ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ (๒):  “หนึ่งปีให้มีนายกฯ สี่คน” หรือ “นายกฯ หนึ่งคนให้อยู่สี่ปี”

เด็กชายคิมหันต์

ผมตรวจการบ้านชิ้นแรกของนักศึกษาปีหนึ่งไป มีคำถามข้อหนึ่งออกจะง่ายดาย ถามถึงอัตราส่วนระหว่างของสองอย่าง คำตอบที่ถูกต้องคือ ๒ แต่นักศึกษาคนหนึ่งใส่คำตอบมาว่า ๑/๒  ซึ่งเป็นที่น่าเสียดายอย่างมาก ต้องให้คะแนนเป็น ๐ ในข้อนี้ไปเพราะว่าคำถามแบบนี้มันมีคำตอบตายตัว  แต่ถ้าถามว่านายกรัฐมนตรีไทยมีวาระดำรงตำแหน่งได้กี่ปีแล้วเขาใส่เลขสลับกันมา แม้จะฟังดูเป็นเรื่องตลกแต่ผมก็คงอาจพิจารณาให้คะแนนเขาบ้าง  ไม่เชื่อมาดูข้อมูลที่จะเล่าต่อไปนี้ซิครับว่า  “หนึ่งปีให้มีนายกฯ สี่คน” หรือ “นายกฯ หนึ่งคนให้อยู่สี่ปี” กันแน่

[Click on images for full size.]

หลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่ ๒ นายกรัฐมนตรีตลอดกาล จอมพลแปลก ตกเป็นผู้ต้องหาคดีอาชญากรสงคราม อำนาจจึงหวนกลับมาสู่ประชนชนอีกครั้งหนึ่งโดยการเลือกตั้ง เมื่อวันที่ ๖ มกราคม พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ ซึ่งเป็นการเลือกตั้งครั้งแรกในรอบเกือบแปดปี  ปรากฏว่าเมื่อเสร็จศึกสงครามแล้วเสรีไทยที่นำชัยมาสู่ประเทศชาตินั้นกลับแตกคอกันเสียเอง และนำมาซึ่งความวุ่นวายทางการเมืองที่มีนายกรัฐมนตรีถึง ๔ คนในปีเดียว ในปีเดียวกันนี้เองพรรคประชาธิปัตย์ซึ่งเป็นพรรคการเมืองที่เก่าแก่ที่สุดและยังดำเนินการอยู่ของไทยและเก่าแก่เป็นอันดับสองในเอเชียรองจากพรรคก๊กมินตั๋งในจีนและไต้หวันเท่านั้นได้ก่อตั้งขึ้น โดยจุดประสงค์เริ่มแรกเพื่อคานอำนาจของนายปรีดี พนมยงค์ เท่านั้น

มีผู้กล่าวว่าวงล้อประวัติศาสตร์มักหมุนเวียนกลับมาในตำแหน่งเดิมๆ เป็นวัฏจักร ในปี พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ ฝ่ายนิยมปรีดีและไม่นิยมปรีดีได้นายกฯไปฝ่ายละสองเก้าอี้ หกทศวรรษผ่านไปถึงยุค พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๑ เสื้อเหลืองและเสื้อแดงผลัดกันครองตำแหน่งฝ่ายละสองวาระและพรรคพรรคประชาธิปัตย์ก็ยังเป็นผู้เล่นในเวทีนี้อีก เมื่อไม่มีอำนาจปรีดีให้คานก็คานอำนาจ “ทักษิณ” แล้วกัน แม้ว่ามันคงไม่อาจเทียบได้กับอำนาจ “ปรีดี” ก็ตาม

