parliament to officially select a new Prime Minister (which he did on December 15) following Abhisit’s apparent success in garnering enough votes to become Prime Minister.

16. How Suthep Installed a Democrat-led Government,“ The Nation, May 26, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

17. Manop Thip-osod, “Scramble to be the Next Top Cop,” Bangkok Post, August 11, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Pradit Ruangdit, Manop Thip-osod, “Abhisit Loses Police Vote,” Bangkok Post, August 21, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

18. Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Fears Meddling in Lists, Bangkok Post, August 6, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

19. Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,”Bangkok Post, June 19, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

20. Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Urged to Prevent Meddling in Reshuffle,” Bangkok Post, August 7, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

21. Wassana Nanuam, “Source Says Prayuth to Stay as Chief-of-Staff,” Bangkok Post, August 18, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

22. “Puea Thai Blows Whistle on Silent Coup Plot,” The Nation, August 17, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

I went at 9 am to Wat Kaeow Fa first. Thousands of Thaksin’s supporters gathered there. The event was hosted by former Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat and his wife, Thaksin’s sister Yaowapa. There were many elaborate rituals, such as protecting Thaksin, and lifting curses laid by his opponents.  One ritual, for example, countered a curse laid by the PAD some time before. Four upturned bowls on a table were, after chanting by four monks, turned around. This was to symbolize the lifting of the spell.

An amusing episode was when Somchai was to feed a few bulls with grass. One of the bulls was aggravated by the crowd wearing Red Shirts, and broke free. I think I made not the most courageous impression when I had to jump over several chairs to escape the mad bull running after me. If anyone thinks of going to attend the bull running in Pamplona – don’t!

The ceremonies ended with a phone-in by Thaksin, and the crowd sang ‘happy birthday’.

In the later afternoon, after some heavy rainshowers, I made my way to Bang Na, to the Mangkorn Luang Restaurant, a huge Chinese restaurant styled after a Chinese temple, with tiled roofs, walkways, a lake, and a tall pagoda. There were many pretty reception girls and beer girls, and waiters on roller skates. The venue was sold out in advance – a table for 5000 baht, a single seat for 500 baht. Organizers said that they expect to make a loss of at least several hundred thousand baht, so they could keep the dinner cheap enough.

Attending were many Pheua Thai MP’s and stars, and members of Thaksin’s family, including his sisters Yaowapa and Yingluck.

I had no chance to taste the food – the dishes brought to the journalist’s tables were attacked by my colleagues like hungry wolves (I managed though to snatch a small piece of the cake behind the stage – very nice!).

After many speeches Thaksin appeared in a video-link. The candles of the cake were blown out by Yaowapa and Yingluck, with Thaksin in Dubai simultaneously blowing out the candles of his cake there. The party ended with fireworks and songs by several stars, such as plaeng look thung star Takadaen Chonlada. The crowd cheered when it was announced over the microphone that the Pheua Thai Party-supported candidate won a Provincial Adminsitration Organization election over the Democrat-supported candidate in Surat Thani. 

I went last to Wat Uthaitharam, hosted by Veera Musikapong, Dr. Weng Tojirakarn and Shinawat Habunphad from the taxi radio station. Many thousand Red Shirts had gathered there.

It seems that Thaksin Shinawatra together with his family might play a much larger role again in the Red Shirts, as was indicated by his increased presence during the Songkran riots and its run up, and in many of the new Red Shirt publications. It remains to be seen if this is a turn towards personality cult, or if the aspirations for a more open Democracy in Thailand will still be the main focus in the Red Shirt movement.  Clear though is that Thaksin and the Red Shirts still have massive support, and show no inclination of giving up their struggle. The birthday celebrations were a PR victory for Thaksin over Abhisit, whose strategically well laid football game of government vs. foreign diplomats may have stolen some of the media attention, but did not get much interest from the Thai population.

A stunning first-hand account from the streets of Bangkok. Incredible photos that shock, move, entertain and inform.  A superb contribution to the documentation and analysis of Thailand’s recent political history. And this is just the first volume!

Published by White Lotus Press

UPDATE: Book launch details are here.

ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ (๒):  “หนึ่งปีให้มีนายกฯ สี่คน” หรือ “นายกฯ หนึ่งคนให้อยู่สี่ปี”

เด็กชายคิมหันต์

ผมตรวจการบ้านชิ้นแรกของนักศึกษาปีหนึ่งไป มีคำถามข้อหนึ่งออกจะง่ายดาย ถามถึงอัตราส่วนระหว่างของสองอย่าง คำตอบที่ถูกต้องคือ ๒ แต่นักศึกษาคนหนึ่งใส่คำตอบมาว่า ๑/๒  ซึ่งเป็นที่น่าเสียดายอย่างมาก ต้องให้คะแนนเป็น ๐ ในข้อนี้ไปเพราะว่าคำถามแบบนี้มันมีคำตอบตายตัว  แต่ถ้าถามว่านายกรัฐมนตรีไทยมีวาระดำรงตำแหน่งได้กี่ปีแล้วเขาใส่เลขสลับกันมา แม้จะฟังดูเป็นเรื่องตลกแต่ผมก็คงอาจพิจารณาให้คะแนนเขาบ้าง  ไม่เชื่อมาดูข้อมูลที่จะเล่าต่อไปนี้ซิครับว่า  “หนึ่งปีให้มีนายกฯ สี่คน” หรือ “นายกฯ หนึ่งคนให้อยู่สี่ปี” กันแน่

[Click on images for full size.]

หลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ ๒ นายกรัฐมนตรีตลอดกาล จอมพลแปลก ตกเป็นผู้ต้องหาคดีอาชญากรสงคราม อำนาจจึงหวนกลับมาสู่ประชนชนอีกครั้งหนึ่งโดยการเลือกตั้ง เมื่อวันที่ ๖ มกราคม พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ ซึ่งเป็นการเลือกตั้งครั้งแรกในรอบเกือบแปดปี  ปรากฏว่าเมื่อเสร็จศึกสงครามแล้วเสรีไทยที่นำชัยมาสู่ประเทศชาตินั้นกลับแตกคอกันเสียเอง และนำมาซึ่งความวุ่นวายทางการเมืองที่มีนายกรัฐมนตรีถึง ๔ คนในปีเดียว ในปีเดียวกันนี้เองพรรคประชาธิปัตย์ซึ่งเป็นพรรคการเมืองที่เก่าแก่ที่สุดและยังดำเนินการอยู่ของไทยและเก่าแก่เป็นอันดับสองในเอเชียรองจากพรรคก๊กมินตั๋งในจีนและไต้หวันเท่านั้นได้ก่อตั้งขึ้น โดยจุดประสงค์เริ่มแรกเพื่อคานอำนาจของนายปรีดี พนมยงค์ เท่านั้น

มีผู้กล่าวว่าวงล้อประวัติศาสตร์มักหมุนเวียนกลับมาในตำแหน่งเดิมๆ เป็นวัฏจักร ในปี พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ ฝ่ายนิยมปรีดีและไม่นิยมปรีดีได้นายกฯไปฝ่ายละสองเก้าอี้ หกทศวรรษผ่านไปถึงยุค พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๑ เสื้อเหลืองและเสื้อแดงผลัดกันครองตำแหน่งฝ่ายละสองวาระและพรรคพรรคประชาธิปัตย์ก็ยังเป็นผู้เล่นในเวทีนี้อีก เมื่อไม่มีอำนาจปรีดีให้คานก็คานอำนาจ “ทักษิณ” แล้วกัน แม้ว่ามันคงไม่อาจเทียบได้กับอำนาจ “ปรีดี” ก็ตาม

แม้ว่าวงล้อประวัติศาสตร์จะหมุนกลับมาสู่ตำแหน่งเดิมแต่วงล้อนั้นก็เคลื่อนผ่านไปในหนทางแห่งกาลเวลา ข้อที่แตกต่างกันมีอยู่ว่ายุคสี่นายกฯ พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ เริ่มต้นด้วยสงครามโลก และจบลงไปด้วยการรัฐประหารเอาจอมพลคนหน้าเดิมที่ครองประเทศรอบแรกมาเกือบ ๘ ปีแล้วกลับมา  แต่ยุคสี่นายกฯ พ.ศ.๒๕๕๑ เริ่มต้นด้วยการรัฐประหารเสียแล้วและคนหน้าเดิมที่ดำรงตำแหน่งนายกฯ มา ๕ ปีก็ถูกตัดสิทธิ์ทางการเมืองและมีคำพิพากษาถึงที่สุดให้จำคุก ไม่สามารถกลับมาได้อีกในเร็ววันนี้ เราคงต้องคอยติดตามกันต่อไปนะครับว่ายุคสี่นายกฯ รอบที่สองนี้จะสิ้นสุดลงอย่างไร

ภาพและข้อมูลจาก http://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/รายนามนายกรัฐมนตรีของประเทศไทย