แม้ว่าวงล้อประวัติศาสตร์จะหมุนกลับมาสู่ตำแหน่งเดิมแต่วงล้อนั้นก็เคลื่อนผ่านไปในหนทางแห่งกาลเวลา ข้อที่แตกต่างกันมีอยู่ว่ายุคสี่นายกฯ พ.ศ. ๒๔๘๙ เริ่มต้นด้วยสงครามโลก และจบลงไปด้วยการรัฐประหารเอาจอมพลคนหน้าเดิมที่ครองประเทศรอบแรกมาเกือบ ๘ ปีแล้วกลับมา  แต่ยุคสี่นายกฯ พ.ศ.๒๕๕๑ เริ่มต้นด้วยการรัฐประหารเสียแล้วและคนหน้าเดิมที่ดำรงตำแหน่งนายกฯ มา ๕ ปีก็ถูกตัดสิทธิ์ทางการเมืองและมีคำพิพากษาถึงที่สุดให้จำคุก ไม่สามารถกลับมาได้อีกในเร็ววันนี้ เราคงต้องคอยติดตามกันต่อไปนะครับว่ายุคสี่นายกฯ รอบที่สองนี้จะสิ้นสุดลงอย่างไร

ภาพและข้อมูลจาก http://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/รายนามนายกรัฐมนตรีของประเทศไทย

คำอธิบายสำหรับผู้เรียนภาษาไทย (พจนานุกรมฉบับราชบัณฑิตยสถาน พ.ศ. ๒๕๔๒)

วัฏจักร ช่วงระยะเวลาของเหตุการณ์หรือกิจกรรมชุดหนึ่งซึ่งเกิดขึ้นและดําเนินติดต่อกันไปอย่างมีระเบียบจนจบลง ณ จุดเริ่มต้นนั้นอีก เช่น วัฏจักรแห่งฤดูกาล วัฏจักรแห่งพืช

สวรรคต [สะหฺวันคด] ไปสู่สวรรค์ ตาย (ใช้ในราชาศัพท์สําหรับพระเจ้าแผ่นดิน สมเด็จพระบรมราชินีนาถ สมเด็จพระบรมราชินี สมเด็จพระบรมราชชนนี สมเด็จพระยุพราช สมเด็จพระบรมโอรสาธิราช และพระบรมราชวงศ์ที่ทรงได้รับพระราชทานฉัตร ๗ ชั้น) (มาจากภาษาสันสกฤต สฺวรฺค + คต ว่า ไปสู่สวรรค์)

Before Khor Mor Chor there were a number of independent bodies such as the NCCC and the Constitutional Court (CC), then after coup they were replaced with the Assets Scrutiny Committee (ASC) and Constitutional Tribunal to target Thaksin. These were handpicked people selected by the coup-makers. The EC was also implanted with the junta’s own people who had something against Thaksin. The coup-makers also created other so-called “independent” bodies such as Draft Constitutional Council (DCC). Most of these folk were taken from the judiciary. After one and a half years of the coup government these bodies were dissolved and the country went back to the NCCC and CC. But the same handpicked junta people remained in these bodies all working in tandem and passing decisions among themselves to ensure a guilty verdict against Thaksin. This was important given the flimsy evidence at hand. They also wanted to ensure that the Democrat Party would become the elected government after the elections. But this did not happen. There was a gentleman’s agreement in place whereby the Democrats would protect the coup-makers and those involved in the junta’s Brave New World 2007 government. After every previous coup in Thailand the Democrats came into government to protect the coup-makers: this was supposed to be the case last year. A coup d‘état, after all, is constitutionally illegal in Thailand. 

Thaksin had to be found guilty by whatever means as too many of the junta’s people had their reputations at stake. The new judiciary was bought over with promises of extended tenure for another ten years (they can now retire at seventy years of age), united together and chosen anti-Thaksinites all now firmly embedded in the system to ensure a continued flow of skewed decisions and control and regulation according to the anti-democratic 2007 Constitution; a key element of which was to protect coup-makers and these “independent bodies” from any future prosecution.  Many of these bodies will be in power until 2013/2015 to make sure Thai Rak Tha (TRT) and Thaksin will never reappear again on the political landscape. 

The problem is that most people actually liked TRT and Thaksin’s policies and could actually see how these policies benefitted them.  But then there was a downside: some of Thaksin’s policies actually hurt many elites and powerful interests including local mafia. The People Power Party (PPP) similarly has the popular consensus while other political parties can only look on and see that as things stand they would never have an opportunity to share in the spoils of government from the ballot box. All they could do was to call foul in the election process – and the EC was happy to listen.