คำอธิบายสำหรับผู้เรียนภาษาไทย (พจนานุกรมฉบับราชบัณฑิตยสถาน พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๒)

วัฏจักร ช่วงระยะเวลาของเหตุการณ์หรือกิจกรรมชุดหนึ่งซึ่งเกิดขึ้นและดําเนินติดต่อกันไปอย่างมีระเบียบจนจบลง ณ จุดเริ่มต้นนั้นอีก เช่น วัฏจักรแห่งฤดูกาล วัฏจักรแห่งพืช

สวรรคต [สะหฺวันคด] ไปสู่สวรรค์ ตาย (ใช้ในราชาศัพท์สําหรับพระเจ้าแผ่นดิน สมเด็จพระบรมราชินีนาถ สมเด็จพระบรมราชินี สมเด็จพระบรมราชชนนี สมเด็จพระยุพราช สมเด็จพระบรมโอรสาธิราช และพระบรมราชวงศ์ที่ทรงได้รับพระราชทานฉัตร ๗ ชั้น) (มาจากภาษาสันสกฤต สฺวรฺค + คต ว่า ไปสู่สวรรค์)

On the second day of Christmas my true love sent to me a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the third day of Christmas my true love sent to me a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the fourth day of Christmas my true love sent to me a farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the fifth day of Christmas my true love sent me to Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the sixth day of Christmas my true love sent to me one in three MPs and Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the seventh day of Christmas my true love sent to me PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the eighth day of Christmas my true love sent to me some right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Samak Sundaravej. A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the ninth day of Christmas my true love sent to me a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Somchai Wongsawat.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the tenth day of Christmas my true love sent to me an airport occupation, a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and Somchai Wongsawat.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the eleventh day of Christmas my true love sent to me PPP’s destruction, an airport occupation, a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, one in three MPs and my new best friend Newin.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

On the twelfth day of Christmas my true love sent to me 80 MP’s seduction, PPP’s destruction, an airport occupation, a cook-show PM sacking, right royal backing, PAD attacking, 243 MPs  and my new best friend Newin.  A farcical referendum, a brand new constitution, a party dissolution and a coup against my arch enemy.

(Rest assured, with practice this can be sung. Here is the music!)

It is a bizarre situation and one where a coup, of some sort, seems almost inevitable.

How did it come to this? Here are some of New Mandala’s stepping stones to the end of the Somchai government.

The 2007 constitutional referendum

19 August 2007: General Sonthi, after casting his vote, refused to rule out future military action against the constitution. As we know, according to the tenets of sufficiency democracy, voters’ decisions are only valued when, as in the case of this referendum, they have no meaningful choice.

20 August 2007: So, of the 45 million Thais registered to vote, 14.7 million have endorsed the proposed constitution. It is a victory of sorts (and key no vote campaigners have accepted it), but not an impressive one. The international reaction will be interesting to watch.

3 September 2007: The explicit request of the military government was that Thai voters endorse a constitution; but the implicit request was that they endorse the future abrogation of that very document if it delivers a government unpalatable to those who wield the power to overthrow it. We can see the ideological groundwork for this being laid already with the usual tired claims about vote buying in relation to the substantial no vote in the northeast and the north. And these claims come from a government that spared little in terms of incentives and expenses for villagers mobilised as part of the yes vote campaign.

The 2007 general election campaign

10 September 2007: Some members of the ruling regime in Thailand have reacted with predicable nationalist outrage to a European Union request to send observers to the forthcoming general election. Why such a defensive response? I don’t think it is because the junta holds out some hope of ballot-box manipulation. Quite the opposite. What the current regime fears most is that the Thai electoral process could be internationally recognised as being relatively clean. The “sufficiency democracy” paradigm that they promote is based on the view that the electoral process is so compromised by money politics that it can be cast aside when it delivers an unpalatable result. Slandering the electoral process is the ideological bread and butter of the coup-endorsing Thai elite. With European Observers on the ground, the elite’s ongoing attempts to discredit electoral democracy will be all the more difficult.

The election

23 December 2007: The central question for Thailand’s democracy is this: will the royalist-military elite that staged the September 2006 coup be willing to accept the election of Thaksin’s proxy party? Finding themselves back at square one after 15 months will be a bitter pill to swallow. Military action against the election result seems highly unlikely, though it cannot be ruled out. More likely is a concerted judicial attack on the elected government. This may take the form of a series of challenges to constituency results. The current military regime has worked hard to keep the spectre of electoral irregularity and vote buying alive and they may waste no time in arguing, as they did in relation to the Thaksin government, that the People Power victory was bought from an ill-informed and easily manipulated electorate.