The coup seemed so neat. However, neither General Sonthi Boonyaratglin nor appointed junta PM General Surayud Chulanont had the aggression to deliver the coup de grâce on Thaksin and TRT as desired by the Supreme Puppet-Master General Prem Tinsulanonda. While the Democrat Party waited for an opportunity to take government away from the electorate’s choice. The junta underestimated the anti-coup group (red shirts). They thought that, as in the past, they could emplace a puppet government in power (i.e. the Democrat Party) to protect them.

This time things were different. The electorate had seen that Thaksin’s policies were the best so far and could see real benefits from voting for beneficial liberal policies.  This was democracy in process. Post-coup PPP were elected with Samak Sundaravej appointed as PM and then the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) reemerged in the streets. Their calls were for a new morality — but whose morality? They were not happy with the people’s choice because TRT had come back to haunt them in a new incarnation. This is why Thailand has suffered from continued riots: PAD and its aristocratic supporters could see they were not going to win on democratic grounds, but instead on issues of primordial national sentiment.

Remember, before the coup in 2006 Prem asked his people who they had primary allegiance to: the monarchy, or the elected government. Prem, as Chief Privy Councilor, has long controlled much of what goes in and what goes out of the palace.

PAD, the “People Against Democracy”, are a grouping of disenchanted intellectuals, elites, NGOs (harking back to the days when governments actually listened to them) and middle class Thai business interests – many of whom lost significantly in 1997 financial crisis and wanted the banks and favorable political interests to “help them along” – which Thaksin refused to do. This motley collection of urban folk, and many supporters from the south of Thailand where the Democrat Party reigns supreme (and of course this is Prem’s home), want to establish a status quo ante and control over government at any cost; even at the cost of the semi-democratizing nation state. Right now PAD has five police generals behind it as well as some senior army bosses. The group of five leaders also claim “higher support”. They started with yellow and then, more recently, changed to predominantly display blue. This perplexed observers for a while until, well, the penny dropped: The queen came out this week in an open show of support for PAD attending the funeral of a female PAD victim from the street violence last week and did not show up for the cremation of anti-PAD protestors some weeks before. But then she had long been close to Prem. It may also be a reaction to Princess Siridhorn’s comment in the US last week when questioned whether PAD were doing this for royalty as she replied that they were “doing it for themselves”. This was only reported in Matichon’s Khao Sod as most of the country’s print media had already chosen sides some years back. This infuriated wannabe media tycoon Sondhi who said that they probably reported it wrong or mistranslated it and then called upon his supporters to boycott this publication.  Then when the queen came out yesterday all was clear again for PAD to continue claiming its legitimacy…back to square one.  

Meanwhile, the opposition is no longer prepared to take it sitting down. Enough is enough. Nor Por Chor (”People’s Alliance Against Dictatorship”, the anti-PAD group) are hoping to hold out until the end of the month when annual reshuffling will be finished, when many high ranking pro-PAD public servants are due to retire and taking the control of weapons out of the hands of the pro-PAD army elites; hence the urgency of getting the new government’s policy statement read through the house and allowing some movement for the elected PPP to govern…The power holders will then be in place. Traditionally, Prem controlled all appointments. Thaksin did not consult with Prem — and this was his most serious mistake and his subsequent downfall. He was the only PM to challenge Prem. All PMs in the past consulted with Prem as he would position his people in power to control all government sectors.  The budget is being determined now for next year. Once people are in place within various agencies and the budget allocated, the process cannot be easily changed.

Prem sent his representative (General Pathompong) to tell the over-stressed police to back off every time — even when police charges are laid against PAD members…They never stay long incarcerated. Pathompong is the husband of Supatra Masadit (a Democrat Party politician and former minister) and is seen on PAD’s stage in full uniform giving encouragement to the mob. It is with Prem’s sanction otherwise he would not do this. The king has been silenced, though he met with the current PM Somchai Wongsawat who emerged from a meeting yesterday looking sombre. Apparently the king told Somchai to continue with his work.

Is Thailand heading towards emulating Burma? Let’s see.  There is too much at stake for the Amaat (aristocrats or traditional elites): The arch-enemy of democracy nominated by Kho Mor Chor last year Senator Rosana Tositrakul said something dramatic will happen within seven days. A threat or what?

Red Shirts/Nor Por Chor asked all the faithful to gather at Sanam Luang last Sunday at which time they said they would expose who is behind the anti-democracy campaign. But they did not say anything at the time. Thaksin also knows a lot but he will not talk – as least right now. The queen is either naive or politically bold; she has palace elites around her feeding PAD (literally and metaphorically). Her closeness to Prem has long been well known since she protected Prem during the clash with General Arthit Kamlangek in the 1980s & etc…The queen’s open support for PAD at the funeral yesterday has given the PAD a blank cheque for direct action against the government. Will this be the final coup? Sondhi said way back that his political party was in fact the “Chakri Party”! He knew all along where the buck stopped and in his brashness felt fully protected by the queen. The “Udorn group”, a core PPP Northeast area with entrenched early TRT supporters, are now mobilising. The elite group of people and those around PAD who think the political process in Thailand has to be dumped have destroyed the very seeds of legislative and judicial integrity and the people have nothing left to depend upon; democracy however defined is doomed. Samak Sundaravej, who has been ill, was one of Thailand’s most experienced politicians and knew the consequences of action against PAD. It was a case of damned if you do and damned if you don’t: they got at him anyway. If all this assessment is correct then one may reasonably ask what is left for Thailand other than going the way of Burma?

If this all does not make much sense then remember what Alice said: “If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be. And what it wouldn’t be, it would. You see?”

“goodbyedemocracy”

Privy councillor Surayud Chulanont yesterday conceded that the 2006 coup had not been able to put politics back on course as anticipated and that two years had lapsed with continuing turmoil.”The political divide persists, and parties concerned should take part in forging reconciliation,” he said, marking the second anniversary of the September 19 seizure of power in which he became interim prime minister.

He said that under his interim government the political crisis had dissipated somewhat but several issues remained unsolved. He urged the people to raise their own awareness of politics at the national and local levels in order to safeguard their interests.

Voters hold the key to screening and electing competent and honest leaders, he said, for if voters could make informed judgements when casting votes, then national and local governments would be run by good and just politicians. Because of the flawed electoral system, many local governments are presently plagued by corruption, he said. He called on the opposing camps to heed the royal advice on unity. It is the collective responsibility of everyone to forge national unity, without which the country cannot advance, he said.

If there is a problem with Thailand’s democratic development, it’s not hard to see where it lies!

What’s important is that the leader in this campaign to exploit nation, religion and monarchy was media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, once a friend of Thaksin (The Nation, November 28, 2005: 1A). Sondhi launched an attack on Thaksin after his business suffered severe losses. His friend Viroj Nualkhair (who helped Sondhi resuscitate his business from the debts that followed the 1997 economic crisis) was not offered the chance to renew his contract as CEO of Krung Thai Bank. This also coincided with the removal of Sondhi’s Thailand Weekly television program from Channel 9 (The Nation, November 30 2005: 4A).

Sondhi’s anti-Thaksin movement, which was later joined by people from various other groups including intellectuals, aristocrats, some of the middle-class, members of the Privy Council and some parts of the military, cited issues relating to nation, religion and monarchy to oust Thaksin.

When Sondhi and his allies launched their attacks on Thaksin -whether at gatherings that took place in the auditorium of Thammasat University, Lumpini Park or at Sanam Luang – the slogan ‘save the nation’ was used to justify their political mobilisation. They were convinced that the Thaksin government was responsible for corruption in the purchase of the explosive detection system CTX 9000 and the Russian C 130 aircraft. Even more important was the sale of USD 1.8 billion worth of shares of Shin Corporation by the Shinawatra and Damapong families to the Singaporean state-owned Temasek Holdings on January 24, 2006 (Ukrist, 2007: 108-109). They branded this transaction a sale of national assets since Shin Corporation received access to Thailand’s satellite network.

From a focus on the nation, the anti-Thaksin campaign moved on to issues related to the monarchy. Sondhi and his allies demonstrated their loyalty to the king under the political slogan “we will fight for the king,” wearing yellow shirts, the colour of Buddhism as well as the colour representing Monday, the day of the king’s birth. “We will fight for the king” was unveiled with the release of Pramual Rujanaseri’s book entitled The Royal Power, which demanded a return of royal power to the king. Later on, in August 2005, during a seminar at Thammasat University that included Sondhi, Pramual and Kaewsan Atibhoti as speakers, Pramual announced that:

…there are two paths for our country to follow, one is to be a kingdom where prosperity of the country is measured not only by economic prosperity but through the improvement of the people’s quality of life according to the advice given by His Majesty the King.