A coup by stealth?

1 January 2008: Now the issuing of “red cards” to the successful People Power Party has started in earnest with speculation that up to 60 candidates may be disqualified … As expected the common charge against disqualified candidates is the tired old charge of vote buying. This legal manoeuvring is just so predictable. … Just how far the powers that be are willing to go in their current coup by stealth remains to be seen. They will do everything they can to muddy the electoral waters.

The PAD return

7 April 2008: For some so-called pro-democracy advocates, constitutional reform by a democratically elected government seems to be more alarming than the complete destruction of a constitution by military force. The outrage at the proposed amendment of Section 237 of the 2007 Constitution is motivated by anything but democratic principles. Section 237 allows the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party if one of its executives is found guilty of electoral irregularity (or failing to act to prevent such an irregularity).

28 May 2008: Whoever is launching the attacks on the rallies held by the People’s Alliance for (Sufficiency) Democracy in Bangkok is doing the PA(S)D a big favour. With their cause looking increasingly tawdry and discredited, the most the PA(S)D can hope for is that their credibility will be boosted by the impression that they are standing firm against the dark forces of violence and dissension.

A ham fisted government

15 July 2008: Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej must dread reading the newspaper each morning. Each day seems to bring a new crisis or an escalation in one of his many existing problems. On Tuesday last week, his deputy party leader and former speaker was found guilty of vote buying. On Wednesday, the health minister was disqualified for not declaring his wife’s assets, and on Thursday the foreign minister resigned after a nationalist backlash against the Government’s decision to support a Cambodian bid for World Heritage listing for an ancient Hindu temple. …  Samak is a rough and tumble politician with a highly-dubious political history. His government has been ham-fisted, arrogant and ill-informed on a number of issues. Street protests, no-confidence motions, court cases and media condemnation are all legitimate in a democratic system. Attacks on the Government have produced some high profile casualties and caused some significant backdowns. But Samak’s Government is less than six months old. Opposition forces calling for Samak to hand over power (presumably to the Democrats) are overplaying their hand.

Royal silence

3 September 2008: The recent escalation of protest action by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has taken Thailand to the brink of civil breakdown. Swathed in King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s royal yellow, the protesters have forced the government of Samak Sundaravej to declare a state of emergency. … Today the king should not wait for more ordinary Thais to suffer the consequences of brinksmanship. The People’s Alliance for Democracy is goading the Samak government to over-react. With the real possibility of more bloodshed in Bangkok in the days ahead, the king’s silence is baffling. His lifelong reservoir of charisma is no good to his people if he does not call off the anti-democratic provocateurs acting in his name.

The cooking show coup

9 September 2008: Hosting a TV cooking show = GUILTY! Staging a coup and tearing up a constitution = NO PROBLEM!

Blood over ballots

14 October 2008: If you do the numbers it is clear that the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leadership has chosen bloodshed over ballots. The PAD has abandoned electoral politics. With no coherent or credible political platform their only hope is that sufficient blood will be spilt to prompt a military or royal strike against Thailand’s democratically elected government.

The “royal institution”

30 October 2008: In the wake of the October 7 violence in Bangkok, the queen made her support for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) abundantly clear. As a result of the queen’s actions, the “royal institution” was publically aligned with an opposition group that had clashed with police, besieged parliament and openly courted a military coup. This public alignment took place when the attention of the national and international media was focussed on the events in Bangkok. … The queen let the genie of a politically engaged royalty out of the bottle. The powers that be are desperately trying to put it back in.

The final battle

24 November 2008: After today’s “final showdown” things are as unresolved as ever in Thai politics. Both sides can claim victory. The PAD succeeded in delaying the joint meeting between MPs and Senators and, although they showed their now familiar disregard for the rule of law, their behaviour was more restrained than many had expected. The government can claim credit for avoiding a confrontation over the parliamentary meeting and for the restrained police handling of the PAD protestors. The pro-government red-shirts wisely kept their distance. Hopefully, if the night ends peacefully, overblown PAD rhetoric will be the only casualty.

25 November 2008: The relative peace of 24 November seemed too good to be true. The PAD have now reverted to their regular strategy of extreme provocation. … “Bangkok International Airport has now been closed by Fascist thugs from the anti-government PAD.”

27 November 2008: The crisis of 1992 produced a powerful image of the king as an apolitical and independent force stepping in to resolve a political crisis. In 2008 this may be much harder to achieve. The royal brand has been thoroughly caught up in the political turmoil and it may prove very difficult to extract it.