The second path is to see to it that our nation turns into Thailand Company Limited where money is everything and everything is money…

The “royal power” discourse soon transformed itself from an idea in a book to a basis for the formation of various anti-Thaksin movements in society and was popularised by Sondhi in his Manager newspaper and on his ASTV.

The most significant movement to restore royal power was the petition for a royally-appointed prime minister, citing Article 7 of the 1997 constitution as a justification. The king, however, dismissed the possibility of using Article 7 on April 25, 2006.

Religion and monarchy: Sondhi and Luangta Maha Bua

Later on, the anti-Thaksin campaign employed religion as a tool to attack Thaksin. Sondhi Limthongkul observed that politics had begun to encroach upon the institution of Buddhism. The appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharn (Somdet Kiaw) as Acting Supreme Patriarch, with a special committee appointed to act in the ailing Supreme Patriarch Nyanasamvara Suvaddhana’s stead, was regarded as an appointment which could provoke a rift among Buddhists in Thai society due to the perceived existence of two Supreme Patriarchs. The appointment was also believed to contravene the royal prerogative of the king (Kumnoon 2006: 54).

Sondhi opined during the first travelling session of his Thailand Weekly on September 25, 2005, that;

…The country is comprised of only two institutions that are, please remember, religion and monarchy, not the 30-baht health campaign, not anything else. Whenever religion is vulnerable, the monarchy will become vulnerable, too, and vice versa. Then, we will have no country, no religion, whether Buddhism, Christianity or Islam, all of which form the anchor of spirituality of Thai society…

…The monarchy is the final buffer of the Thai society which we all can depend on whenever the leader is deficient in his virtues. However, whenever the monarchy becomes but a mere political rubber stamp and the country could be subject to a transaction because the constitution was created by politicians, who were controlled by the party, which was owned the capital… (cited in Kumnoon 2006 : 54)

Sondhi’s reference to Buddhism and mention of the perceived violation of royal power as a means to attack the Thaksin government was not his sole attack. He found ardent support and close alliance in a senior monk, namely Phra Dharma Visuthimongkol or Luangta Maha Bua. Luangta Maha Bua dispatched 600 monks from the forest temples to give Sondhi a blessing and support at his Baan Phra Athit headquarters, Bangkok, on November 21, 2005 following Sondhi’s attacks on the prime minister.  Later on, Luangta Maha Bua summoned both Sondhi and Thaksin for a meeting at Baan Tad forest temple, Muang district, Udon Thani, on November 24, 2005. However, only Sondhi turned up for the meeting (Kumnoon 2006: 159).  Luangta Maha Bua cited the peace of the country as the reason behind his invitation, while allowing Sondhi to stage a travelling session of his Thailand Weekly programme there for Sondhi’s own safety (Kumnoon 2006: 160).

Initially, Luangta Maha Bua had been very supportive of Thaksin, particularly during the time the former prime minister was being investigated in the first assets concealment case in 2001. Back then, Luangta Maha Bua’s crucial disciple Thongkon Wongsamut said in a newspaper interview that during the time Thaksin was faced with difficulties it was Luangta Maha Bua and a number of meditative forest monks and disciples who mustered up their resources and manpower to gather signatures in support of Thaksin. It turned out that within a period of two months they had a list of 1.8 million names (Manager, March 29, 2006: 10). The main motivation behind Luangta Maha Bua’s support of Thaksin was a belief that Thaksin could steer the country through any financial crisis after the approaching general election.

Thongkon gave an interview saying that:

…I asked Thaksin why he had been in and out of the political arena and why he returned to politics. He told me that he had everything and had had enough but then one day, Dr Chao Na Sylvanta, privy councillor and a disciple of Luangta Maha Bua approached him, and asked if he could spare a sum of 5 billion baht to establish a political party to solve the problems of the country… (cited in Manager, March 29, 2006: 10)

Upon hearing Thaksin’s answer, Thongkon volunteered to help and asked him to take on the task of restoring the status of Buddhism to its former glory. Thaksin’s reply was that there was no need to worry because he would certainly restore Buddhism, particularly the Buddhist treasures which would be utilised to generate more money. This reflects a capitalist idea that was deeply rooted in his head, which dictates that any asset that was immobile became useless, including religious treasures (ibid.).

Luangta Maha Bua, Thongkon and the disciples’ support for Thaksin would subsequently hinder Thaksin strongly opposing them after Thaksin was cleared of the assets concealment case and became prime minister. Later in 2004, the Thaksin government, through the Deputy Education Minister overseeing the Department of Religious Affairs (Chamlong Krutkhuntod), cited Article 7 of 1992’s Sangha Act (second edition) to justify the appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharn (Somdet Kiaw) as Acting Supreme Patriarch following the chronic illness of the current Supreme Patriarch. Sondhi and his allies, however, objected that the Supreme Patriarch was not too sick to perform his duties and that during the past two years (2004-2005), the Supreme Patriarch had been performing his religious functions as usual (Kumnoon 2006: 77-79).

The appointment of the Acting Supreme Patriarch was one issue that turned Luangta Maha Bua against Thaksin.

The use of religious disputes in political conflicts escalated following the September 2006 coup. After the coup, there was an accusation that an order of the Supreme Patriarch was counterfeited. The order had attempted to change the Acting Supreme Patriarch from Somdet Phra Buddhacharn (Somdet Kiaw) to Somdet Phra Maha Theracharn, the abbot of Wat Chanasongkram (Thairath, November 7, 2006: 19; Matichon, November 8, 2006: 16). Approximately 300 monks from several temples turned up to protest against the order, which was claimed to be fraudulent.

Also, there was an attempt to take an opportunity to propose a new Sangha law to the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly (Manager, November 7, 2006). The proposed  Sangha Law was a revised draft for the 1962 Sangha Act (amended in 1992). Paisan Peutmongkol gathered 32 names of fellow NLA members to propose the amendment of the Sangha Act. One major amendment was to base the qualification of candidates for the post of Acting Supreme Patriarch on seniority of ordination, that is, according to the total length of time spent in the monkhood, rather than the seniority in the monastic hierarchy (Matichon, November 8, 2006; The Nation, November 9, 2006).

The Bangkok Post analysis mentioned that Somdet Phra Buddhacharn or Somdet Kiaw of Sra Ket Temple was the most influential figure in the Council of Elders. But he is less senior than other elders. All this reveals the ongoing feud between Luangta Maha Bua, an outspoken and revered forest monk, and his arch-enemy Somdet Kiaw. Luangta Maha Bua has long campaigned for a return to the original Sangha Act, which would block Somdet Kiaw’s rise in the clergy on grounds that the present bill infringes on royal prerogative as well as violates the Vinaya (Sanitsuda, 2006 : 11).

In November 2006, there was an attempt to file a petition to then Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, pressing him to bring the subject of changing the Acting Supreme Patriarch to cabinet (Thairath, November 7, 2006 : 19). But he didn’t comply with the request in the petition. Besides, some members of the NLA withdrew their names from the proposal for the amendment of the Sangha Act, leaving the proposal short of the compulsory 25 names required for legislative consideration (Thairath, November 9, 2006: 10; Krungthep Turakit, November 9, 2006: 19).

Manager newspaper criticised those NLA members who withdrew their name, branding them irresponsible while Paisan Peutmongkol said in an interview that he had a rural background and was a follower of Buddhadasa Bhikku and not Luangta Maha Bua, and that his action had not been prompted by any order from anyone, nor was it masterminded by Sondhi Limthongkul (Krungthep Turakit, November 9, 2006: 19).

***

The religion and monarchy issues fuelled the conflict between the Thaksin government and its opponents. The accusation that the appointment of the Acting Supreme Patriarch is a violation of the royal power is a strong accusation. Religious issues were also related to the movement to replace Thaksin with a royally-appointed prime minister. Such political machinations can be considered directly related to the monarchy.

Thaksin journeyed upcountry and travelled overseas to tone down the intensity of resistance and to avoid confrontation. The Thaksin government had exploited the political legitimacy derived from winning the general elections in 2001, 2005 and 2006 with an overwhelming vote and the establishment of a single-party government. In addition, Thaksin had managed to dominate the bureaucracy, provincial governors, and police officers, as well as the military.

When the attempt to oppose the government through the parliamentary system failed, the anti-government group resorted to non-parliamentary politics by calling on anti-government spirit using nation, religion and monarchy as tools to attack the Thaksin government through the media and the campaigns staged by Sondhi Limthongkul.

In terms of the conflict between the two senior monks, it remained clear that religious issues were used to damage the government which culminated in the coup of September 19, 2006. The junta, however, never again mentioned the religious issues raised during the anti-Thaksin movement. The issues relating to the monarchy, though mentioned by the coup makers in the Council of National Security’s announcement, were not pursued. However, the anti-Thaksin government was trying to take advantage of the junta-appointed NLA to propose a change to the Sangha Act in order to use the monarchy’s royal power to appoint the future Supreme Patriarch. However, the rushed attempt met with no success.

Slightly more than a year ago, on 22 July 2007, Bangkok saw a violent street protest when the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) protested in front of the compound of General Prem Tinsulanonda, head of the Privy Council. Even today this event is cited as proof of the supposedly uncontrollable violence of Thaksin supporters. Most of the Thai media has reported this event as if enraged protesters attacked police and attempted to storm the compound of General Prem. Most international media were not present, and simply copied their articles from the Thai media. At the time international attention to Thai politics had almost completely vanished. Only Asia Sentinel’s coverage showed a different, and for me far more realistic picture.

The UDD, holding Prem responsible for the military coup, had already once attempted to protest in front of his compound, but were blocked by police. At the next opportunity, however, their strategy was different. At lunchtime 15,000 to 20,000 protesters marched from Sanam Luang. A small group was already diverted on to a different route over Thewet. The main body of protesters reached the first police block on their way to Prem’s compound, but instead of the usual long negotiations they simply used their mass to press through the barricades. Police had to give way, and the protesters used the lorries from the blockade to push through the next police lines.  There was minimal violence, mostly hotheads attacking drivers of those lorries, but fellow protesters quickly stopped this. At about 3 pm the protesters reached Prem’s house, sat down, and listened to speeches from a mobile stage. By that time I had already heard about an order given to police to disperse the protesters. I was also given the possible time. After a break at home I returned to Thewet just in time to see the first police assault against protesters which was successfully fought back. After police retreated, protesters themselves quieted their fellow protesters down, and stopped them from further attacking police.

One of these photos shows protesters standing in front of police, stopping other protesters from hurling stones.

Another photo shows protesters waiing police during the clashes.

After a lull the second police attack began, which was also fought back. Also a third attack started soon after, during which the police were beaten back into Prem’s compound. What was mostly reported as an attack on Prem’s compound, was actually an attempt by protesters to block police from leaving Prem’s compound by building a barricade at the entrance. There was also a small group of police that was left over near the Thewet corner. As these officers did not engage in any further active fighting, they were also left alone by the protesters.

Shortly after, the police staged a fourth attack, preceded by a barrage of tear gas grenades. At that time the protest leaders decided to retreat, and there was no more confrontation.

My guess is that at the time of the street battles there were maybe up to 5000 protesters left, and by the end maybe 2000 who walked back to Sanam Luang.

In the days after, I spoke with many police officers, of both high and low ranks, who took part in the clashes. I also spoke with plain clothes officers who were in the mass of protesters. All officers stated that the decision to attack the protesters came directly from the army. In the opinion of police, violent tactics should not have been used because the UDD protesters would have left anyhow during the night as they did not have sufficient people to continuously block Prem’s compound like the PAD did at Government House before the coup.

In conclusion, this protest, if analysed dispassionately, showed several positive developments. The police did not use lethal force, there were no deaths; there was nobody injured beyond mending. The worst injury was the broken leg of a police officer. The protest leaders mostly controlled the protesters very well, and also managed to stop the protest when it was in danger of descending into further levels of violence. In every modern democracy there are protests, and often violent protests — looking at the recent WTO protests, which are often far more violent. The importance issue is how these protests are dealt with by the government authorities — non-lethal force, or all out confrontation by shooting protesters, as has been done often in Thai history.

Here, police used tear gas, both grenades and pepper spray, batons and makeshift missiles such as bottles and stones (I was nearly hit by a bottle that came flying out of Prem’s compound, and the elderly protester in the photo that is helped up by two fellow protesters was hit by a missile that was thrown out of Prem’s compound), while protesters used whatever came handy – bottles, stones, pieces of wood and iron. In this sense, I would judge the events at Thewet as a clear step forward, even though I am equally of the opinion that violence could have been avoided if the army-installed government had used a softer approach.

Obviously in the aftermath both sides politicised this event tremendously. The very one-sided and partial reporting in the Thai medias stems most definitely from the fact that at the time every Thai news outlet still had military officers as censors in their offices. International media was mostly not present, the few who were there were on the ground only very briefly.

But, never fear, “sufficiency” is one of those ideas that seems to always make a comeback in one form or another.

In today’s Bangkok Post Suranand Vejjajiva, who was a Prime Minister’s Office Minister under Thaksin, provides an interesting set of “prescriptions” for Thailand’s economic woes.  Among other things, he suggests that:

The sufficiency economy must be seriously implemented at the village level, providing a base for sustainable development for the rural areas.

This leaves me scratching my head.  Why does he only mention “sufficiency economy” as a way of improving village life?  Is he actually taking it seriously as a set of economic policies, or is he just uttering the shibboleth for good measure, or is he, in fact, using it for something else entirely?

My question for Suranand is — if the “sufficiency economy” will save rural Thailand, why shouldn’t it be “seriously implemented” across society?  Why does the “village level” bear the brunt of “sufficiency” attention?  Nowhere else in his article does Suranand mention the idea and, in fact, he offers a number of other suggestions for economic reform and re-structuring which, one must imagine, would upset some “sufficiency” advocates.  There is no explicit mention of “sufficiency” for Bangkok or its residents.  Are the questions just too hard?  Under a “sufficiency” regime what would be first to go for the urban elite?  Meals at posh places in Siam Paragon?  Trips to Europe?  Any superfluous income?

And a question for New Mandala readers — have you had enough of sufficiency?

What I can do, of course, is provide links to some of the best “live” coverage.  Bangkok Pundit leads the charge, as usual, with a characteristically well-chosen mix of news and pithy comment.  The Nation also has regular updates from the protest site.  Over at AbsolutelyBangkok, Dan is doing a good job of keeping the live content up-to-date.  He calls it “Another Bangkok D-Day”.  And Matt Crook (of Lost Boy fame) from down Phuket way has even noted that he might fly up to see what is going on.    

And, finally, before I forget, The Manager website has to be seen to be believed.  Browsing some of their articles one can’t but help leave with the strangest sense that Thailand has been here before…

On the front page it is filed under “Sports” (above articles like FA extends Mascherano ban and Croatian football player dies following injury sustained in match) and the URL (…sport/sport_30070437.php) makes it unmistakable. 

My eyes are not playing tricks on me, are they?  What is the referee’s decision?

Update 20 April: I’m not wanting to dwell on this…but…the article highlighted here remains the first “Sports” report on The Nation’s website.  It must have been there for at least a week already.  Has it become a permanent fixture?  Or are the relevant webmasters just taking an extended Songkran vacation?

Thailand’s proxy war between loyalists to deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Bangkok’s royalist elite is stirring once again, with the outcome as uncertain as ever…This week King Bhumibol Adulyadej named three more people to his 19-member Privy Council: Surayud Chulanont, a former army chief who left the Privy Council after the coup to become the military-appointed prime minister; and two former Supreme Court presidents, Charnchai Likhitjitta and Supachai Phungam. They join Santi Thakral, who was named to the advisory body in 2005, and former top judge Atthaniti Disathaamnari, who joined the council last year. This means that of the last five appointments to the council, four have been former presidents of the top court…The latest appointments reveal that the rift between the palace and Thaksin’s allies remains…The rubber will hit the road later this year. If the PPP can’t change the laws in time, its fate will be in the hands of the Supreme Court. If the past is any prologue, that doesn’t bode well for Thaksin’s allies.

- Extracted from the anonymously authored “Thai political beat goes on”, Asia Sentinel, 13 April 2008.